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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO

FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO
Plaintiff/Respondent

vs.

EDGAR WILKINS COOK and
LAURIE FRANCES COOK
Husband and wife
And
JOSEPH STANCZAK
Defendants/Appellants

Appeal from the First Judicial District, Bonner County, Idaho
HONORABLE BARBARA A. BUCHANAN, presiding

James L. Martin
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields
PO Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701

ATIORNEY FOR FARM BUREAU
Michael T. Howard
Winston & Cashatt
250 Northwest Blvd., Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
ATIORNEY FOR EDGAR AND LAURIE COOK
Wes. S. Larsen
James, Vernon & Weeks
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
ATIORNEY FOR JOSEPH STANCZAK

Date: 4/20/2017

First Judicial District Court - Bonner County

Time: 10:12 AM

ROA Report

Page 1 of 7

User: CFLOWERS

Case: CV-2016-0000590 Current Judge: Idaho Supreme Court
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho vs. Edgar Wilkins Cook Jr., etal.

Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho vs. Edgar Wilkins Cook Jr. , Laurie Frances Cook, Joseph Stanczak
Date

Code

User

5/2/2016

NGOC

HUMRICH

New Case Filed - Other Claims

Barbara A. Buchanan

APER

HUMRICH

Plaintiff: Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Company of Idaho Appearance James L Martin

Barbara A. Buchanan

HUMRICH

Filing : AA- All initial civil case filings in District
Barbara A. Buchanan
Court of any type not listed in categories E, F and
H(1) Paid by: Moffatt Thomas Receipt number:
0006476 Dated: 5/2/2016 Amount: $221.00
(Check) For: Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Company of Idaho (plaintiff)

COMP

HUMRICH

Complaint for Declaratory Judgment Filed

Barbara A. Buchanan

SMIS

HUMRICH

Summons: Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. Issued Original to file

Barbara A. Buchanan

DOSI

HUMRICH

Summons: Document Service Issued: on
Barbara A. Buchanan
5/2/2016 to Edgar W ilkins Cook Jr.; Assigned to .
Service Fee of $0.00. Summons Issued (Edgar
Wilkins Cook, Jr.) - Original to file

SMIS

HUMRICH

Summons: Joseph Stanczak Issued - Original to Barbara A. Buchanan
file

DOSI

HUMRICH

Summons: Document Service Issued: on
5/2/2016 to Joseph Stanczak; Assigned to .
Service Fee of $0.00. Summons: Joseph
Stanczak Issued - Original to file

SMIS

HUMRICH

Summons: Laurie Francis Cook Issued - Original Barbara A. Buchanan
to file

DOSI

HUMRICH

Summons: Document Service Issued: on
5/2/2016 to Laurie Frances Cook; Assigned to.
Service Fee of $0.00. Summons: Laurie Francis
Cook Issued - Original to file

Barbara A. Buchanan

6/3/2016

COMP

HENDRICKSO

Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment

Barbara A. Buchanan

6/13/2016

DOSN

HENDRICKSO

Summons: Document Returned Not Served on
6/13/2016 to Joseph Stanczak; Assigned to.
Service Fee of $0.00.

Barbara A. Buchanan

DOSI

HENDRICKSO

Summons: Document Service Issued: on
6/13/2016 to Joseph Stanczak; Assigned to .
Service Fee of $0.00. Amended Summons

Barbara A. Buchanan

SMIS

HENDRICKSO

Amended Summons Issued - original to file

Barbara A. Buchanan

6/14/2016

SMIS

HENDRICKSO

Amended Summons Issued - original to file

Barbara A. Buchanan

7/28/2016

AFSV

HENDRICKSO

Affidavit Of Service - served 07-23-2016

Barbara A. Buchanan

CINF

HENDRICKSO

Affidavit of Service does not indcate who the
Substitute Service was for.
Only states who was served

Barbara A. Buchanan

ACSV

ANITAD

Acceptance Of Service

Barbara A. Buchanan

8/1/2016

Judge

Barbara A. Buchanan
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HENDRICKSO

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Craig
Vernon / James Vernon & Week Receipt
number: 0011779 Dated : 8/10/2016 Amount:
$136.00 (Credit card) For: Stanczak, Joseph
(defendant)

Barbara A. Buchanan

HENDRICKSO

Filing: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Craig
Vernon / James Vernon & Week Receipt
number: 0011779 Dated: 8/10/2016 Amount:
$3.00 (Credit card) For: Stanczak, Joseph
(defendant)

Barbara A. Buchanan

APER

HENDRICKSO

Defendant: Cook, Edgar Wilkins Jr. Appearance
Michael T. Howard

Barbara A. Buchanan

APER

HENDRICKSO

Defendant: Cook, Laurie Frances Appearance
Michael T. Howard

Barbara A. Buchanan

HENDRICKSO

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
Barbara A. Buchanan
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Winston &
Cashatt Receipt number: 0011902 Dated :
8/12/2016 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For: Cook,
Edgar Wilkins Jr. (defendant) and Cook, Laurie
Frances (defendant)

ANSW

HENDRICKSO

Edgar and Laurie Cook's Answer, Affirmative
Defenses, and Counterclaim

Barbara A. Buchanan

ANSW

OPPELT

Defendant Stanczak's Answer to Amended
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment

Barbara A. Buchanan

APER

OPPELT

Defendant: Stanczak, Joseph Appearance Wes S Barbara A. Buchanan
Larsen

DOSS

HENDRICKSO

Summons: Document Returned Served on
Barbara A. Buchanan
8/10/2016 to Edgar Wilkins Cook Jr.; Assigned to
. Service Fee of $0 .00.

DOSS

HENDRICKSO

Summons: Document Returned Served on
8/10/2016 to Laurie Frances Cook; Assigned to .
Service Fee of $0.00.

Barbara A. Buchanan

8/12/2016

DOSS

HENDRICKSO

Summons: Document Returned Served on
8/12/2016 to Joseph Stanczak; Assigned to .
Service Fee of $0.00.

Barbara A. Buchanan

8/18/2016

REPL

HENDRICKSO

Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of
Idaho's Reply to Counterclaim and Demand for
Jury Trial

Barbara A. Buchanan

9/2/2016

HRSC

RASOR

Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference
10/05/2016 09:00 AM)

Barbara A. Buchanan

8/10/2016

RASOR

9/16/2016

9/19/2016

Notice Of Scheduling Conference

Barbara A. Buchanan
Barbara A. Buchanan

CINF

GLAZE

Clerk Information Notice of Disqualification
of Designated Alternate Presiding Judge

NOTC

HENDRICKSO

Notice of Disqualification of Designated Alternate Barbara A. Buchanan
Presiding Judge Mitchell (faxed document)

MODQ

HENDRICKSO

Notice of Disqualification of Designated Alternate Barbara A. Buchanan
2
Presiding Judge Mitchell
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9/20/2016

ORDQ

RASOR

Order Granting Disqualification

DISA

RASOR

Disqualification Of Judge - Judge John T. Mitchell Barbara A. Buchanan

CMIN

SECK

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Scheduling Conference
Hearing date: 10/5/2016
Time: 9:03 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Kathy Plizga
Minutes Clerk: Melissa Seek
Tape Number: 1
Wes Larsen
Mike Howard, Ben Richie, Michael Chisholm by
phone

Barbara A. Buchanan

DCHH

RASOR

Hearing result for Scheduling Conference
scheduled on 10/05/2016 09:00 AM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kathy Plizga
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less Than 100 Pages James Martin
by phone
Michael Howard by phone

Barbara A. Buchanan

HRSC

RASOR

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
12/15/2017 10:00 AM)

Barbara A. Buchanan

HRSC

RASOR

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial - 5 Days
01/23/2018 09:00 AM)

Barbara A. Buchanan

RASOR

OrderSetting Trial And Pretrial Order

Barbara A. Buchanan

MISC

HENDRICKSO

***END OF FILE #1***BEGIN FILE #2****
***BEGIN EXPANDO***

Barbara A. Buchanan

MOTN

HENDRICKSO

Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company Barbara A. Buchanan
of Idaho's Motion for Summary Judgment

MEMO

HENDRICKSO

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Farm Bureau Barbara A. Buchanan
Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho's Motion for
Summary Judgment

MISC

HENDRICKSO

Declaration of Steven Johnson in Support of
Barbara A. Buchanan
Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company
of Idaho's Motion for Summary Judgment

MISC

HENDRICKSO

Declaration of Benjamin C. Ritchie In Support of
Plaintiff Farm Burea Mutual Insurance Company
of Idaho's Motion for Summary Judgment

MISC

HENDRICKSO

Declaration of Barbara E. Mayne in Support of
Barbara A. Buchanan
Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company
of Idaho's Motion for Summary Judgment

CINF

HENDRICKSO

No Notice of Hearing filed at the time of the above Barbara A. Buchanan
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment

CINF

GLAZE

Clerk Information - Defendant Stanczak's
Motion to Strike

10/5/2016

10/20/2016

10/21/2016

Judge
Barbara A. Buchanan

Barbara A. Buchanan

Barbara A. Buchanan
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10/21/2016

CINF

GLAZE

Clerk Information - Memorandum In
Support of Defendant Stanczak's Motion
to Strike

Barbara A Buchanan

MOTN

HENDRICKSO

Defendant Stanczak's Motion to Strike

Barbara A Buchanan

MEMO

HENDRICKSO

Memorandum in Support of Defendant Stanczak's Barbara A Buchanan
Motion to Strike

CINF

HENDRICKSO

No Notice of Hearing filed at the time of the above Barbara A Buchanan
Motion to Strike

CINF

GLAZE

Clerk Information - Notice of Hearing

Barbara A Buchanan

NOHG

HENDRICKSO

Notice of Hearing
re: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

Barbara A Buchanan

HRSC

HENDRICKSO

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 12/21/2016 01 :30 PM) Plaintiff's
motion

Barbara A Buchanan

CINF

ROSTECK

STANCZAKS MOTION TO STRIKE-JO

Barbara A Buchanan

NOHG

HENDRICKSO

Notice of Hearing on Defendant Stanczak's
Motion to Strike

Barbara A Buchanan

HRSC

HENDRICKSO

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/21/2016 01 :29
PM) Defendant's Motion to Strike

Barbara A Buchanan

MISC

HENDRICKSO

*****END OF FILE #2***BEGIN FILE #3****

Barbara A Buchanan

CINF

ROSTECK

Defendant Stanczaks opposition to plaintiffs
motion for summary judgement-jo

Barbara A Buchanan

RSPN

HENDRICKSO

Defendant Stanozak's Response in Opposition to Barbara A Buchanan
Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company
of Idaho's Motion for Summary Judgment

12/9/2016

MEMO

HENDRICKSO

Barbara A Buchanan
Edgar and Laurie Cook's Memorandum in
Opposition to Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary
Judgment

12/14/2016

CINF

GLAZE

Clerk Information - Plaintiff Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho's
Response to Stanczak's Motion to Strike

MOTN

HENDRICKSO

Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company Barbara A Buchanan
of Idaho's Response to Stanczak's Motion to
Strike

REPL

HENDRICKSO

Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Barbara A. Buchanan
Judgment

10/27/2016

10/28/2016

12/7/2016

Judge

Barbara A Buchanan
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12/21/2016

CMIN

AYERLE

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Pl Mtn Summary Jdgmnt; Def Mtn
Strike
Hearing date: 12/21/2016
Time: 1:31 pm
Courtroom :
Court reporter: Kathy Plizga
Minutes Clerk: Susan Ayerle
Tape Number: 1
Ben Ritchie for Pl
Mike Howard for Defs Cook
Wes Larsen for Def Stanczak

DCHH

OPPELT

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Barbara A. Buchanan
scheduled on 12/21/2016 01 :30 PM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kathy Plizga
Number of Transcript Pages for th is hearing
estimated : Plaintiffs motion - James Martin to
listen in on the phone and will not be partici pating
- Ben Ritchie will be here to Argue Motion - Less
Than 100 Pages

DCHH

OPPELT

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Barbara A Buchanan
12/21/2016 01 :29 PM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Kathy Plizga
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated : Defendant's Motion to Strike - Less
Than 100 Pages

MEMO

OPPELT

Memorandum Decision and Order Granting
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment

Barbara A Buchanan

JDMT

OPPELT

Judgment

Barbara A Buchanan

HRVC

OPPELT

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled
on 12/15/2017 10:00 AM : Hearing Vacated

Barbara A Buchanan

HRVC

OPPELT

Hearing result for Jury Trial - 5 Days scheduled
on 01/23/2018 09:00 AM : Hearing Vacated

Barbara A Buchanan

CDIS

HENDRICKSO

Civil Disposition entered for: Cook, Edgar Wilkins Barbara A Buchanan
Jr. , Defendant; Cook, Laurie Frances, Defendant;
Stanczak, Joseph, Defendant; Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho, Plaintiff.
Filing date: 1/20/2017

STAT

HENDRICKSO

STATUS CHANGED: closed

Barbara A Buchanan

2/7/2017

MEMO

ROSS

Farm Bireau Mutual Insurance Company Of
Idaho's Verified Memorandum Of Costs

Barbara A Buchanan

2/9/2017

MEMO

ANITAD

Cooks' Opposition to Farm Bureau's
Memorandum of Cost

Barbara A Buchanan

2/24/2017

ORDR

HENDRICKSO

Order Settling Amount of Costs

Barbara A Buchanan

JDMT

HENDRICKSO

Amended Judgment

Barbara A Buchanan

1/20/2017

Judge
Barbara A Buchanan
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CFLOWERS

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Idaho Supreme Court
Supreme Court Paid by: Winston & Cashatt
Receipt number: 0002921 Dated: 3/3/2017
Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: Cook, Edgar
Wilkins Jr. (defendant) and Cook, Laurie Frances
(defendant)

NOTC
BNDC

CFLOWERS

Notice of Appeal

Idaho Supreme Court

CFLOWERS

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 2924 Dated
3/3/2017 for 100.00)

Barbara A. Buchanan

CHJG

CFLOWERS

Change Assigned Judge

Idaho Supreme Court

CCOA

CFLOWERS

Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal

Idaho Supreme Court

CERT

CFLOWERS

Certificate Of Mailing of Clerk's Certificate of
Appeal and attachments via USPS Certified Mail
to Idaho Supreme Court (7016 2070 0000 4878
0080)

Idaho Supreme Court

3/8/2017

REQU

ANITAD

Plaintiff/Respondent's Farm Bureau Mutual
Idaho Supreme Court
Insurance Company of Idaho's Request For
Additional Documents in The Clerks's Record and
Request for Transcript

3/13/2017

DCRR

CFLOWERS

Domestic Certified Mail Return Receipt - Idaho
Supreme Court (7016 2070 0000 4878 0080)

Idaho Supreme Court

3/17/2017

BNDC

CFLOWERS

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 3781 Dated
3/20/2017 for 150.00)

Idaho Supreme Court

NOTC

CFLOWERS

Notice of Plaintiffs Payment of Transcript Fee for
December 21, 2016 Hearing

Idaho Supreme Court

NOTC

CFLOWERS

Notice of Transcript Preparation - Motions
Hearing 12/21/2016 (K. Plizga)

Idaho Supreme Court

MISC

CFLOWERS

Invoice no. 0028 $136.50 - Motions Hearing
12/21/2016 (K. Plizga)

Idaho Supreme Court

TRAN

CFLOWERS

Transcript Filed - Motions Hearing 12/21/2016 (K.
Plizga)

Idaho Supreme Court

3/21/2017

SCDF

CFLOWERS

Supreme Court Document Filed - Email: Filed
Notice of Appeal - no Transcripts requested;
however, Court Reporter was provided service.

Idaho Supreme Court

3/22/2017

CERT

CFLOWERS

Certificate Of Mailing - Transcript of Hearing
dated December 21, 2016 via USPS Certified
Mail to Moffatt Thomas (7016 2070 0000 4878
1933), Winston & Cashatt (7016 2070 0000 4878
1940), and James, Vernon & Weeks (7016 2070
0000 4878 1957)

Idaho Supreme Court

3/24/2017

BNDV

CFLOWERS

Bond Converted (Transaction number 310 dated
3/24/2017 amount 100.00)

Idaho Supreme Court

MISC

CFLOWERS

Letter - to Winston & Cashatt requesting
remainder of Transcript fee

Idaho Supreme Court

DCRR

CFLOWERS

Domestic Certified Mail Return Receipt - James,
Vernon & Weeks (7016 2070 0000 4878 1957)

Idaho Supreme Court

3/2/2017

3/7/2017

3/27/2017
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3/27/2017

DCRR

CFLOWERS

Judge
Domestic Certified Mail Return Receipt - Winston

Idaho Supreme Court

& Cashatt (7016 2070 0000 4878 1940)
MISC

CFLOWERS

Receipt of Transcript - Wes Larsen

Idaho Supreme Court

3/31/2017

DCRR

CFLOWERS

Domestic Certified Mail Return Receipt - Moffatt
Thomas (7016 2070 0000 4878 1933)

Idaho Supreme Court

4/3/2017

BNDV

CFLOWERS

Bond Converted (Transaction number 342 dated
4/3/2017 amount 136.50)

Idaho Supreme Court

BNDE

CFLOWERS

Cash Bond Exonerated (Amount 13.50)

Idaho Supreme Court

MISC

CFLOWERS

Receipt of Transcript - Pamela Buckley

Idaho Supreme Court

4/14/2017
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Attorneys for Defendant Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Company of Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

Case N 0.

a

CV OI Lu - 0 5 q a

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT

vs.
EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR. and LAURIE
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife, and
JOSEPH STANCZAK,

FEE: $221.00
FEE CATEGORY: A

Defendants.

ASSIGNE TO
JU CE UCHANAN
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 1

Client:4130615.2

8

I

Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho ("Farm Bureau"), by
and through undersigned counsel, hereby complains and alleges as follows against Edgar
Wilkins Cook, Jr., Laurie Frances Cook, and Joseph Stanczak.
1.

This is a claim for declaratory judgment regarding whether there is

coverage for certain claims under an insurance policy issued by Farm Bureau.
2.

Farm Bureau is an Idaho Domestic Insurance Company authorized to do

business in the state ofldaho, with its principal place of business in Pocatello, Bannock County,
Idaho, whose business includes entering into insurance contracts, including automobile insurance
policies and homeowner' s insurance policies.
3.

Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook (the "Cooks") are

husband and wife and, upon information and belief, are residents of Bonner County.
4.

Upon information and belief, Joseph Stanczak ("Stanczak") is a resident

of Boundary County, Idaho.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
5.

Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 57 and Title 10, Chapter 12 of

the Idaho Code, the Court is vested with the jurisdiction to declare the rights and legal
relationships of the parties of the contract of insurance referred to in this Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment. A controversy exists as to whether there is coverage under the Cooks'
Farm Bureau insurance policy for some or all of the claims that Stanczak has or will make
against the Cooks. In order to determine and end that controversy, it is necessary that a
declaration be made as to the rights and obligations that Farm Bureau owes or does not owe
related to claims asserted by Stanczak against the Cooks.

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 2

Client:4130615.2
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6.

While Stanczak is not a named insured under the insurance policy at issue,

he is properly included as a defendant in this Complaint for Declaratory Judgment pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 57(b) and Idaho Code Section 10-1211, because he claims an
interest in the Farm Bureau insurance policy which will be affected by the Court's declaration.
7.

Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404 because

some of the defendants reside in Bonner County, Idaho.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
The Insurance Policy and the Bloom Lake Property

8.

Farm Bureau issued to Idaho residents and policy holders Edgar Wilkins

Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook ("the Cooks") a Farm Bureau Country Squire Policy No. OlA-038872-01 ("the Cook Policy") with a policy period of January 26, 2015 to January 26, 2016.
A true and correct copy of the Cook Policy and Declaration Sheet is attached hereto as Exhibit
"A" and by this reference is made a part hereof.
9.

The Cook Policy has a number of provisions and exclusions that are

implicated and applicable to this dispute.
10.

The Cook Policy insures, among other things, a number of properties

owned by the Cooks, including certain real property owned by the Cooks located near Bloom
Lake, Bonner County, Idaho ("the Bloom Lake Property").
11.

The Bloom Lake Property consists of 200 acres, Bloom Lake, and a small

12.

For the past seventeen years and up and until approximately June 28,

cabin.

2015, the Cooks have allowed an individual by the name of Michael Jessie Chisholm a/k/a
Michael Allen Pederson ("Chisholm"), to reside in the cabin at the Bloom Lake Property in

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 3

Client:4130615.2
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exchange for taking care of the Bloom Lake Property, including the lake, the cabin, and a small
campground that apparently is located on the Bloom Lake Property.
13.

The Cooks have indicated that Chisholm's maintenance activities included

weed management, trash removal, and road and lake maintenance.
14.

The Cooks have further indicated that Chisholm did not receive any

monetary compensation for his maintenance activities.
15.

The Cooks have further indicated that Chisholm paid for gas, propane, and

other supplies used for heating and maintaining the Bloom Lake Property and that they provided
a weed eater, snowmobile, and diesel generator to Chisholm.
16.

The Cooks have maintained that there is not and never was an

employment relationship between the Cooks and Chisholm.

The Shooting
17.

On June 28, 2015 Joseph Stanczak ("Stanczak") and his girlfriend Susan

Jackson were camping at the Bloom Lake Property.
18.

Chisholm invited Stanczak and Susan Jackson into the cabin.

19.

A dispute arose between Chisholm and Stanczak. Stanczak left the cabin

and Chisolm followed. Chisolm had a .45 caliber handgun and shot Stanczak twice, once in the
arm and once in the back.
20.

Chisholm left the scene, but was later apprehended by local authorities and

Chisholm was later charged in Bonner County, Idaho with Aggravated Battery and Use of a
Deadly Weapon in Commission of a Felony. Chisholm ultimately entered an Alford Plea in the
criminal case and was found guilty of aggravated battery against Stanczak. Chisholm is
currently incarcerated.

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 4

Client:4130615 .2
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21.

Stanczak survived the shooting, but sustained various injuries.
The Insurance Claim and Denial

22.

Stanczak has retained counsel and made a claim against the Cooks for the

injuries he sustained at the hands of Chisholm (the "Stanczak Claim").
23.

The Cooks have tendered the Stanczak Claim to Farm Bureau under the

Cook Policy seeking confirmation of whether Farm Bureau would defend or indemnify the
Cooks for this claim.
24.

After conducting an investigation of the facts and circumstances

surrounding the Stanczak Claim made against the Cooks and the resulting tender, Farm Bureau
advised the Cooks that based upon the evidence, the facts, and the language of the Cook Policy,
that there was no coverage under the Cook Policy for Chisholm's actions or Stanczak's injuries
and therefore, Farm Bureau has neither a duty to defend or to indemnify the Cooks related to the
Stanczak Claim.
25.

Farm Bureau's conclusions regarding its coverage position are contained

in two letters directed to the Cooks, one dated March 2, 2016---Farm Bureau's initial reservation
of rights, and one dated March 22, 2016---Farm Bureau's denial of coverage. These two letters
are attached hereto as Exhibits B and C respectively.
COUNT 1 - DECLARATORY RELIEF

26.

Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 57 and Title 10, Chapter 12,

Idaho Code, this Court is vested with jurisdiction to declare the rights and legal relationships of
the parties of the contract of insurance referred to in this Complaint for Declaratory Judgment. A
controversy exists as to whether there is coverage under the Cook Policy for the Stanczak Claim
against the Cooks. In order to determine and end that controversy it is necessary that a
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declaration be made as to the rights and obligations under the Cook Policy related to the
Stanczak Claim and whether Farm Bureau has a duty to defend or indemnify the Cooks related to
the claim.
27.

Because Farm Bureau has taken the position that there is no coverage

under the Cook Policy for the Stanczak Claim, and the fact that the parties hereto have different
positions as to that coverage position, a justiciable controversy, as contemplated by Rule 57 of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and Idaho Code §10-1202, et.seq. exists between Farm
Bureau, the Cooks, and Stanczak concerning whether there is any coverage under the Cook
Policy for Stanczak's injuries and claimed damages.
28.

Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 10-1201, et.seq., Farm Bureau is entitled to a

determination of its rights, status, and/or other legal relations under the Cook Policy.
29.

Specifically, Farm Bureau is entitled to a determination by this Court that

there is no coverage under the Cook Policy for Stanczak's claimed injuries or damages sustained
when Chisholm shot Stanczak at the Bloom Lake Property on June 28, 2015.
30.

Farm Bureau is further entitled to a determination by this Court that Farm

Bureau has no duty to defend or indemnify the Cooks related to the Stanczak Claim.
31.

Farm Bureau has been required to retain the services of an attorney in

order to prosecute this action and is entitled to an award of its reasonable attorney's fees and
costs of this suit pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54, and Idaho Code Sections 12-120, 12-121 and 10-1210.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Farm Bureau prays for relief as follows:
1.

For declaratory judgment finding that: (a) Farm Bureau does not owe

under any contract of insurance either a duty to defend or indemnify the Cooks for the claims
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that Stanczak has asserted against the Cooks, and (2) there is no insurance coverage under the
Cook Policy for the claims or damages asserted by Stanczak against the Cooks arising out of the
shooting incident that occurred on the Cook's Bloom Lake Property on or about June 28, 2015.
2.

For an award of costs, and its reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred in the

prosecution of this Complaint for Declaratory Judgment pursuant to Idaho Code
Sections 10-1210, 12-121, 12-123, and 41-1839, Rule 57 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
and other applicable law; and
3.

For judgment against the Cooks and Stanczak and in favor of Farm

Bureau, granting such other and further relief to Farm Bureau as the Court deems just and
equitable.
DATED this 29th day of April, 2016.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

By

~--J rtles L. Martin- Of the Firm
/Attorneys for Defendant Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho
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COUNTRY SQUIRE POLICY
DECLARATIONS
PAGE 1

FARM BUREAU HUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO
275 TIERRA VISTA DR PO BOX 4848
POCATELLO ID 83205-4848

THE INSURANCE PROVIDED AS INDICATED BY THESE DECLARATIONS SUPERSEDES
ANO REPLACES ALL INSURANCE PREVIOUSLY AFFORDED BY THIS POLICY.

INSURED:

POLICY NUMBER:
POLICY PERIOD:
COUNTY:
AGENCY:
AGENT:
EFFECTIVE DATE:
ISSUE DATE:

EDGAR HILKINS COOK JR
LAURIE FRANCES COOK
491476 HIGHHAY 95
SANDPOINT ID 83864-8153

Ol-A-038872-01
01-26-2015 UNTIL 01-26-2016
AT 12:01 AH STANDARD TIHE
BONNER
ZEMAITIS AGENCY
DINNING HALTER
01-26-2015
03-31-2015

SECTION I - PROPERTY
APPLICABLE APPLICABLE
LIHITS OF
PERILS ENDORSEMENTS
LIABILITY COVERAGE
1-19
260000 A RESIDENCE PREMISE FRAME
BUILDING NUMBER: 002 LOCATION: 02
INCREASED REPLACEMENT COST (25%)
•1183 (1014j
•1171 (0108
HAIVE DEDUCTIBLE ON GLASS
DETACHED CARAGESl STORAGE SHEDS(MAX. 200 SQ FT)
26000
,. 1133 (1014)
LIMITED FUNGI HT OR DRY ROT, OR BACTERIA
13000
SMOKE ALARM~ 6EAD BOLT LOCKS, AND NONSMOKER
DISCOUNTS A PLIED
52000 B LOSS OF USE
1-19
130000 C PERSONAL PROPERTY
...1111 (1014)
REPLACEMENT COST
REFRIGERATED PRIXJUCTS
750
1-19
215000 A OHELLING PREMISE FRAME
BUILDING NUMBER: 004 LOCATION: 04
INCREASED REPLACEMENT COST (25l)
•1183110141
•l17l 0108
HAIVE DEDUCTIBLE ON GLASS
DETACHED CARAGESt STORAGE SHEDS(HAll. 200 SQ FT)
21500
•1133 (1014)
LIMITED FUNGI HT OR ORY ROT, OR BACTERIA
10750
SMOKE ALARM~ DEAD BOLT LOCKS, AND NONSMOKER
DISCOUNTS A PLIED
43000 B LOSS OF USE
1-19
53750 C PERSONAL PROPERTY
•llll (1014)
REPLACEMENT COST
REFRIGERATED PRODUCTS
750
1-9 .
35000 E BARN FRAHE 4000SQF
BUILDING NUMBER: 011 LOCATION: 02
1-9
1169 (0408)
16000 E DHELLING PREMISE MOBILE N/0 FOUND 868SQFT
BUILDING NUMBER: 012 LOCATION: 02
1-9
40000 E DHELLIHG PREMISE FRAME lOBOSQF
BUILDING NUMBER: 014 LOCATION: 03
33750 D FARM PERSONAL PROPERTY
1-10~20,
24, 6
...1130 (0108}
ELIMINATE LIVESTOCK
TONS PER STACK LIHIT
1000
FIRE DEPARTMENT SERVICE CHARGE
500
1000 DEDUCTIBLE APPLIES TO EACH SECTION I LOSS
TOTAL SECTION I ANNUAL PREMIUM
• ENDORSEMENT PRINTED IN THE POLICY BOOKLET

ANNUAL

PREMIUM

$1,697.00

$1,170.00

$173.00
$166.00

$221.00
$281.00

$3,708.00

CONTINUED ON PAGE 2
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FARH BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO
275 TIERRA VISTA DR PO BOX 4848
POCATELLO ID 83205-4848

COUNTRY SQUIRE POLICY
DECLARATIONS
AGE 2
POLICY NUMBER: Ol-A-038872-01
EFFECTIVE DATE: 01-26-2015

90

SECTION I IS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOHING AllllTIONAL ENDORSEMENTS:
ENDORSEMENT I116 (1014) - COSMETIC ROOF DAMAGE ENDORSEMENT (PRINTED IN THE POLICY BOOKLET)
SECTION II - LIABILITY
APPLICABLE
LIMITS OF
ENDORSEMENTS
LIABILITY COVERAGE
Fl BODILY INJURY
G PROPERTY DAMAGE
500000
EACH OCCURRENCE
1000000
FARMING ACTIVITIES ANNUAL AGGREGATE
F2 PREH1SES MEDICAL
25000
EACH PERSON
125000
EACH OCCURRENCE
H DAMAGE TO PROPERTY OF OTHERS
1000
EACH OCCURRENCE
•!259 (1014)
ACCIDENTAL DEATH
1000
EACH PERSON
DESCRIPTION OF PREMISES:
LOCATION DESCRIPTION
02
2 RES 135 ACRES 491476 HIGHHAY 95 SANDPOINT IO 83864
02
SECTION=03 TOHNSHIP=59N RANGE:OlH BONNER COUNTY
03
1 RES 200 ACRES SECHON ..01 TOHNSHIP=59N RANGE=OlH·BONNER COUNTY
04
1 RES 7 ACRES 49083 HHY 95 SANDPOINT ID 83864
04
SECTION=03 TOHHSHIP=59N RANGE=Ol.H BONNER COUNTY
TOTAL SECTION II ANNUAL PREHIUH
SECTION II IS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLONJNG ADDITIONAL ENDORSEMENTS:

ANNUAL
PREHIUH
$548.00

$548.00

1 0
0
~i
i
~
!~~i
:
:
[~~,i~t
E~ir~~~R~iH[Ile~r1~~v~~~i~E~l~TG,(tl~N~ED(f~ ~~( p~~Itl)EB~Ri~)BOOKLET)
ENDORSEMENT 1282 (1014 - • PERSONAL INJURV ENDORSEMENT (PRINTED IN THE POLICY BOOKLET)

(~~~:~~~~:f

ENDORSEMENT 1287 (0208 - LIMITED POLLUTION COVERAGE ENOORSE~ENT
SECTION III - AUTOMOBILE
LIMITS OF
LIABILITY COVERAGE
N BODILY INJURY
0 PROPERTY DAMAGE
500000
EACH OCCURRENCE
p UNINSURED MOTORIST
500000
EAOf OCCURRENCE
Pl UNDERINSUREO MOTORIST
500000
EAOf OCCURRENCE
Q MEDICAL
EACH PERSON
25000
s 100 COMPREHENSIVE DEDUCTIBLE
T 250 COLLISION DEDUCTIBLE
ROADSIDE ASSISTANCE
100
EACH OCCURRENCE
CAR RENTAL REIMBURSEMENT
25
PER DAV
500
PER ACCIDENT

ANNUAL

PREHIUH
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COUNTRY SQUIRE POLICY
DECLARATIONS
PAGE 3
POLICY HUMBER: Ol-A-038872-01
EFFECTIVE DATE: 01-26-2015

FARH BUREAU HUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO
275 TIERRA VISTA DR PO BOX 4848
POCATELLO ID 83205-4848

SECTION III - AUTOMOBILE
LIMITS OF
LIABILlTY COVERAGE
LOSS OF USE BY THEFT
25
PER DAY
500
PER ACCIDENT
INSURED VEHICLES:
DRIVER
APPLICABLE COVERAGES
CLASS
DESCRIPTION
NOP Pl,Q
03-490
1992 CHEV PU 1GCGK24F7NE173320
ROA6SfDE ASSISTANCE
FARM - AGE 70-74
LIABILITY PREMIUM $308.00
03-190-X
i~~ ~Hf~ET~~~7fC4GP54L55R291443 ~O~D~f~l·is~f!TANCE
LIABILITY PREMIUM $390.00
CAR RENTAL REIMBURSEMENT
COMP/ COLL PREHIUH $397.00

90

ANNUAL
PREMIUM

APPLICABLE
ENDORSEMENTS
•1334

ANNUAL
PREMIUM
$308.00

(1014)

$787.00

•1334 (1014)
•1368 (1014)
TOTAL SECTION III ANNUAL PREMIUM

$1,095.00

• ENDORSEMENT PRINTED IN THE POLICY BOOKLET
SECTION III IS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOHIHG ADDITIONAL ENDORSEMENTS:
ENDORSEMENT 1313 (1014) - COMBINED SINGLE LIMIT ENDORSEMENT - COVERAGE P AND P-1 (PRINTED IN THE POLICY BOOKLET)
ENDORSEMENT I320 {1014) - COMBINED SINGLE LIMIT ENDORSEMENT - COVERAGES NANDO {PRINTED IN THE POLICY BOOKLET)
ENDORSEMENT 1324 l1014l - HEH VEHICLE LOAN COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT (PRINTED IN THE POLICY BOOKLET)
ENDORSEMENT I326 (1014 - HEH VEHICLE ADDITIONAL COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT (PRINTED IN THE POLICY BOOKLET)
SECTION IV - INLAND MARINE
NO COVERAGE
THIS POLICY IS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOHIHG FORKS AND ADDITIONAL ENDORSEMENTS:
POLICY BOOKLET ID-CQ-02-01(1014) - COUNTRY SQUIRE POLICY
TOTAL ANNUAL PREMIUM $5,351.00
•••• THIS IS NOT ABILLING••••

LIMITS OF LIABILITY ARE SHOHH IN HHOLE DOLLARS
NO CONTINGENT LIABILITY. THE POLICY IS HITHOUT CONTINGENT LIABILITY AND IS HONASSESSABLE.
EHDORSEHEIITS
THIS IS THE DECLARATIONS FOR YOUR NEH OR RENEHAL POLICY. INCLUDED ARE COPIES OF ANY ENDORSEMENTS THAT PERTAIN TO IT THAT ARE
NOT IN YOUR POLICY BOOKLET. IF VDU MAKE ANY HDDIFICATIONS TO THE POUCY DURING THE POLICY PERIOD HE HILL SEND YOU A
REPLACEMENT DECLARATIONS SHOHING THESE CHANGES. THE REPLACEMENT DECLARATIONS Hill CONTINUE TO SHOii HHICH ENDORSEMENTS APPLY,
BUT HE HILL NOT SEND YOU HEH COPIES OF THESE ENDORSEMENTS. HE HILL SEND YOU ACOPY Of ANY HEH ENDORSEMENT THAT HAS BEEN
ADDED OR OF ANY ENDORSEMENT THAT HAS BEEN CHANGED.
FEDERATION MEMBERSHIP
THIS lHSURANCE IS ONE OF THE BENEFITS OF THE IDAHO FARM BUREAU FEDERATION AND IS OFFERED ONLY TO ITS MEMBERS. HHILE THIS
POLICY IS IN FORCE YOU HUST MAINTAIN MEMBERSHIP IN THE IDAHO FARK BUREAU FEDERATIONi IKC AND AN AFFlLIATED COUNTY FARM
BUREAU. IF YOU DO NOT MAINTAIN THIS MEMBERSHIP YOU HILL NOT BE ELIGIBLE FOR THIS HEnBER SERVICE BENEFIT AND HE HILL BE
REQUIRED TO CANCEL THIS INSURANCE.

CONTINUED ON PAGE 4
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FARM BUREAU HUrUAL INSURANCE COMPANY Of IDAHO
275 TIERRA VISTA DR PO BOX 4848
POCATELLO ID 83205-4848

COUHTRY SQUIRE POLICY
DECLARATIONS
·p GE 4
POLICY NUMBER: Ol-A-038872-01
EFFECTIVE DATE: 01-26-2015

90

NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING
THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE HEHBERS HILL BE HELD AT THE HOHE OFFICE AT 275 TIERRA VISTA DRIVE( POCATELL01, IDAHO AT 10 A.H.
OH THE FIRST FRIDAY OF FEBRUARY UNLESS THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS CHOOSES ADIFFERENT TIHE OR PACE. THIS "ILL BE YOUR ONLY
NOTICE OF THIS HEETING UNLESS THE TIHE OR PLACE IS CHANGED. NOTICE OF ANY CHANGE HILL BE SENT TO YOU NOT HORE THAN 60 DAYS
NOR LESS THAN 10 DAYS PRIOR TO THE HEETING. THE MEETING SHALL BE HELD FOR THE PURPOSE OF ELECTING DIRECTORS ANO THE
TRANSACTION OF SUCH OTHER BUSINESS AS HAY PROPERLY COHE BEFORE SUCH HEETING. YOU ARE ENTITLED TO VOTE IN PERSON OR BY PROXY
AT THE HEETIHG.

! •

I

!•
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AGREEMENT
1.

2.

We wlll provide the insurance described in this
policy and the Declarations If you have paid the
premium and have complied with the policy
provisions and conditions. This policy is divided
into four sections, some with multiple coverages.
You have only the coverages for which you have
paid premium. These coverages are indicated In
the Declarations and are subject to the indicated
limits of insurance.
The insured first named in the Declarations, or
that personrEl spouse if also named, is authorized
to act on behalf of all insureds with respect to
giving or receiving notices, receiving refunds, or
agreeing to or making any changes in this policy.

3. By acceptance of this policy, you agree that the
Declarations indicate the coverages you pur-

chased. No agreement in conflict with,
modifying, or extending this policy is valid
unless In writing and made a part of the policy.
4.

This policy booklet, the Declarations, and
applicable endorsements constitute your
policy. The Declarations references coverages
and endorsements that are included in your
policy. Upon renewal or change of your policy
you will receive an updated Declarations but
no new policy booklet unless the policy booklet
changes.

5.

This policy will be governed by the laws of the
state of Idaho.

READ THE DECLARATIONS TO DETERMINE
WHICH COVERAGES PERTAIN TO YOU.

DEFINITIONS
Throughout this policy, we, us, and our, mean Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho. You
and your mean a person named In the Declarations
as an insured and that personrs spouse if a resident
of the same household. You and your also refer to a
partnership, corporation, limited liablllty company, or
trust, named in the DeclaraUons as an insured. You
and your do not Include an additional insured such
as a lessor, trustee, or landlord. The following
defined words appear in bold print In the policy.

Business means a full-time or part-time trade,
profession, occupation, or activity, engaged in for
compensation, other than farming or custom
farming. Business includes rental of atl or any part
of an Insured location to others, or held for rental by
you, other than:
1. Your residence premises if rented occasionally;
2.

Garages, if not more than three car spaces are
rented;

3.

One-, two-, three-, or four-family dwellings
described in the Declarations; or

The following definitions apply to Sections I, II, and
IV. They do not apply to Section Ill {Automobile
Insurance).

4.

Your farm.

Bodily Injury means physical injury to, or sickness,
disease, or death of, a person. Bodily Injury does
not include:

1. The operation of roadside stands principally for
the sale of produce raised on the insured
location;

1.

Any sexually transmitted disease.

2.

2.

Any emotional, psychological, or mental injury or
effect, unless it arises out of actual physical
Injury to a person.

Newspaper defivery, lawn care, or other
activities, perfonned by a self-employed minor
on a part-time basis; or

3.

Childcare services provided by any insured if
the number of children is six or fewer and then

DEFINITIONS APPLICABLE TO SECTIONS I
(Property Insurance), II (Liability Insurance), AND
IV (Inland Marine Insurance)

ID-CQ-02-01(1014)

Business does not include:
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only with respect to their duties as members or
managers.

only if care is provided for fewer than a total of
31 days during your policy period. Part-time child
care services provided by any insured who is a
minor is not considered a business.

4.

Custom farming means an insured rs use of a draft
animal or mobile agricultural machinery to perform
farming operations for others for a charge or other
benefit.

If you are a trust, insured also means the
trustees, but only with respect to their duties as a
trustee.

5.

If you are an organization other than a type listed
above, insured also means your executive
officers and directors, but only with respect to
their duties as your officers or directors. Your
stockholders are also insureds with respect to
their liability as stockholders.

6.

Under Section II, insured means a person
operating your watercraft or recreational motor
vehicle within the scope of your permission; or a
person operating your mobile agricultural
machinery within the scope of your permission
in your farming operation covered by this policy.

7.

Under Section II, Insured means a person in
charge of your domestic animals, including
livestock: (a) to which Section II applies, (b) with
your permission, and (c) in your activities
covered by this policy.

Dwelling means a one-, two-, three-, or four-family
residence.
Dwelling premises means a dwelling listed fn the
Declarations, including its grounds and private
garages. A dwelling premises includes a residence
premises.
Farm employee means someone employed by you
whose duties are in connection with the maintenance
or use of the insured location as a farm, including
the maintenance or use of your farm equipment.
Farm employee does not include you or your minor
child, but includes exchange labor.
Farm personal property means your personal
property which is usual to the operation of a farm and
is used on your farm. It includes livestock, mobile
agricultural machinery, tools, supplies, equipment,
and harvested crops, used in or resulting from your
farming operation. It includes property you are
purchasing under an installment plan whether or not
you have title to the property.
Farming means the production of fruit, nuts, or field
crops, or the raising or keeping of livestock, fish, or
bees, or the raising of mink, fox, or similar small
mammals primarily for fur production. It includes
wholesale but not retail sales, except incidental retail
sales of your unprocessed farm products with the
resulting gross income being less than 25% of your
combined farming gross income.
Insured means you or the entity named in the
Declarations. The following are also Insureds:

1. If you are a person, Insured also means, if
resid~nts of your household, your spouse, your
relatives, and minors in the care of you or your
relatives. Insured does not include a relative
age 25 or over who is a student and lives away
from your residence premises while attending
school.

2. If you are a partnership, insured also means
your members and your partners, but only with
respect to their duties in the partnership.

3.

If you are a limited liability company, insured
also means your members and managers, but

ID-CQ-02-01(1014)

Insured location means:

1. A location listed in the Declarations where you
maintain a farm or residence, including private
approaches;

2.

A location acquired by you during the policy
period where you maintain a farm or residence,
including private approaches. This does not
include a location purchased by you that is
outside the state of Idaho;

3. Your cemetery plots or burial vaults;
4.

A location you do not own where you temporarily
reside; and

5. Vacant land owned by you and listed in the
Declarations, or vacant land in the state of Idaho
acquired by you during the pollcy period.
Insured location does not include property where a
business is conducted.
Livestock means cattle, horses, llamas, alpacas,
mules, swine, poultry, donkeys, goats, or sheep.
Mobile agricultural machinery means a land
vehicle, including any machinery or attached
apparatus, whether or not self-propelled, usual to the
operation of a farm, used primarily for agricultural
purposes, not subject to licensing, and designed for
use principally off public roads.

Page 2 of45
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Motor vehicle means a motorized land vehicle,
trailer, or semi-trailer (including any attached
machinery or apparatus), designed principally for
travel on public roads. The following are not
considered motor vehicles unless they are being
towed by or carried on a motor vehicle:

1.

Utility, boat, camping, or travel trailers;

2.

Mobile agricultural machinery;

3. Recreational motor vehicles; or
4.

Any equipment which is designed for use principally off public roads.

reside. A residence premises does not Include any
part of a building used for business.

DEFINITIONS APPLICABLE
(Automobile Insurance)

TO

SECTION

Ill

Bodily injury means physical injury to a person and
any resulting sickness, disease, or death.
Business and Farming have the same definitions
under Section Ill as under DEFINITIONS APPLICABLE TO SECTIONS I (Property Insurance), II
(Liability Insurance), AND IV (Inland Marine
Insurance).
Insured means:

Occurrence means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the same harmful
conditions, which results in unexpected bodily injury
or property damage during the policy period. Afl
bodily injury and property damage resulting from a
common cause will be considered the result of one
occurrence.

1. Under Coverages N, 0, R, S, and T, with respect
to an insured vehicle:

Personal property means personal property usual
to the use of the dwelling premises as a dwelling.
Pollutants means any solrd, liquid, gaseous, or
thermal Irritant or contaminant, Including but not
limited to, smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
chemicals, petroleum products, waste, lead,
asbestos, or anything defined by federal or state law
as a pollutant. Waste includes materials to be
recycled, reconditioned, or reclaimed.
Property damage means injury to or destruction of
tangible property, Including resulting loss of use.
Recreational motor vehicle means any motorized
vehicle designed for recreational use off public
roads, including but not limited to, golf carts,
snowmobiles, trail bikes, mopeds, dune buggies,
motorcycles, or all-terrain vehicles. It does not
include motorcycles that are licensable for road use.
Relative means a person related to you by blood,
marriage, or adoption, who is a resident of your
household, including a ward or foster child. This
definition applies only if you are a person.
Residence employee means someone employed by
you who performs duties in connection with the
maintenance or use of the residence premises.
This Includes a person who performs duties for you
elsewhere of a similar nature not in connection with
your business or farming.

2.

a.

You or any relative; or

b.

Anyone using an Insured vehicle within the
scope of your permission or within the scope
of permission of your adult relative. This
does not include a passenger.

Under Coverages N and O with respect to a
nonowned vehicle, you or your relatives when
opera!lng a nonowned vehicle. This does not
Include a relative who owns a licensed motor
vehicle not insured by this policy.

Insured does not include the United States Government, its agencies, or any person when acting as an
employee of the United States Government when the
Federal Tort Claim Act applies.
Insured vehicle means:

1. Any vehicle owned by you and described In the
Declarations;

2. Any vehicle in your care, custody, or control, that
you drive on a regular basis, and that is
described in the Declarations;

3. A temporary substitute vehicle. The same
coverages apply to the temporary substitute
vehicle as apply to the Insured vehicle for
which it is being substituted;

4. Under Coverages N and O only, any trailer while
attached to a motor vehicle to which these
coverages apply;

5. Under Coverages R, S, and T, any camper,
Residence premises means, if shown in the
Declarations: {a) a dwelling that Is your principal
residence, including its grounds and private garages,
or {b) that part of any other building where you
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camper shell, topper, or other shell, described in
the Declarations;
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1.
6.

7.

8.

Under Coverages N, 0, P, P-1, and Q , any
licensed private passenger automobile, pickup,
SUV, farm truck, passenger van, motorcycle, or
motor home, ownership of which is acquired by
you during the policy period;
Under Coverages S and T, any licensed private
passenger automobile, pickup, SUV, farm truck,
trailer, passenger van, motorcycle, or motor
home, ownership of which Is acquired by you
during the policy period; and
Under Coverages S and T, any camper, camper
shell, topper, or similar shell, ownership of which
is acquired by you during the policy period.

The newly acquired vehicles or equipment in
paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 above are not insured
vehicles unless we insure all of your insured
vehicles and you ask us to insure the newly acquired
vehicle or equipment during the policy period or
within 30 days of its acquisition, whichever is shorter.
The separate Coverages described in paragraphs 6,
7, and 8, above do not apply to a newly acquired
vehicle unless that Coverage applies to at least one
Insured vehicle described in the Declarations.
A newly acquired vehicle Includes a vehicle that
replaces one shown In the Declarations. Ownership
includes your written lease of a motor vehicle for
more than 6 continuous months.

2. Any pickup, truck, van, or trailer, used for any
business purpose. This limitation does not apply
to a pickup or passenger van that otherwise
qualifies as a nonowned vehicle if we Insure a
pickup or van shown in the Declarations for
which premium Is charged based on a business
use class.

3.

A motor vehicle rented to an insured for more
than three weeks.

Occupying means in, upon, or getting into or getting
out of.
Occurrence means an accident arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle,
including continuous or repeated exposure to the
same harmful conditions. which results in unexpected bodily injury or property damage during the
policy period. All bodily injury and property
damage resulting from a common cause will be
considered the result of one occurrence.

Property damage means injury to or destruction of
tangible property, Including resulting loss of use.
Relative means a person related to you by blood,
marriage, or adoption, who is a resident of your
household, including a ward or foster chlld . This
definition applies only if you are a person.

Motor vehicle means a motorized land vehicle
designed principally for travel on public roads. The
term motor vehicle does not include a trailer.

Temporary substitute vehicle, means a motor
vehicle or trailer you do not own while temporarily
used as a substitute for a vehicle described In the
Declarations when that vehlcle cannot be used
because of breakdown or servicing.

Nonowned vehicle means a trailer or motor
vehicle with a gross vehicle rating of 26,000 lbs. or
fess, as lndicated by the manufacturer, operated by
you or your relatives, or In the custody of you or
your relatives, provided the actual use is within the
scope of the permission of the owner.

Trailer means a vehicle designed to be towed by a
private passenger automobile, pickup, SUV, van, or
farm truck. It also includes a fam, wagon, farm semitrailer, or farm implement, while being towed by an
Insured vehicle. Trailer does not include any
vehicles being used:

A nonowned vehicle does not include:

1. To haul passengers;

1. A vehicle owned by you or your relatives or that

2.

is available for regular use by you or your
relatives. This limitation does not apply to a
motor vehicle owned by you or your relatives,
that is driven by you , and Is described as an
insured vehicle in the Declarations of another
policy issued by us or Western Community
Insurance Company, if It otherwise qualifies as a
nonowned vehicle.
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As an office, store, or for display purposes; or

3. As a permanent residence.
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GENERAL CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO THIS POLICY
sured in the Declarations at least 30 days
before the cancellation date. If cancellation is
because you did not pay the premium we
may cancel by mailing notice to you at least
15 days before the cancellation date.

Unless otherwise indicated, the following conditions
are applicable to this policy.

1. Abandonment of Property. We are not obligated
to pay for or accept any property abandoned by
an insured.
c.

2. Arbitration. This paragraph does not apply to
liability coverages, or uninsured or underinsured
motorist coverages. An Insured or we may make
a written demand for arbitration to determine all
disputed issues as to (1) whether an insured is
entitled under the policy to coverage for a loss, or
(2) the value of a loss to real or personal property
where coverage is not disputed. Each party wifl
select a competent, impartial arbitrator within 20
days of receipt of the written demand. The two
arbitrators will select a third arbitrator. If they
cannot agree upon a third arbitrator within 10
days, either may request that a judge of a court
having jurisdict1on selects a third arbitrator. Both
parties shall make disclosure to each other of all
Information as required by the arbitrator(s) in the
scheduling and discovery order. Each party will
pay the expenses it Incurs, including attorney fees
and related costs, and bear the expenses of the
third arbitrator equally. Arbitration will take place
in Idaho in the county where the policy was
issued unless both parties agree otherwise. Local
rules of law as to arbitration procedure and
evidence will apply. A decision agreed to by two
of the arbitrators will be binding.

(1) At least 10 days before the cancellation
date if the policy has not been In force for
60 days or if the cancellation is because
you did not pay the premium. Under this
paragraph, if the notice is mailed, the 10
day period begins 5 days after the date
our notice is postmarked;

(2) At least 30 days before the cancellation
date if the cancellation pertains to a
commercial vehicle, unless cancellation is
because of non-payment of premium; we
will then give you notice at least 1O days
before cancellation; or

(3) At least 20 days before the cancellation
date if the cancellation is for any other
reason.
d.

Payment or tender of unearned premium is
not a condition of cancellation. We will mail
any notice of cancellation to you at the
address shown in the Declarations. Our proof
of mailing will be sufficient proof of the
mailing of notice. The effective date and hour
of cancellat!on stated in the notice will
become the end of the policy period. Our
hand delivery of this written notice will be
equivalent to malling.

e.

If you or we cancel, earned premiums will be
computed pro rata based on the effective
date of cancellation. Premium adjustment
may be made at this time or as soon after as
is practical. Our check mailed or delivered will
be sufficient tender of any refund of premium.

3. Assignment. No assignment or transfer of this
policy to another person or entity will be valid.

4.

Premium. The premium stated in the Declarations will be computed according to our rules and
rating plans. The premium is for insurance from
the pollcy inception date to its expiration date.

5.

Bankruptcy of An Insured. Bankruptcy or
insolvency of an insured will not relieve us of our
obligations under this policy.

6.

Cancellation. Our cancetlation rights are limited
by state insurance law.

7.

a.

You may cancel this entire policy by mailing
to us written notice stating the future date this
cancellation will be effective.

b.

We may cancel all or part of Sections l, II, or
IV, by mailing notice to the first named in·
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When allowed by state law, we may cancel all
or part of Section Ill of this policy by mailing
notice to you:

Changes. We reserve the right to adjust the
amount of your premiums if there is a change in
the information used to calculate your policy
premiums.

8. Concealment or Fraud. We will not provide
coverage if any Insured has intentionally conPage 5 of45
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cealed or misrepresented any material fact or
circumstance relating to this insurance.
9.

Cooperation of Insured. If any insured fails to
cooperate with us or send us legal papers as
required, we have the right to refuse any further
coverage for the occurrence or loss.

10. Death. Upon your death, we will continue through
the current policy period to insure any member of
your household who is an insured at the time of
your death. We will also insure:
a.

b.

With respect to your property, the person
having proper temporary custody of the
property until appointment and qualification of
a legal representative; or
Your legal representative,
respect to:

but only with

(1) Your property that we covered at the time
of your death; and

that broadens the coverage under this policy
without payment of additional premium, the
broadened coverage will apply to this policy. This
clause does not apply to changes implemented
through introduction of a new edition of our policy.
16. Loss Payment. This paragraph does not apply to
liability coverages . We wlll adjust all losses with
you unless someone else is entitled to payment
under this policy. Payment for loss will be made
within 60 days after we receive and accept as
complete your signed, sworn proof of loss, and
ascertainment of the loss is made by: (a)
agreement with you; (b) entry of a final judgment;
or (c) the filing of an arbitration award with us.
17. Loss Payable Clause (Applicable to Coverage
D-Farm Personal Property and Section IV). This
clause is applicable if a loss payee is named in
the Declarations. A loss payee includes a
lienholder.
a.

(2) Your legal liability covered by this policy.
11. Deductible Clause. Loss from each occurrence
will be adjusted separately. We will not pay for
any covered loss unlit the amount of loss exceeds
the applicable deductible shown in the Declarations. We do not cover the deductible portion of a
loss. We will apply only one deductible (the
highest one applicable) to a loss to which more
than one section of this policy applies, or if two or
more insured vehicles or other covered items
are damaged in a single occurrence.
12. Dividends or Credits. Any obligation of ours for
dividend or credit will not in any way extend or
change the policy period.
13. Inspection and Audit. You must permit us to
inspect and audit your Insured property and
operation at any reasonable time. The purpose is
to determine insurability and the appropriate
premium charge. We are not obligated to conduct
inspections. We are not obligated to give you a
copy of any inspection or audit report. Any
Inspection or audit wlll not be considered a
representation that the operation or property Is
safe or complies with any legal requirements.

b. We may cancel the policy during the policy
period. We will mail notice of cancellation to
the lienholder at least 10 days before the date
the cancellation takes effect.
c.

e.

If we deny your claim, that denial will not
apply to a valid claim of the loss payee, if the
loss payee:
(1) Notifies us of any change In ownership,
occupancy, or substantial change in risk
of which the loss payee is aware;
(2) Pays any premium due under this policy
on demand if you have neglected to pay
the premium; and
(3) Submits a signed, sworn proof of loss
within 60 days after receiving notice from
us of your failure to do so.

f.
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If we make any payment to the loss payee,
we will obtain their rights against any other
party.

d. We will pay the loss payee for. their interest
directly if the covered property has been
repossessed.

14. Insured cs Interest and Limit of Liability. lf more
than one person has an insurable interest in the
property covered by this policy, we will not be
liable to the Insured for an amount greater than
the insured[) interest, subject to the applicable
limit of liability.
15. Liberallzatlon Clause. If within 60 days prior to
or during the policy period we adopt any revision

If a payable loss is for the value of the
covered property, we will pay you and the
loss payee. If a payable loss is under $10,000
and is for repairs, payment may be made to
you only. At our option we may pay you and
the loss payee for any loss.

If we pay the loss payee for any loss and
deny payment to you:
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'r.

(1) We are subrogated to all the rights of the
loss payee granted under their lien on the
property; or

22. Policy Renewals .
a.

(2) At our option, we may pay to the loss
payee the whole principal on their lien
plus any accrued interest. In this event,
we have the right to receive a full
assignment and transfer.
g.

Subrogation will not impair the right of the
loss payee to recover the full amount of their
claim.

h.

Policy conditions relating to Arbitration, Suit
Against Us, and Loss Payment apply to the
loss payee.

18. No Benefit to Bailee. We will not recognize any
assignment or grant any coverage for the benefit
of any person or organization holding, storing, or
transporting property for a fee regardless of any
other provision of this policy.
19. Nonduplication of Insurance Benefits. No
person entitled to any payment or benefit under
any coverage of this policy Is entitled to recover
any duplicate payment or benefit for the same
elements of loss under any other coverage of this
policy, including liability coverages, or any other
policy.
20. Our Option. If we give you notice within 30 days
after we receive and accept your signed, sworn
proof of loss, we may:

a.

b.

Take all or any part of the property at the
agreed or appraised value. If we exercise this
option, you must sign any papers we require
for transfer of title; or
Repair, rebuild, or replace any part of the
property with equivalent property. We will not
be liable for any loss resulting from delay in
repair or choice of repairmen.

21. Policy Period. The policy period is shown in the
Declarations and Is subject to cancellation as
stated in the policy. This policy applies only to
occurrences which take place during the policy
period. Losses to your insured property are
covered only if the peril originates and causes
loss during the policy period. The time shown in
the Declarations is standard time at your primary
residence. To the extent that this policy replaces
another policy or coverage that terminates at a
different hour on the effective date of this policy,
this policy is not effective until the other policy
terminates.

ID-CQ-02-01(1014)

Subject to our consent, you may renew this
policy for successive periods by payment to
us of the premium we require to renew the
policy. If we are willing to renew this policy we
will give you notice of the amount of premium
or estimated premium to be paid at least 20
days before it is due. Premium payment for
any renewal period will be due before the
expiration of the preceding policy period. We
may change the terms of your policy at
renewal. We will give you notice of any
change resulting in a decrease in coverage at
least 30 days before it becomes effective.

b. We will give you notice of our intent to nonrenew all or part of any commercial coverage
under this policy at least 45 days before the
end of the policy period.
c.

We will give you notice of our intent to nonrenew all or part of any noncommercial
coverage under this policy at least 30 days
before the end of the policy period.

23. Polley Termination. If you fail to pay the renewal
premium when due, this policy w!II terminate on
its expiration date without any notice or action by
us. If you purchase another policy to replace this
one, this policy terminates on the inception of
such policy without notice by you or us.
24. Premium Waiver. If this policy is cancelled,
lapses, or is nonrenewed, any premium you owe
us that is less than $10 or any premium we owe
you that is less than $5, is waived.

25. Recovered Property. If an insured or we
recover any property for which we have made
payment under this policy, the Insured or we will
notify the other of the recovery. We are the owner
of this property. At our option, we will return the
property to the insured upon insured[S payment
of the amount we, in our discretion, may agree to.
26. Subrogation
a.

oour Right to Recover Payment.

If we make payment under this policy and the
person to or for whom payment was made
has a right to recover damages, we will be
subrogated to that right (have that right
transferred to us). That person must do
whatever is necessary to enable us to
exercise our rights and must do nothing after
the loss to prejudice our rights. An insured
must not pursue our subrogated interest
without our written permission.
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b.

If we make a payment under this policy, and
the person to or for whom payment was
made recovers damages from another, that
person must reimburse us to the extent of our
payment.

c.

We may prosecute in the name of any
insured for the recovery of these payments.
We may use any documents in our files to
pursue our subrogation claim.

27. Special or Lower Limit, or Additional Cover-

ages o Section I. Under some Section I
coverages there may be a special or lower limit or
an additional coverage for a particular type of
property or loss. Unless the policy specifically
states otherwise, such limit is included within and
does not increase the applicable coverage limit.
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28. Sult Against Us. No action Is to be brought
against us unless there has been compliance with
the policy provisions. No one has any right to join
us as a party to any action against an Insured.
No action with respect to liability coverages is to
be brought against us until the obligation of the
insured has been determined by final judgment
or agreement signed by us.

29. Terms of Policy to Conform to Statute. If any of
the terms of this policy are in conflict with the
statutes of the state of Idaho, they are hereby
amended to conform to such statutes.
30. Waiver or Change of Policy Provisions. A
waiver or change of any provision of this policy
must be in writing by us to be valid.
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SECTION I D PROPERTY INSURANCE
We cover the property insured under Section I for
direct physical loss only, caused by specified perils.
For most coverages, the applicable perils, limit of
llability, and deductible, are indicated in the Declarations; for some coverages, one or more of these may
be indicated in the policy booklet or an applicable
endorsement.
COVERAGE A

o DWELLINGS

We cover the following:

1. The dwelling on the residence premises
described in the Declarations used principally as
your private residence, including:

2.

a.

Structures attached to the dwelling;

b.

Permanently installed outdoor equipment
pertaining to the dwelling; and

c.

Materlals and supplies located on the
residence premises for use in the construction, alteration, or repair of the dwelling
or its private garage.

enclosed building, designed to house one or more
motor vehicles. We do not cover field, corral, or
pasture fences, even if attached to a dwelling. We do
not cover bridges designed to be used by motor
vehicles or boat docks.
COVERAGE B

1. Additional Living Expense. If a loss covered
under Coverage A makes your covered dwelling
uninhabitable, we will pay any reasonable and
necessary increase in livlng expenses incurred by
you so that your family can maintain its normal
standard of living. Payment will be for the shortest
time required to repair or replace the premises, or
if you permanently relocate, the shortest time
required for your household to settle elsewhere.
This period of time is not limited by expiration of
this policy. We will not pay for any increase in
living expenses resulting from your rental or use
of any real property that is more than 150 miles
from the covered dwelling.

2.

Fair Rental Value. If a loss under Coverage A
causes your covered dwelling rented to others to
become uninhabitable, we will pay the fair rental
value of the dwelling premises. Payment will be
for the shortest time required to repair or replace
the part of the premises rented or held for rental.
This period of time is not limited by expiration of
this policy. Fair rental value does not include any
expenses that do not continue while part of the
dwelling premises rented or held for rental is
uninhabitable.

3.

Prohibited Use. If a civil authority prohibits you
from use of the dwelllng premises as a result of
direct damage to neighboring premises by a peril
insured against in this policy, we cover any
resulting additional living expenses or fair rental
value loss incurred by you for a period not
exceeding two weeks during which use is
prohibited.

The dwelling(s) shown in the Declarations, other
than the dwelling on the residence premises,
used principally as a private residence, including:
a.

Structures attached to the dwelling(s);

b.

Permanently installed outdoor equipment
pertaining to the dwelling(s); and

c.

Materials and supplies on these dwelling
premises for use in the construction,
alteration, or repair of the dwelling(s) or its
private garage.

We cover detached private garages, swimming pools,
and storage sheds, on the dwelling premises
pertaining to the above dwelllng(s). Our aggregate
limit of liabillty for these structures is indicated in the
Declarations and is a separate llmit. We do not cover
these structures if used for any business, professional, or farming purposes. We do not cover any garage
or storage shed rented to someone other than a
tenant of the dwelling. Under this coverage a storage
shed means a structure for storage of your personal
property, with exterior dimensions no greater than
200 square feet. A garage means a carport, or a fully
ID-CQ-02-01(1014)

o LOSS OF USE

We do not cover loss or expense due to cancellation
of a lease or agreement.
COVERAGE C o PERSONAL PROPERTY

We cover personal property owned or used by an
insured while ii is anywhere in the world. At your
request, we will cover uninsured personal property
owned by others while the property is In that part of
Page 9 of45
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the residence premises occupied exclusively by an
insured. Coverage C is subject to the following
limitations and exclusions.

watches, furs, and
precious stones;

semi-

$4,000 for loss by theft of firearms, firearm
optics, and firearm attachments;

g.

$3,500 for loss by theft of silverware, silverplated ware, goldware, gold-plated ware, and
pewter.vare;

h.

Multiple Insured Dwelling Premises. If you
have more than one dwelling premises Insured
under Section I, a different Coverage C limit of
liability applies to each dwelling premises.
These limits are stated In the Declarations. The
limit applicable to one Insured dwelling premises
cannot be applied to a loss at another insured
dwelling premises.

$4,000 on property on the residence
premises used at any time for any business
purpose and $2,000 for such property away
from the residence premises. This includes
computers, blank electronic storage ·media,
and
pre-recorded
computer
programs
available to the publlc. We do not cover cash,
securities, books of account, drawings, other
paper or electronic records, CD-ROM,
electronic data processing tapes, DVDs,
disks, or other software media;

I.

Special Limits of Liability. Special limits of
liability apply to the following categories of
property. If an item of property Is subject to more
than one category, only the category with the
lowest limit applies. The special limit for each
following category ls the total aggregate limit for
each loss for all property in that category:

$1,500 on DVD players, GPS devices, cell or
mobile phones, televisions, computers, and
other electronic data processing equipment,
while this property is in or upon a motor
vehicle. This limitation applies to portable
equipment that is capable of being operated
by the motor vehicle[S electrical system;

j.

$5,000 on any one article and $10,000 in the
aggregate for loss by theft of any rug, carpet,
tapestry, wall hanging, or other similar article;

k.

$5,000 on your personal property which is
usually located at your residence premises
while this property is at any other dwelling
owned by you and insured by us;

I.

$8,000 on hand, electronicJ power, and
similar tools that can be used for carpentry,
buildlng construction, or dwelling or vehicle
maintenance or repair; and

personal property at a newly acquired principal
residence for 30 days immediately after you begin
to move the property there. If your personal
property is distributed between your residence
premises and this newly acquired principal
residence, the limit of liability applies at each
location in the proportion that the value at each
location bears to the total value of all property
distributed between the two locations.

3.

and

f.

1. Newly Acquired Residence. We cover your

2.

precious

a.

b.

c.

$250 on money, bank notes, numismatic
property, bullion, gold other than goldware,
silver other than silverware, platinum, coins,
medals, gift cards or certificates, scrip, smart
cards, or stored value cards;
$1,000 on securities, accounts, deeds,
evidences of debt, letters of credit, notes
other than bank notes, manuscripts, personal
records, passports, tickets, sports collection
cards, and stamps. This limit applies
regardless of the medium (such as paper or
computer software) on which the material
exists. This limit includes the cost to
research, replace, or restore the information
from the lost or damaged material;
$1,500 on watercraft, including their trailers,
attached equipment, and outboard motors.
We do not cover any loss by windstorm or
hail to this property unless it is inside a fully
enclosed building;

d.

$1,500 on trailers, not including trailers used
with any watercraft;

e.

$2,000 on any one article and $4,000 in the
aggregate for loss by theft of jewelry,

m. $3,000 on saddles and tack.
If you have purchased addltlonal coverage for any
of the above special limits, this is shown in the
Declarations and replaces the applicable limit(s)
shown above.
4.

Exclusions. Section I Exclusions and the
followlng additional exclusions apply to Coverage
C. Coverage C does not cover:

a. Farm personal property;
b. Animals, llvestock, birds, fish, or pets;
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c.

Mobile agrlcultural machinery, motorized
land vehicles, and their parts, except vehicles
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designed for assisting the handicapped and
vehicles used solely to service your dwelling,
provided they cannot be licensed for road
use;

Our annual aggregate limit for this coverage is
$2,000. We do not cover losses resulting from
business pursuits or dishonesty of any insured.
COVERAGE D D FARM PERSONAL PROPERTY

d.

Aircraft and their parts;

e.

Property of roomers, tenants, and boarders,
not related to an insured;

f.

Recreational motor vehicles, trailer homes,
camper shells, tent trallers, and campers, and
their parts;

g. Any personal property located at any
dwelling, its grounds, garages, or sheds,
which are owned by you and not insured
under Section I or by Western Community
Insurance Company;

We cover your farm personal property on the
Insured location . We also cover your farm personal
property away from the Insured location except
while:
a.

Stored in or being processed in manufacturing plants, public elevators, warehouses,
seed houses, or drying plants;

b.

In transit by common or contract carrier; or

c.

In public sales barns or sales yards.

1. Coverage Limitations.
h. Articles separately insured by this or other
insurance;

I.

a.

Materials and supplies on any dwelling
premises for the construction, alteration, or
repair of the dwelling premises or its private

added to Coverage D by endorsement. Our
coverage on leased farm personal property
is excess over any other valid and collectible
insurance available to the owner.

garages; or
j.

Personal property owned and insured by
someone who is not an Insured.

b.

Additional Coverages. Subject to any special limits,

Coverage C
coverages:
1.

2.

includes

the

following

additional

We cover loss to property insured under
Coverage C while at the insured location due to
change In temperature as a result of physical
damage to the building or its equipment caused
by a peril insured against.

The legal obligation of an insured to pay
because of the theft or unauthorized use of
credit cards or bank debit cards issued to or
registered in any insuredcs name. We do not
cover credit card or bank debit card use if any
insured has not complied with all terms and
conditions under which the card was issued;

b.

Loss suffered by an insured caused by
forgery or alteration of any check or
negotiable instrument; or

c.

Loss suffered by an Insured through
acceptance in good faith of counterfeit United
States or Canadian paper currency.

Livestock Coverage. Except for the peril of
theft, we cover your livestock only if the
specified peril causes death. Our limit of
liability will not exceed the actual cash value
of the livestock subject to the maximum per
head limit stated in the Declarations. Death
must result within 30 days from the date of
occurrence.

c.

Crop Coverage. Woodchips, sawdust, and
the following harvested crops: grain, seed,
silage, fodder, peas, beans, hay, and straw,
are covered for loss caused by peril 1 (fire or
lightning) only. Our limit of liability for any one
stack of hay or straw, whether free standing
or in a building, will not exceed the number of
tons per stack stated in the Declaratlons. If a
stack or building is exposed within 125 feet of
another stack or building, the applicable per
stack tonnage limit will apply to the aggregate
of all such exposed stacks or buildings. For
example, if stack Y is 100 feet from stack X
and stack Z is 100 feet from stack Y and 200
feet from stack X, the aggregate limit
applicable to stacks X, Y, and Z ls the per
stack tonnage limit stated in the Declarations.

d.

Computers. Peril 18 (sudden and accidental
damage from artificially generated electrical
current) also applies to your laptop or desktop
computers that qualify as farm personal

Credit Card, Bank Transfer Card, Counterfeit
Currency, and Forgery. We will pay up to
$1,000 for:
a.

Leased Property. We cover farm personal
property leased by you for the conduct of
your farming operation only if this property is

property.
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e. Records and Electronlc Data Processing
Property. Our liability for loss to any records,
software programs, electronic data, or other
information, however stored or recorded, will
not exceed the cost of pre-recorded computer
programs available to the public, or of blank
media or material, plus the cost incurred by
you for transcribing, copying, reentering, or
recreating such data or software.
Our fimlt of liability for this coverage is $2,500
for all loss sustained in a policy period.

2.

Coinsurance. You must maintain insurance on
your farm personal property insured under
Coverage D to the extent of at least 80% of the
actual cash value at the time of any loss. For
example, if at the tlme of a loss your covered
farm personal property is worth $100,000, then
the amount of insurance must be at least
$80,000. If you fall to keep this percentage of
coverage, you will share in each loss in addition
to the deductible. We will pay the proportion of
each loss represented by the amount you did
insure at the time of loss divided by the amount
you should have insured, less any applicable
deductible. If you purchase mobile agricultural
machinery during the policy period, we will not
apply this coinsurance clause to any loss to that
equipment that occurs within 30 days of its
purchase.

If the aggregate claim for any loss under this
coverage Is less than 2% of the total amount of
insurance under Coverage D, you will not be
required to furnlsh an inventory of the undamaged
property. This does not mean we waive any of our
rights concerning coinsurance.
3.

Exclusions. Section I Exclusions and the
following additional exclusions apply to Coverage
D. We do not insure under Coverage D:

a. Personal property;

f.

Vehicles primarily designed and licensed for
road use other than wagons and trailers
designed for farming purposes and used
principally on the Insured location;

g. Motor vehicles, house trailers, motorcycles,
watercraft, recreational motor vehicles,
ATVs, mini trucks, aircraft, or their parts or
accessories;
h.

Unharvested or unthreshed crops or stubble;

i.

Any harvested crops, including root crops,
bulbs, or fruits, except to the extent they are
covered under the Crop Coverage above;

j.

Structures and buildings except portable
buildings on skids in an amount not to exceed
$1,000 per building;

k.

Any damage arising from wear and tear,
freezing, or mechanical breakdown or failure.
This exclusion does not apply to loss covered
by peril 1 (fire), peril 4 (explosion), peril 8
(smoke), or peril 20 (collision with another
object or overturn);

I.

Under peril 20 (collision or overturn
coverage), damage to tires, unless damaged
by the same cause as other loss covered
under Coverage D;

m. Bees, their larvae, bee boards, beehives, or
any other bee nesting or housing enclosure;
n.

Loss to livestock caused by the direct or
indirect result of fright, freezing, running into
fences or other objects, running into streams
or ditches, or smothering, whether an insured
peril is involved or not; or

o.

Property which is separately described and
specifically insured in whole or in part by this
or any other insurance.

b. Animals, other than livestock;

COVERAGE E DADDlTIONAL BUlLDINGS

c. Accounts, bills, currency, deeds, evidences of

The Declarations describe your dwellings, buHdings,
fences, and structures that we cover under Coverage
E. Coverage A does not apply to any property insured
under Coverage E.

debt, money, or securities;
d.

Irrigation equipment, including irrigation
pumps, buried water lines, electric pump
motors, panels, wiring, transformers, or
permanently installed or portable sprinkler
lines and sprinkler equipment (includfng any
sprinklerts electric equipment);

e. Fences, sawmill equipment, windmills, wind
chargers, towers, power poles, light poles,
telephone poles, or radio and television
towers and antennas;
ID-CQ-02-01(1014)

1. Buildings. Coverage on buildings includes their
permanent fixtures and attached sheds, but
excludes fences.

2. Materials and Supplies. Coverage on a building
or structure is extended to cover all materials and
supplies on the premises intended to be used in
the construction, alteration, or repair of such
building or structure.
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3.

Utility Poles. Coverage on private utillty poles
includes attached switch boxes, fuse boxes, and
other electrical equipment mounted on the poles.

4.

Fences and Similar Structures. For fences,
corrals, and similar structures, we will be liable for
no greater portion of any loss than the amount of
insurance bears to 100% of the actual cash value
of the property at the time of the loss.

limit Is the most we will pay in any one loss
regardless of the number of fallen trees.

3.

Pollutants. If a loss under Coverage A is caused
by perils 1 through 18, or peril 27, and that loss
results in pollutants contaminating land or water
on the dwelling premises, and you are required
by law to extract these pollutants, we will pay for
that extraction, provided you report the
contamination within 180 days of the date of the
peril causing the loss. Our limit of liabllity for this
coverage is $10,000. This limit is in addition to the
Coverage A limit of lfabillty. This additional
coverage includes the cost of necessary testing
for, monitoring, or assessing pollutants as a part
of extraction from land or water.

4.

Reasonable Repairs. We will pay the reasonable
costs incurred by you for necessary repairs made
solely to protect covered property from further
damage provided coverage is afforded for the
peril causing the loss.

5. Antennas, Aerials, and Receivers. Coverage on
outdoor radio and television antennas, aerials,
and satellite receivers, including their lead-in
wiring, masts, and towers, is subject to a
maximum payment of $250, unless this
equipment is specifically insured for a greater
amount. No deductible applies to this coverage.

SECTION I ADDITIONAL COVERAGES
Section I includes the following additional coverages.

1. Debris Removal. This coverage does not include
the expense of removing pollutants.
a.

We will pay the reasonable expense incurred
by you for the removal of debris of covered
property provided coverage is afforded for the
peril causing the loss. This includes the cost
to remove from a building or from personal
property in a building, ash, dust, or particles,
resulting from a covered loss caused by peril
19 (volcanic eruption). Debris removal
expense is included in the limit of liability
applying to the damaged property.

5. Door Locks. We will pay up to $200 for the cost
of re-keying or replacing locks to exterior doors
on the residence premises if your keys have
been stolen during the policy period. No deductible applies to this coverage.

6.

Headstones. We will pay up to $5,000 for loss
caused by perils 1 through 19 to a headstone for
your spouse, parent, or child.

7.

Trees, Shrubs, and Other Plants. We cover
trees, shrubs, plants, lawns, and decorative bark,
on a dwelling premises Insured under Coverage
A for loss caused by peril 1 (fire or lightning), peril
4 (explosion), peril 5 (riot or civil commotion), peril
6 (aircraft), peril 7 (vehicles}, peril 9 (vandalism or
malicious mischief), or peril 10 (theft). The limit of
liability for all loss under this coverage (including
debris removal) shall not exceed 5% of the limit of
liability specified for the Coverage A dwelling at
the same dwelling premises. Our limit of liability,
including debris removal, for any one tree, shrub,
or plant is $500, and $750 for decorative bark.
We do not cover property grown for business or
farming purposes. We do not cover any property
located farther than 100 feet from the covered
dwelling.

8.

Refrigerated Products. If Coverage C applies to
your policy, we will pay an amount not to exceed
the limit of liability stated in the Declarations for
loss to contents of a freezer or refrigerator at the
residence premises. This coverage does not
apply to farm personal property. The loss or
damage must be caused by a change in
temperature resulting from:

b. When the amount payable under Coverage A
for the actual damage to the property plus the
expense for debris removal exceeds the
Coverage A limit of liability for the damaged
property, an additional 5% of that limit of
liability wlll be available to cover debris
removal expense. This additional limit does
not apply to paragraph 7 below (Trees,
Shrubs, and Other Plants).

2.

Fallen Tree Removal. We will pay up to $1,000
for the reasonable cost for removal from the
residence premises of:

a.

Your tree(s) felled by perll 3 (windstorm or
hail);

b.

Your tree(s) felled by peril 12 {weight of ice,
snow, or sleet); or

c.

A neighboris tree(s) feiled by perils 1 through
19;

provided the tree(s) damages a covered structure
or blocks your driveway or sidewalk. The $1,000
ID-CQ-02-01(1014}

Page 13 of 45

34

a.

Interruption of electrical service to refrigeration equipment caused by damage to the
generating or transmission equipment which
results in a shutdown of the system;

a.

We will not pay more for a covered upgrade
to the undamaged portion of your dwelling
than the depreciated value of the undamaged
portion of the dwelling.

b.

Mechanical or electrical breakdown of the
refrigeration system; or

b.

We will not pay more for a covered loss than
the amount you actually spend to make
necessary upgrades or repairs your dwelling.

c.

A tripped breaker or blown fuse.
c.

We will not pay for any upgrade for any part
of your dwelling that did not comply with
code or ordinance requirements at the time it
was constructed.

d.

The Loss Settlement paragraph under
SECTION I CONDITIONS that applies to
dwellings insured under Coverage A also

You must exercise diligence in Inspecting and
maintaining refrigeration equipment in proper
working condition. If interruption of electrical
service or mechanical or electrical breakdown is
known, you must exercise all reasonable means
to protect the insured property from further
damage.

applies to this coverage.
9.

Fire Department Service Charge. We will pay
Limit of Liability. Our limit of liability under this
coverage for all losses is 10% of the Coverage A
limit of liability for the dwelling that sustains the
loss. This limit is included within and does not
increase the limit of liability for the dwelling.

up to the amount shown in the DeclaraUons for
your liability assumed by contract or required by
law for tire department charges incurred when the
fire department is called to save or protect your
covered property from a peril insured against. No
deductible applies to this coverage.

SECTION I PERILS INSURED AGAINST

10. Sinking or Swamping of a Boat. If you have
Coverage C, we will pay up to $2,500 for the loss
of an insuredls personal property in a boat and
caused by the sinking or swamping of the boat.
This coverage does not apply to the boat, its
attached equipment and motors, to money, or
Jewelry. Our limit of liability is the total aggregate
limit for each loss for all covered property.

We cover for direct physical loss to property insured
caused by the following perils if shown in the
Declarations:

1. Fire or lightning.
2.

11. Leaking Main Water Line. If Coverage A applies
to your residence premises, we will pay up to
$2,500 of the cost to excavate its main water line
if it is leaking.

Removal. When property ls removed because it
is endangered by other insured perils, we pay for
direct accidental loss from any cause to that
property while it is being removed and for 30
days after removal to a safe place.

3. Windstorm or hail.
12. Building Ordinance or Law Coverage. When
your dwelling insured under Coverage A sustains
a covered loss, we will pay for the increased cost
to repair or rebuild your dwelling required by the
enforcement of a building, zoning, or land use
ordinance or law, if the enforcement is because of
repairs to the covered damages and the
requirement is in effect at the time the loss
occurs. This coverage includes legally required
changes to the undamaged portion of your
dwelling if the enforcement of a building, zoning,
or land use ordinance or law, is directly related to
the same covered loss and the requirement Is in
effect at the time the covered loss occurs. This
coverage does not include the cost to remove,
neutralize, treat, monitor, or test for pollutants.
Subject to the applicable limit of liability, the
following limitations apply to this coverage:
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a. This peril does not include loss to the interior
or contents of a building caused by rain,
snow, sleet, sand, or dust, unless the direct
force of wind or hail damages the building
causing an opening in a roof or wall through
which the rain, snow, sleet, sand, or dust
enters.
b. This peril does not include loss caused
directly or indirectly by frost, cold weather, ice
(other than hail), snowstorm, or sleet, all
whether driven by wind or not.
c.

4.

This peril does not apply to a structure with a
roof or outer wall made in whole or part of
fabric or to personal property in this structure.

Explosion. This peril does not include rupture or
bursting of steam boilers, steam pipes, steam
turbines, steam engines, or water pipes, if
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owned by, leased, or operated under the control
of an insured.

c.

Of materials, tools, or supplies, for use in the
construction of a building until it is completed
and occupied;

d.

To property of others from any part of a
residence premises rented by an insured to
other than an insured;

5. Riot or civil commotion.
6.

7.

8.

Aircraft, including self-propelled missiles and
spacecraft. We cover only direct loss caused by
physical contact of the covered property with an
aircraft.
Vehicles, meaning direct loss caused by a
collision between the covered property and a
vehicle, or an object thrown up by a vehicle . We
also cover an lnsuredl:S personal property
while it is In or on a land vehicle, for loss caused
by rollover of the vehicle or collision of the
vehicle or the personal property with another
vehicle, an object, animal, or structure.
Smoke, meaning sudden and accldental
damage from smoke. This peril includes a puff
back of smoke from a furnace. This peril does
not include loss caused by smoke from
agricultural smudging or industrial operations.

9. Vandalism or malicious mischief, meaning the
wlllful and malicious damage to or destruction of
the covered property by someone other than an
Insured. We do not cover:
a.

Loss if the dwelling has been vacant or
unoccupied for more than 60 consecutive
days Immediately before the loss. Any
ensuing loss caused by the vandalism or
malicious mischief is also not covered. A
dwelling being constructed is not considered
vacant or unoccupied; or

e. Of property while in the custody of the postal
service or similar government or private
business;
f.

Caused by any of your tenants, members of
their households, or your employees; or

g. Caused by someone to whom an Insured
has entrusted or voluntarily given possession
of the property.

11. Breakage of glass or safety glazing material
that is part of the covered building. This
coverage extends to storm doors and storm
windows in summer storage. This peril does not
Include loss if the building has been vacant more
than 30 consecutive days immediately before the
loss. A building being constructed Is not
considered vacant. This peril does not include
loss to window framing or other materials that
are not glass.
12. Weight of Ice, snow, or sleet, which causes
damage to a building or property contained in a
building. This peril does not Include loss to an
awning, fence, patio, pavement, swimming pool,
foundation, retaining wall, bulkhead, pier, wharf,
or dock.

13. Collapse of a building or any part of a building.

b. Vandalism or malicious mischief by your
tenants or members of their household.

10. Theft, lncluding attempted theft.
Proof of theft must be based on evidence that
confirms the property more llkely than not has
been stolen. The term theft does not include
escape, inventory shortage, wrongful conversion,
or embezzlement.
Property of a student who Is an Insured is
covered while at the studentis temporary
residence away from the residence premises
only if the student has been there at any time
during the 45 days Immediately before the loss.

Collapse means the abrupt falling down or
caving in of all or part of a building resulting in
the building being unfit for occupancy and its
intended use. A building that Is In danger of
falling down or caving In is not in a state of
collapse. A building that is standing is not in a
state of collapse even if It is cracking, bulging,
sagging, bending, leaning, settling, shrinking, or
expanding.
We cover collapse only if caused by one or more
of the following :
a.

Perils 1 through 12 or 14 through 17;

b.

Hidden decay if unknown to the insured prior
to the collapse;

c.

Hidden Insect or vermin damage if unknown
to the Insured prior to the collapse;

We do not cover loss:
a.

Caused by any Insured or any person
residing at any dwelling premises;

b.

In or to a building under construction;

d. Weight of contents, equipment, animals, or
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e.

Weight of rain which collects on a roof; or

f.

Use of defective material or methods in
construction, remodeling, or renovation, but
only if the collapse occurs during the course
of the construction, remodeling, or renovation.

We do not cover loss to an awning, structure
adjacent to the building, fence, patio, pavement,
outdoor equipment, swimming pool, underground
pipe, flue, drain, cesspool, septic tank, foundation, retaining wall, bulkhead, pier, wharf, or dock,
under items b through f unless the loss is a direct
result of the collapse of a building.

14. Accidental discharge or overflow of water or
steam from within a plumbing, heating, air
conditioning, or automatic fire protective
sprinkler system, or from within a household
appliance. We also pay for tearing out and
replacing any part of the building on the
dwelling premises necessary to repair the
system or appliance from which the water or
steam escaped.
We do not cover loss:
a.

b.

On the dwelling premises if the dwelllng
has been vacant for more than 30
consecutive days immediately before the
loss. A dwelling being constructed is not
considered vacant;
Caused by fungi, wet or dry rot, or bacteria;

c. To the system or appliance from which the
water or steam escaped;

of the building is first damaged by a falling
object. We do not cover loss to outdoor
equipment, awnings, fences, and retaining walls.
We do not cover damage to the falling object
Itself.

17. Freezing of a plumbing, heating, air conditioning, or automatic fire protective sprinkler system, or of a household appliance, but
only if you have used reasonable care to:
a. Maintain heat in the building; or
b. Have shut off the water supply and drained
the systems and appliances of water.
We do not cover under this peril:
c. Loss to an outdoor hot tub, spa, or swimming
pool, including any related plumbing; or
d. Loss to sidewalks, driveways, patios, or other
outdoor property.
In this peril, a plumbing system does not include
a septic system, sump, sump pump, roof drain,
gutter, downspout, outside drainage system, or
related equipment.

18. Sudden and accidental damage from
artificially generated electrical current. This
peril does not include loss to a tube, transistor,
integrated circuit, or similar electronic component unless caused by a sudden and
accidental increase or decrease of artificially
generated electrical current. Our limit of liability
under this peril is $2,500 for each damaged item
of personal property with a per occurrence
limit for all damaged items of $5,000.

d.

Caused by or resulting from freezing, except
as provided In peril 17 (freezing); or

19. Volcanic eruption, meaning direct loss by

e.

On the dwelfing premises caused by
accidental discharge or overflow which
occurs off the dwelling premise.

volcanic eruption, including volcanic blast, air
born shock wave, lava flow, and volcanic fallout,
except as to trees, shrubs, lawns, plants, and
grounds.

In this peril, a plumbing system does not include a
septic system, sump, sump pump, roof drain,
gutter, downspout, outside drainage system, or
related equipment.

15. Sudden or accidental tearing apart, cracking,
burning, or bulging of a steam or water heating
system, an air conditioning system, or an
appliance for heating water. We do not cover loss
caused by or resulting from freezing under this
peril.

16. Falling objects. This peril does not include loss
to the interior of a building or property contained
in the building unless the roof or an exterior wall

ID-CQ-02-01 (1014)

We do not cover loss caused directly or indirectly
by earthquake, land shock wave, landslide, mud
flow, tidal wave, flooding, or earth sinking, rising,
or shifting, resulting from volcanic eruption,
except for direct loss by fire, theft, or breakage of
glass.
One or more volcanic eruptions that occur within
a 72-hour period will constitute a single volcanic
eruption.

20. Colflsion with another object or overturn.
This peril does not apply to livestock. Impact
with the ground or roadbed is not considered a
collision.
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21. Electrocution. This peril applies only to livestock.

22. A direct attack by dogs or wild animals
causing mortal wounds. This peril applies only
to livestock. It does not include attack by dogs
owned by you or any person residing on the

e.

Freezing, thawing, pressure, or weight of
water or ice, whether driven by wind or not, to
an awning, fence, concrete, pavement, patio,
swimming pool, foundation, retaining wall,
bulkhead, pier, wharf, or dock;

f.

Vandalism, malicious mischief, or breakage
of glass and safety-glazing materials, if the
building has been vacant or unoccupied for
more than 60 consecutive days immediately
before the loss. A building being constructed
is not considered vacant or unoccupied;

insured location.

23. Accidental shooting. This peril applies only to
livestock. This peril does not include loss
caused by any insured, employee of an
insured, or person residing on the insured
location.

24. Loading, unloading, collision with another
object, or overturn while in transit. This peril
applies only to livestock and mobile
agricultural machinery. In transit means being
carried by vehicle.

g. Wear and tear, marring, scratching,
deterioration, inherent vice, hidden or latent
defect, or mechanical breakdown or failure;
h.

Mold, fungus, rust, electrolysis, wet or dry rot,
bacteria, or any other corrosion;

i.

Smog or contamination;

j.

Smoke from agricultural smudging or industrial operations;

k.

Settling, cracking, shrinking, bulging, or expansion of pavements, patios, foundations,
walls, floors, roofs, or ceilings;

I.

Birds, vermin, rodents, insects, or domestic
animals. Hidden insect or vermin damage
causing collapse, however, is covered but
only as provided in peril 13 (collapse). The
word vermin, includes but is not limited to,
bats, beavers, coyotes, mice, porcupines,
raccoons, rats, skunks, snails, snakes, slugs,
or squirrels;

25. Drowning. This peril applies only to livestock.
26. Collapse

of a building onto mobile
agricultural machinery, meaning a building
collapse that would qualify for coverage under
perH 13 (collapse) that causes damage to your
mobile agricultural machinery. This peril
applies only to mobile agricultural machinery.

27. Special form. We insure for direct physical loss
to the property insured, except for any loss
excluded below. Under items a through m below,
any ensuing loss not excluded by any other
policy provision is covered. We also cover under
peril 27 any loss which would have been
covered had perils 1 through 19 applied to your
covered property. We do not cover under this
peril any loss excluded under SECTION I

m. Pressure from or presence of tree, plant, or
shrub roots; or

EXCLUSIONS.
Exclusions Applicable to Peril 27

n.

The following additional exclusions apply. We do
not cover under peril 27 any loss caused directly
or indirectly by:
a. Theft, except as provided in peril 10;

b. Collapse, except as provided in peril 13;
c.

Accidental discharge or overflow of water or
steam from within a plumbing, heating, air
conditioning, or automatic fire protective
sprinkler system, or from a household
appliance, except as provided in peril 14;

d.

Freezing of a plumbing, heating, air conditioning, or automatic fire protective sprinkler
system, or household appliance, except as
provided in peril 17;
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Any pollution, contamination, or environmental impairment, unless the loss or
damage follows immediately as a result of a
loss caused directly by perils 1 through 10,
and then only to the extent of such direct
loss.

If peril 27 applies to Coverage C, the following
additional exclusions also apply. We do not cover
any loss caused directly or indirectly by:
o.

Breakage of eyeglasses, glassware, statuary,
bric-a-brac, porcelains, and similar fragile
articles, other than jewelry, watches, bronzes,
cameras, and photographic lenses. These
items are covered only if breakage results
from perils 1 through 10 or 12 through 19;

p.

Dampness or dryness of atmosphere or
extremes of temperature;
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q.

Refinishing, renovating, or repairing property
other than watches, jewelry, and furs;

r.

Any malicious or harmful computer code,
including but not limited to, computer virus,
trojan, worm, or spyware;

s.

Rain, snow, or sleet to personal property
that is outdoors;

t.

Collision, other than collision of the insured
property with a land vehicle; or

u.

Sinking, swamping, or stranding of watercraft,
including their trailers, attached equipment, or
motors.

SECTION I EXCLUSIONS

We do not cover loss under Section I resulting directly
or indirectly from the following. Such loss is excluded
regardless of any other cause or event contributing
concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.

4.

3.

Water damage, meaning:

a.

Flood, surface water, Ice flow, waves, tidal
water, storm surge, tsunami, seiche, overflow
of a body of water, or spray from any of
these, whether or not driven by wind. This
exclusion applies even if an excluded peril Is
caused in whole or in part by man, the failure
of a man-made structure, or other non-natural
means;
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c.

Water or sewage that backs up or overflows
from a sewage, septic, or drainage system, a
drain, sump, sump pump, or related
equipment. A blockage on the dwelllng
premises In a sewer or septic drain caused
by solid material that stops the flow of water
from a plumbing system in the dwelling is not
considered a backup or overflow. We do not,
however, cover any loss caused by a septic
tank that Is full or in need of servicing. We do
not cover the cost to service, clear, or repair
your drains, sewer or septic system; or

d.

Water below the surface of the ground,
including water that exerts pressure on, or
seeps or leaks through a building, sidewalk,
pavement, driveway, foundation, swimming
pool, or other structure. This includes water
from a drain or plumbing system.

Neglect, meaning neglect of an Insured to use

all reasonable means to save and preserve
property at and after the time of loss, or when
property is endangered by a peril insured against.

5. War,

including undeclared war, civil war,
insurrection, rebelllon, revolution, warlike act by
military force or military personnel, destruction or
seizure of property for use for any military
purpose, and including any consequence of any
of these. Discharge of a nuclear weapon will be
deemed a warlike act even if accidental.

2. Earth movement, including but not limited to,
earthquake, landslide, mine subsidence, mudflow,
earth sinking, rising, or shiftlng. Direct loss by
peril 1 (fire), peril 4 (explosion}, peril 10 (theft), or
peril 11 (breakage of glass or safety glazing
materials), resulting from earth movement is
covered if these perils apply to your covered
property.

Rain or other natural precipitation that seeps
or enters through or around doors, windows,
or other openings;

Direct loss by peril 1 (fire), peril 4 (explosion), or
peril 10 (theft), resulting from water damage Is
covered if these perils apply to your covered
property.

1. Ordinance or law, meaning If because of any
loss caused by any covered perll you are required
during repairs or replacement to comply with any
ordinance or law regulating the construction,
repair, or demolition of your insured property
which increases the cost of repairs or replacement beyond our obligation to repair or replace
with like kind and quality, we do not cover that
increased cost. This exclusion includes any
requirement that you test for, monitor, clean up,
remove, or respond in any way to pollutants.
Limited pollution or ordinance or law coverage,
however, may apply to a Coverage A dwelling
under SECTION I ADDITIONAL COVERAGES.

b.

6.

Power, heating, or coollng fallure, unless the
failure results from physical damage to power,
heating, or cooling equipment situated on the
dwelling premises where the loss occurs. This
failure must be caused by a peril insured against.

7.

Depreciation, decay, deterioration, change In
temperature or humidity, loss of market, or
from any other consequential or indirect loss of
any kind.

8.

Nuclear hazard, meaning any nuclear reaction,
radiation, or radioactive contamination, whether
controlled or uncontrolled or however caused, or
any consequence of any of these. Loss caused
by the nuclear hazard is not considered to be loss
caused by fire, explosion, or smoke, whether
these perils are specifically named or otherwise
included within the perils insured against in
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Section I. If nuclear reaction or radiation result in
fire, however, we will pay for loss or damage
caused by that fire if otherwise covered by this
policy.

9.

Weather conditions, meaning
condition which results in:

any weather

a.

Landslide, mudflow, or earth sinking, rising,
or shifting;

b.

Flood, surface water, ice flow, waves, tidal
water, storm surge, tsunami, seiche, overflow
of a body of water, or spray from any of
these, whether or not driven by wind;

c.

Water or sewage backing up through sewers,
drains, or a septic system; or

d. Water below the surface of the ground,
including water that exerts pressure on, or
seeps or leaks through a building, sidewalk,
pavement, driveway, foundation, swimming
pool, or other structure.
Direct loss by peril 1 (fire), peril 4 (explosion), or
peril 1O (theft), resulting from weather conditions
is covered if these perils apply to your covered
property.
Section I also does not cover the following:
10. Any loss where one or more of the following at

any time directly or indirectly cause, contribute to,
or aggravate the loss:

a. Any conduct, act, failure to act, or decision of
any person, organization, or governmental
entity, whether intentional, wrongful, negligent, or without fault;
b.

Any faulty, inadequate, or defective compaction, design, development, grading, plannlng,
siting, specifications, surveying, workmanship, or zoning;

c.

Any faulty, inadequate, or defective construction, remodeling, renovation, repair, workmanship, or materials, except as is specifically covered under paragraph f of peril 13
(collapse); or

d. Any maintenance of all or any part of any
property whether on or off the insured location.
Any ensuing loss not excluded by any other policy
provision, however, is covered if the loss is
caused by perils 1 through 19, and they apply to
the loss.
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11. Any CD player, MP3 player, satellite radio
receiver, citizens band radio, scanning monitor, or
radar detector, while such device is in or upon
any motorized vehicle if the device is used
primarily in a vehicle. Such device is covered,
however, ff it is factory installed in mobile agricultural machinery insured under Coverage D.

12. Any disc, CD, DVD, or other medium, including
downloaded media, while such items are in a
motorized vehicle. This exclusion does not apply
to a prerecordE';ld software program available to
the public and purchased for use in a laptop or
desktop computer.
13. Any loss caused intentionally by or at the
direction of any Insured.

14. Any loss caused by the possession or manufacturing of a controlled substance.

15. Any loss caused by the intentional dispersal or
application by anyone of pathogenic, poisonous,
biological, or chemical materials.

16. Any land or water.
SECTION I CONDITIONS

1. Dwelling Not Owned by You. If we choose to
insure a dwelllng premises under Section I not
owned by you, the Insured and applicable
coverages are shown in the Declarations.
2.

Duties after Loss. In case of a loss to which this
insurance may apply, the Insured must see that
the following duties are performed:

a.

Give notice as soon as practicable to us, and
also to the police if the loss is suspected to
be caused by someone[s violation of law. In
case of loss under the credit or bank card
coverage, also notify the issuing card
company;

b.

Protect the property from further damage,
make reasonable and necessary repairs
required to protect the property, and keep an
accurate record of repair expenditures;

c.

Prepare an inventory of damaged or stolen
property showing in detail the quantity,
description, actual cash value, and amount of
loss. Attach to the inventory all bills, receipts,
and related documents, that substantiate the
figures and ownership of property in the
inventory;

d. As often as we may reasonably require:
show us your property; provide us with
records and documents we request and allow
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outdoor equipment, whether or not attached
to the buildings, for actual cash value at the
time of loss but not exceeding the amount
necessary to repair or replace.

us to make copies; and submit to examination
under oath while not in the presence of any
other insured and sign the same; and
e.

Within 60 days after our request, submit to us
a signed, sworn proof of loss which sets forth
the following information to the best of the
insuredt.s knowledge and belief:
(1) The time and cause of loss;
(2) The interest of the insured and all others
in the property involved and all encumbrances on the property;
(3) Other insurance which may cover the
loss;
(4} Changes in title or occupancy of the
property during the term of the policy;
(5} Specifications of any damaged property
and detailed estimates for repair of the
damage;
(6} An inventory of damaged
property as described above;

(8) Evidence or affidavit supporting a claim
under the credit card coverage stating the
amount and cause of loss; and

(9) Such other information that we may
reasonably request.

4.

Limit of Liability. Subject to the provisions of this
policy, the most we will pay for loss or damage
from any occurrence is the applicable limit of
liability stated in the Declarations, in the policy
booklet, or in any applicable endorsement.
Loss Settlement. Subject to the applicable limits
stated in the Declarations, in the policy booklet, or
in any applicable endorsement, covered property
losses are settled as follows:

a.

We cover personal property, structures that
are not buildings, farm personal property,
and buildings Insured under Coverage E, for
actual cash value at the time of loss but not
exceeding the amount necessary to repair or
replace. If repair or replacement results in
better than like kind or quality, the insured
must pay for the amount of the betterment.

b.

We
cover floor
coverings,
domestic
appliances, awnings, outdoor antennas, and
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We cover buildings insured under Coverage
A, except for property described in paragraph
4 b above, as follows:

(1) When the full cost of repair or
replacement for loss to a building under
Coverage A is less than $5,000, we will
pay the full cost of repair or replacement
without deduction for depreciation.
(2) If the limit of liability on the damaged
building is less than 80% of its replacement cost at the time of the loss, we will
pay the larger of the following:

i.

Actual cash value of the damaged
part of the buildings; or

ii.

That proportion of the replacement
cost of the damaged part which our
limit of liability on the building bears
to 80% of the full replacement cost of
the building.

or stolen

(7) Receipts for additional living expenses
incurred and records supporting any fair
rental value loss;

3.

c.

(3) If the limit of llability on the damaged
building is at least 80% of Its replacement
cost at the time of loss, we wilt pay the
full cost of repair or replacement of the
damaged part without deduction for
depreciation, but not more than the
smallest of the following amounts:

i.

The limit of liability applicable to the
building;

Ii.

The cost to repair or replace the
damage on the same premises using
materials of equivalent kind and
quality to the extent practicable; or

iii. The amount actually and necessarily
spent to repair or replace the
damage.
(4) When the cost to repair or replace
exceeds 5% of the applicable limit of
liability on the damaged building, we are
not liable for more than the actual cash
value of the loss until actual repair or
replacement ls completed. Such repairs
or rebuilding must be made at the same
location as where the loss occurred. Any
replacement structure must be of a
similar type and use.
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(5) You may make a claim for the actual
cash value amount of the loss before
repairs are made. A claim for any
additional amount payable under this
provision must be made and construction
started within one year after the loss.
d. We do not cover any reduction in value to
your insured property after repairs are
completed.
5. Loss to a Panel, Section, Pair, or Set. In case
of a loss to a panel, section, side, pair, set, or
part, including a loss to cabinets, siding, roofing,
or carpet, we may elect to:
a.

b.

c.

Repair, replace, or restore, the panel, section,
side, pair, set, or part, to its value before the
loss;
Pay the difference between the actual cash
value of the property before and after the
loss; or
Pay the reasonable cost of providing a
substitute to match as closely as practicable
the remainder of the outer covering, panel,
section, side, pair, or set.

We do not guarantee the availability of parts or
replacements. We are not obligated to repair,
match, or replace the entire pair, set, series of
objects, outer covering, or panel, when a section,
side, set, or part, is lost or damaged.
6.

Glass Replacement. Covered loss for breakage
of glass will be settled on the basis of
replacement with safety glazing materials when
required by ordinance or law.

7. Waiver of Subrogation. You may waive in
writing before a loss all right of recovery against
any person. If not waived, we may require an
assignment of rights for a loss to the extent that
payment is made by us.
B.

Other Insurance. If you have other insurance on
the property to which this policy applies, we will
not be liable for a greater portion of any loss than
our pro rata share in excess of any deductible.
Our coverage Is excess, however, over any
restoration plan, home warranty, or similar
coverage, whether or not it is characterized as
insurance.
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9.

Mortgagee Clause. The word ITnortgageeD
includes a trustee of a deed of trust. If a
mortgagee is named in this policy, any loss
payable will be paid to the mortgagee and you, as
interests appear. If a payable loss is under
$10,000 and is for repairs, however, payment
may, at our discretion, be made to you only. If
more than one mortgagee is named, the order of
payment will be the same as the order or
precedence of the mortgages.

If we deny your claim, that denial will not apply to
a valid claim of the mortgagee, If the mortgagee:
a.

Notifies us of any change in ownership,
occupancy, or substantial change in risk of
which the mortgagee is aware;

b. Pays any premium due under this policy on
demand if you have neglected to pay the
premium; and
c.

Submits a signed, sworn proof of loss within
60 days after receiving notice from us of your
failure to do so.

Policy conditions relating to Arbitration, Suit
Against Us, and Loss Payment apply to the
mortgagee.
If this policy is canceled by us, notice will be
mailed to the mortgagee at least 10 days before
the date cancellation takes effect.
If we pay the mortgagee for any loss and deny
payment to you:
a.

We are subrogated to all the rights of the
mortgagee granted under the mortgage on
the property; or

b. At our option, we may pay to the mortgagee
the whole principal on the mortgage plus any
accrued interest. In this event, we have the
right to.receive a full assignment and transfer.
c. Subrogation will not impair the right of the
mortgagee to recover the full amount of the
mortgageels claim.
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SECTION II o LIABILITY INSURANCE
COVERAGE F-1 D BODILY INJURY LIABILITY and
COVERAGE G D PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY
If a claim is made or a suit Is brought against any
insured for damages because of bodily Injury or
property damage, caused by an occurrence to
which this coverage applies, we will:

1.

Pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for
which the insured is legally liable (damages
Includes any awarded prejudgment interest); and

COVERAGE F-2 D PREMISES MEDICAL
Subject to the limit of liability, we will pay reasonable
and necessary medical and funeral expenses
resulting from bodily injury caused by an
occurrence as described below. This coverage does
not apply to you or residents of your household other
than residence employees. This coverage applies
only:

1. To a person on the Insured location with the
permission of any insured; or

2. Provide a defense at our expense by counsel of
our choice. We may investigate and settle any
claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our
obligation to defend any suit or claim ends when
our limit of liability is paid in settlements or
judgments.

Additional Payments. Under Coverages F-1 and G,
we will pay the following expenses In addition to our
limit of liability, but our obligation for these payments
ceases when our obligation to defend ends:

1.

Expenses for first aid to others incurred by any
insured for. bodily injury covered under this
policy. We will not pay for first aid to you or any
other insured;

2. To a person off the Insured location, if the
bodily injury:
a.

Arises out of a condition in the insured
location or the roads or walkways
immediately adjoining;

b.

Is caused by the activities of any Insured;

c. Is caused by the activities of a farm or
residence employee in the
employment by any insured;
d.

course

of

Is caused by an animal owned by or In the
care of any insured; or

2. Expenses incurred by us and costs taxed against

e. Is sustained by any residence employee

any insured In any suit we defend. We do not
cover attorney fees or costs taxed against an
Insured that are associated with any part of a
judgment not covered by this policy;

and arises out of and in the course of
employment.

3. Premiums on bonds required in a suit defended
by us, but not for bond amounts greater than the
limit of liability provided by Section 11 of this policy.
We are not obligated to apply for or furnish any
bond;

We cover only expenses incurred within two years
from the date of occurrence. Any payment under this
coverage applies toward settlement of any claim for
damages against any Insured. We may decline to
make a payment under this coverage if you
disapprove of the payment.

COVERAGE J D NAMED PERSONS MEDICAL

4.

Reasonable expenses incurred by any insured at
our request, Including actual loss of earnings (but
not loss of other income) up to $250 per day for
assisting us In the investigation or defense of any
claim or suit; and

5. Interest on the entire judgment which accrues
after entry of the judgment in any suit we defend
and before we pay, tender, or deposit in court that
part of the judgment which we cover and which
does not exceed the applicable limit of liability.

ID-CQ-02-01(1014)

Subject to the limit of liability, we will pay reasonable
and necessary medical and funeral expenses
resulting from bodily injury caused by an
occurrence. This coverage applies only to persons
named in the Declarations for this Coverage J. Any
payment under this coverage applies toward
settlement of any claim for damages against any
Insured. We cover only expenses incurred within two
years from the date of occurrence. We do not cover
any expenses resulting from sickness or disease.
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COVERAGE L UCUSTOM FARMING
Coverages F-1 and G also cover your custom
farming.

Exclusions. Section II Exclusions do not apply to
Coverage M. The follow exclusions apply. We do not
cover under Coverage M any property damage:

1. Caused intentionally by any insured who is 13
Additional Exclusions. Section II Exclusions apply
to Coverage L. The following additional exclusions
apply. Coverage L does not apply to:

years of age or older;

2.

1. Any damage, injury, or loss of use to the land or
crops upon which the custom farming
performed or is to be performed, arising from:

is

a. The mixing or application of fertilizers,
herbicides, pesticides, fungicides, or other
chemical treatment of real property, seeds, or
crops;

2.

b.

Cleaning of seed; or

c.

Any goods, products, or their containers,
manufactured, sold, handled, or distributed by
or on behalf of any Insured.

3. Arising out of:

a. Any business;
The ownership, maintenance, use, loading, or
unloading of a motor vehicle or aircraft;

c.

Theft, mysterious disappearance, or loss of
use;or

d.

Mechanical or electrical breakdown or failure,
wear and tear, latent defect, or inherent vice;

A delay in or lack of performance by or on
behalf of any insured of any contract or

4. To tires;

agreement, whether written or oral; or

5. Caused by any goods, products, or containers
manufactured, processed, sold,
distributed by an insured; or

b. The failure of any insured!S products or work
performed by or on behalf of any insured to
meet the level of performance, quality,
fitness, or result warranted or represented by
an insured.
Property damage to an lnsured!s work arising
out of it or any part of It. An insuredrs work
includes operations or work performed by an
Insured or on the insured[& behalf. It also
includes materials, parts, or equipment furnished
in connection with the insured!s work or
operations.

COVERAGE M
OTHERS

o

DAMAGE TO PROPERTY OF

We will pay for property damage to property of
others caused by an Insured.
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or

escape of any pollutants.
Additional Conditions. The following
conditions apply to Coverage M:

additional

1. Additional Duties. The insured shall submit to
us within 60 days after the loss, a signed, sworn
proof of loss and exhibit the damaged property, if
within the Insured~ control.

2.

Applfcatlon of Section I. if Section I of this
policy also applies to a loss covered under
Coverage M, Section I is primary and Coverage
M is excess. You must pay any applicable
Section I deductible before Coverage M applies.

3.

Limit of Liability. Our limit of liability under
Coverage M for property damage arising out of
any occurrence will not exceed the lesser of:

or any part of it. Your product means any goods
or products manufactured, sold, handled,
distributed, or disposed of by you in connection
with your custom farming.
Any custom farming conducted more than 100
miles outside the borders of the state of Idaho.

handled,

6. Arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release, or

4. Property damage to your product arising out of it

5.

b.

Damage, injury, or loss of use resuftlng from :
a.

3.

To property owned by or rented to any Insured, a
tenant of any insured, or a resident of any
insuredtS household. This exclusion does not
apply to a rented golf cart when it is being used to
play golf on a golf course;

I

a.

The actual cash value of the damaged
property at the time of the loss;

b. What it would then cost to repair or replace
the damaged property with other property of
like kind and quality; or
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c.

The limit of liability stated in the Declarations
for Coverage M.

Our limit of liability is the most we will pay for any
occurrence regardless of the number of
insureds under this policy or persons or organizations sustaining property damage. Our limlt of
liability is also the most we will pay for all
damages arising out of one or more occurrences
within a 24-hour period.
4.

No Coverage for Defense. We have no
obligation under Coverage M to provide a
defense against any claim or suit brought against
any Insured.

2.

Arising from any location which an Insured owns,
rents, leases, or controls, other than an Insured
location. This exclusion does not apply to bodily
injury of a residence employee arising out of
and in the course of employment by an insured;

3. Which is Intentionally caused by any insured.
This exclusion does not apply to the use of
reasonable force by an insured to protect a
person or property;

4. Arising from the maintenance, operation, use,
entrustment to others, loading, or unloading of
any of the following which any insured owns,
borrows, rents, leases, or operates:

5. Occurrence.

Under Coverage M only, the
definition of occurrence includes property
damage caused intentionally by an Insured who
is under 13 years of age.

a.

Any aircraft;

b.

Any motor vehicle; coverage, however,
applies on the Insured location if the motor
vehicle is not licensed for road use and is
used exclusively on the Insured location; or

c.

Any watercraft if 26 feet or more in length.

6. Our Settlement Options. At our option, we may
pay for the loss in money or may repair or replace
the property. We may settle the claim for loss to
property either with the owner or with you. At our
option, any property paid for or replaced will
become our property. We may Investigate and
settle any claim or suit we decide is appropriate.

This exclusion does not apply to bodily Injury
sustained by a residence employee maintaining,
loading, or unloading a motor vehicle in the
course of employment; it also does not apply to
Coverage J (Named Persons Medical);

SECTION II ADDITIONAL COVERAGES

Section II includes the following additional coverages:
1.

Fire Legal. Coverage G covers property
damage to a lodging place and its furnishings
rented to, occupied by, used by, or in the care of
an Insured, if such property damage arises out
of fire, smoke, or explosion. For purposes of this
fire legal coverage, the term insured includes
only you and those persons listed in paragraph 1
of the definition of Insured. The care, custody,
and control exclusion (exclusion 18) does not
apply to this extension of coverage.

5. Arising out of the use of any aircraft, watercraft, or
motorized land vehicle, including any motor
vehicle, mobile agricultural machinery, or
recreational motor vehicle, while being used in
or following any prearranged or organized racing,
speed, or stunting contest or activity, or in
practice or preparation for any such contest or
activity;
I•

6. Which results from Uability arising out of any
contract or agreement;

7. Arising out of custom farming unless coverage
2.

Newly Acquired Locations. Section II applies to
a newly acquired location if it qualifies as an
Insured location. You must notify us of this
acquisition on or prior to the next renewal date of
the policy or coverage will not apply. You must
pay any additional premium required.

is indicated under Coverage L In the Declarations;

8.

Caused directly or indirectly by war, including
undeclared war, civil war, insurrection, rebellion,
revolution, warlike act by a military force or
military personnel, or destruction or seizure or
use of property for any military purpose, and
including any consequence of these. Discharge of
a nuclear weapon will be deemed a warlike act
even if accidental;

9.

Resulting from any act or omission of a
residence or farm employee while away from
the insured location if the employee is under the
control and direction of some person other than
an insured;

SECTION II EXCLUSIONS

The following exclusions apply to all coverages under
Section II except Coverage M. Section II does not
cover bodily injury or property damage:

1. Arising from any insured!s business activities or
any professional service;
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10. Caused by a substance released or discharged
from an aircraft in connection with dusting or
spraying operations;

19. Property damage to work completed by or for an
insured, any damage arising out of such work, or
out of the materials, parts, or equipment furnished
in connection with such work;

11. Arislng out of the actual, alleged, or threatened
discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release,
or escape of any pollutants. This exclusion
applies only to occurrences arising from farming
or custom farming;

20. Property damage or injury, or loss in value, to

12. Caused by any goods, products, or containers

21. Damages claimed for the withdrawal, inspection,

manufactured, processed, sold, handled, or
distributed by an insured, except farming
products raised on the Insured location. Loss
arising out of the failure of seed sold by an
insured to conform to the variety, type, purpose,
quality, or conditions specified by an insured,
however, is not covered. This Includes but ls not
limited to loss caused by any viral, fungal,
bacterial, or any other type of seed disease. The
term r.seedomeans seeds, bulbs, plants, roots,
tubers, cuttings, or other similar means of plant
propagation;

repair, replacement, or loss of use of an
lnsuredcs products, or work completed by or for
an Insured, or for any property of which such
products or work form a part, if such products,
work, or property are withdrawn from the market
or from use because of any known or suspected
defect or deficiency;

13. Sustained by you or any insured as defined in
paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 of the definition of
Insured or by any other resident of your
residence premises;

14. Arising out of a violation of a criminal law, Youth
Rehabilitation Act, or similar law, except traffic
violations, if committed by any insured;

15. With respect to which any Insured under this
policy is also an insured under a nuclear energy
liability policy issued by a Nuclear Energy Liabillty
Insurance Association, Mutual Atomic Energy
Liability Underwriters, Nuclear Insurance Association of Canada, or any similar organization, or
would be an insured under any such policy but for
its termination upon exhaustion of its limits of
liability;

livestock, goods, or products, including containers, which an Insured raises, manufactures,
sells, handles, or distributes;

22. Punitive or exemplary damages;
23. Bodily injury to any person eligible to receive
any benefits required to be provided or voluntarily
provided by any Insured under any worker[S
compensation, non-occupational disease, disability, or occupational disease law;
24. Bodily injury to a farm employee that arises out
of that employeels work for you. We also do not
cover any damages that the spouse or any minor
children of the farm employee may have that
arise out of a farm employeels bodily Injury.
This exclusion applies whether you may be liable
as an employer or in any other capacity;

25. Property damage to an insured location arising
out of the alienation (for example: selling, leasing,
separating, etc.) of that location;

26. Bodily Injury under Coverage F-2 sustained by
any person residing on the Insured location
except a residence employee to whom workerlS
compensation does not apply;

16. Arising out of the molestation, corporal punrshment, or physical, sexual, emotional, or mental
abuse of any person; or

27. Under Coverages F-2 and J:
a.

Bodily injury involving hernia or back injury,
unless it is of recent origin, it is accompanied
by pain at the time of occurrence, and it did
not exist prior to the date of the alleged injury;

b.

Any person while conducting their business
on the insured location, including the
employees of that person;

17. Arising out of the posting of any information,
opinion, statement, or material of any kind in an
email, text message, or on the Internet by an
Insured, including postings on chat rooms, bulletin boards, social media, biogs, or gripe sites.

Section II also does not cover the following:

18. Property damage to property owned by, used by,

c. Bodily injury to the extent that any medical

rented to, or in the care, custody, or control of any
Insured or the insured[S employees, or as to
which any insured or the insuredrs employees
exercrse physical control for any purpose;

expenses are paid or payable under the
provisions of any workers compensation or
similar law; or
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d.

Expenses for any treatment administered by
anyone not subject to state licensing and any
expense for the purchase or rental of
equipment not primarily designed to serve a
medical purpose;

b.

Immediately forward to us every notice,
demand, summons, or other process relating
to the occurrence; and

c.

At our request, assist in:
(1) Making settlement;

28. Under Coverages F-1 and F-2, bodily injury
sustained by any farm employee arising out of
employment;

(2) The enforcement of any right of contribution or indemnity against any person or
organization who may be liable to any
insured;

29. Bodily Injury or property damage:

a. Arising out of a rodeo or horse racing,
(3) The conduct of suits including attending
hearings and trials; and

including chariot or harness racing, or from
practice or preparations for any of these
activities. This exclusion does not apply to an
insuredtS participation in a riding clubrs
practice, preparation for, or performance in a
rodeo;

(4) Securing and giving evidence and
obtaining the attendance of witnesses.

2.

Payment by an Insured. For any occurrence
involving a potential claim against an insured, an
Insured must not, except at the insuredrs own
cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any
obligation, or Incur any expense other than for
first aid to others at the time of the bodily injury.

3.

DutiesrJ Coverages F·2 and J. The injured
person or claimant shall:

b. Arising out of the use of any horse rented by
an Insured to others;
c.

Arising from rlding instruction given by an
insured for compensation;

d.

Arising out of the training, care, boarding,
pasturing, or act of breeding, of any horse not
owned by an insured; or

e.

Arising out of the lease of all or part of the
insured location for any activity involving
horses;

a.

Give us a signed, written proof of loss
containing the Information we request, under
oath if required, as soon as practicable;

b.

Submit to such medical or other examinations
or evaluations by persons selected by us
when and as often as we may reasonably
require;

c.

At our request, submit to examination under
oath as often as we may reasonably require,
and subscribe the same; and

d.

Execute authorization to allow us to obtain
copies of any medical or other reports or
records.

30. Any occurrence covered under Section Ill; or

31. The transmission of any communicable disease,
bacteria, virus, or parasite, by an insured.

SECTION II CONDITIONS

1.

Duties after Loss. In case of an accident or
occurrence, the insured shall perform the
following duties to the extent possible:
a.

Give a written notice to us as soon as
practicable, which sets forth to the best of the
tnsuredrs knowledge and belief:

If a claim is being made because of the death of
an injured person, the person(s) making the claim
shall comply with paragraphs a, c, and d above.

(1) The identity of the policy and insured;

(2) Reasonably available information on the

Payment of Claim. A payment by us or any
Insured Is not an admission of liability.

time, place, and circumstances of the
occurrence;

5. Limits of Liabilityo Coverages F-1 and G.

4.

Regardless of the number of:

(3) Names and addresses of any claimants
and witnesses; and

(4) Such other information that we may
reasonably request;
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a.

Insureds under this policy;

b. Persons or organizations sustaining damages, bodily injury, or property damage; or

Page 26 of 45

47

c.

Claims made;

our liability for each occurrence is subject to the
following !imitations:
d.

Under Coverage F-1, the bodily injury
liability limit for each person stated in the
Declarations Is the maximum amount we will
pay for all damages arising out of bodily
Injury sustained by one person resulting from
an occurrence, including any emotional
distress or other damages resulting from this
bodily injury and sustained by any other
person.
Subject to the bodily Injury limitation for
each person, the bodily injury liability limit
for each occurrence stated in the Declarations is the maximum amount we will pay for
all damages arising out of bodily injury
sustained by two or more persons resulting
from an occurrence;

e.

f.

Under Coverage G, the property damage
liability limit for each occurrence stated in
the Declarations is the maximum amount we
will pay for all property damage resulting
from an occurrence;
The per occurrence limit of liability for bodily
injury and the per occurrence limit of liability
for property damage caused by farm
products produced on the Insured location
are each the total aggregate limit of our
liability for all such occurrences during the
policy period; and

g. Subject to the above llmitatlons, the
applicable annual aggregate limit of liability
shown in the Declarations is the most we will
pay for all damages from all occurrences
during the policy period. This limitation
applies only to occurrences arising from
your farming activities.

6. Limits of Liabllityu Coverages F-2 and J. Our
limit of liability per person for Coverages F-2 and
J is stated in the Declarations. This is the
maximum amount we will pay for all covered
expenses incurred by or on behalf of each person
who sustains bodily Injury resulting from an
occurrence. This limit is subject to reduction as
explained below.
a.

Our limit of liability in the aggregate for all
physical therapy, massage therapy, and any
treatment by or at the direction of a
chiropractor, per person per occurrence is
the lesser of $2,000 or the limit of liability
stated in the Declarations.

b. Our limit of liability for funeral expenses per
person is the lesser of $5,000 or the limit of
liability stated in the Declarations.
Subject to the limit of liability for each person, our
total limit of liability for each occurrence for
bodily injury sustained by two or more persons
is the per occurrence limlt of liability stated in the
Declarations.
7. Other Insurance . The insurance under Section II
is excess over any other valid and collectlble
insurance. Coverages F-2 and J, however, are
primary coverages.

l,
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SECTION Ill OAUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COVERAGE N O BODILY INJURY LIABILITY and
COVERAGE O o PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY

If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any
insured for damages because of bodily injury or
property damage, arising out of an occurrence
involving an Insured vehicle or a nonowned
vehicle, we will:

1. Pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for
which the Insured is legally liable (damages
includes any awarded prejudgment interest); and
2.

Provide a defense at our expense by counsel of
our choice. We may investigate and settle any
claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our
obligation to defend any claim or suit ends when
our limit of liability is paid in settlements or
judgments.

Additional Payments. Under Coverages N and 0,
we will pay the following in addition to our limit of
liability, but our obligation for these payments ceases
when our obligation to defend ends:

1. Expenses for first aid to others incurred by any
insured for bodily Injury covered under this
policy. We will not pay for first aid to you or any
other insured;

part of the judgment which we cover and which
does not exceed the applicable limit of liability.
COVERAGE P D UNINSURED MOTORIST

We wm pay damages which an Insured ls legally
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an
uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury
sustained by an insured and caused by an
occurrence. The ownerts or operatorls liability for
these damages must arise from the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured motor vehicle.
COVERAGE P-1

We will pay damages which an Insured is legally
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an
underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily
Injury sustained by an Insured and caused by an
occurrence. The owneris or operatorls liability for
these damages must arise from the ownership,
maintenance, or use of the underlnsured motor
vehicle.
Additional Definitions. The following additional definitions apply to Coverages P and P-1:

1. Insured means:
a.

2.

Expenses incurred by us and costs taxed against
any insured in any suit we defend. We do not
cover attorney fees or costs taxed against an
insured that are associated with any part of a
judgment not covered by this policy;

while operated by you or your relative,
except a relative who owns a licensed motor
vehicle not insured by this policy; or
c.

5. Interest on the entire judgment which accrues
after entry of the judgment in any suit we defend
and before we pay, tender, or deposit in court that

ID-CQ-02-01(1014)

Anyone occupying an Insured vehicle.

2. Uninsured motor vehicle means a motor
vehicle:

a.

To which a bodily Injury liability bond or
policy does not apply at the time of the
occurrence;

b.

For which an insuring or bonding company
denies coverage or becomes insolvent: or

c.

Which Is a hit-and-run motor vehicle and
neither the driver nor the owner can be
identified. The hit-and-run motor vehicle

4. Reasonable expenses incurred by any Insured at
our request, including actual loss of earnings (but
not loss of other income) up to $250 per day for
assisting us in the investigation or defense of any
claim or suit; and

If you are a person, you and any relative,
except a relative who owns a licensed motor
vehicle not Insured by this policy;

b. Anyone occupying a nonowned vehicle

3. Premiums on bonds required in a suit defended
by us, but not for bond amounts greater than the
limit of liability provided by this policy. We will also
pay up to $250 for the premium of any bail bond
required of an insured because of an arrest in
connection with an accident resulting from the
use of an insured vehicle. We are not obligated
to apply for or furnish any bond;

o UNDERINSURED MOTORIST
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3.

must hit an insured, an Insured vehicle, or a
vehicle that an Insured is occupying.
Underinsured motor vehicle means a motor
vehicle for which the sum of liability limits of all
applicable liability bonds or policies at the time of
an occurrence Is less than the llmlts of this
coverage. For an occurrence involving only one
insured this means the sum of all applicable per
person limits compared to the per person limit of
this coverage . For an occurrence involving two
or more Insureds, this means the sum of all
applicable per occurrence limits compared to the
per occurrence limit of this coverage.

P-1 under your policy applies to you, however,
while driving a motor vehicle Insured by us that
is owned by a relative;

4.

Bodily injury sustained by an insured while
occupying a motor vehicle owned by any
insured if Coverages P and P-1 do not apply to
that motor vehicle;

5. The liability of an owner or operator of an Insured
vehicle or nonowned vehicle for bodily injury
sustained by a passenger of that vehicle; or

6.
A motor vehicle cannot qualify as both an
uninsured motor vehicle and an underinsured motor vehlcle .

Bodily Injury for which a claim against the owner
or driver of the uninsured or underinsured
motor vehicle is barred by the applicable statute
of !imitations, unless we recelved notice of the
claim before the statute of limitations has expired.

4. An uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle
does not Include any motor vehicle:
a.

Owned or operated by a self-insured as
defined by any applicable motor vehicle law;

b.

Owned by any governmental unit or agency;

c.

Used as a residence;

d.

That does not collide with an Insured, an
Insured vehicle, or a vehicle that an Insured
is occupying, and neither the driver or the
owner can be identified;

e.

Owned by or furnished for the regular use of
you or any relative; or

f.

Which is an Insured vehicle.

Additional Conditions. The following additional conditions apply to Coverages P and P-1:

1. Limits of Liability. Under Coverages P and P-1,
the bodily Injury liabllity limit for each person
stated in the Declarations is the maximum
amount we will pay for all damages arising out of
bodily Injury sustained by one person resulting
from an occurrence, including any emotional
distress or other damages resulting from this
bodily injury and sustained by any other person.
Subject to the bodily injury limitation for each
person, the bodily Injury liability limit for each
occurrence stated in the Declarations is the
maximum amount we will pay for all damages
arising out of bodily injury sustained by two or
more persons resulting from an occurrence.

5. An uninsured or underlnsured motor vehicle

If both Coverages P and P-1 apply to the same
occurrence, our combined limit of liability for all
damages payable under both coverages for: (1)
each person shall be the applicable Coverage P
limit of liability for each person; and (2) each
occurrence shall be the applicable Coverage P
limit of liability for each occurrence.

does not Include any motorized vehicle designed
for recreation use off public roads, including but
not limited to, golf carts, snowmobiles, trail bikes,
mopeds, dune buggies, or all-terrain vehicles.

Additional Exclusions. Section Ill Exclusions and
the following additional exclusions apply to
Coverages P and P-1 . Coverages P and P-1 do not
apply to:
1.

2.

Nonstacking of Limits. Regardless of the
number of insured vehicles, insureds, policies
of insurance with us, premium charges, claims
made, or vehicles involved in the occurrence, the
most we wlll pay for all damages resulting from
any occurrence is the limit of liability shown in
the Declarations, subject to reduction as outlined
in the next paragraph.

3.

Reduction of Amounts Payable. The amount
payable under Coverages P and P-1 shall be the
lesser of our limit of liability stated in the
Declarations reduced by a and b below, or the
total damages for bodily Injury reduced by a and
b below:

Bodily injury sustained by an insured while
occupying a motor vehicle or trailer without the
permission of the owner;

2. The direct or indirect benefit of any insurer or selfInsured under any workerls
disability benefits, or similar law;

compensation,

3. Bodily injury sustained by an insured while
occupying a motor vehicle owned by or
available for the regular use of any insured which
is not an insured vehicle. Any Coverage P or
ID-CQ-02-01(1014)
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mediator. In the event they cannot agree on a
mediator within 10 days, either may request that a
mediator be selected by a judge of a court having
jurisdiction. Both parties shall make disclosure to
each other of all required information at least 20
days prior to mediation. Each party shall pay onehalf of the cost of the mediator; except if the claim
is settled through mediation, we shall pay the
mediatorrs full cost. A request for mediation can
be made within 10 days after a request for
arbitration and supersedes a request for
arbitration.

a. All sums paid or payable by or on behalf of
persons or organizations who may be legally
responsible for the bodily Injury to which this
coverage applies. This includes all amounts
paid under the liability coverage of this policy.
This also includes all applicable liability bonds,
or policies, regardless of whether such bonds
or policies have been exhausted by judgments
or payments; and
b. The sum of all amounts payable under any
workerls compensation, disability, or similar
law.

8. Arbitration and Litigation. If we and an Insured
disagree whether the Insured is legally entitled to
recover damages from the owner or driver of an
uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle or
disagree as to the amount of damages, either
party may make a written demand for arbitration.
Each party will select a competent, impartial
arbitrator within 20 days of receipt of the written
demand. The two arbitrators will select a third
arbitrator. If they cannot agree upon a third
arbitrator within 10 days, either may request that
a judge of a court having jurisdiction select a third
arbitrator. Both parties shall make disclosure to
each other of all Information as required by the
arbitrator(s) in the scheduling and discovery
order. Each party will pay the expenses it incurs,
including attorney fees and related costs, and
bear the expenses of the third arbitrator equally.
Arbitration will take place in Idaho in the county
where the policy was Issued unless both parties
agree otherwise. Local rules of law apply as to
arbitration procedure and evidence. A decision
agreed to by two of the arbitrators will be binding.

Any payment under this coverage to or for an
insured will reduce any amount that person ls
entitled to receive under this policyrs liability
coverages.

4. Payment of Loss. We will pay only after the
insured has satisfied all duties under Section Ill
Conditions, paragraph 6 (Additional Duties of an
Injured Person Cl Coverages P, P-1, and Q) and it
has been determined by agreement, arbitration, a
final judgment, or other method agreed to by us,
that the damages which the Insured Is legally
entitled to recover under this coverage exceeds
the limits of all applicable bonds or policies. We
have the option to pay any amount due under this
coverage as follows:
a.

To the insured;

b.

If the Insured is deceased, to the insured!:s
surviving spouse; or

c.

To a person authorized by law to receive
such payment, or to a person who is legally
entitled to recover the damages that the
payment represents.

At the option of either party, instead of arbitration,
a dispute as to the amount, if any, of the
insured!S loss owing under this coverage will be
determined in a court of competent jurisdiction.
The party selecting this option must make it In
writing and mail or hand deliver it to the other
party. If either party has already asked for
arbitration, the notice must be made no later than
20 days after notice of arbitration was made.

5. Persons not entitled to recovery. A person who
is not an Insured under Coverage P and P-1 is
not entitled to recover damages under these
coverages, including damages for wrongful death
of an Insured.
9.
6.

7.

Hit-and-Run Accident. At our request, the insured shall make available for inspection any
motor vehicle or trailer that the Insured
occupied at the time of a hit-and-run accident.
The insured must notify the police within 24
hours of a hit-and-run accident.
Mediation. After the Insured submits a proof of
loss with the information requested by us, either
the insured or we may make a written demand
on the other for mediation to resolve a claim.
After mediation has been demanded, the parties
shall attempt to agree on a competent, impartial

ID-CQ-02-01 (1014)

Trust Agreement. If a claim or payment is made
under Coverages P or P-1:
a.

We will be entitled to reimbursement of
payments we have made to an Insured to be
taken from the proceeds of any judgment or
settlement.

b.

Paragraph 24 (Our Right to Recover
Payment) under General Conditions
Applicable to This Policy applies to our
recovery rights.
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10. Nonblnding Judgment. No judgment resulting
from a suit brought without our written consent is
binding on us, either in determining the liability of
the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle
operator or owner, or the amount of damages to
which the insured is entitled.

3. The stranding, sinking, burning, collision, or
derailment of any conveyance in or upon which
the vehicle is being transported; or

4 . Theft.
COVERAGE S D COMPREHENSIVE

11 . Interest. The term damages does not include
interest. We are not liable for any interest on any
payment we make under Coverages P or P-1.
COVERAGE Q

o MEDICAL

Subject to the limit of liability, we will pay reasonable
and necessary medical and funeral expenses resulting from bodily injury caused by an occurrence as
described below.
The following are Insureds under Coverage Q:

1. Any person occupying an insured vehicle with
your permission or the pennission of an adult
relative, who sustains bodily injury caused by
an occurrence resulting from the use of this
insured vehicle;

2. You or your relatives who sustains bodily Injury
caused by an occurrence while occupying an

We will pay for any direct and accidental loss of, or
damage to, your insured vehicle and its equipment
not covered by Coverage T. We cover loss or
damage from missiles, falling objects, theft, collision
with animals, or accidental glass breakage under this
coverage.

COVERAGE T

We will pay for direct and accidental loss to your
insured vehicle and its equipment when it is hit by or
hits another vehicle or object, or rolls over. We will
waive any applicable deductible if the collision
involves insured vehicles of two or more of our
policyholders.

SECTION Ill ADDITIONAL COVERAGES

1. Loss to Personal Property. We will pay up to
$750 for loss to personal property being
transported by the insured vehicle if the loss
results from an occurrence involving an Insured
vehicle that is covered under Coverages R, S, or
T. We do not cover cash or securities under this
additional coverage. We do not cover loss by theft
of any personal property unless the loss is
caused by the Insured vehicle being stolen.

insured vehicle or a motor vehicle not owned
by any insured;

3. Any person who sustains bodily injury caused
by an occurrence while occupying a nonowned
vehicle operated by you or a relative; and

4. If you are an individual, you or your relatives who
sustains bodily Injury when struck by a motor
vehicle or trailer while a pedestrian, an equestrian, or while on a bicycle or other vehicle.

o COLLISION AND ROLLOVER

2.

Loss of Use by TheftD Reimbursement.
a.

Any payment under this coverage applies toward
settlement of any claim for damages against any
insured. We cover only expenses incurred within two
years from the date of occurrence. No payment
under this coverage shall be subject to duplicate
payment under Coverages P, P-1, or any liability
coverage of this policy.

Following a theft of an insured vehicle
covered under Coverages R or S, we will
reimburse you for expenses for the rental of a
substitute automobile including taxicabs.

b. Subject to our limit of liability, our duty to
reimburse you begins after the theft has been
reported to us and the police, and terminates,
regardless of expiration of the policy period,
on the date the Insured vehicle is returned
to you, or on such earlier date as we make or
offer settlement for this theft.

COVERAGE R DFIRE AND THEFT ONLY
We will pay for any direct and accidental loss of, or
damage to, your insured vehicle and its equipment
caused by:

c.

Limit of Liability. Our limit of liability per day
and per loss for this coverage are shown In
the Declarations.

1. Fire, lightning, or windstorm;
3.
2.

Smoke or smudge due to a sudden, unusual, and
faulty operation of any heating equipment serving
the premises in which the vehicle is located;

ID·CQ-02-01(1014)

Rental Car and Test Drive Coverage. If
Coverages S and T apply to an Insured vehicle
they also apply to a private passenger car,
pickup, or passenger van that is rented, or test
driven by an insured and qualifies as a
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nonowned vehicle. Coverage applies only if the
vehicle is owned by a new or used automobile
dealer or rental car company. This coverage does
not apply to a relative who owns a motor vehicle
that is insured by another insurance company.
4.

5.

Locks. We wlll pay up to $200 for the cost of rekeying or replacing the locks of an insured
vehicle to which Coverage S applies if the keys
to the vehicle have been stolen during the policy
period. No deductible applies to this coverage.
Loaned trailer liability. Coverages N and 0
apply to you or your adult relative for an
occurrence resulting from the permissive use of
your trailer by someone else. This does not apply
to the use of a trailer for business purposes.

SECTION Ill EXCLUSIONS
Section Ill does not cover:

1. Damages arislng out of the use of a vehicle to
carry persons for a fee. This exclusion does not
apply to a share-the-expense car pool;

2. Any vehicle rented or !eased to others;
3.

Damages arising out of the use of a vehicle ln a
pre-arranged race, speed contest, or other
competition, or preparation for any of these
activities;

4.

Damages which are intentionally caused by any
insured;

5. Any nonowned vehicle while an insured is
using it in the business of selling, repairing,
servicing, storing, or parking motor vehicles,
including road testing and delivery of a motor
vehicle;

6.

Damages caused by nuclear reaction, radiation,
or radioactive contamination;

7.

Any radar or similar detection device, or any
portable GPS or similar electronic device;

9.

Damages caused directly or indirectly by war,
including undeclared war, civil war, insurrection,
rebellion, revolution, warlike act by a military force
or military personnel, or destruction or seizure or
use of property for any military purpose, and
including any consequence of these. Discharge of
a nuclear weapon shall be deemed a warlike act
even lf accidental;

10. Damages caused by the confiscation of Insured
property by a duly constituted governmental or
civil authority;

11. Punitive or exemplary damages;

12. Bodily injury to anyone eligible to receive
benefits that an insured either provides or is
required to provide under any workerrs
compensation or occupational disease law;

13. Under Coverage 0, damage to property owned
by an Insured, or transported by, rented to, used
by, or in the care, custody, or control of an
Insured. This exclusion does not apply to
property damage to:
a. A residence or private garage rented to an
insured; or
b. A nonowned vehicle if there is no
comprehensive or collision coverage on the
vehicle;

14. Under Coverages N, 0, P, and P-1, liability
arising out of any contract or agreement;

15. Under Coverage Q:
a.

b.
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Bodily injury sustained by a person engaged
in the maintenance or repair of an insured

vehicle;
c.

Bodily injury to anyone eligible to receive
benefits under any workerls compensation or
similar law;

d.

Any expenses for any treatment administered
by anyone not subject to state licensing and
any expense for the purchase or rental of
equipment not primarily designed to serve a
medical purpose; or

e.

Bodily injury arising from any lnsuredll use
of a motor vehicle in the commission of a
felony;

8. Any device or instrument designed for recording,
reproduction, amplification, receiving, or transmitting of sound, radio waves, microwaves, or
television signals; or tapes, records, CDs, DVDs,
discs, or other medium, designed for use with this
equipment. This exclusion does not apply to such
device or instrument if it is permanently installed
in the dash, trunk, or console opening at the time
of manufacture or by a dealer when the insured
vehicle is purchased new;

Bodily Injury sustained while an Insured
vehicle is used as a residence or temporary
living quarters;
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r.
I

I

traveling outside the state of Idaho in a state or
province which has a compulsory insurance,
financial responsibility, or similar law applicable to
nonresidents, we will automatically provide the
required minimum amounts and types of
coverages if your policy does not already provide
these coverages, but only to the extent required
by law and only with respect to the operation or
use of the insured vehicle in that state or
province. The required coverage, however, will be
excess over any other valid and collectible
insurance.

16. Under Coverages R, S, and T:
a.

Any loss to a camper, camper shell, topper,
or other shell, unless listed in the
Declarations for these coverages, or unless it
qualifies for coverage as newly acquired
equipment under the definition of insured
vehicle;

b.

Any loss to a camper, camper shell, motor
home, or trailer caused by moisture coming
through seals, joints, or cracks; or loss from
mold, fungi, or wet or dry rot;

c.

Any loss by collapse, explosion, or implosion
of any tank or container;

d.

Any welder or compressor;

e.

Any equipment or accessories contained in
an insured motor home, camper unit, or
trailer, unless the equipment or accessories
are built in and form a permanent part of the
vehicle;

2. Attached Trailers. A vehicle and an attached

f.

Any loss caused by recall of an Insured
vehicle;

g.

Loss to tires, unless damaged concurrent
with other loss covered under Coverages R,
S, or T. This exclusion does not apply to loss
caused by vandalism, theft, or fire;

h.

Damages caused by wear and tear, freezing,
mechanical or electrical breakdown or failure;
any ensuing damage is covered if caused by
other loss covered under Coverages R, S, or
T;

i.

Damages to ariy vehicle caused by any fuel
or fuel additive not approved by the vehiclels
manufacturer;

J.

Any loss resulting from conversion, embezzlement, or secretion, by any person possessing the vehicle under any lien, rental, or
sales agreement; or

k.

Any loss to an insured vehicle caused by
the possession or manufacturing of a
controlled substance, including but not limited
to, methamphetamines; or

trailer will be considered one vehicle under
Coverages N, 0, P, P-1, and Q, and separate
vehicles under Coverages R. S, and T. The
maximum applicable limits of liability in this policy
shall not be increased in any way by this
paragraph.

3. Other Vehicle Insurance in the Company. If
this policy and any other vehicle insurance policy
issued to you or your relative by us or Western
Community Insurance Company apply to the
same occurrence, the maximum limit of our
liability under all of the policies shall not exceed
the highest applicable limit of liability under any
one policy. This is the most we will pay regardless
of the number of Insureds, clafms made, Insured
vehicles, or premium charges.
4.

Payment by an Insured. For any occurrence
involving a potential claim against an Insured, the
insured shall not, except at the insured~ own
cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any
obligation, or Incur any expense other than for
first aid to others at the time of the occurrence.

5.

Duties after Loss. In case of an occurrence, the
Insured shall perform the following duties to the
extent possible:

a.

Give written notice to us as soon as
practicable, which sets forth to the best of the
lnsuredu; knowledge and belief:
(1) The identity of the
insured;

policy and

the

(2) Reasonably available information on the
time, place, and circumstances of the

occurrence;
17. Under Coverage S, any loss resulting from
defective title or failure to obtain proper title.

SECTION IU CONDITIONS
1.

Out of State Insurance. If you have liability
insurance under Section Ill and if an insured is
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(3) Names and addresses of any clafmants
and available wHnesses; and
(4) Such other information that we may
reasonably request;
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I

i.

b.

Immediately forward to us every notice,
demand, summons, or other process relating
to the occurrence; and

c.

At our request, assist in:

and related documents, that substantiate the
figures and ownership of property in the
inventory;
d.

As often as we may reasonably require:
exhibit the damaged property, provide us with
records and documents we request and allow
us to make copies, and submit to examination
under oath while not In the presence of any
other insured and subscribe the same; and

e.

Within 60 days after our request, submit to us
a signed, sworn proof of loss which sets forth
the following information to the best of the
insuredi:S knowledge and belief:

(1) Making settlement;
(2) The enforcement of any right of contribution or indemnity against any person or
organization who may be liable to any
insured;

(3) The conduct of suits, including attending
hearings and trials; and
(4) Securing and giving evidence and
obtaining the attendance of witnesses.

(1) The time and cause of loss;
(2) The interest of the insured and all others
in the Insured vehicle involved and all
encumbrances on the insured vehicle;

6. Additional Duties of an Injured PersonD
Coverages P, P-1, and Q. If Coverage P, P-1, or
Q applies to a loss, the injured person shall:

(3) Other insurance which may cover the
loss;

a. Give us a written proof of loss containing the
information we request, signed under oath if
required, as soon as practicable;

(4) Changes in title of the Insured vehicle
during the term of the policy; and

b. Submit to such medical or other examinations
or evaluations by persons selected by us
when and as often as we may reasonably
require;

(5) Such other information that we may
reasonably request.
8.

Territory. This policy applies only to occurrences within the United States of America (USA)
and Canada. If applicable to your insured
vehicle, Coverages R, S, and T only are

c.

At our request, submit to examination under
oath as often as we may reasonably require,
and subscribe the same; and

d.

Execute authorization to allow us to obtain
copies of any medical or other reports and
records.

extended for trips into that part of the Republic of
Mexico lying not more than 100 miles from the
boundary line of the USA. Our liability will be
determined on the basis of cost at the nearest
USA point.

If a claim is being made because of the death of
an injured person, the person(s) making the claim
shall comply with paragraphs a, c, and d above.

WARNING: Automobile accidents in the Republic

of Mexico are considered a criminal offense,
rather than a civll matter. The insurance provided
by this policy will not meet Mexico automobile
insurance requirements. If you are in an
automobile accident in Mexico and have not
purchased Insurance through a licensed Mexican
insurance company, you may be jailed and may
have your automobile impounded.

7. Additional Duties after Loss o Coverages R, S,
and T. If Coverage R, S, or T applies to a loss,
the insured shall perform the following duties:
a.

Give notice as soon as practicable to us, and
also to the police If the toss is suspected to
be caused by sorneoners violation of law;

b.

Protect the property from further damage,
make reasonable and necessary repairs
required to protect the property, and keep an
accurate record of repair expenditures;

9.

c.

Prepare an inventory of damaged or stolen
property showing in detail the quantity,
description, actual cash value, and amount of
loss. Attach to the inventory all bills, receipts,
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Payment of Claim. Any payment is not an
admission of liability by any Insured or us.

10. Limits of Liability D Coverages N, 0, and Q.

Regardless of the number of:
a.

Insureds or vehicles insured under this

policy;
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b.

Persons or organizations sustaining damages, bodily injury or property damage; or

c.

Claims made;

our liability for each occurrence is subject to the
following limitations:
d.

Under Coverage N, the bodily injury liability
limit for each person stated in the
Declarations is the maximum amount we will
pay for all damages arising out of bodily
injury sustained by one person resulting from
an occurrence, including any emotional
distress or other damages resulting from this
bodily injury and sustained by any other
person.
Subject to the bodily injury limitation for
each person, the bodily injury liability limit
for each occurrence stated in the
Declarations is the maximum amount we will
pay for all damages arising out of bodily
injury sustained by two or more persons
resulting from an occurrence;

e.

f.

Under Coverage 0, the property damage
liability limit for each occurrence stated in
the Declarations is the maximum amount we
.wflf pay for all property damage resulting
from an occurrence; and
Under Coverage Q, our limit of liability per
person is stated in the Declarations. This is
the maximum amount we will pay for all
covered expenses incurred by or on behalf of
each person who sustains bodily injury
resulting from an occurrence. This limit is
subject to reduction as explained below:
(1) Our limit of liability in the aggregate for all
physical therapy, massage therapy, and
any treatment by or at the direction of a
chlropractor, per person per occurrence
is the lesser of $2,000 or the limit of
liability stated in the Declarations; and

Actual cash value is determined by the market
value, age, and condition, at the time the loss
occurred. The cost of repair or replacement is
based on the cost of repair agreed upon by us or
an estimate written based upon the prevalling
competitive price. The prevailing competitive price
means labor rates, and parts and material prices,
charged by a majority of repair facilities in the
area where the Insured vehicle is to be repaired.
We do not cover any reduction in value to your
Insured vehicle after repairs are completed.

12. Non-Original Manufacturer Parts. Under Coverages R, S, and T, we have the right to base our
payment on the cost of non-original equipment
manufacturer parts provided they are certified by
CAP.A., or a similar independent testing organization, as being equivalent to or better than
original equipment.

13. Betterment. Under Coverages R, S, and T,
deductions for betterment and replacement will be
made only for parts normally subject to repair and
replacement during the useful life of the insured
vehicle. Such deductions shall be the lesser of:
a.

An amount equal to the proportion that the
expired life of the part bears to the normal
useful life of the part; or

b.

The amount which the resale value of the
vehicle is increased by the repair or
replacement.

14. Loss Payable Clause. This clause applies if a
lienholder is named in the Declarations.
a.

If a payable loss is for repairs only, we will
pay you. If a payable loss is for the value of
the covered property, we will pay you and the
lienholder as their interests may appear. At
our option we may pay you and the fienholder
for any loss.

b. We cover the interest of the Henholder unless
the loss is intentionally caused by you or is
the result of fraudulent acts or omissions on
your part.

(2) Our limit of liability for funeral expenses
per person is the lesser of $5,000 or the
limit of liability stated in the Declarations.

c. We may cancel this policy during the policy
period. We will mail notice of cancellation to
the lienholder at least 10 days before the dale
the cancellation takes effect.

11. Limit of Liability - Coverages R, S, and T. Our
limit of liability under Coverages R, S, and Tis the
lesser of:
The actual cash value of the insured vehicle
or covered property; or

d.

If we make any payment to the lienholder we
will obtain their rights against any other party.

b. The cost of repair or replacement using parts
of like kind and quality.

e.

We wiff pay the lienholder for their interest
directly if the covered property has been
repossessed.

a.

ID-CQ-02-01(1014)

Page 35 of45

56

f.

15. Loss Settlement. We have the right to settle a
loss with you or the owner of the property in one
of the following ways:
a. Pay up to the actual cash value of the
property;

b.

c.

Policy conditions relating to Arbitration, Suit
Against Us, and Loss Payment apply to the
lien holder.

Pay to repair or replace the property or part
with like kind and quality. If the repair or
replacement results in better than like kind
and quality, you must pay for the amount of
the betterment;

Return the stolen property and pay for any
damage due to the theft; or

d. Take the property at an agreed value, but it
cannot be abandoned to us.

16. Other Insurance. The insurance under Section Ill
is excess over any other valid and collectible
insurance. Coverage Q, however, is primary
coverage.
17. Vehicle Registration. We insure only motor
vehicles registered in the state of Idaho.

SECTION IV C INLAND MARINE INSURANCE
the best of the lnsuredrs knowledge and
belief:

The coverages under this section apply as indicated
by endorsement. Applicable endorsements are listed
in the Declarations. All Section IV policy provisions
apply to these endorsements unless an endorsement
specifically states otherwise.

(1) The time and cause of loss;

(2) The interest of the Insured and all others
in the property Involved and all encumbrances on the property;

SECTION IV CONDITIONS

1.

Duties after Loss. In case of a loss to which this
insurance may apply, the insured must see that
the following duties are performed:

(3) other insurance which may cover the
loss;

a. Give notice as soon as practicable to us, and

(4) Changes in title during the term of the
policy;

also to the police if the loss is suspected to
be caused by someonern violation of law;
b.

c.

d.

(5) Specifications of any damaged property
and detailed estimates for repair of the
damage;

Protect the property from further damage,
make reasonable and necess1;1ry repairs
required to protect the property, and keep an
accurate record of repair expenditures;
Prepare an Inventory of damaged or stolen
property showing in detail the quantity,
description, actual cash value, amount of
loss, and ownership of property. Attach to the
inventory all bills, receipts, and related
documents, that substantiate the figures and
ownership of property in the Inventory;
As often as we may reasonably require:
exhibit the damaged property; provide us with
records and documents we request and allow
us to make copies; and submit to examination
under oath while not in the presence of any
other insured and subscribe the same; and

e. Within 60 days after our request, submit to us
the insuredi:s signed, sworn proof of loss
which sets forth the following information to
ID-CQ-02-01 (1014)

{6) An inventory of damaged property as
described above; and

(7) Such other information that we may
reasonably request.

2.

Loss to a Pair or Set. ln case of a loss to a
panel, section, pair, set, or part, we may elect to :
a.

Repair, replace, or restore, the panel, section,
side, pair, set, or part, to Its value before the
loss;

b.

Pay the difference between the actual cash
value of the property before and after the
loss; or

c.

Pay the reasonable cost of providing a
substitute to match as closely as practicable
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the remainder of the outer covering, panel,
section, side, pair, or set.

The actual cash value of the property; or
a.

We do not guarantee the availability of parts or
replacements. We are not obligated to match,
repair, or replace the entire pair, set, series of
objects, outer covering, piece, or panel, when a
part is lost or damaged.
3. Limit of Liability. Our applicable limit of liability is
shown in each endorsement or an accompanying
schedule.
4.

Loss Settlement. Subject to the limit of liability

The cost to repair or replace the property or
part with like kind and quality.

If repair or replacement results in better than like
kind or quality, you must pay for the amount of
betterment. We do not cover any reduction in
value to your covered property after repairs are
completed.
5.

Other Insurance. The insurance under Section

IV is excess over any other valid and collectible
insurance.

stated In the endorsement or schedule, our
payment for covered losses shall be the lesser of:

POLICY ENDORSEMENTS
The coverage In your policy may be modified by
endorsement. Each of the following endorsements
may or may not apply to your policy. An endorsement
applies only when it is listed in the Declarations. In
addition to the endorsements in this booklet, other
endorsements may apply If listed in the Declarations.
The policy provisions apply to endorsements unless
an endorsement specifically states otherwise.
SECTION I ENDORSEMENTS
1104 (1014) Property Coverage Endorsement. Cov-

erage E, and perils 1 through 9, apply to the following
property:
1. New buildings or structures, or additions to
property covered under Coverage E, while under
construction on the Insured location;
2.

3.

Permanent buildings at a newly acquired premise
that qualifies as an insured location. We also
cover buildings under construction, permanent
structures, fixtures, and fixed equipment, at this
premise; and
Materials and supplies on the Insured location to
be used in construction of the above covered
property.

You must report the new acquisitions on or before the
next policy renewal date and pay the appropriate
premium. New dwellings that qualify for Coverage A
are not covered under this endorsement. This
endorsement does not apply to an Insured location
outside the state of Idaho.

Limit of Liability. The total limit of additional insurance for all property covered under this endorsement
shall not exceed $300,000 untll you report values of
the property to us. Additional premium is due and
ID-CQ-02-01(1014)

computed from the date of property acquisition. At our
discretion, the premium may not be billed until the
next policy renewal.
Loss Settlement Clause. Loss covered under this
endorsement will be settled based on actual cash
value.
1109 (0108) Irrigation Equipment and Spare Truck
Parts Endorsement. Coverage O is amended to

include your irrigation equipment, including irrigation
pumps, buried water lines, electric pump motors,
panels, wiring, transformers, and permanently
installed or portable sprinkler lines and sprinkler
equipment (including
any sprlnkleris
electrical
equipment). In addition to the perils that apply to
Coverage D, this endorsement covers loss to your
pivot or wheel lines caused by collapse if caused by
either weight of ice or snow or by mechanical failure.
Spare truck parts are included in this endorsement If
Indicated in the Declarations.
Our limit of liability for this endorsement is indicated in
the Declarations. The coinsurance requirement under
Coverage D applies separately to this endorsement.
1111 (1014) Replacement Costo Personal Property
Endorsement. Losses under Coverage C will be

settled at replacement cost. This endorsement also
covers domestic appliances, floor coverings, awnings,
outdoor antennas, and outdoor equipment, pertaining
to a dwelling insured under Coverage A. Limitations
on this coverage are explained below.
1. Property Not Ellgible . Property listed below is
not eligible for replacement cost settlement. Any
loss to this property will be settled at actual cash
value at the time of loss but not exceeding the
amount necessary to repair or replace.
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a.

b. Articles whose age or history contribute
substantially to their value, includfng but not
limited to, memorabilia, souvenirs, and
collectorscltems.
c.

Personal property of others.

d.

Articles not maintained in good or workable
condition.

e. Articles that are outdated or obsolete and are
stored or not being used.

2.

Limit of Coverage. Subject to the Coverage C
limit of liability, we will not pay more than the
smallest of the following amounts under this
endorsement
a.

Replacement cost al time of loss without
deduction for depreciation;

b. The full cost of repair at time of loss;
c.

400% of the actual cash value at time of loss;

d.

The actual cash value of any property
purchased or acquired used; or

e. Any special limit of liability applicable under
Coverage C.
Any payment under Coverage C that is not
subject to replacement cost coverage under this
endorsement reduces the Coverage C limit of
liability available under this endorsement for the
same occurrence.

3. Additional Provisions.
a.

b.

means the cost of a new
comparable quality and features.

Antiques, fine arts, paintings, statues, and
other articles, which by their inherent nature
cannot be replaced with new items.

When the replacement cost for the entire loss
under this endorsement exceeds $500, we
will pay no more than the actual cash value
for the loss or damage until the actual repair
or replacement is completed. You must
provide proof of replacement with purchase
receipts or other proof of purchase.
An insured may make a claim for loss on an
actual cash value basis and then make claim
within one year after the loss for any
additional amount payable under this
endorsement.

article

of

1114 (1014) Borrowed Equipment Endorsement.
We cover under Coverage D, loss to mobile
agricultural machinery in which you have no interest
and is not available for your regular use, provided
such machinery has been borrowed by either you or
your employees, and is being used in the conduct of
your own farming operation. This coverage will apply
as excess over any insurance that the owner has on
this property. Our limit of liability per occurrence
under this endorsement is stated in the Declarations.
1116 (1014) Cosmetic Roof Damage Endorsement.
Coverages A and E do not cover cosmetic damage to
roof surfacing caused by wind or hail, meaning
marring, pitting, or other superficial damage that
alters the appearance of the roof surfacing but does
not prevent it from functioning as a barrier to the
elements to the same extent as before the cosmetic
damage occurred.

1118 (0108) Scheduled Farm Personal Property
Endorsement. Coverage D is changed to cover only
the scheduled categories of farm personal property
listed in the Declarations. The coinsurance clause is
changed to apply individually to each category.

1125 (1014) Sewage or Sump System Backup
Endorsement. Coverages A, B, and C are amended
to inctude loss caused by water or sewage backup
into your insured dwelling, meaning water or sewage
backup from a sewer, septic or sump system not
caused by peril 14 (Accidental discharge or
overflow of water) . Section I Exclusions, except
exclusion 3 c, apply to this endorsement.
This coverage is limited to damage to your dwelling
and personal property in the dwelling. It does not
Include service, damage, or repair to a sewage,
septic, or sump system. The Coverage A and C limits
for this endorsement are stated in the Declarations.
Each limit is the annual aggregate limit for all losses
during the policy period.
If a loss covered under this endorsement is caused by
a broken sewer tine on the residence premises, we
wilt pay up to $2,500 to excavate that sewer line, but
not to repair it. Any amount paid for excavation is
included in the limit applicable to this coverage.

1130 (0108) Elimination of Livestock under Cover•
age D Endorsement. There is no coverage for livestock under Coverage D.

1133 (1014} Limited Fungi, Wet or Dry Rot, or
c.

Under this endorsement, replacement cost
means the cost at the time of loss of a new
item identical to the one for which the claim is
made. If an identical item is not available, it
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Bacteria Coverage Endorsement.

1.

Definition. Fungi means any type or form of
fungus, including mold, mildew, mycotoxins,
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spores, scents, or their by-products which they
produce.
2.

3.

4.

Coverage. Coverage under this endorsement
applies only to dwellings insured under
Coverage A (Your Dwellings) and personal
property insured under Coverage C {Personal
Property) located in those dwellings. We cover
direct, physical loss caused by fungi, wet or dry
rot, or bacteria, but only when such loss is the
result of perils 1-19 under SECTION I PERILS
INSURED AGAINST and only if all reasonable
means were used to save and preserve the
property from further damage resultfng from the
peril insured against. SECTION I ADDITIONAL
COVERAGES • Debris Removal does not apply
to any loss under this endorsement. The fungi or
bacterial exclusion in peril 14 (Accident discharge or overflow of water} does not apply to
coverage under this endorsement.
Additional General Exclusion. Except as indicated above, we do not cover any loss caused
by fungi, wet or dry rot, or bacteria whether an
insured peril is involved or not. This exclusion
applies to all property insured under Section I.
Limit of liability. Our limit of liability for this
coverage for loss to each Coverage A dwelling
and the personal property located in that
dwelling Is stated In the Declarations. Our limit
of liability is the most we will pay for:

5.

Conditions.
a.

This endorsement applies only to perils and
losses which occur during the policy period.

b.

If there Is any loss to covered property not
caused in whole or in part by fungi, wet or
dry rot, or bacteria, our loss payment will not
be limited by the terms of this endorsement
except to the extent that fungi, wet or dry
rot, or bacteria, causes an increase in the
loss. Any such increase in the loss will be
subject to the terms of this endorsement.

c.

The limitations of coverage under this
endorsement do not apply to loss from
fungi, wet or dry rot, or bacteria if such loss
is a result of fire or lightning.

d.

The policy provisions apply unless this
endorsement states otherwise.

1171 (0108) Glass Deductible Waived Endorsement. No deductible applies to glass breakage to the
building(s) insured under Coverage A. This endorsement does not apply to window framing or other
materials that are not glass.

1183 (1014) Increased Replacement Cost Endorsement. Our limit of liability applicable to a dwelling
insured under Coverage A to which this endorsement
applies will be increased by the percentage shown In
the Declarations for this endorsement if:

The total of all loss caused by fungi, wet or
dry rot, or bacteria;

1. You Insure your dwelling for 100% of its

b.

The cost to remove fungi, wet or dry rot, or
bacteria from covered property;

replacement cost as we estimate based on the
accuracy of information you furnish, and you pay
the premium we require;

c.

The cost to tear out and replace any part of
the covered property as needed to gain
access to the fungi, wet or dry rot, or
bacteria; and

a.

2. You accept any annual adjustment we make to
the limit·applicable to your dwelling and you pay
the additional premium; and

3. You notify us within 90 days of the start of any
d.

The cost of testing of air or property to
confirm the absence, presence, or level of
fungi, wet or dry rot, or bacteria whether
performed prior to, during, or after removal,
repair, restoration, or replacement. The cost
of such testing will be provided only to the
extent_ that there rs reason to believe that
there is a presence of fungi, wet or dry rot,
or bacteria.

Our llmlt of liability ts the most we will pay for the
total of all loss or costs under this endorsement
for the covered dwelling and personal property
located in that dwelling regardless of the
number of claims made during the policy period.
This limit does not increase our limit of liability
under Coverage A or Coverage C.
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additions or other physical changes that increase
the value of your dwelllng on the dwelling
premises by $5,000 or more, and pay the
additional premium.
Subject to our limit of liability, losses under this
endorsement are covered for the cost of repair or
replacement of the damaged part with new materials
without deduction for depreciation, but not more than
the amount spent to repair or replace the damage on
the same premises using new materials of equivalent
kind and quality to the extent practical.
Paragraphs c (1 ), (2), and (3) of the Loss Settlement
paragraph of SECTION I CONDITIONS are deleted.
This endorsement is void if you fail to comply with its
provisions.
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Our calculation of the replacement cost of your
insured dwelllng is our estimate using software
widely used in the insurance industry. You are
responsible to see that the limit that applies is
adequate to replace your property.
SECTION II ENDORSEMENTS

one that becomes uncontrollable or breaks out
from where it was intended to be.
2.

The bodily injury or property damage arises
from the accidental above ground contact with
herbicides, pesticides, fungicides, or fertilizers,
caused by the application of the same to an
Insured location and provided that:

1220 (1014) Combined Single Limit EndorsementCoverages F-1 and G. The Limits of LiabilityCoverages F-1 and G paragraph under SECTION fJ
CONDITIONS is changed to read as follows:

a.

The contact begins during the policy period;

b.

The contact begins at an established time
and place;

5. Limit of LiabiJityo Coverages F-1 and G.
Regardless of the number of:

c.

The contact ends no more than 7 days after
the beginning of the contact as identified in
the requirements of 2 b;

d.

The bodily injury or property damage must
occur within 12 months of said application;
and

e.

The application is not from an aircraft.

a.

Insureds under this policy;

b.

Persons or organizations sustaining damages, bodily Injury, or property damage; or

c.

Claims made;

our liability for each occurrence is subject to the
following limitations:
d.

Our total combined single limit of liability
under Coverages F-1 and G for all bodily
Injury and property damage resulting from
one occurrence shall not exceed the
applicable limit of liability stated in the
Declarations.

e. The per occurrence combined single limit of
liability for bodily injury and property
damage caused by farm products produced
on the Insured location is also the total limit
of our liability for all occurrences during the
policy period.
f.

Subject to the above limitations, the
applicable annual aggregate limit of liability
shown in the Declarations is the most we will
pay for all damages from all occurrences
during the policy period arising from your
farming activities.

3. The bodily injury or property damage arises out
of a short-term pollution event. As used in this
endorsement, a short-term pollution event means
a discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of
pollutants directly from either an insured
location or mobile agricultural machinery
being operated by an insured which:
a.

Begins during the policy period;

b.

Begins at an identified time and place;

c.

Ends at an identified time within 7 days of the
beginning of the discharge, dispersal,
release, or escape of the pollutants as
identified in the requirements of 3 b, and
involves no further discharge, dispersal,
release, or escape of additional amounts of
the pollutants after the end date;

d.

ls reported to us within 37 days of its
beginning;

1223 (0108) Limited Pollution Coverage Endorse•

e.

ment basic form. Coverages F-1 (Bodily Injury
Liability} and G (Property Damage Liability) apply to
bodily injury or property damage caused by an
occurrence and arising out of the actual discharge,
dispersal, seepage, migration, release, or escape of
pollutants but only on the following conditions: (a) it
is a claim or suit by a non-governmental entity or
private person and (b) the claim meets alt the
requirements of one of the three following numbered
paragraphs:

Is not a repeat or resumption of a previous
discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of
the same pollutants from essentially the
same source within 14 months of a previous
discharge, dispersal, release, or escape;

f.

Is not covered under paragraphs 1 or 2
above;

g.

Does not originate from an underground
storage tank; and

1. The bodily injury or property damage arises out

h. Is not animal waste, which includes manure,

of heat, smoke, or fumes from a hostile fire. As
used in this endorsement, a hostile fire means
ID-CQ-02-01(1014)

or a by-product of animal waste from:
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1.

(i) Any farming operation where animals,
Including fish, are fed and confined in any
pen, corral, shed, barn, or other
enclosure; or
(ii) Any animal waste collection device,
holding facility, or disposal system.

Llmlt(s) of Liability, Expenses and Defense Costs.
The limit(s) of liability applicable to occurrences
under paragraph 3 is shown in the Declarations with
reference to this endorsement. The per occurrence
limit of liability is also the total aggregate limit of our
liability for all such occurrences during the policy
period. The limit(s) of liability applicable to Coverages
F-1 and Coverage G applies to an occurrence under
paragraphs 1 and 2 above.
Claims expense and defense costs, for losses
covered under paragraph 3, reduce the limft of
liability, both per occurrence and aggregate limit of
liability, notwithstanding any other defense provisions
In the policy.

Exclusions. We do not cover:
(a) Under paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, any claim for treble
damages, punitive damages, fines, penalties,
monitoring tests, or similar assessments;
(b) Under paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, any claim for
nuisance or trespass;
(c) Under paragraph 3, any claim for bodily injury
which arises from or has as a component of the
bodily Injury, asthma, cystlc fibrosis, or any
other ailment caused by or aggravated by smoke
or any other pollutants that comes from any
agricultural burning, including but not limited to,
the burning of weeds, grasses, fann crops, crop
residue, or any other plant matter;
(d) Under paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, any loss, damage,
cost, or expense, directly or indirectly caused by,
contributed to by, resulting from, or arising out of
or in connection with any act of terrorism
regardless of any other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any other sequence to the
loss; or
(e) Under paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, any loss, damage,
cost, or expense, directly or indirectly caused by,
contributed to by, resulting from, or arising out of
or in connection with any action in controlling,
preventing, suppressing, retaliating against, or
responding to any act of terrorism.
An act of terrorism Includes any act, preparation
to act, or threat of action: (1) designed to
influence the government de jure or de facto of
any nation or any political division, (2) in pursuit of
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political,
religious,
ideological,
or
s[milar
purposes, or (3) to intimidate the pubHc or a
section of the public of any nation, by any
person(s) whether acting alone or on behalf of or
in connection with any organization or
government de jure or de facto, and which:
(i) involves violence against any person;
(ii) involves damage to property;
(iii) endangers llfe other than that of the person
committing the action;
(iv) creates a risk to health or safety of the public
or a section of the public; or
(v) is designed to interfere with or to disrupt an
electronic system.

Additional Provisions.
Except as specifically provided in paragraphs 1, 2,
and 3, and subject to all conditions stated in those
paragraphs, this endorsement does not apply to or
provide any coverage for any liability arising out of the
actual, alleged, or threatened discharge, dispersal,
seepage, migration, release, or escape of pollutants.

If Coverage L (Custom Farming) applles, all
Coverage L conditions, limitations, and exclusions
also apply to this endorsement.
Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous, or
thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke,
vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, waste,
or anything defined by federal or state law as a
pollutant. Waste includes materials to be recycled,
reconditioned, or reclaimed.
The policy provisions apply unless this endorsement
states otherwise.

1259 (1014) Accidental Death Endorsement. If you
or any of your unmarried children under age 25 who
qualify as an Insured dies as a result of an
occurrence, we will pay the limit of liability for this
coverage as indicated in the Declarations. We do not
cover any death that results more than 90 days from
the date of the occurrence.

1. Additional Exclusions. Except for exclusion 13,
Section II Exclusions pertaining to bodily injury
apply to coverage under this endorsement. The
following exclusions also apply. We do not cover
any death:
a.

Caused by suicide, attempted suicide, or any
intentionally self-inflicted injury, regardless if
the person is incompetent or suffers from a
mental illness; or

b. To any insured 81 years of age or older on
the date of occurrence; or
c.

Caused by heart attack, heart failure, stroke,
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any illness, disease, or physical ailment.

2. Notice and Proof of Claim. Upon notice of claim,
we will provide a fonn for filing a proof of loss.
Payment under this coverage will be made as
follows:
a. In the case of death to a named Insured, to
the surviving spouse;
b. In the case of death to a qualifyfng child, to
you ; or

c. If the beneficiary is deceased, to the estate of
the decedent.
1269 (0108} Limited Employerrs Liability Endorsement. Coverages F-1 and F-2 are extended to apply
to bodily injury caused by an occurrence and
sustained by a person performing labor for you in
your farming operation, but only if you are not
required by law to provide workerrs compensation
benefits or coverage for this bodily injury. Coverage
F-2 does not apply to a person or their employees
while they conduct their business on the insured
location.

6. Injury sustained by any person as a result of an
offense directly or indirectly related to the
employment of this person by the insured;

7.

Injury sustained by an Insured;

8.

Injury arising out of the business pursuits of an
Insured;

9. Civic or public activities performed for pay by an
Insured;

10. Injury arising out of the molestation, corporal
punishment, or physical, sexual, emotional, or
mental abuse of any person;

11. Injury arising

out of the posting of any
information, opinion, statement, or material of any
kind on the Internet by an insured, including
postings on chat rooms, bulletin boards, social
media, biogs, or gripe sites;

12. Injury arising out of any material in an e-mail or
text message sent by an Insured; or

13. Injury arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of any pollutants.

1282 (1014) Personal Injury Endorsement. Under
Coverage F-1, we cover personal injury. Personal
injury means injury other than bodily Injury arising
out of one or more of the following offenses:

1. False arrest, detention or Imprisonment, or

Additional Condition. Our applicable per occurrence limit of liability shown in the Declarations is
also the most we will pay for all damages from all
occurrences during the policy period.

malicious prosecution;

SECTION Ill ENDORSEMENTS

2.

Libel, slander, or defamation of character; or

1309 (1014) Employerrs Nonownership Liability
Endorsement. Coverages N and O cover your

3.

Invasion of privacy, wrongful eviction, or wrongful
entry.

liability and the liability of your executive officers
arising out of the use of a nonowned motor vehicle
In your farming or household activities by any person
other than you.
·

Exclusions. SECTION II EXCLUSIONS do not apply
to this endorsement. This endorsement does not
cover:

1. Liability arising out of any contract or agreement;

1. Definition. In this endorsement, nonowned
motor vehicle means a motor vehicle, trailer,
or semi-trailer not owned by, registered in the
name of, hired by, leased by, or loaned to you or
your executive officers.

2.

Injury caused by a violation of a criminal law or
ordinance;

3.

Injury arising out of the oral or written publication
of materials if done by or at the direction of an
Insured with the knowledge that it Is false;

a.

Injury arising out of an oral or written publication
that was first published before the beginning of
the policy period;

b.

2. Application of Insurance.

4.

5.

Injury caused by or at the direction of an insured
with the knowledge that the insured would violate
the rights of another and would inflict injury;
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This endorsement does not apply to any
motor vehicle owned by any of your
executive officers or their spouses.
This insurance does not apply to any motor

vehicle owned by or registered in the name
of a partner if your business is in the form of
a partnership.
1312 (1014) Automobile Accidental Death Benents
Endorsement.
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the time of the occurrence; otherwise, the
death benefit is payable to the insured
decedentts estate.

Death Benefit. We agree to pay $10,000 if an
Insured dies solely as the result of bodily Injury
caused by an occurrence while occupying or if
struck by a motor vehicle. Death of the insured
must occur within one year after the date of the
occurrence.
Exclusions. The following additional exclusions apply
to this endorsement. This endorsement does not
cover:

b.

We shall have the right to have an autopsy
performed where it is not forbidden by law.

The paragraphs titled Nondupllcation of Insurance
Benefits, Subrogatlono Our Right to Recover
Payment, and Other Insurance, do not apply to this
endorsement.

1. Death caused by or resulting from disease,
except infection resulting from bodily injury to
which this insurance applies;

2.

Bodily injury sustained by an insured engaged
in the maintenance or repair of a motor vehicle;

3.

Bodily injury to an Insured arising out of the
business of selling, repairing, servicing, storing, or
parking motor vehicles, including road testing or
delivery;

1313 (1014) Combined Single Limit EndorsementCoverages
P
and
P-1
(Uninsured
and
Underinsured Motorist). The limits of !!ability
paragraph pertaining to Coverages P and P-1 under
Additional Conditions applicable to Coverages P
and P-1 is changed to read as follows:

1.

Limit of Liability. Regardless of the number of:
a.

Insureds or vehicles insured under this
policy;

operation, loading, unloading, or occupying of a
public or commercial motor vehicle;

b.

Persons or organizations sustaining bodily
injury; or

5. Bodily injury to an insured while occupying a

c.

Claims made;

4. Bodily injury to an insured arising out of the

motor vehicle without the permission of the
owners; or

6.

Bodily injury to an Insured while occupying a
motor vehicle owned by or available for the
regular use of any insured which is not an
insured vehicle.

Conditions. The following additional conditions apply
to this endorsement:

1. Insured means only those persons listed in the
Declarations as persons to whom this endorsement applies.

2. Notice of Claim. The insured!S spouse or someone acting on behalf of the insured!s heirs shall:
a.

Give us a signed, written proof of loss
containing the information we request, under
oath if required, as soon as practical; and

our liability for each occurrence is subject to the
following limitation: Our total combined single limit
of liability under Coverages P and P-1 for all
bodily Injury resulting from one occurrence
shall not exceed the applicable limit of liability
stated in the Declarations.
Separate Limits Requirements. We will apply the
combined single limit to provide any separate limits
required by law for bodily Injury. This provision,
however, will not Increase our total limit of liability.
1320 (1014) Combined Single Limit Endorsement•
Coverages N and 0. The limits of liability paragraph
pertaining to Coverages N and O under Section Ill
Conditions is changed to read as follows:

10. Limit of Liability. Regardless of the number of:

a. Insureds or vehicles insured under this
policy;

b.

3.

Execute authorization to allow us to obtain
copies of medical reports and records.

b.

Persons or organizations sustaining bodily
Injury or property damage; or

c.

Claims made;

Payment of Death Beneflto Autopsy.
a.

If the insured decedent is survived by a
spouse who is a resident of the same
household at the time of the occurrence, the
death benefit Is payable to the decedent!S
spouse. If the insured decedent was a minor,
the death benefit is payable to any parent
who was a resident of the same household at
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our liability for each occurrence Is subject to the
following limitation:
Our total combined single limit of liability under
Coverages N and O for all bodily Injury and
property damage resulting from one occurrence
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shall not exceed the applicable limit of liability
stated in the Declarations.
Separate Limits Requirements. We will apply
the combined single limit to provide any separate
limits required by law for bodily Injury and
property damage. This provision, however, will
not increase our total limit of liability.
1324 (1014) New Vehicle Loan Coverage Endorsement. For each Insured vehicle to which this
endorsement applies, our limit of liability for a covered
total loss shall be increased to cover the interest of a
lienholder in the vehicle which exceeds the actual
cash value of the vehicle subject to the following:

1.

The llenholder must be listed in the Declarations;

2.

The lienholder must be a financial institution
licensed or chartered under state or federal law;
and

3.

Our maximum ffmit of liability is an additional 20%
of the actual cash value of the insured vehicle at
the time of loss.

Additional Provisions.

1.

2.

3.

Total loss in thfs endorsement means that the
cost of repairs exceeds the actual cash value of
the Insured vehicle less salvage value.

1. The cost of a new vehicle of the same make,
model, size, class, body type, and equipment as
your insured vehicle; or

2. The amount you paid the dealer for the vehicle
when It was purchased.
Additional Exclusions. This endorsement does not
cover:

1. An Insured vehicle that is damaged or stolen
more than one year past the date you bought it;

2. A motor vehicle that you lease or you do not

own; or
3.

a.

Resulting from overdue payments;

b.

Resulting from the cost of an extended
warranty, credit life or other insurance; or

c.

Resulting from
previous loans.

1.

This endorsement does not apply unless you
replace within 60 days of the date of the loss, the
insured vehicle that is damaged or stolen.

2.

If a replacement vehicle of the same make,
model, size, class, body type, and equipment is
not available, we may require that you replace the
vehicle with one that is similar in size, class, body
type, and equipment as we may determine.

3.

Total loss in this endorsement means that the
cost of repairs exceeds the actual cash value of
the insured vehicle less salvage value.

4.

This endorsement applies only to an insured
vehicle:

carry-over balances from

This endorsement applies only to an Insured
vehicle that:
You purchased new from a new car dealer
and it had mlleage of less than 1,000 miles
on the date of purchase;

b.

Is financed under an original purchase lien;

c.

Is covered under Coverages S (Comprehensive) and T (Collision}; and

d.

Is a private passenger car or van, or a pickup.

This endorsement does not apply to any loss for
which you make claim under 1326 (0108) (New
Vehicle Additional Coverage Endorsement).

1326 (1014) New Vehicle Additional Coverage Endorsement. For each Insured vehicle to which this
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An insured vehicle that has been driven more
than 20,000 miles.

Additional Provisions.

We do not pay any amount of a lien:

a.

4.

endorsement applies, for a total loss we shall pay the
cost to replace the Insured vehicle without deduction
for depreciation. Our limit of liability under this
coverage will not exceed the lesser of:

5.

a.

That is covered under Coverages
(Comprehensive) and T (Collision);

S

b.

That you purchased new from a new car
dealer and it had mileage of less than 1,000
miles on the date of purchase; and

c.

That is a private passenger car or van, or a
pickup.

This endorsement does not apply to any loss for
which you make claim under 1324 (0108) (New
Vehicle Loan Coverage Endorsement}.

1334 (1014) Roadside Assistance Endorsement.
We will pay for reasonable and necessary roadside
assistance expense caused by the disablement of
your Insured vehicle and incurred at the place of
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disablement. Roadside assistance includes only the
following:
1.

Unlocking the Insured vehlcle if the keys have
been locked inside the vehicle or If the keys have
been fost;

2.

Battery jump and flat tire repair;

3.

Labor for on-site mechanical repairs;

4. Towing or winch-out service; or
5. Delivery of up to 3 gallons of gasoline, antifreeze,
or other motor vehlcle fluids.
If you are pulling a trailer with your insured vehicle,
items 2, 3, and 4 above also apply to the trailer If It or
your Insured vehicle Is disabled.

2. The expense incurred by you for taxicabs.

When Coverage Begins and Ends. Coverage
applies during a period starting on:

1. The date of loss if as a direct result of this fess
the insured vehicle cannot be operated under its
own power; or

2.

If the insured vehicle is operable, the date you
authorize repairs and deliver the vehicle to the
repair shop.

Regardless of the polfcy period, our liability for taxicab
or rental fees shall end on the earliest of the following:

1. Upon completion of repair or replacement of
property lost or damaged; or

2. Upon such date as we make or tender settlement
The limit applicable to this coverage Is indicated in the
Declarations. No deductible applies to this coverage.
The limit for this coverage is not increased if both
your Insured vehicle and the trailer it is pulling are
disabled.

1368 (1014) Car Rental Reimbursement Endorsement. If a loss exceeds the applicable deductible to
the insured vehicle under Coverages S or T, we
agree to reimburse you for:
1.

for the loss or damage.

Limit of Liability. Our limit of liability per day and per
accident for this coverage are shown In the
Declarations.
Other Coverage. This coverage shall not apply in the
event of a theft of the insured vehicle for which
reimbursement of transportation expense is provided
elsewhere in this policy.

The expense incurred by you for the rental fee
(excluding all other charges) of a substitute automobile from a car rental agency or garage; or

ID-CQ-02-01(1014)
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EXHIBITB
67

IIIIFamt Bu.reaw111utual I11s11rmu:e Co111pm1y efltlalto
P.O. Box 4848 • Pocatello, Idaho• 83205-4848

Fax: (800) 574-5066

March 2, 2016

Edgar Cook
491476 Hwy 95
Sandpoint, ID 83864

RE:

Sent Certified Mail

Insured: Edgar and Laurie Cook
Claimant: Joseph Stanczak
Policy No. Ol-A-028872-01
Date of Loss: 06/28/15
Claim No. 01038872012015062801

Dear Mr. Cook:
Late last week, I sent to you Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company's ("Farm Bureau's") coverage opinion
regarding the above-referenced matter in a letter dated February 23, 2016. That coverage opinion needed to be
updated with an analysis of the actual claim and settlement proposal that was submitted by Joseph Stanczak's
lawyer by his letter dated February 1, 2016 ("Settlement Proposal"), a copy of which I have attached to this
amended coverage opinion.
As such, please consider this letter Farm Bureau's amended coverage opinion and reservation of rights regarding
a claim that has been made against you by Joseph Stanczak with respect to a shooting that occurred at your
property located at Bloom Lake, Idaho, on June 28, 2015.
Last fall you advised us of this potential claim and provided us with communications from Mr. Stanczak' s
attorney indicating that he had been retained and would be in touch. However, we heard nothing further from Mr.
Stanczak or your on this potential claim, until recently when Farm Bureau received the Settlement Proposal from
Mr. Stanczak's counsel which will be summarized below. Farm Bureau has now reviewed the Settlement
Proposal, Edgar Cook's verbal statement previously given in this matter, and other relevant documents and
information in making its coverage decision on this matter.
Now that an official claim has been made, we have evaluated this claim in light of the insurance policy you have
with Farm Bureau, specifically Country Squire Insurance Policy Ol-A-038872-01 (the "Policy") with the Policy
period of January 26, 2015 - January 26, 2016. After reviewing the Policy and the information provided to date,
including your recorded statement, please be advised that there does not appear to be any insurance coverage
under the Policy for the injuries/damages that are being claimed by Mr. Stanczak, and given the questions raised
regarding coverage under the Policy, Farm Bureau hereby issues this reservation of rights notice to you. Granted
our investigation is ongoing and we are happy to review any additional information you may provide us relative
to this claim, but at this point, please be advised that there likely is no coverage under the Policy for
Mr. Stanczak's claims.

BACKGROUND
Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook are the owners of real property located in Bonner County,
Idaho. The property consists of 200 acres, a lake called Bloom Lake, and a small cabin. It is our understanding
that neither you nor your wife reside in the cabin located on this property, and in fact, in your sworn statement
you indicated that the cabin and surrounding property are not close to where you actually reside and you only get
up to this property every couple of years.
It does appear, however, that you do operate some sort of a campground on the real property near Bloom Lake. It
is our understanding that you do not charge an up-front fee for campers to use this campground and lake, but you
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do solicit voluntary financial donations from campers and that campers can leave in a donation box located at the
campground. You have indicated that the donations are just enough to pay the infrastructure costs for the
campground.
For the past seventeen (17) years, you have allowed one Michael Jessie Chisholm ("Chisholm") to reside in the
cabin on the real property in exchange for taking care of your property, including the lake, the cabin, and the
campground. It is unclear how Chisholm initially came into contact with you some seventeen (17) years ago or
how you got to know him. However, Chisholm has never and does not now receive any monetary remuneration
for his maintenance activities, that is, you have not and do not pay him a wage or salary of any sort.
There are no public utilities for the cabin and Chisholm pays for any gas, propane, or other supplies used for
heating or maintenance of the cabin and camp ground areas. You indicated that Chisolm' s main responsibilities
include keeping the "lake up to specs"; keeping the weeds down; taking out the trash accumulated by the campers
using the property; and maintaining the road. You indicated that you also provide some equipment to Chisholm
in order to maintain the real property, including a weed eater, snowmobile, and diesel generator. You have stated
that you do not believe there is an employment relationship between Chisholm and you, the owners of this
property.
On June 28, 2015, Chisholm was involved in an altercation with Joseph Stanczak. Mr. Stanczak was apparently
camping at the campground when he and Chisholm had an argument and a physical altercation. From news
reports, the men may have eventually entered the cabin located on the real property. At some point, Chisholm
fired multiple shots from a .45-caliber automatic pistol at or in the direction of Mr. Stanczak and some of those
bullets struck Mr. Stanczak.
The Settlement Proposal contains Mr. Stanczak's version of the events. Mr. Stanczak alleges that on the evening
of June 28, 2015 Chisholm and his friend, Sarah Johns, were spending time with Mr. Stanczak and his girlfriend,
Susan Jackson, at the Bloom Lake Campground. Mr. Stanczak alleges that Chisholm became intoxicated. Mr.
Stanczak was also intoxicated as his medical records indicate that his blood alcohol level was 0.24. At some point
in the evening, Chisholm invited Mr. Stanczak and Susan Jackson into a cabin located at the campground because
Mr. Stanczak and Susan Jackson claimed to be having trouble fighting off the mosquitoes. Mr. Stanczak alleges
that sometime after arriving at the cabin (its unclear how much time had passed) Chisholm began acting
belligerently and inappropriately towards Susan Jackson. An argument ensued, and Mr. Stanczak left the cabin
and started walking towards Susan Jackson's pickup. As he was walking, Chisholm apparently exited the cabin
and pulled out a .45 caliber handgun and shot Mr. Stanczak twice, once in the back and once in the left arm.
Chisholm then jumped into his truck and drove away from the scene. He crashed his truck and tried to hide in the
woods, but was later apprehended by the police and taken into custody.
Chisholm was subsequently charged with aggravated battery with a deadly weapon and use of a deadly weapon in
commission of a felony. In reviewing the repository for the pending criminal case, it appears Mr. Chisholm
bonded out of jail in late August 2015. Trial was set for January 11, 2016, but on January 5, 2016 Chisholm
entered an Alford plea of guilty to the charge of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, which the Judge
accepted. The use of a deadly weapon in commission of a felony charge was apparently dropped. Chisholm's
sentencing is currently set for March 8, 2016.
Mr. Stanczak survived the shooting, but was hospitalized for a period of time. Back in July, Mr. Stanczak
retained counsel who have advised you that they may be making a claim against you and have asked that you to
report this potential claim to Farm Bureau. Again, you have previously provided Farm Bureau with that Jetter.

Mr. Stanczak's Settlement Proposal contains additional information regarding his injuries and claimed damages
against you because of Chisholm's actions. Mr. Stanczak's claim.<; against you allege negligence based upon the
condition of your premises, namely the Bloom Lake Campground. Mr. Stanczak also alleges a theory of recovery
based upon agency, i.e., that you are responsible for the actions of Chisholm.
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Mr. Stanczak alleges that he incurred just over $80,000 in medical expenses arising from the shooting. The lion's
share of these expenses relate to $30,000 for the life flight and $41,000 for expenses relating to his hospital stay at
Kootenai Medical Center from June 28-30, 2015. The other expenses relate to follow-up treatment, imaging,
medical and anesthesia services, and follow-up visits. Mr. Stanczak also alleges that he will require $10,000 in
future medical care for physical therapy services and pain medication.
Apparently, one of the bullets is still lodged in Mr. Stanczak' s pelvic bone and cannot be removed because of its
proximity to an artery. The bullet apparently causes Mr. Stanczak regular pain. Mr. Stanczak claims to have
previously worked as a welder but alleged in the letter that he can no longer work as a welder because of his
injuries. Mr. Stanczak alleges that he made nearly $50,000 a year as a welder and that he has past lost wages in
the amount of nearly $30,000 and a potential loss of future earning capacity of $840,000 based upon his 21 years
until retirement age. In the Settlement Proposal, Mr. Stanczak also notes that he has a claim for pain and
suffering between the range of $500,000 to $3,000,000.
Mr. Stanczak concludes his Settlement Proposal by making a settlement offer in the amount of $950,000.
You have previously inquired whether there is any coverage under the Policy and whether Farm Bureau will be
defending you against any claim that Mr. Stanczak may make against you and your wife. To be clear, the only
issue this coverage opinion addresses is whether this potential claim by Mr. Stanczak will be covered under your
Farm Bureau insurance policy. We are not analyzing and offer no opinion as to whether Mr. Stanczak has any
direct valid legal claim against you and your wife, whether Chisholm was your employee, whether you and your
wife would have vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondent superior etc. We seriously doubt whether
Mr. Stanczak can make such a claim against you, but in the event that he does, there does not appear to be any
insurance coverage for that claim.

THE POLICY
The Policy has three separate coverage sections: Section I (Property), Section II (Liability), and Section III
(Automobile). (In case you do not have your copy handy, I am enclosing another copy of the certified Policy and
Declaration sheets.) As this claim does not relate to a property or auto loss, only Section II is implicated and will
be addressed.
The Policy Declarations list only the individuals Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook as the
"Insureds." There is no business or other entity insured by this Policy. The Policy Declarations also note that the
Policy period is 1/26/2015 - 1/26/2016. The Policy Declarations for Section II Liability Coverage include
coverage for Bodily Injury Liability (coverage Fl) and for Premises Medical Coverage (coverage F2). The Policy
Declarations also note that premises under Section II includes "Location 02," one residence and 200 acres, which
is the Bloom Lake location and cabin. Finally, the Policy Declarations state that Section II coverage is subject to
four endorsements, including: Endorsement I220 (Combined Single Coverage Limits), Endorsement 1269
(Limited Employer's Liability Endorsement), Endorsement I282 (Personal Injury Endorsement), and
Endorsement 1287 (Limited Pollution Coverage Endorsement).
The Policy contains a number of relevant definitions, including the following:
Business means a full-time or part-time trade, profession, occupation, or activity,
engaged in for compensation, other than farming or custom farming ....

Farming means the production of fruit, nuts, or field crops, or the raising or
keeping of livestock, fish, or bees, or the raising of mink, fox, or similar small
mammals for fur production ....
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Insured means you or the entity named in the Declarations. The following are
also insureds:
1. If you are a person, insured also means, if residents of your household, your
spouse, your relatives, and minors in the care of you or your relatives ....

Insured location means:
1. A location listed in the Declarations where you maintain a form or residence,
including private approaches;

Insured location does not include property where a business is conducted.

Occurrence means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the
same harmful conditions, which results in unexpected bodily injury or property
damage during the policy period. All bodily injury and property damage
resulting from a common cause wil1 be considered the result of one occurrence.

Relative means a person related to you by blood, marriage, or adoption, who is a
resident of your household, include a ward or foster child. This definition applies
only if you are a person.
Residence employees means someone employed by you who performs duties in
connection with the maintenance or use of the residence premises. This .
includes a person who performs duties for you elsewhere of a similar nature not
in connection with your business or farming.
Residence premises means, if shown in the Declaration: (a) a dwelling that is
your principal residence, including its grounds and private garages, or (b) that
part of any other building where you reside. A residence premises does not
include any part of a building used for business.
Section II Liability Coverage contains two relevant coverages, Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) and F2 (Premises
Medical Coverage). Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) allows for the following coverage:
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for damages because
of bodily injury or property damage, caused by an occurrence to which this
coverage applies, we will:
1. Pay up 'to our limit of liability for the damages for which the insured is
legally liable (damages includes any awarded prejudgment interest); and
2. Provide a defense at our expenses by counsel of our choice ....
The Policy provides coverage under Coverage F2 (Premises Medical Coverage) as follows :
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Subject to the limit of liability, we will pay reasonable and necessary medical and
funeral expenses resulting from bodily injury caused by an occurrence as
described below. This coverage does not apply to you or residents of your
household other than residence employees. This coverage applies only:
1. To a person on the insured location with the permission of any insured . . ..

Both of the above-described coverages are subject to several exclusions, including the following:
The following exclusions apply to all coverages under Section II . . . . Section Il
does not cover bodily injury or property damage:
1. Arising from any insured's business activities or any professional service;

3. Which is intentionally caused by any insured. This exclusion does not apply
to the use of reasonable force by an insured to protect a person or property.

14. Arising out of a violation of a criminal law ... if committed by any insured.
Two relevant Policy endorsements state the following:
I269 (0108) Limited Employers Liability Endorsement. Coverages F-1 and F-2
are extended to apply to bodily injury caused by an occurrence and sustained by
a person performing labor for you in your farming operation . ...
I282 (1014) Personal Injury Endorsement. Under Coverage F-1, we cover
personal injury. Personal Injury means injury other than bodily injury arising
out of one or more of the following offenses:
1. False arrest, detention or imprisonment, or malicious prosecution;
2. Libel, slander, or defamation of character; or
3. Invasion of privacy, wrongful eviction, or wrongful entry.
(Bold emphasis in original.)
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF IDAHO LAW REGARDING
CONSTRUCTION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS

The Idaho courts have set forth certain rules for determining whether a claim is covered by an insurance policy.
An insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the insured and must be construed the same way as any
other contract. See Auto Club Ins. Co., Inc. v. Tyrer, 560 F. Supp. 755 (D. Idaho 1983), aff'd, 734 F.2d 20 (9th
Cir. 1984); see also Anderson v. Title Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 875,655 P.2d 82 (1982). Like any other contract, an
insurance policy is to be construed as a whole, the court looking to the plain and ordinary sense of the words used
in the policy. See Miller v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 108 Idaho 896, 702 P.2d 1356 (1985); see also Juker v.
Am. Livestock Ins. Co., 102 Idaho 644, 637 P.2d 792 (1981); Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505, 600
P.2d 1387 (1979). Absent ambiguity, words are to be given their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. See
Meckert v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 108 Idaho 597, 701 P.2d 217 (1985). Where the language of the insurance
policy is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for construction thereof and coverage must be determined
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according to the plain meaning of the words employed. See Kromrei v. AID Ins. Co. (Mut.), 110 Idaho 549, 716
P.2d 1321 (1986).
Where the language of the insurance policy is susceptible to only one meaning, that meaning will be given effect.
See Burgess Famis v. New Hampshire Ins. Grp., 108 Idaho 831, 702 P.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1985). Where a word or
phrase in an insurance policy has a settled legal meaning or interpretation, that meaning will be given effect even
though other interpretations are possible. See Nielsen v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 223, 596
P.2d 95 (1979); Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cook, 92 Idaho 7, 435 P.2d 364 (1967). See also Mut. of
Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4, 843 P.2d 154 (1992). However, not every word and phrase in an insurance
contract needs to be defined. See id.; see also State Fann Fire & Cas. v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693, 946 P.2d 1333
(1997).

COVERAGE ANALYSIS
Referring to the Policy language above, your Policy only applies to "bodily injury" caused by an "occurrence" for
which coverage applies. The plain and unambiguous provisions of the Policy cited above preclude coverage for
the purposeful and intentional shooting of Mr. Stanczak by Chisholm. There is no coverage for the damage or
injuries suffered by Mr. Stanczak as a result of the referenced shooting under the Policy under either Section II Fl
(Bodily Injury Liability) or F2 (Premises Medical Coverage). There also is no coverage for Mr. Stanczak's
claimed injuries under any other coverages provided for in your Policy.
A.
Section II Fl (Bodily Injury Liability).
Again, Section II Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) provides coverage to an Insured if a claim is made or a suit is
brought against the Insured for damages because of bodily injury caused by an occurrence. Chisholm is not
covered for his actions under Section II F 1. First, Chisholm is not a named Insured under the Policy. The Policy
was issued just to you and your wife, and the Policy Declarations only list the two of you as the named Insureds.
There is no business or other entity listed as an Insured. Chisholm is not a "relative" who might be considered an
additional insured under the Policy. There is no definition or other provision under the Policy that would include
Chisolm as an Insured. Because he is not an Insured, Chisolm is not entitled to coverage under the Policy. To the
extent you had a "business" related to your Bloom Lake property, no such business is insured under the Policy
and no employees of that business are insured by the Policy.
Second, even if Chisholm was somehow an Insured under the Policy no occurrence occurred under Coverages F 1
or F2. Again, an occurrence is "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the same harmful
conditions, which results in unexpected bodily injury .... " Webster's Online Dictionary defines "accident" as a
"sudden event ... that is not planned or intended and that causes damage or injury." The shooting in question
was not an accident because it was not a sudden event that was not intended. Rather, if Chisholm shot Mr.
Stanczak multiple times as reported, his actions were most likely intended to cause injury. Likewise, the shooting
did not cause unexpected bodily injury. The shooting caused bullet wounds to Mr. Stanczak, which is the
expected injury when pointing and shooting a gun at another man.
Courts agree with this interpretation. The Texas Court of Appeals in Texas Famz Bureau Underwriters v.
Graham, 450 S.W.3d 919, 926-28 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014) recently confrrmed the majority view and found no
coverage under an insurance policy for a shooting because it was not an accident nor did it cause unexpected
injuries. See also Home Owners Ins. Co. v. Chammus, Case No. 299412, slip op. at 2-3 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Neal, 304 Ga. App. 267, 268-70 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); Stone v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co., 34 S.W.3d 809 (Ky. App. 2000) (shooting was clearly not an accident, intent to harm inferred from
nature of act of pointing and shooting gun at victim.); Norman v. Ins. Co., 239 S.E.2d 902, 905-06 (Va. 1978);
Harris v. Richard~, 867 P.2d 325 (Kan. 1994) (intent to injure inferred since serious bodily injury was natural
consequence of shooting gun into back of occupied truck); Barton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 527 So. 2d 524 (La. App. 3
Cir. 1988) (intentional act exclusion barred coverage under policy for shooting through a door knowing someone
was on other side); Allstate v. Peasley, 80 Wn. App. 565 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (criminal act exclusion applied in
shooting case as exclusion meant an act for which a criminal conviction may result).
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You also reported that Mr. Chisholm may allege that he did not intentionally aim and shoot at Mr. Stanczak, but
rather, he only intended to fire warning shots at Mr. Stanczak which accidently did, in fact, hit Mr. Stanczak and
cause injury to him. Even if that is the case and the evidence comes out which supports this assertion by Mr.
Chisholm, it is doubtful that said fact will change the coverage analysis under your Policy. While there does not
appear to be any Idaho law on this point, other courts have stjlJ found that in this situation there is no
"occurrence" under an insurance policy because there still was an intentional act of firing a gun irrespective of
whether the gun was aimed at the shooting victim and regardless of whether the shooter intended to actually cause
physical harm to the shooting victim. The injury suffered by the victim was still the natural consequence of the
intentional acts of picking up a loaded gun, aiming in the direction of the victim, and pulling the trigger. Berry v.
McLemore, 795 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1986) (no occurrence under policy even though shooter only fired warning
shots; intentional act of firing weapon sufficed to find no coverage); Allstate v. Cannon, 44 F.Supp. 31 (E.D.
Mish. 1986) (fact that rifle was discharged intentionally resulting in finding of no occurrence under the policy and
no coverage despite fact shooter meant to only fire warning shots).
In light of the foregoing, Mr. Stanczak' s claims related to his injuries and damages do not describe an
"occurrence," and without an occurrence under the Policy, there is no coverage for Mr. Stanczak's injuries or
damages.

Third, even if Chisholm was an Insured under the Policy and an occurrence occurred under the Policy, there are
specific Policy exclusions that would also bar coverage for Mr. Stanczak's claims. Mr. Stanczak has argued that
the operation of the campground was a business activity of yours because you invited or licensed campers to
come on to your property for a voluntary donation. They will further argue that Chisholm was your employee,
because even though he was not paid a wage or salary he was paid to do work on your property by viltue of the
fact that you allowed him to reside in your cabin on this property without paying rent. If Chisholm was somehow
your employee (ignoring that he would likely still not be performing duties within the scope of his employment)
given that you had some business related to the operation of Bloom Lake and the campground, then Mr.
Stanczak' s claims would still be specifically excluded under Section II Exclusion Number 1 because you have no
insurance coverage under this Policy arising out of any of your "business activities." This would be the case
even, if as you have indicated, your operation of the campground and lake was only a break even proposition as
best given the fee collections generated from campers.
In looking at whether an activity is a business pursuit, the courts will typically look at: whether the activity is
customary to a business pursuit and whether the objective and purpose of the activity are commercial in nature,
and in furtherance of the business, or the means of livelihood. Blacks v. Fireman's Fund American Ins., 115
Idaho 449 (Ct.App. 1989). Applying these factors, your activity of offering up campground sites in exchange for
a voluntary fee, may be considered a business pursuit as its objective may be deemed to be commercial in nature.
And it does not appear to matter whether you made a profit on this activity for it to be considered a business
pursuit which would then bar any coverage for that activity under your Policy.
Similarly, Section II Exclusion Number 3 excludes bodily injury intentionally caused by an Insured. Thus, even
if Chisholm was somehow found to be an Insured under the Policy-which he is not-his intentional act of
shooting Mr. Stanczak would be excluded. Again, Chisolm may say that he did not intentionally cause bodily
injury to Mr. Stanczak, but that he was shooting warning shots. The intentional act of shooting a gun near a
person is sufficient grounds to deny coverage under Section II Exclusion Number 3. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herman,
551 N .E.2d 844 (Ind. 1990) (Intentionally firing gun into a fleeing crowd is an egregious act and intent to injure
may be inferred as a matter of law).
Finally, Section II Exclusion Number 14 excludes bodily injury that arises out of the violation of a criminal law
by an Insured. As noted above, Chisolm has entered a guilty plea for the charge of aggravated battery with a
deadly weapon. The type of guilty plea entered by Chisolm is called an Alford plea. Under Idaho law, an Alford
plea occurs where a defendant enters a plea of guilty, but asserts that he or she is innocent. Irrespective, an Alford
plea is a guilty plea. State v. Salisbury, 143 Idaho 476, 147 P.3d 108 (2006). A judge has discretion to accept an
Alford plea and will do so only where there is sufficient evidence that that the prosecution would likely be able to
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persuade a jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, it sounds like the judge
presiding over the criminal case has accepted Chisholm's Alford plea, thus fmding that the prosecution would
likely be able to convict Mr. Chisholm of this crime if it moved forward.
In this situation, because Chisholm entered a guilty Alford plea, he admits to violating criminal law. Chisholm
gave up his defenses to the shooting charge by entering into the Alford plea. He and others are bound by his
admission and abandonment of his defenses. One court has noted the following:
Under an Alford plea, a defendant maintains innocence while entering a plea of
guilty because the defendant concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty
plea and the record before the court contains strong evidence of actual guilt. A
guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of the criminal charge. Guilty pleas
must be rooted in fact before they may be accepted. Accordingly, courts treat
Alford pleas as having the same preclusive effect as a guilty plea. The collateral
consequences of a guilty plea may not be avoided by the simultaneous assertion
of innocence.

Cortese v. Black, 838 F.Supp. 485, 492 (D. Colo. 1993). See also, Merchants Mutual Ins. Co. v. Arzillo, 98
A.D.2d 495, 472 N.Y.S.2d 97 (N.Y.App.Div. 1984) (with Alford type plea, the issues representing the essential
elements of the crime have necessarily been judicially determined by the acceptance of the plea); State Fann Fire
& Cas. Co. v. Sallak, 140 Ore. App. 89, 914 P.2d 697 (Or.Ct.App. 1996) (acceptance of plea is the equivalent of a
judicial determination of each of the material elements of the crime).
Chisholm admits to violating a criminal law. So, even if Chisholm was an Insured under the Policy and an
occurrence did occur, it arose out of a violation of Idaho criminal law and the intentional act exclusion of the
Policy is therefore implicated. Therefore, there is no coverage. See Colorado Fann Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Snowbarger, 934 P.2d 909 (Colo. Ct.App. 1997) (guilty plea to intentional criminal act precluded coverage under
homeowners insurance policy; no duty to defend or indemnify; intent cannot be relitigated so as to avoid the
intentional act exclusion of an insurance policy); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Groshek, 161 Mich.App. 703,
411 N.W.2d 480 (Mich.Ct.App. 1987) (defendant's guilty plea established the necessary intent to make the
insurance policy's exclusionary clause applicable).
Bottom line, under Section II Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) of the Policy, there does not appear to be any coverage
for the injuries and damages that Mr. Stanczak may claim arising out of being shot by Chisholm.

B.

Section II F2 (Premises Medical Coverage).

For all the same reasons, there is no coverage for Mr. Stanczak's potentially claimed medical expenses under
Section II F2 (Premises Medical Coverage) of the Policy. This section does not require that the actors be insured.
Rather, it gives coverage for medical costs for those who suffer bodily injury caused by an occurrence to those
who are on the insured location with permission of an Insured. From what we understand, there may be no
dispute that Mr. Stanczak was on the insured location with permission, if he in fact was camping at the
campground on your property.
However, there was still no occurrence as that term is defined in the Policy. As outlined above, shooting
someone is not an accident and does not caused unexpected injuries. Without an occurrence causing bodily
injury, there is no coverage under Section II F2 (Premises Medical Coverage) of the Policy for Mr. Stanczak's
potentially claimed medical expenses.
Even if there was an argument that there was an occurrence under the Policy, the same exclusions, specifically
Exclusion Nos. 1, 3 and 14 identified and discussed above, would preclude coverage for any medical expenses
claim by Mr. Stanczak arising out of the shooting.
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As such, there is no coverage for any claimed medical expenses of Mr. Stanczak under Section II F2 (Premises
Medical Coverage) of the Policy.

C.

Other Language of the Policy.

Someone may argue that Chisholm somehow is a "residence employee" under the Policy and that as result
thereof, coverage for Mr. Stanczak's claims exists. As outlined above, the Policy does define a residence
employee as someone who performs duties in connection with the maintenance or use of a "residence premises."
Certain coverages are then provided for those residence employees, for example, to the extent they are hurt on an
insured premise or insured location. However, Chisholm is not a residence employee as that term is defined in the
Policy. The maintenance that employee performs must be in connection with the "residence premises," which is
also a defined term in the Policy. That term is limited to a dwelling that is the insured's principal residence or
part of any other building where the insured resides. You have made it clear in your statement that neither you
nor your wife reside in the cabin or at Bloom Lake. In addition, the Policy only affords coverage for the actions
of residence employees that occur off an insured location and are caused by activities within the residence
employee's course and scope of the employment by you, the Insured. Neither of these requirements is satisfied
here because the shooting allegedly occurred on an insured location and Chisholm was not acting in the course
and scope of his employment by you.
In addition, the same exclusions under Section II would bar coverage for Mr. Stanczak's claims even if Chisholm
was somehow found to be a "residence employee" as that term is defined in the Policy.
We have also confirmed that none of the Policy "endorsements" provide or contemplate any additional coverage
that would cover Mr. Stanczak' s claims. None of the endorsements provided on the declaration sheet for this
Policy are applicable. For example, Endorsement 1269 (0108), the Limited Employers Liability Endorsement,
only contemplates coverage for someone injured while engaging in farming activities. Chisholm did not engage
in farming activities as contemplated by the Policy definition. Similarly, Endorsement 1282 (1014), the Personal
Injury Endorsement, does not contemplate coverage for injuries arising from an intentional shooting but rather
deal with personal injury resulting from specific offenses like false arrest, libel and slander, and invasion of
privacy.

CONCLUSION
As a result of the foregoing analysis and our investigation to date, there does not appear to be coverage for the
injuries and damages that Mr. Stanczak may assert. As such, Farm Bureau is hereby reserving any rights and
defenses which may now exist and all rights and defenses which it may later have under all the termc,, conditions,
provisions and exclusions of your insurance Policy with Farm Bureau This letter is intended to provide you with
an explanation of Parm Bureau's cmrent position in relation to the investigation of Mr. Stanczak's potential claim
and the lack of coverage for that claim under the terms of the Policy. This letter does not alter in any way or
amend the terms of the Policy, nor is this letter intended to provide an exhaustive recitation of Farm Bureau's
coverage position on all matters discussed herein. Fann Bureau reserves all rights and tlefe,,ses which may
110w exist and all riglzts a11d defe11ses which it may hereafter have under any or all ofthe terms, conditio11s,
provu;ions, endorsements, and exclusions o{the Policy whether or not they are referenced ill this letter. Farm
Bureau specifically reserves its rights to add additional defenses to coverage and to modify or amend this
coverage position based upon further investigation of the facts and circumstances pertaining to this matter or
based upon any additional information you or anyone else may provide. Farm Bureau also reserves the right to
seek a judicial determination of its rights and obligations, if any, under the Policy.
To the extent additional information is provided or a specific claims is made, Fann Bureau will certainly continue
to investigate this claim even though it does not appear any coverage would exist under the Policy for Mr.
Stanczak's claims. However, no act of any Farm Bureau representative while investigating this claim shall be
construed as waiving any company rights. Farm Bureau reserves the right, under the Policy, to continue to deny
coverage to anyone claiming coverage under the Policy related to the shooting that is the subject of this coverage
opinion.
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Farm Bureau also reserves the right to supplement or update this letter. No actions taken by or on behalf of Farm
Bureau in connection with this claim shall constitute an admission of liability or an admission of coverage under
the Policy that is at issue.

In addition, please be aware of your continuing obligation to fully and completely cooperate in connection with
this matter, together with your obligation to keep Farm Bureau fully informed and apprised of developments as
they proceed. Again, it is our understanding that no lawsuit has yet been filed against you by Mr. Stanczak. In
the event you are served with any other demand or lawsuit, please notify me immediately and forward copies of
all documents served on you to my attention so that I can continue my coverage review.
If you have any questions as to the content of this coverage position letter, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely,

P,::;0)1Sr. Regional Claims Manager
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co
1250 S. Allante Ave, Boise, ID 83709
(208) 947-2478
SJ/js
cc:

File

Enclosures: (1) Policy, (2) 2/1/16 Settlement Demand from Wes Larsen to Farm Bueau.
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MOFFATT
THOMAS
Attorneys at Law

James L. Martin
{208) 385-5303
jlm@moffatt.com

MAILING ADDRESS:
PO Box 829
Boise ID 83701-0829

PHYSICAL ADDRESS:
101 S Capitol Blvd 10th Fl
Boise ID 83702-7710

ww,u. moffan.com

208.345. 2000 MAIN
800.422.2889 TOLJ.,,FREE
208.385.5384 FAX

March 22, 2016
via Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
I.

i

!
Edgar and Laurie Cook
c/o Elmira Store & Cafe
490870 Highway 95
Sandpoint, ID 83864

Re:

Claim No. 01038872012015062801
Claim by Joseph Stanczak
Policy No. 01-A-028872-01
Date of Loss: June 28, 2015
MTBR&F File No. 13900.0252
Dear Mr. Cook:
Our firm has been assisting your insurance company, Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company
("Farm Bureau") with its investigation and coverage determinations regarding the claim being
made by Joseph Stanczak for the injuries that he sustained at your north Idaho property at
Bloom Lake when he was allegedly shot by Michael Chisholm on June 28, 2015. We
understand that Farm Bureau has previously provided you with two separate reservation of
rights notices ("ROR Notices") wherein it indicated to you that there did not appear to be any
coverage under your Farm Bureau policy for the claims of Mr. Stanczak, but that it was
continuing with its investigation and reserving all rights in the meantime.
The purpose of this letter is to advise you that Farm Bureau has now completed its
investigation. We are not aware of any additional information that has been provided to Farm
Bureau by you or Mr. Stanczak's attorney since Farm Bureau sent out its prior ROR Notices.
Nor are we are aware of any information that would otherwise change the coverage analysis
contained within those prior ROR Notices.
As such, Farm Bureau has concluded that there is no coverage under your Farm Bureau
insurance policy for any claim arising out of the incident that occurred on your property on June
28, 2015 involving Joseph Stanczak and Michael Chisholm. As such, Farm Bureau will not be
able to provide you with a defense for any claim or resulting lawsuit filed by Mr. Stanczak. Nor

BOISE • POCATELLO • IDAHO FALLS
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Edgar and Laurie Cook
March 22, 2016
Page2

will Fann Bureau be able to indemnify you for any resulting judgment arising from any such
lawsuit or this claim. By separate letter, a copy of which is enclosed, we have advised Mr.
Stariczak's attorney of this coverage determination.
Farm Bureau bases this denial of coverage on the policy's insuring agreement, as well as other
coverage provisions and limitations set forth in the policy and which were described to you in
detail in the prior ROR Notices which are incorporated herein by reference. Farm Bureau
reserves the right to rely upon any and all defenses of non-coverage and does not admit any
obligations under the policy. Certainly, if Farm Bureau is provided additional information from
you or others regarding Mr. Stanczak's claim or the subject incident, then Farm Bureau reserves
the right to modify this denial of coverage determination to the extent that additional
information is determined to be relevant to this coverage determination.
Farm Bureau continues to fully and expressly reserve all rights and defenses which may now
exist and all right and defenses which it may hereinafter have under any and all of the terms,
conditions, provisions, and exclusions of the policy, as well as all endorsements thereto,
irrespective of whether or not they are referenced in its prior ROR Notices. Farm Bureau
specifically reserves its right to add additional defenses to coverage and to modify and amend
its coverage determination based upon further investigation of the fact or circumstances
pertaining to this matter or upon the discovery or notice of facts not currently available to it.

I

!i·

No actions taken by or on behalf of Farm Bureau in connection with this claim shall constitute
an admission of liability or an admission of coverage under the subject Farm Bureau policy.
If you have any questions, please give me a call.

JLM/peb
Enclosure

Cllent:4103630.1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

c...r::

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

0
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMP ANY OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 2016-0590

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

vs.
EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR. and LAURIE
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife; and
JOSEPH STANCZAK,
Defendants.

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 1
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Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company ofldaho ("Farm Bureau"), by
and through undersigned counsel, hereby complains and alleges as follows against Edgar
Wilkins Cook, Jr., Laurie Frances Cook, and Joseph Stanczak.
1.

This is a claim for declaratory judgment regarding whether there is

coverage for certain claims under an insurance policy issued by Farm Bureau.
2.

Farm Bureau is an Idaho Domestic Insurance Company authorized to do

business in the state ofldaho, with its principal place of business in Pocatello, Bannock County,
Idaho, whose business includes entering into insurance contracts, including automobile insurance
policies and homeowner' s insurance policies.
3.

Upon information and belief, Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances

Cook (the "Cooks") are husband and wife and are residents of Bonner County.
4.

Upon information and belief, Joseph Stanczak ("Stanczak") is a resident

of Boundary County, Idaho.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

5.

Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 57 and Title 10, Chapter 12 of

the Idaho Code, the Court is vested with the jurisdiction to declare the rights and legal
relationships of the parties of the contract of insurance referred to in this Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment. A controversy exists as to whether there is coverage under the Cooks'
Farm Bureau insurance policy for some or all of the claims that Stanczak has or will make
against the Cooks. In order to determine and end that controversy, it is necessary that a
declaration be made as to the rights and obligations that Farm Bureau owes or does not owe
related to claims asserted by Stanczak against the Cooks.
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6.

While Stanczak is not a named insured under the insurance policy at issue,

he is properly included as a defendant in this Complaint for Declaratory Judgment pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 57(b) and Idaho Code Section 10-1211, because he claims an
interest in and has made demands against the Farm Bureau insurance policy which will be
affected by the Court's declaration.
7.

Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to Idaho Code§ 5-404 because

some of the defendants reside in Bonner County, Idaho.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
The Insurance Policy and the Bloom Lake Property

8.

Farm Bureau issued to Idaho residents and policy holders the Cooks a

Farm Bureau Country Squire Policy No. 01-A-038872-01 ("the Cook Policy") with a policy
period of January 26, 2015 to January 26, 2016. A true and correct copy of the Cook Policy and
Declaration Sheet is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and by this reference is made a part hereof.
9.

The Cook Policy has a number of provisions and exclusions that are

implicated and applicable to this dispute.
10.

The Cook Policy insures, among other things, a number of properties

owned by the Cooks, including certain real property owned by the Cooks located near Bloom
Lake, Bonner County, Idaho ("the Bloom Lake Property").
11.

The Bloom Lake Property consists of200 acres, Bloom Lake, and a small

12.

For the past seventeen years and up and until approximately June 28,

cabin.

2015, the Cooks have allowed an individual by the name of Michael Jessie Chisholm a/k/a
Michael Allen Pederson ("Chisholm"), to reside in the cabin at the Bloom Lake Property in
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exchange for taking care of the Bloom Lake Property, including the lake, the cabin, and a small
campground that apparently is located on the Bloom Lake Property.
13.

The Cooks have indicated that Chisholm's maintenance activities included

weed management, trash removal, and road and lake maintenance.
14.

The Cooks have further indicated that Chisholm did not receive any

monetary compensation for his maintenance activities.
15.

The Cooks have further indicated that Chisholm paid for gas, propane, and

other supplies used for heating and maintaining the Bloom Lake Property and that they provided
a weed eater, snowmobile, and diesel generator to Chisholm.
16.

The Cooks have maintained that there is not and never was an

employment relationship between the Cooks and Chisholm.
The Shooting

17.

On June 28, 2015 Stanczak and his girlfriend Susan Jackson were camping

at the Bloom Lake Property.
18.

Chisholm invited Stanczak and Susan Jackson into the cabin.

19.

A dispute arose between Chisholm and Stanczak. Stanczak left the cabin

and Chisolm followed. Chisolm had a .45 caliber handgun and shot Stanczak twice, once in the
arm and once in the back.
20.

Chisholm left the scene, but was later apprehended by local authorities and

Chisholm was later charged in Bonner County, Idaho with Aggravated Battery and Use of a
Deadly Weapon in Commission of a Felony. Chisholm ultimately entered an Alford Plea in the
criminal case and was found guilty of aggravated battery against Stanczak. Chisholm is
currently incarcerated.
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21.

Stanczak survived the shooting, but sustained various injuries.
The Insurance Claim and Original Denial

22.

Stanczak has retained counsel and made a claim against the Cooks for the

injuries he sustained at the hands of Chisholm (the "Stanczak Claim").
23.

The Cooks have tendered the Stanczak Claim to Farm Bureau under the

Cook Policy seeking confirmation of whether Farm Bureau would defend or indemnify the
Cooks for this claim.
24.

After conducting an investigation of the facts and circumstances

surrounding the Stanczak Claim made against the Cooks and the resulting tender, Farm Bureau
advised the Cooks that based upon the evidence, the facts, and the language of the Cook Policy,
that there was no coverage under the Cook Policy for Chisholm's actions or Stanczak's injuries
and therefore, Farm Bureau has neither a duty to defend or to indemnify the Cooks related to the
Stanczak Claim.
25.

Farm Bureau's conclusions regarding its coverage position are contained

in three letters directed to the Cooks: one dated March 2, 2016-Farm Bureau's initial
reservation of rights; one dated March 22, 2016-Farm Bureau's denial of coverage and one
dated June 2, 2016-Farm Bureau's second denial of coverage. Those three letters are attached
hereto as Exhibits "B", "C" and "D" respectively.
The Complaint for Damages and Subsequent Denial

26.

On May 12, 2016 Stanczak filed a Complaint for Damages in Bonner

County against the Cooks individually and doing business as the Bloom Lake Campground and
Chisolm, Bonner County Case Number CV-2016-679 (hereinafter referred to as the "Stanczak
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Complaint" or "Stanczak Lawsuit"). A true and correct copy of the Stanczak Complaint is
attached hereto as Exhibit "E".
27.

The Stanczak Complaint contains four causes of action: 1) Premises

Liability against the Cooks and the Bloom Lake Campground; 2) Negligent Supervision of
Chisholm against the Cooks and Bloom Lake Campground; 3) Strict Liability against Chisholm;
and 4) Negligent, Reckless, and Tortious Misconduct against Chisholm.
28.

The Stanczak Complaint alleges that on June 28, 2015 Stanczak was

camping at the Bloom Lake Property with his girlfriend, Susan Jackson. Chisholm invited
Stanczak and Susan Jackson into a cabin located at the Bloom Lake Property to stay the night.
Chisholm allegedly became intoxicated and an argument ensued between Chisholm and
Stanczak. Stanczak left the cabin, and as he did, Chisholm fired a .45 caliber handgun at him.
Two bullets struck Stanczak, one in the arm and one in the back. Stanczak sustained serious
injuries. Chisholm left the scene and was later apprehended by law enforcement. Law
enforcement found several other firearms at the cabin at the Bloom Lake Property.
29.

The Stanczak Complaint was submitted to Farm Bureau. Farm Bureau has

reviewed the Stanczak Complaint and determined that there is no coverage under the Policy for
the allegations contained in the Stanczak Complaint and has advised the Cooks of this decision.
See Ex. D, hereto.

COUNT 1 - DECLARATORY RELIEF
30.

Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 57 and Title 10, Chapter 12,

Idaho Code, this Court is vested with jurisdiction to declare the rights and legal relationships of
the parties of the contract of insurance referred to in this Complaint for Declaratory Judgment. A
controversy exists as to whether there is coverage under the Cook Policy for the Stanczak Claim
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against the Cooks or the Stanczak Complaint. In order to determine and end that controversy it
is necessary that a declaration be made as to the rights and obligations under the Cook Policy
related to the Stanczak Claim and Stanczak Complaint and whether Farm Bureau has a duty to
defend or indemnify the Cooks related to the claim and/or lawsuit.
31.

Because Farm Bureau has taken the position that there is no coverage

under the Cook Policy for the Stanczak Claim and Stanczak Lawsuit, and the fact that the parties
hereto have different positions as to that coverage position, a justiciable controversy, as
contemplated by Rule 57 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and Idaho Code §10-1202,

et.seq. exists between Farm Bureau, the Cooks, and Stanczak concerning whether there is any
coverage under the Cook Policy for Stanczak's injuries and claimed damages.
32.

Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 10-1201, et.seq., Farm Bureau is entitled to a

determination of its rights, status, and/or other legal relations under the Cook Policy.
33.

Specifically, Farm Bureau is entitled to a determination by this Court that

there is no coverage under the Cook Policy for Stanczak's claimed injuries or damages sustained
when Chisholm shot Stanczak at the Bloom Lake Property on June 28, 2015, as outlined in the
Stanczak Claim and Stanczak Lawsuit.
34.

Farm Bureau is further entitled to a determination by this Court that Farm

Bureau has no duty to defend or indemnify the Cooks relating to the Stanczak Claim or Stanczak
Lawsuit.
35.

Farm Bureau has been required to retain the services of an attorney in

order to prosecute this action and is entitled to an award of its reasonable attorney's fees and
costs of this suit pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54, and Idaho Code Sections 12-120, 12-121 and 10-1210.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Farm Bureau prays for relief as follows:
1.

For declaratory judgment finding that: (a) Farm Bureau does not owe

under any contract of insurance either a duty to defend the Cooks in the Stanczak Lawsuit or the
duty to indemnify the Cooks for any adverse judgment or settlement that may arise out of the
Stanczak Lawsit and claims, and (2) there is no insurance coverage under the Cook Policy for the
claims or damages asserted by Stanczak against the Cooks arising out of the shooting incident
that occurred on the Cook's Bloom Lake Property on or about June 28, 2015.
2.

For an award of costs, and its reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred in the

prosecution of this Complaint for Declaratory Judgment pursuant to Idaho Code
Sections 10-1210, 12-121, 12-123, and 41-1839, Rule 57 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
and other applicable law; and
3.

For judgment against the Cooks and Stanczak and in favor of Farm

Bureau, granting such other and further relief to Farm Bureau as the Court deems just and
equitable.
DATED this 2nd day of June, 2016.
MOFFA IT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK
FIELDS, CHARTERED

&

art.in- Of the Firm
meys for Plaintiff
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FarmBureau

COUNTRY SQUIRE POLICY
·
DECLARATIONS

FARM.BUREAU llJTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO
275 TIERRA VlSTA OR PO BOX 484B
POCATELLO IO 83205-4848
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THE INSURANCE PROVIDED AS INDICATED BY THESE DECLARATIONS SUPERSEDES
AND REPLACES ALL INSURANCE PREVIOUSLY AFFORDED BY THIS POLICY.

INSURED:

POLICY NUMB ER:
POLICY PERIOD:
COUNTY:
ACENCY:
AGENT:
EFFECTIVE DATE:
ISSUE DATE:

EDGAR HILKINS COOK JR
LAURIE FRANCES COOK
491476 HIGHHAY 95
SANDPOINT ID 83864-8153

Ol-A-038872-01
01-26-2015 UNTIL 01-26-2016
AT 12:01 AK STANDARD TIKE

BOHNER
ZEMAITIS AGEl!CY
DIHHIHG HALTER
01-26-2015
03-31-2015

S~CTJOH I - PROPERTY
APPLICABLE APPLICABLE
LIIUTS OF
ENDORSEMENTS
PERILS
llABllllY COVERAGE
1-19
260000 A RESIDENCE PREMISE FRAME
BUILDING HUMBER: 002 LOCATION: 02
INCREASED REPLACEMENT COST (25i)
•Il83 f10141
•ll71 0108
HAIYE DEDUCTIBLE ON GLASS
DETACHED GARAGESE STORAGE SHEDS(MAX. 200 SQ FT}
26000
,e,J13J 11014)
LIMITED FUNGI HT OR ORY ROT, OR BACTERIA
13000
SMOKE. ALARM~ 6EAO BOLT LOCKS, AND NONSHOKER
DISCOUNTS A PLIED
52000 8 LOSS OF USE
1-19
130000 C PERSONAL PROPERTY
•1111 (1014)
REPLACEMENT COST
REFRIGERATED PRODUCTS
750
1-19
215000 A DHELLIHG PREHISE FRAME
BUILDING HUHBER: 004 LOCATION: 04
INCREASED REPLACEMENT COST (25,)
•1183 pol4!
•1171 0108
HAIVE DEOUCTlBLE DH GLASS
DETACHED GARAGESE STORAGE SHEDS(HAX. 200 sq FT)
21500
•1133 (1014)
llKITEO FUNGI HT DR ORV ROT, OR BACTERIA
10750
SHOKE ALARH~ 6EAD BOLT LOCKS, AHO NONSMOKER
DISCOUNTS A PLIED
43000 8 LOSS OF USE
1-19
53750 C PERSOHAl PROPERTY
•llll (1014)
REPLACEHEHT COST
REFRIGERATED PRODUCTS
750
1-9 .
35000 E BARN FRAME 4000SQF
BUILDING NUHBER: 011 LOCATION: 02
1161} (O~OS}
1-9
16000 E DREllING PREMISE MOBILE H/0 FOUND 868SQFT
BUILDING NUMBER: 012 LOCATION: 02
1-9
40000 E DHELLIHG PREMISE FRAME lOBOSQF
BUJLDIHG NUMBER: 014 LOCATION: 03
33750 D FARM PERSONAL PROPERTY
1-lOlO,
24, 6
•llJO (0108)
ELIHINATE LIVESTOCK
TONS PER STACK LIMIT
1000
FIRE DEPARTMENT SERVICE CHARGE
500
1000 DEDUCTIBLE APPLIES TD EACH SECTION I LOSS
TOTAL SECTION I ANNUAL PREMIUM
• EJIDORSEMEllT PRINTED IN THE POLICY BOOKLET

ANNUAL
PREMIUM
$1,697.00

$1,170.00

$173.00
$166.00

$221.00
$281.00

$3,708.00

CONTINUED OH PAGE 2
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FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE CO!IPANY Of IDAHO
275 TIERRA VISTA DR PO BOX 4848
POCATELLO ID 83205-4848
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COUNTRY SQUIRE POLICY
DECLARATIONS
G 2
POLICY NUH8ER: 01-A-038B72-0l
EFFECTIVE DATE: 01-26-2015

SECTION I IS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOHlHG ADDITIORAL EHDDRSEHEHTS:
ENOORSEHENT 1116 (1014) - COSMETIC ROOF DAMAGE ENOORSEHENT (PRINTED IH THE POLICY BOOKLET}
SECTION II - LIABILITY
LIMITS OF
APPUCAIILE
LIABILITY COVERAGE
EHDORSEHEHTS
Fl BODILY INJURY
G PROPERTY DAMAGE
500000
EACH OCCURRENCE
1000000
FARHIHG ACTIVITIES ANNUAL AGGREGATE
F2 PREMISES MEDICAL
25000
EACH PERSOH
125000
EACH OCCURRENCE
H DAMAGE TO PROPERTY OF OTHERS
1000
EACH OCCURRENCE
ACCIDENTAL DEATH
•1259 11014)
1000
EACH PERSON

DESCRIPTION OF PREHISES:
LOCATION DESCRIPTION
02
2 RES 135 ACRES 491476 HIGHKAY 95 SANDPOINT ID 83864
02
SECTI0N=03 TOHNSHJP=59H RANGEaOlH BONNER COUNTY
03
1 RES 200 ACRES SECTIOH=Ol TOHNSHIP=59N RANGE=OlH·BON!IER COUKTY
04
1 RES 7 ACRES 49083 HKY 95 SANDPOINT ID 83864
04
SECTION=03 TOWHSHIP=59N RANGEDOlH BONNER COUNTY
TOTAL SECTION II ANNUAL PREMIUM
SECTION II IS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLDMIHG ADDITIONAL ENOORSEHENTS:

1
~~~~~i~~~~f Iii~ 1
t~J;

ANNUAL
PREMIUM
$548.00

$548.00

0
0
:- ~~~,f~ti
e~Jr~9~R~i"tIIerr1f~V~~~iiE~lATG (~~rH~ED(flif~l Pi~I~EB~~[~)BOOKLET)
• PERSONAL IHJURY ENDORSEMENT (PRINTED IH THE POLICY BOOKLET)

EHOORSEMEHJ 1282 1014
ENDORSEHEHT I287 0208 - LIMITED POLLUTION COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT
SECTION III - AUTOHOBILE
LIHITS OF
LIABILITY COVERAGE
N BODILY INJURY
0 PROPERTY DAMAGE
500000
EACH OCCURRENCE
P UNINSURED MOTORIST
500000
EACH OCCURRBICE
Pl UHDERINSURED HOTOR[ST
500000
EACH OCCURRENCE
Q MEDICAL
EACH PERSCH
25000
s 100 CO!IPREHEHSIVE DEDUCTIBLE
T 250 COLLISION DEOUCTIDLE
ROADSIDE ASSISTANCE
100
EACH OCCURRENCE
CAR RENTAL REIHBURSEHENT
PER DAY
25
500
PER ACCIDEHT

1

ANNUAL
PREHIUH

91
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COUNTRY SQUIRE POLICY
DECLARATIONS

FARH BUREAU HUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO
275 TIERRA VISTA DR PO eox 4848
POCATELLO ID 83205-4848

AGE 3

POLICY HUMBER: Ol-A-038872-01
EFFECTIVE DATE: 01-26-2015

SECTION III - AUTOMOBILE
LIMITS OF
LIA8JLITY COVERAGE
LOSS OF USE BY THEFT
25
PER DAY
500
PER ACCIDENT
INSURED VEHICLES:
DRIVER
DESCRIPTION
CLASS
1992 CHEV PU 1GCGK24F7NE173320
03-490
fARH - AGE 70-74
LIABILITY PREHIUH $308.00
03-190-X
i~~ ~H~lET~ij~7iC 4GP54 L55RZ 9l443
LIABILITY PREMIUM $390.00
COHP / COLL PREHIUK $397. 00

ANNUAL

PREHIIJH

APPLICABLE COVERAGES
N O P Pl,O

R6A6sfoE ASSISTAHCE

APPLICABLE
EMDORSEHENTS
• 1334

AIIHllAL

PREHIUH
$308.00

(1014)

$787.00

~oio~t~i·i~~ilTANCE
•1334 f1014l
CAR RENTAL REIHBURSEHENT •1368 1014
TOTAL SECTION III ANNUAL PREHIUM

$1,095.00

• ENDORSEMENT PRINTED IN THE POLICY BOOKLET
SECTION III IS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLDHIKG ADDITIONAL EHDDRSEHENTS:
EIIDORSEHENT !313 (1014) - COMBINED SINGLE lIHlT ENDORSEHEHT - COVERAGE P AHO P-1 (PRll!TEO IN THE POLICY BOOKLET)
ENDORSEMENT 132011014) - COMBINED SINGLE LIHIT £HD0RSEHENT - COVERAGES NANDO (PRI. NTED IN 7HE POLICY BOOKLET)
EHDORSEHEMT 1324 1014} - HEW VE\IICLE LOAN COVERAGE EHDORSEHEKT (PRINTED Ill TIIE POLICY BOllKLETl
ENDORSEHENT 1326 1014) - HEH VEHICLE ADDITIONAL COVERAGE ENDORSEHENT !PRINTED IN THE POLICY BOOKLET)
SECTION IV - INLAND KARINE
HO COVERAGE
THIS POLICY lS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOKING FORKS AND ADDITIONAL ENDORSEMENTS:
POLICY BOOKLET ID-CQ-02-01(1014) - COUNTRY SQUIRE POLICY

I

TOTAL ANNUAL PREKIUH $5,351.00
••.. THIS IS NOT ABILLING ....

LIMITS OF LIABILITY ARE SHOHH IN HHOLE DOLLARS
HO CONTIHGEHT LIABILITY. TH£ POLICY IS HITHOUT CONTINGENT LIABILITY AHO IS NONASSESSABLE.
EijDORSEHENTS
THIS IS THE DECLARATIONS FOR YOUR HEN OR REHEHAL POLICY. INCLUDED ARE COPIES OF ANY ENDORSEMENTS THAT PERTAIN TO IT THAT ARE
NOT IH YOUR POLICY BOOKLET. IF YOU HAKE AHY HODIFICATJOHS TO THE POL(CY DURING lllE POLICY PERIOD HE HILL SEHD YOU A
REPLACEMENT DECLARATIONS SHOHING THESE CHANGES. THE REPLACEMENT DECLARATIONS HILL CONTINUE TO SHO!f HHICH ENDORSEKENTS APPLV,
BUT HE HILL HOT SEND YOU HEl4 COPIES OF THESE ENDORSEHEHTS. HE HILL SEND YOU ACOPY OF AIIY HEH EHOORSEHEHT THAT H~S BEEN
ADDED OR OF ANY EKDORSEHEHT THAT HAS BEEN CHANGED.
FEDERATION HEHBERSHIP
THIS INSURANCE IS ONE OF THE BENEFITS OF THE IDAHO FARH BUREAU FEDERATION AND IS OFFERED ONLY TO ITS HEKBERS. HHILE THIS
POLICY IS IN FORCE YOU HUST HAIHTAIH HEHBERSHIP IN THE IDAHO FARH BUREAU FEDERATIONi INC AND AH AFFILIATED COUNTY FAAH
BUREAU, IF YOU DO HOT HAINTAIH THIS HEHBERSHIP YOU HILL NOT BE ELIGIBLE FOR THIS HEnBER SERYlCE BENEFIT AND HE HILL BE
REQUIRED TO CANCEL THIS INSURANCE.

i(.

I

.I ..
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FARH BUREAU HUTUAL INSURAHCE COMPANY OF IDAHO
275 TIERRA VISTA DR PO BOX 4848
POCATELLO ID 83205-4848

COUNTRY SQUIRE POLICY
DECLARATIONS
· GE 4
POLICY NUHBER: Ol-A-0~872-01
EFFECTIVE DATE: 01-26-2015

90

NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING
THE ANNUAL KEETIHG OF THE HEllBERS HILL BE HELO AT THE HOHE OFFICE AT 275 TIERRA VISTA DRIYE1 POCATELLO.~ IDAHO AT 10 A.H.
OH lffE FIRST FRIDAY OF FEBRUARY UNLESS THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS CHOOSES ADIFFERENT TIHE OR PLACE. THIS HILL BE YOUR ONLY
NOTICE Of THIS MEETING UHLESS THE TIHE DR PLACE IS CHANCED. NOTICE OF ANY CHANGE HILL DE SENT TO YOU HOT KORE THAN 60 om
NOR LESS THAN 10 DAYS PRIOR TO THE HEETIHG. THE HEETIIIG SHALL BE HELD FOR THE PURPOSE OF ELECTING DIRECTORS AND THE
TRANSACTION OF SUCH OTHER BUSINESS AS HAY PROPERLY CONE BEFORE SUCH HEETING. YOU ARE ENTITLED TO VOTE IH PERSON OR BY PROXY
AT THE MEETING.
.

I.

I

:•
;

INSURE0 1S COPY
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AGREEMENT
1. We will provide lhe Insurance described In this
policy and the Declarations If you have paid the
premium and have complied with the policy
proVislons and conditions. This policy Is divided
into four sectJons, some wllh multiple coverages.
You have only the coverages for which you have
paid premium. These coverages are indicated In
the Declaratfons and are subject to the Indicated
limlts of insurance.
2.

3.

The Insured first named In the Declarations, or
that person~ spouse if also named, Is authorized
to act on behalf of all insureds with respect to
giving or receiving notices, receiving refunds, or
agreeing lo or making any changes In this policy.
By acceptance of lhls policy, you agree that the
Declarations Indicate the coverages you pur-

chased. No agreement in conflict with,
modifying, or extending this policy Is valid
unless in writlng and made a part of the policy.
4.

This policy booklet, the DeclaraUons, and
appl!cable endorsements constllute your
policy. The Declaratlons references covera~s
and endorsements that are Included In your
pollcy. Upon renewal or change of your policy
you will receive an updated Declarations but
no new policy booklet unless the policy booklet
changes.

5.

This policy wlll be governed by the laws of the
state of Idaho.

READ THE DECLARATIONS TO DETERMINE
WHICH COVERAGES PERTAIN TO YOU.

DEFINITIONS
Throughout this policy, we, us, and our, mean Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho. You
and your mean a person named In the Declarations
as an Insured and that person!§ spouse if a resident
of the same household. You and your also refer to a
partnership, corporation, llmlted llablllty company, or
trust, named In the Declarations as an Insured. You
and your do not Include an additional insured such
as a lessor, trustee, or landlord. The followlng
defined words appear In bold print In the policy.

Business means a full-time or part-time trade,
profession, occupation, or activity, engaged ln for
compensation, other than farming or custom
farming. Business Includes rental of all or any part
of an Insured location to others, or held for rental by
you, other than:

1. Your residence premises If rented occaslonally;
2.

Garages, If not more than three car spaces are
rented;

3.

One-, two-, three-, or four-family dwelllngs
described In the Declarations; or

The following definitions apply to Sections I, II, and
IV. They do not apply to Section Ill (Automobile
Insurance).

4.

Yourfarm.

Bodily Injury means physical Injury to, or sickness,
disease, or death of, a person. Bodily Injury does
not Include:

1.

1. Any sexually transmitted disease.

2. Newspaper delivery, lawn care, or other
acllvllles, performed by a self-employed minor

DEFINITIONS APPLICABLE TO SECTIONS I
(Property Insurance), II (Llablllty Insurance), AND
IV (Inland Marine Insurance)

2.

Any emotional, psychologlcal, or mental injury or
effect, unless It arises out of actual physical
Injury to a person.

Business does not include:

The operation of roadside stands principally for
the sale of produce raised on the Insured

locatton;

on a parMime basis; or

3. Childcare services provided by any Insured If
the number of children Is six or fewer and then

lD-CQ-02-01(1014)
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only If care is provided for fewer than a total of
31 days during your policy period. Part-time chltd
care services provided by any insured who Is a
minor Is not considered a business.
Custom farming means an lnsuredi:A use of a draft
animal or mobile agricultural machinery to perform
farming operations for others for a charge or other
benefit.
Owetllng means a one-, two·, three-, or four-famlly
residence.
Dwelling premises means a dwelling listed In the
Declarations, Including its grounds and private
garages. A dwelling premise& Includes a residence
premises.

Farm employee means someone employed by you
whose duties are In connection with the maintenance
or use of the Insured location as a farm, Including
the maintenance or use of your farm equipment.
Farm employee does not Include you or your minor
child, but Includes exchange labor.
Farm personal property means your personal

property which ls usual to the operation of a fann and
Is used on your farm. It Includes livestock, mobile
agricultural machinery, tools, supplies, equipment,
and harvested crops, used in or resulting from your
fanning operation. It Includes property you are
purchasing under an installment plan whether or not
you have title to the property.
Farming means the production of fruit, nuts, or ffeld
crops, or the raising or keeping of livestock, fish, or
bees, or the raising of mink, fox, or slmllar small
mammals prlmarlly for fur production. It Includes
wholesale but not retail sales, except Incidental retail
sales of your unprocessed farm products with the
resulting gross Income being less than 25% of your
combined fanning gross Income.
Insured means you or the entity named fn the
Declarations. The following are also Insureds:

1. If you are a person, Insured also means, if
resld?nls of your household, your spouse, your
relatives, and minors in the care of you or your
relatives. Insured does not Include a relatlve
age 25 or over who Is a student and lives away
from your residence premises while attending
school.
2.

If you are a partnership, Insured also means

your members and your partners, but only with
respect to their duties in the partnership.

3. If you are a limited llablllty company, Insured
also means your members and managers, but

ID-CQ-02-01(1014)

only with respect to their duties as members or
managers.
4.

If you are a trust, Insured also means the
trustees, but only with respect to their duties as a
trustee.

5. If you are an organization other than a type listed
above, Insured also means your executive
officers and directors, but only with respect to
their duties as your officers or directors. Your
stockholders are also Insureds with respect to
their liabl11ty as stockholders.

6. Under Section II, Insured means a person
operating your watercraft or recreatlonal motor
vehlcle within the scope of your pennission; or a
person operating your mobile agricultural
m~chlnery within the scope of your permission
in your farming operation covered by this policy.
7.

Under Section II, Insured means a person In
charge of your domestic animals, Including
livestock: (a) to which Section II applles, (b) with
your permission, and (c) In your acllvities
covered by this policy.

Insured location means:

1. A locatlon listed In the Declarations where you
maintain a farm or residence, Including private
approaches;

2. A location acquired by you during the policy
period where you maintain a farm or residence,
Including private approaches. This does not
Include a location purchased by you that Is
outside the state of Idaho;
3. Your cemetery plots or burial vaults;
4. A locatlon you do not own where you temporarily
reside; and
5. Vacant land owned by you and listed In the
Declarations, or vacant land In the state of Idaho
acquired by you during the policy period.
Insured location does not Include properly where a
business Is conducted.
Livestock means cattle, horses, llamas, alpacas,
mules, swine, poultry, donkeys, goats, or sheep.
Mobile agricultural machinery means a land
vehicle, Including any machinery or attached
apparatus, whether or not self-propelled, usual to the
operation of a ram,, used primarily for agricultural
purposes, not subject to licensing, and designed for
use prlnclpally off public roads.
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Motor vehicle means a motorized land vehicle,
traHer, or seml-lraller (Including any attached

reside. A residence premises does not Include any
part of a building used for business.

machinery or apparatus), designed principally for
travel on public roads. The following are not
considered motor vehicles unless they are being
towed by or carried on a motor vehicle:

DEFINITIONS APPLICABLE
(Automobile Insurance)

1. Utility, boat, camping, or travel trailers;

2.

Mobile agricultural machinery;

3. Recreational motor vehicles; or
4.

Any equipment which Is designed for use principally off public roads.

TO SECTION

Ill

Bodily Injury means physlcal injury to a person and
any resulting sickness, disease, or death.
Business and Farming have the same definitions
under Section Ill as under DEFINITIONS APPLI•
CABLE TO SECTIONS I (Property Insurance), II
(Llablllty Insurance), AND IV (fnland Marine
Insurance).
Insured means:

Occurrence means an accident, Including continuous or repeated exposure to the same harmful
conditions, which results In unexpected bodily Injury
or property damage during the policy period. All
bodily Injury and property damage resulting from a

1.

Under Coverages N, 0, R, S, and T, with respect

to an Insured vehicle:
I

I

a. You or any relative; or

common cause wlll be considered the result of one

b. Anyone using an Insured vehicle within the
scope of your permission or within the scope
of permission of your adult relative. This
does not Include a passenger.

occurrence.
Personal property means personal property usual
to the use of the dwetnng premises as a dwelling.
Pollutants means any solld, liquid, gaseous, or
thermal Irritant or contaminant, Including but not
llmlted to, smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
chemicals, petroleum products, waste, lead,
asbestos, or anything defined by federal or state law
as a pollutant. Waste Includes materials to be
recycled, reconditioned, or reclalmad.

Property damage means injury to or destruction of
tanglble property, Including resulting loss of use.
Recreatlonal motor vehicle means any motorized
vehicle designed for recreational use off public
roads, including but not limited to, golf carts,
snowmobiles, trail bikes, mopeds, dune buggies,
motorcycles, or all-terrain vehicles. It does not
Include motorcycles that are licensable for road use.
Relative means a person related to you by blood,
marriage, or adoption, who Is a resident of your
household, including a ward or foster child. Thls
definition applies only If you are a parson.

Residence employee means someone employed by
you who performs duties In connection with the
maintenance or use of the residence premises.
This Includes a person who performs duties for you
elsewhere of a similar nature not in connection with
your business or farming.

2.

Under Coverages N and O with respect to a
nonowned vehicle, you or your relatives when
operating a nonowned vehlcle. This does not
Include a r&latlve who owns a licensed motor
vehicle not Insured by this policy.

Insured does not Include the United States Government, Its agencies, or any person when acting as an
employee of the United States Government when the
Federal Tort Claim Act applies.

Insured vehicle means:

1. Any vehicle owned by you and described In the
Declarations;

ID-CQ-02-01(1014)
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2. Any vehicle In your care, custody, or conlrol, that
you drive on a regular basis, and that is
described in the Declaratlons;

3. A temporary substitute vehicle. The same
coverages apply to the temporary substitute
vehicle as apply to the Insured vehicle for
which it Is being substituted;

4. Under Coverages N and O only, any tralfer while
attached to a motor vehicle to which these
coverages apply;

5. Under Coverages R, S, and T, any camper,
Residence premises means, if shown in the
Declarations: (a) a dwefllng that Is your principal
residence, Including Its grounds and private garages,
or (b) that part of any other building where you

r'

camper shell, topper, or other shell, described In
the Declarations;

Page 3 of 45

98

..

j

1.
6. Under Coverages N, 0, P, P-1, and Q, any
lfcensed private passenger aulomoblle, pickup,
SUV, farm lruck, passenger van, motorcycle, or
motor home, ownership of which is acquired by
you during the policy period;

7.

Under Coverages S and T, any licensed private
passenger automobile, pickup, SUV, fami truck,
trailer, passenger van, motorcycle, or motor
home, ownership of which Is acquired by you
during the policy period; and

B. Under Coverages Sand T, any camper, camper
shell, topper, or similar shell, ownership of which
is acquired by you during the policy period.
The newly acquired vehicles or equipment In
paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 above are not insured
vehicles unless we Insure all of your Insured
vehicles and you ask us to Insure the newly acquired
vehicle or equipment during the policy period or
within 30 days of Its acquisition, whichever Is shorter.
The separate Coverages described In paragraphs 6,
7, and 8, above do not apply to a newly acquired
vehicle unless that Coverage applies to at least one
Insured vehicle described In the Declarations.
A newly acquired vehicle Includes a vehicle that
replaces one shown In the Declarations. Ownership
Includes your written lease of a motor vehicle for
more than 6 continuous months.

2.

Any pickup, truck, van, or traller, used for any
business purpose. This limitation does not apply
to a pickup or passenger van that otherwise
qualifies as a nonowned vehicle if we Insure a
pickup or van shown In the Declarations for
which premium Is charged based on a business
use class.

Occupying means In, upon, or getting Into or getting
out of.
Occurrence means an accident arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehlcle,
including continuous or repeated exposure to the
same harmful conditions, which results In unexpected bodily injury or property damage during the
policy period. All bodily Injury and property
damage resulting from a common cause will be
considered Iha result of one occurrence.
Property damage means injury to or destruction of
tangible property, lncludlng resulting loss of use.
Relative means a person related to you by blood,
marriage, or adoption, who Is a resident of your
household, including a ward or foster child. This
definition applies only if you are a person.

Motor vehicle means a motorized land vehicle
designed principally for travel on public roads. The
tenn motor vehlcle does not Include a traller.
Nonowned vehicle means a trailer or motor
vehicle with a gross vehicle rating of 26,000 lbs. or
less, as Indicated by the manufacturer, operated by
you or your relatives, or In the custody of you or
your relatives, provided the actual use is within the
scope of the permission of the owner.

Trailer means a vehicle designed to be towed by a
private passenger automobile, pickup, SUV, van, or
farm truck. ft also Includes a farm wagon, farm semitrailer, or fann Implement, while being towed by an
Insured vehicle. Trailer does not Include any
vehicles being used:

A nonowned vehicle does not Include:

1. To haul passengers;

1. A vehicle owned by you or your relatives or that

2. As an office, store, or for display purposes; or

ID-CQ--02-01(1014)
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3. A motor vehlcle rented to an Insured for more
than three weeks.

Temporary substitute vehicle, means a motor
vehicle or trailer you do not own while temporarily
used as a substitute for a vehicle described In the
Declarations when that vehicle cannot be used
because of breakdown or servicing.

Is available for regular use by you or your
relatives. This limitation does not apply to a
motor vehicle owned by you or your relatives,
that Is driven by you, and Is described as an
Insured vehicle in the Declarations of another
policy Issued by us or Western Community
Insurance Company, If it otherwise qualifies as a
nonowned vehicle.

I

!

3. As a permanent residence.
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GENERAL CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO THIS POLICY
Unless otherwise Indicated, the followlng conditions
are appllcable to this policy.
1. Abandonment of Property. We are not obligated
to pay for or accept any property abandoned by
an insured.

j.

~

sured in the Declarations at least 30 days
before lhe cancellation date. If cancellation is
because you d[d not pay the premium we
may cancel by malllng notice to you at least
15 days before the cancellation date.

c. When allowed by state law, we may cancel all
2.

Arbitration. This paragraph does not apply to
llablllty coverages, or uninsured or underinsured
motorist coverages. An Insured or we may make
a written demand for arbitration to determine all
disputed Issues as to (1) whether an Insured Is
entitled under the pollcy to coverage for a toss, or
(2) the value of a loss to real or personal property
where coverage is not disputed. Each party will
select a competent, lmpartlal arbitrator within 20
days of receipt of the written demand. The two
arbitrators will select a third arbitrator. If they
cannot agree upon a third arbitrator within 1O
days, either may request that a Judge of a court
having jurlsdlctlon selects a third arbitrator. Both
parties shall make disclosure to each other of all
lnformallon as required by the arbltrator(s) ln the
schedulfng and discovery order. Each party will
pay the expenses It Incurs, lncludlng attorney fees
and related costs, and bear the expenses of the
third arbllrator equally. Arbitration will take place
tn Idaho In the county where the policy was
Issued unless both parties agree otherwise. Local
rules of law as to arbitration procedure and
evidence will apply. A decision agreed to by two
of the arbitrators will be binding.

3. Assignment. No assignment or transfer of this
policy to another person or enuty will be valld.
4. Premium. The premium slated In the Declarations will be computed according to our rules and
rating plans. The premium is for Insurance from
the policy Inception date to its expiration date.
5. Bankruptcy of An Insured. Bankruptcy or
Insolvency of an Insured wlll not relieve us of our
obligations under this policy.
6.

Cancellatlon. Our cancellatlon rights are limited
by state Insurance law.

or part of Section Ill of this policy by mailing
notice to you:
(1) At least 10 days before the cancellation
date If the policy has not been In force for

60 days or Jr the cancellation Is because
you did not pay the premium. Under this
paragraph, if the notice is malled, lhe 10
day period begrns 5 days after the date
our notice Is postmarked;
(2) At least 30 days before the cancellation
dale if the cancellation pertains to a
commercial vehicle, unless cancellatlon Is
because of non-payment of premium; we
will then give you notice at least 1O days
before cancellation; or
(3) At least 20 days before the cancellation
dale If the cancellation Is for any other
reason.
d. Payment or tender of unearned premium Is
not a condition of cancellatlon. We will mail
any notice of cancellaUon to you at the
address shown in the Declarations. Our proof
of malling wlll be sufficient proof of the
maillng of notice. The effective date and hour
of cancellation stated In the notice wlll
become the end of the policy period. Our
hand delfvery of this written notice will be
equivalent to malling.
e. If you or we cancel, earned premiums wm be
computed pro rata based on the effective
date of cancellation. Premium adjustment
may be made at this time or as soon after as
Is practical. Our check malled or delivered will
be sufficient tender of any refund of premium.
; •

a. You may cancel this entire policy by malling
to us written notice stating the future date this
cancellation will be effeclive.

7. Changes. We reserve the right to adjust the
amount of your premiums if there is a change in
the Information used to calculate your policy
premiums.

b. We may cancel all or part of Sections I, II, or
IV, by malling notice to the first named In-

8. Concealment or Fraud. We wlll not provide
coverage if any Insured has lntentronally con-
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cealed or misrepresented any material fact or
circumstance relating to lhls Insurance.
9, Cooperation of Insured. If any Insured falls to
cooperate with us or send us legal papers as
required, we have the right to refuse any further
coverage for the occurrence or loss.
10. Death. Upon your death, we wlll continue through
the current pollcy period to Insure any member of
your household who is an insured at the time of
your death. We will also Insure:
a . With respect to your property, the person
having proper temporary custody of the
property until appointment and quallflcatlon of
a legal representa11ve; or

b. Your legal representative, but only with
respect to:

that broadens the coverage under this policy
wiOlout payment of additional premium, the
broadened coverage will apply lo this policy. This
clause does not apply to changes implemented
through introduction of a new edition of our policy.

16. Loss Payment. This paragraph does not apply to
liability coverages. We will adjust ail losses with
you unless someone else Is entitled lo payment
under this pollcy. Payment for loss wlll be made
within 60 days after we receive and accept as
complete your signed, sworn proof of loss, and
ascertainment of the loss ls made by: (a)
agreement with you; (b} entry of a flnal Judgment;
or (c) the filing of an arbitration award with us.

17. Loss Payable Clause (Appllcable to Coverage
D-Farm Personal Property and Section IV). This
clause is applicable If a loss payee Is named In

the Oeclaratlons. A loss payee Includes a
llenholder.

(1) Your property that we covered at the time
of your death; and

(2} Your legal liablHty covered by this policy.

a. If a payable loss ls for the value of the
covered property, we wlll pay you and the
loss payee. If a payable loss is under $10,000
and is for repairs, payment may be made to

11. Deductible Clause. Loss from each occurrence
wlll be adjusted separately. We will not pay for
any covered loss until the amount of loss exceeds
the applicable deductible shown in the Declarations. We do not cover the deductible portion of a
loss. We wlll apply only one deductible (the
highest one applicable) to a loss to which more
than one section of this pol!cy applles, or If two or
more Insured vehicles or other covered items
are damaged In a slngle occurrence.
12. Dividends or Credits. Any obllgatlon of ours for
dividend or credit will not In any way exlend or
change the policy period.
13. Inspection and Audit. You must pennlt us to
inspect and audit your insured property and
operation at any reasonable time. The purpose Is
to determine lnsurablllly and the appropriate
premium charge. We are not obligated to conduct
Inspections. We are not obllgated to give you a
copy of any Inspection or audit report. Any
Inspection or audit wlll not be considered a
representation that the operation or property is
safe or compiles with any legal requirements.

you only. At our option we may pay you and
the loss payee for any loss.

b. We may cancel the pollcy during the policy
mail notice of canceltatlon to
period. We

wnr

the lienholder at least 10 days before the data
the canoellatlon takes effect.
c.

If we make any payment to the loss payee,
we will obtain their rights against any other
party.

d.

We will pay the loss payee for their Interest
dlrectly if the covered property has been
repossessed.

e. If we deny your claim, that denlal wlll not
apply to a valid claim of the loss payee, if the
loss payee:
(1) Notlfles us of any change In ownership,
occupancy, or substantial change In risk
of which the loss payee Is aware;

(2) Pays any premium due under this pollcy
on demand If you have neglected to pay
the premium; and

14. lnsuredls Interest and Limit of Liability. If more
than one person has an Insurable Interest In the
property covered by this policy, we wlll not be
liable to the Insured for an amount greater than
the Insured~ Interest, subject to the applicable
limit of llablllty.

(3) Submits a signed, sworn proof of loss
wlthin 60 days after receiving notice from
us of your failure to do so.

f.
15. Liberalization Clause. lf within 60 days prior to
or during the policy period we adopt any revision
ID-CQ-02-01(1014)

If we pay the loss payee for any loss and
deny payment to you:
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(1) We are subrogated to all the rights of the
loss payee granted under their lien on the
property; or

22. Policy Renewals.

a.

(2) At our option, we may pay to the loss
payee the whole principal on their lien
plus any accrued interest. In this event,
we have the right to receive a full
assignment and transfer.

g. Subrogation will not impair the right of the
loss payee lo recover the full amount of lhetr
claim.
h.

Policy conditions relating to Arbitration, Suit
Against Us, and Loss Payment apply to the
toss payee.

18. No Benefit to Bailee. We will not recognize any
assignment or grant any coverage for the benefit
of any person or organization holdlng, storing, or
transporting property for a fee regardless of any

b. We wlff give you notice or our Intent to nonrenew all or part of any commercial coverage
under this policy at least 45 days before the
end of the policy period.
c.

other provision of this poUcy.

19. Nonduplicatlon of Insurance Benefits. No
person entitled to any payment or benefit under
any coverage of this pollcy is entllled to recover
any duplicate payment or benefit for the same
elements of loss under any other coverage of this
policy, lnclud!ng llablllty coverages, or any other
poflcy.

20. Our Option. ff we give you notice within 30 days
after we receive and accept your signed, sworn
proof of loss, we may:
a.

Take all or any part of the property at the
agreed or appraised value. If we exercise this
option, you must sign any papers we require
for transfer of tl!le; or

b, Repair, rebuild, or replace any part of the
property with equivalent property. We will not
be Hable for any loss resulUng from delay In
repair or choice of repairmen.

21. Polley Period. The pollcy period Is shown In the
Declara1ions and Is subject to cancellation as
stated In the policy. This poflcy applies only to
occurrences which take place during the policy
period. Losses to your Insured property are
covered only If the peril originates and causes
loss during the poflcy period. The time shown in
the Declarations Is standard time at your primary
residence. To the extent that this poflcy replaces
another policy or coyeraga that terminates at a
different hour on the effective date of this pollcy,
this policy is not effective until the other policy
tenninates.

Subject to our consent. you may renew this
policy for successive periods by payment to
us of the premium we require to renew the
policy. If we are willlng to renew this policy we
will give you notice of the amount of premium
or estimated premium to be paid at feast 20
days before it is due. Premium payment for
any renewal period wlU be due before the
expiration of the preceding policy period. We
may change the terms of your policy at
renewal. We wlll give you notice of any
change resulting In a decrease in coverage at
least 30 days before It becomes effective.

We wfll give you notice of our Intent to nonrenew all or part of any noncommercial
coverage under this policy at least 30 days
before the end of the policy period.

23. Polley Termination . If you fall to pay the renewal
premium when due, this policy wlll terminate on
Its expiration date wllhout any notice or action by
us. If you purchase another policy to replace this
one, this policy terminates on the Inception of
such pollcy without notice by you or us.

24. Premium Waiver. If this pollcy is cancelled,
lapses, or Is nonrenewed, any premium you owe
us lhat Is less than $10 or any premium we owe
you that Is less than $5, ls waived.
25. Recovered Property. If an Insured or we
recover any property for which we have made
payment under this pollcy, the lnsul'ed or we wllf
notify the other of the recovery. We are the owner
of this property. At our option, we wlll retum the
property to the Insured upon lnsuredls payment
of the amount we, in our discretion, may agree lo.

26. Subrogation oour Right to Recover Payment.
a.

If we make payment under this policy and the
person to or for whom payment was made
has a right to recover damages, we wlll be
subrogated to that right (have that right
transferred to us). That person must do
whatever is necessary to enable us to
exercise our rights and must do nothing after
the loss to prejudice our rights. An Insured
must not pursue our subrogated Interest
without our written permission.
I'

I
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b.

If we make a payment under this policy, and
the person to or for whom payment was
made recovers damages from anolher, that
person must reimburse us to the extent of our
payment.
·

c.

We may prosecute in the name of any
Insured for the recovery of these payments.
We may use any documents in our files to
pursue our subrogation claim.

27. Speclal or Lower Limit, or Additional Coverages o Section I. Under some Section I
coverages there may be a special or tower limit or
an additional coverage for a particular type of
property or loss. Unless the policy specifically
states otherwise, such llmlt Is Included within and
does not Increase the applicable coverage llmit.

28. Sult Against Us. No actlon Is to be brought
against us unless there has been compliance with
the potlcy provisions. No one has any right to join
us as a party to any action against an Insured.
No action with respect to tlabllity coverages Is to
be brought against us until the obligation of the
Insured has been determined by final Judgment
or agreement signed by us.
29. Tenns of Polley to Conform to Statute. If any of
the terms of this pollcy are In conflict with the
statutes of the state of Idaho, they are hereby
amended lo conform to such statutes.

!.

30. Waiver or Change of Policy Provisions. A
waiver or change of any provision of this policy
must be In wrillng by us to be valld.

;.

l

!
..
!'
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SECTION I DPROPERTY INSURANCE
We cover the property insured under Sectton I for
direct physical Joss only, caused by specified perils.
For most coverages, the applicable perils, limit of
llabiflty, and deductible, are Indicated in the Declarations; for some coverages, one or more of these may
be indicated In the policy booklet or an applicable
endorsement.

enclosed building, designed to house one or more
motor vehicles. We do not cover field, corral, or
pasture fences, even If attached to a dwelllng. We do
not cover bridges designed to be used by motor
vehicles or boat docks.

COVERAGE A D DWELLINGS

1. Additional Living Expense. If a loss covered
under Coverage A makes your covered dwelling
unlnhabltable, we will pay any reasonable and
necessary increase in living expenses Incurred by
you so that your family can maintain Its nonnal
standard of llvlng. Payment will be for the shortest
time required to repair or replace the premises, or
If you permanently relocate, the shortest lime
required for your household to settle elsewhere.
This period of time Is not limited by expiration of
this pollcy. We will not pay for any increase in
living expenses resulting from your rental or use
of any real property that is more than 150 miles
from the covered dwelllng.

We cover the following:

1. The dwelling on the residence premises
described In the Declarallons used principally as
your private residence, Including:
a.

Structures attached to the dwelllng;

b.

Permanently Installed outdoor equipment
pertaining to the dwelling; and

c.

Materlals

and

supplies

located

on

the

COVERAGE B D LOSS OF USE

residence premises for use in the construction, alteratlon, or repair of the dwelling
or its private garage.
2.

2.

Fair Rental Value. If a loss under Coverage A
causes your covered dwelling rented to others to
become uninhabitable, we will pay the fair rental
value of the dwelling premises. Payment will be
for the shortest time required to repair or replace
the part of the premises rented or held for rental.
This period of time Is not llmlted by expiration of
this policy. Fair rental value does not include any
expenses that do not continue whlle part of the
dwelllng premises rented or held for rental Is
uninhabitable.

3.

Prohibited Use. If a civil authority prohibits you
from use of the dwelllng premises as a result of
direct damage to neighboring premises by a peril
Insured against In this po!fcy, we cover any
resulting additional living expenses or fair rental
value loss Incurred by you for a period no!
exceeding two weeks during which use Is
prohibited.

The dwelllng(s) shown in the Declarations, other
than the dwelling on the residence premises,
used principally as a private residence, including:

a.

Structures attached to the dwelllng(s);

b. Permanently Installed outdoor equipment
pertaining to the dwelllng(s); and

c.

Materials and supplies on these dwelllng
premises for use In the construcllon,
alteration, or repair of the dwelllng(s) or Its
private garage.

We cover detached private garages, swimming pools,
and storage sheds, on t~e dwelllng premises
pertaining to the above dwelllng(s). Our aggregate
llmlt of liablUty for these structures Is Indicated In the
Declarations and Is a separate limit. We do not cover
these structures If used for any business, professional, or farming purposes. We
not cover any garage
or storage shed rented to someone other than a
tenant of the dwelllng. Under this coverage a storage
shed means a structure for storage of your personal
property, with exterior dimensions no greater than
200 square feet. A garage means a carport, or a fully

do
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We do not cover loss or expense due to cancellation
of a lease or agreement.
COVERAGE C D PERSONAL PROPERTY
We cover personal property owned or used by an
Insured while it Is anywhere In the world. At your
request, we wlll cover uninsured personal property
owned by others white the property Is In that part of
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watches, furs, and
precious stones;

the residence premises occupied exclusively by an
Insured. Coverage C is subject to the followlng
limitations and exclusions.

f.

1. Newly Acquired Residence. We cover your
personal property at a newly acquired principal
residence for 30 days Immediately after you begin
to move the property there. If your personal
property Is distributed between your residence
premises and this newly acquired principal
residence, the limit of liability applies at each
location In the proportion that Iha value al each
location bears to the total value of all property
distributed between the two locations.

2.

property on the residence
premises used at any time for any business
purpose and $2,000 for such property away
from the residence premises. This includes
computers, blank electronic storage ·media,
and pre-recorded
computer
programs
available to the publlc. We do no! cover cash,
secur!Hes, books of account, drawings, other
paper or eiectronlc records, CD-ROM,
electronic data processing tapes, DVDs,
disks, or other software media;

d.

$250 on money, bank notes, numismatic
property, bull!on, gold other than goldware,
silver other lhan silverware, platinum, coins,
medals, gift cards or certificates, scrip, smart
cards, or stored value cards;

I.

$1,500 on DVD players, GPS devices, cell or
mobile phones, televisions, computers, and
other electronic data processing equipment,
while this property Is In or upon a motor
vehicle. This limitaUon applies to portable
equipment that Is capable of being operated
by the motor vehicle ts electrical syslem;

j.

$5,000 on any one article and $10,000 in the
aggregate for loss by theft of any rug, carpet,
tapestry, wall hanging, or other similar article;

k. $5,000 on your personal property which Is
usually located at your residence premises
while this property Is at any other dwelllng
owned by you and Insured by us;

$1,000 on securities, accounts, deeds,
evidences of debt, letters of credit, notes
other than bank notes, manuscripts, personal
records, passports, tickets, sports colleclion
cards, and stamps. This limit appll_es
regardless of the medium (such as paper or
computer software) on which the material
exists. This limit Includes the cost to
research, replace, or restore the lnformallon
from the lost or damaged material;
$1,600 on watercraft, Including their !railers,
attached equipment, and outboard motors.
We do not cover any loss by windstorm or
hall to this property unless It Is Inside a fully
enclosed building;
$1,500 on trailers, not Including trailers used
with any watercraft;

$4,000 for loss by theft of firearms, firearm
opllcs, and firearm attachments;

h. $4,000 on

Uabillly apply to the following categories of
property. If an Item of property Is subject to more
than one category, only the category with the
lowest limit applies. The special limit for each
following category Is the total aggregate limit for
each loss for all property In that category:

c.

semi-

plated ware, goldwara, gold-plated ware, and
pewterware;

3. Special Limits of Liability. Special llrnlts of

b.

and

g. $3,500 for loss by theft of silverware, sllver-

Multiple Insured Dwelling Premises. If you
have more than one dwelllng premises Insured
under Section I, a different Coverage C limit of
liabllity applies to each dwelllng premises.
These limits are stated in the Declarations. The
limit applicable to one Insured dwelling premises
cannot be applied to a loss at another insured
dweJllng premises.

a.

precious

I.

m.

$8,000 on hand, eleclrontc., power, and
similar tools that can be used for carpentry,
building construction, or dwelling or vehicle
maintenance or repair; and
$3,000 on saddles and tack.

If you have purchased addltronal coverage for any
of the above special llmlts, this is shown In the
Declarations and replaces the applicable llmft(s)
shown above.
4.

Exclusions. Section I Exclusions and the
following additional exclusions apply to Coverage
C. Coverage C does not cover:

a. Farm personal property;
b. Animals, livestock, birds, fish, or pets;

a. $2,000 on any one article and $4,000 in the
aggregate for loss by theft of jewelry,

ID-CQ-02-01(1014)
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Mobile agricultural machinery, motorized
land vehicles, and their parts, except vehicles
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J.
I-

i

designed for assisting the handicapped and
vehicles used solely to service your dwellfng,
provided they cannot be licensed for road
use;

Our annual aggregate llmlt for this coverage is
$2,000. We do not cover losses resulting from
business pursuits or dishonesty of any Insured.
COVERAGE D DFARM PERSONAL PROPERTY

d. Aircraft and !heir parts;
e. Property of roomers, tenants, and boarders,
not related to an Insured;

f.

Recreational motor vehicles, trailer homes,
camper shells, tent trallers, and campers, and
their parts;

g. Any personal property located at any
dwellJng, Its grounds, garages, or sheds,
which are owned by you and not Insured
under Section I or by Western Community
Insurance Company;

h. Articles separately Insured by this or other
Insurance;

r.

Materials and supplles on any dwelllng
premises for the construction, alteratlon, or
repair of the dwelllng premises or Its private
garages; or

J.

Personal property owned and insured by
someone who is not an Insured.

We cover your farm personal property on the
Insured location. We also cover your farm personal
property away from the Insured locatlon except
while:
a. Stored In or being processed in manufacturing plants, publlc elevators, warehouses,
seed houses, or drying plants;
b. In transit by common or contract carrier; or
c.

1. Coverage Limitations.
a. Leased Property. We cover farm personal
property leased by you for the conduct of
your farming operation only If this property is
added to Coverage D by endorsement Our
coverage on leased farm personal property
Is excess over any other valid and collectlbfe
insurance available to the owner.
b.

the

followlng

additional

1. We cover loss to property Insured under
Coverage C while a11he Insured location due to
change In temperature as a result of physical
damage to the building or Its equipment caused
by a peril Insured against.

2. Credit Card, Bank Transfer Card, Counterfeit
Currency, and Forgery. We wlll pay up to
$1,000for:

a. The legal obligation of an Insured to pay
because of the theft or unauthorized use of
credit cards or bank debit cards Issued to or
registered In any lnsuredia name. We do not
cover credit card or bank debit card use if any
Insured has not complied with all terms and
conditions under which Iha card was issued;

b. Loss suffered by an Insured caused by
or alteration of any
negotlable Instrument; or

forgery

c.

check

or

by an Insured through
acceptance In good failh of counterfeit United
States or Canadian paper currency.
Loss

suffered

Livestock Coverage. Except for the perll of

theft, we cover your livestock only if the
spec!fled per/I causes death. Our lfmlt of
llablllty will not exceed the actual cash value
of the livestock subject to the maximum per
head llmlt stated In the Declarations. Death
must result wilhln 30 days from the date of

Addltlonal Coverages. Subject to any speclal limits,

Coverage C Includes
coverages:

In public sales barns or sales yards.

occurrence.

c.

Crop Coverage. Woodchips, sawdust, and

the following harvested props: grain, seed,
sllage, fodder, peas, beans, hay, and straw,
are covered for loss caused by peril 1 (fire or
lightning) only. Our limit of llabillty for any one
stack of hay or straw, whether free standing
or In a building, wlll not exceed the number of
tons per stack stated in the Declaratlons. If a
stack or building Is exposed within 125 feet of
another stack or building, the applicable per
slack tonnage limit will apply to the aggregate
of all such exposed stacks or buildings. For
example, If stack Y rs 100 feet from stack X
and stack Z Is 100 feet from stack Y and 200
feet from stack X, the aggregate limit
applicable to stacks X, Y, and Z Is the per
stack tonnage llmlt stated in the Declarations.

d. Computers. Peril 18 (sudden and accfdental
damage from artiflclaffy generated eleclrlcal
current) also applies to your laptop or desktop
computers that qualify as farm personal
property.

ID-CQ-02-01(1014)
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e. Records and Electronlc Data Processing

f.

Vehicles primarily designed and licensed for
road use other than wagons and trailers
designed for farming purposes and used
prlnclpally on the Insured location;

g.

Motor vehicles, house trailers, motorcycles,
watercraft, recreational motor vehicles,
ATVs, mini trucks, aircraft, or their parts or
accessories;

Property. Our lfability for loss to any records,
software programs, electronic data, or olher
information, however stored or recorded, will
not exceed the cost of pre-recorded computer
programs available to the public, or of blank
media or material, plus the cost Incurred by
you for transcribing, copying, reentering, or
recreating such data or software.
Our lfmlt of liability for this coverage is $2,500
for all loss sustained in a policy period.

h. Unharvested or unthreshed crops or stubble;

I.

Any harvested crops, Including root crops,
bulbs, or fruils, except to the extent lhey are
covered under the Crop Coverage above;

J.

Structures and buildings except portable
bulklings on skids in an amount ncit to exceed
$1,000 per building;

k.

Any damage arising from wear and !ear,
freezing, or mechanical breakdown or tanure.
This exclusion does not apply to loss covered
by peril 1 (fire), peril 4 (explosion), peril 8
(smoke), or perll 20 (collision wllh another
object or overturn);

I.

Under peril 20 (colllslon or overturn
coverage), damage to tires, unless damaged
by the same cause as other loss covered
under Coverage D;

m.

Bees, their larvae, bee boards, beehives, or
any other bee nesting or housing enclosure;

n.

loss to livestock caused by the direct or
indirect result of fright, freezing, running Into
fences or other objects, running Into streams
or ditches, or smothering, whether an Insured
peril is Involved or not; or

2. Coinsurance. You must maintain insurance on
your farm personal property insured under
Coverage D to the extent of at least 80% of the
actual cash value at the time of any loss. For
example, if at the tlme of a loss your covered
farm personal property Is worth $100,000, then
the amount of insurance must be at least
$80,000. If you fall to keep this percentage of
coverage, you wlll share in each loss in addition
to the deductible. We wlfl pay the proportion of
each loss represented by the amount you did
Insure at the time of loss divided by the amount
you should have Insured, less any applicable
deductible. If you purchase mobile agricultural
machinery during the policy period, we will not
apply this coinsurance clause to any loss to that
equipment that occurs within 30 days of Its
purchase.

If the aggregate clalm for any loss under this
coverage Is less than 2% of the total amount of
Insurance under Coverage D, you will not be
required to furnish an inventory of 1he undamaged
property. This does not mean we waive any of our
rights concerning coinsurance.
3. Exclusions. Section t Exclusions and the
following additional exclusions apply to Coverage
D. We do not Insure under Coverage D:

a.

Personal property;

i·

f

o. Property which is separately described and
spaclflcally Insured In whole or In part by this
or any other Insurance.

b. Animals, other than livestock;

C<;)VERAGE E DADOITIONAL BUILDINGS

c.

Accounts, bills, currency, deeds, evidences of
debt, money, or securities;

d.

Irrigation equipment, including irrigation
pumps, burled waler llnes, electric pump
motors, pane[s, wiring, transformers, or
permanently Installed or portable sprinkler
lines and sprinkler equipment (including any
sprlnklerls electric equipment);

The Declarations describe your dwelllngs, buildings,
fences. and structures that we cover under Coverage
E. Coverage A does not apply to any property Insured
under Coverage E.

1. Bulldlngs. Coverage on buildings includes their
permanent foduras and attached sheds, but
excludes fences.

2. Materials and Supplies. Coverage on a building
a.

Fences, sawmill equipment, windmflls, wind
chargers, towers, power poles, light poles,
telephone poles, or radio and television
towers and antennas;

or structure is extended to cover all materials and
supplies on the premises intended to be used In
the construction, alteration, or repair of such
building or structure.

!

r
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limit Is the most we will pay In any one loss
regardless of the number of fallen trees.

3. Utlllty Poles. Coverage on private utility poles
Includes attached switch boxes, fuse boxes, and
other electrical equipment mounted on the poles.
4.

Fences and Similar Structures. For fences,

corrals, and similar structures, we wlll be liable for
no greater portion of any loss than lhe amount of
Insurance bears to 100% of the actual cash value
of the property at the time of the loss.

5. Antennas, Aerials, and Receivers. Coverage on
outdoor radio and television antennas, aerials.
and satellite receivers, Including their lead-In
wiring, masts, and towers, Is subject to a
maximum payment of $250, unless this
equipment Is speclflcally Insured for a greater
amount. No deductible applies to this coverage.

3. Pollutants. If a loss under Coverage A is caused
by perlls 1 through 18, or peril 27, and that Joss
results in pollutants contaminating land or water
on the dwelllng premises, and you are required
by law to extract these pollutants, we will pay for
that extraction, provided you report the
contamination within 180 days of the date of tha
peril causing the loss. Our limit of llablllty for this
coverage is $10,000. This Umlt ls in addition to the
Coverage A limit of llablllty. This additional
coverage includes the cost of necessary testing
for, monitoring, or assessing pollutants as a part
of extraction from land or water.
4.

Reasonable Repairs. We will pay the reasonable
costs Incurred by you for necessary repairs made
solely to protect covered property from further
damage provided coverage Is afforded for the
perJI causing the loss.

5.

Door Locks. We will pay up to $200 for the cost
of re-keying or replacing locks to exterior doors
on the residence premises if your keys have
been stolen during the policy period. No deduct·
Ible applles to this coverage.

6.

Headstones. We will pay up to $5,000 for loss
caused by perils 1 through 19 to a headstone for
your spouse, parent, or child.

SECTION I ADDITIONAL COVERAGES

Section I Includes the following additional coverages.

t.

Debris Removal. This coverage does not Include
the expense of removing pollutants.

a. We wlll pay the reasonable expense Incurred
by you for the removal of debris of covered
property provided coverage Is afforded for the
perll causing Iha loss. This Includes the cost
to remove from a bulldlng or from personal
property In a building, ash, dust, or particles,
resulting from a covered loss caused by peril
19 (volcanic eruption). Debris removal
expense is Included in the limit of llablllty
applying to the damaged property.

b. When the amount payable under Coverage A
for the actual damage to the property plus the
expense for debris removal exceeds the
Coverage A limit of liability for the damaged
property. an additional 5% of that limit of
liability wlll be available to cover debris
removal expense. This addllional limit does
not apply to paragraph 7 below (Trees,
Shrubs, and Other Plants).

2. Fallen Tree Removal. We will pay up to $1,000
for the reasonable cost for removal from the
residence premises of:
a. Your tree(s) felled by perll 3 (windstorm or
hail);
b. Your tree(s) felled by peril 12 (weight of Ice,
snow, or sleet); or
c. A nelghboris tree{s) felled by perils 1 through

19;

7. Trees, Shrubs, and Other Plants. We cover
trees, shrubs, plants, lawns, and decorative bark,
on a dwelllng premises Insured under Coverage
A for loss caused by perll 1 (flre or lightning), peril
4 (explosion), perll 5 (riot or civil commotion), pert!
6 {aircraft), peril 7 (vehicles), perll 9 (vandalism or
malicious mischief), or perll 10 (theft). The limit of
liability for all loss under this coverage (Including
debris removal) shall not e>Cceed 5% of the limit of
llablllty specified for the Coverage A dwelling at
the same dwelllng premises. Our limit of liability,
including debris removal, for any one tree, shrub,
or plant Is $500, and $750 for decorative bark.
We do not cover property grown for business or
farming purposes. We do not cover any property
located farther than 100 feet from the covered
dwelling.

8. Refrigerated Products. If Coverage C applies to
your policy, we will pay an amount not to exceed
the llmlt of liability stated in the Declarations for
loss to contents of a freezer or refligerator at the
residence premises. This coverage does not
apply to rann personal property. The Joss or
damage must be caused by a change In
temperature resulting from:

provided the lree(s) damages a covered structure
or blocks your driveway or sidewalk. The $1,000
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a.

Interruption of electrlcal service to refrigeration equipment caused by damage to the
generating or transmission equipment which
results In a shutdown of the system;

a.

We will not pay more for a covered upgrade
to the undamaged portion of your dwelling
than the depreciated value of the undamaged
portion of the dwelling.

b. Mechanical or electrical breakdown of the

b.

We will not pay more for a covered loss than
the amount you actually spend to make
necessary upgrades or repairs your dwelllng.

c.

We will not pay for any upgrade for any part
of your dwelllng that did not comply with
code or ordinance requirements at the time it
was constructed.

d.

The Loss Settlement paragraph under
SECTION I CONDITIONS that applies to
dwellings Insured under Coverage A also
applies to this coverage.

refrigeration system; or
c.

A tripped breaker or blown fuse.

You must exercise diligence In Jnspecllng and
maintaining refrigeration equipment in proper
working condition. If Interruption of electrical
service or mechanical or electrical breakdown is
known, you must exercise all reasonable means
to protect the insured property from further
damage.
9.

Fire Department Service Charge. We will pay
Limit of Liability. Our limit of liability under this
coverage for all losses is 10% of the Coverage A
limit of liability for the dwelllng that sustains the
loss. This limit Is Included within and does not
increase the limit of liability for the dwelling.

up to the amount shown In the Declarations for
your liability assumed by contract or required by
law for fire department charges Incurred when the
fire department Is called to save or protect your
covered property from a peril Insured against. No
deductible applles to this coverage.

SECTION I PERILS INSURED AGAINST

10. Sinking or Swamping of a Boat. If you have
Coverage C, we will pay up to $2,500 for the loss

of an insuredls personal property In a boat and
caused by the sinking or swamping of the boat.
Thfs coverage does not apply to the boat, Its
attached equipment and motors, to money, or
Jewelry. Our limit of llabillty Is the total aggregate
limit for each loss for all covered property.

We cover for direct physical loss to property insured
caused by the followlng perils If shown In the
Declarations:

1. Fire or lightning.

2. Removal. When property Is removed because lt
Is endangered by other Insured perils, we pay for
direct accidental loss from any cause to that
property while It Is being removed and for 30
days after removal to a safe place.

11. Leaking Main Water Line. tf Coverage A applies
to your residence premises, we wlll pay up to
excavate Its main water line
If It Is leaking.

$2,600 of the cost to

12. Building Ordinance or Law Coverage. When
Your dwelling Insured under Coverage A sustains

3. Windstorm or hall.
a.

a covered loss, we will pay for the increased cost
to repair or rebuild your dwelllng required by the
enforcement of a building, zoning, or land use
ordinance or law. If the enforcement Is because of
repairs to the covered damages and the
requirement Is In effect at the time the loss
occurs. This coverage Includes legally required
changes to the undamaged portion of your
· dwelling if the enforcement of a building, zoning,
or land use ordinance or law, Is directly related to
the same covered loss and the requirement Is In
effect at the time the covered loss occurs. This
coverage does not Include the cost to remove,
neutralize, treat, monitor, or test for pollutants.
Subject to the applicable limit of liablllty, the
foltowlng llmltatlons apply to this coverage:

ID·CQ-02-01(1014)

This peril does not Include loss to the Interior
or contents of a building caused by rain,
snow, sleet, sand, or dust, unless the direct
force of wind or hail damages the building
causing an opening in a roof or wall through
which the raln, snow, sleet, sand, or dust

enters.

4.

b.

This peril does not Include loss caused
directly or indirectly by frost, cold weather, Ice
(other than hall), snowstorm, or sleet, all
whether driven by wind or not.

c.

This pern does not apply to a structure with a
roof or outer wall made In whole or part of
fabric or to personal property In this structure.

Explosion. This peril does not Include rupture or
bursting of steam boilers, steam pipes, steam
turbines, steam engines, or water pipes, if
Page 14 of 45
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owned by, leased, or operated under the control
of an insured.

5.

c.

Of materials, tools, or supplles, for use in the
construction of a building until It is completed
and occupied;

Riot or clvil commotion.

6. Aircraft, including self-propelled missiles and
spacecraft. We cover only direct loss caused by
physical contact of the covered property with an
aircraft.

d. To property of others from any part of a
residence premises rented by an insured to
other than an Insured;
e.

service or similar government or private
business;

7. Vehicles, meaning direct loss caused by a
collislon between the covered property and a
vehicle, or an object thrown up by a vehicle. We
also cover an lnsured1:a personal property
while It is In or on a land vehicle, for loss caused
by rollover of the vehlcle or colllslon of the
vehicle or the personal property with another
vehicle, an object, animal, or structure.

B. Smoke,

meaning sudden and accidental
damage from smoke. This peril Includes a puff
back of smoke from a furnace. This peril does
not Include loss caused by smoke from
agricultural smudging or industrial operations.

9. Vandalism or malicious mischief, meaning the
wlllful and malicious damage to or destruction of
the covered property by someone other than an
Insured. We do not cover:
a.

Loss If the dwelling has been vacant or
unoccupied for more than 60 consecutive
days Immediately before the loss. Any
ensuing loss caused by the vandalism or
mallclou$ mischief ls also not covered. A
dwelllng being constructed Is not considered
vacant or unoccupied; or

b. Vandalism or malicious mischief by your
tenants or members of their household.

10. Theft, including attempted theft.
Proof of theft must be based on evidence that
confirms the property more likely than not has
been stolen. The tenn theft does not include
escape, Inventory shortage, wrongful conversion,
or embezzlement.
Property of a student who Is an Insured is
covered while at the sludentls temporary
residence away from the residence premises
only If the student has been there at any time
during lhe 45 days Immediately before the loss.

Of property while in the custody of the postal

f.

Caused by any of your tenants, members of
their households, or your employees; or

g. Caused by someone to whom an insured
has entrusted or voluntarily given possession
of the property.
11. Breakage of glass or safety glazing material
that Is part of the covered building. This
coverage extends to storm doors and storm
windows In summer storage. This peril does not
Include loss if the building has been vacant more
than 30 consecutive days immediately before the
loss. A bulldlng being constructed ts not
considered vacant. This peril does not Include
loss to window framing or other materials that
are not glass.

12. Weight of Ice, snow, or sleet, which causes
damage to a building or property contained ln a
building. This perll does not Include loss to an
awning, fence, patio, pavement, swimming pool,
foundation, retaining wall, bulkhead, pier, wharf,
or dock.

13, Collapse of a building or any part of a bullding.
Collapse means the abrupt falling down or
caving In of all or part of a building resulting in
the building being unfd for occupancy and Its
Intended use. A building that Is In danger of
falllng down or caving In Is not in a state of
collapse. A bulldlng that Is standing is not In a
state of collapse even If It Is cracking, bulging,
sagging, bending, leaning, settling, shrinking, or
expanding.
We cover collapse only If caused by one or more
of the following:

a.

Perils 1 through 12 or 14 through 17;

b. Hidden decay if unknown to the Insured prior
to the collapse;

We do not cover loss:
c.

Hidden Insect or vermin damage If unknown
to the Insured prior to lhe collapse;

d.

Weight of contents, equipment, animals, or
people;

a. Caused by any Insured or any person
residing at any dwelling premises;

b.

In orto a bulldlng under construction;

lD-CQ-02-01 (1014)
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e.

Weight of rain which collects on a roof; or

f.

Use of defective material or methods in
construction, remodeling, or renovation, but
only If the collapse occurs during the course
of the construction, remodeling, or renovation.

We do not cover loss to an awning, structure
adjacent to the building, fence, patio, pavement,
outdoor equipment, swimming pool, underground
pipe. flue, drain, cesspool, septic tank, foundation, retaining wall, bulkhead, pier, wharf, or dock,
under items b through f unless the loss is a direct
result of the collapse of a building.

14. Accidental discharge or overtlow of water or

sleam from within a plumbing, heating, air
conditioning, or automatic fire protective
sprinkler system, or from within a household
appllance. We also pay for tearing out and
replacing any part of the building on the
dwelllng premises necessary to repair the
system or appliance from which the water or
steam escaped.
We do not cover loss:
a. On the dwelling premises If the dwelling
has been vacant for more than 30
consecutive days Immediately before the
loss. A dwellfng belng constructed Is not
considered vacant;
b.

Caused by fungi, wet or dry rot, or bacteria;

c.

To the system or appliance from which 1he
water or steam escaped;

d.

Caused by or resulting from freezing, except
-as provided in perll 17 {freezing); or

e.

On the dweJJlng premises caused by
accidental discharge or overflow which
occurs off the dwelllng premise.

In this peril, a plumbing system does not Include a
septic system, sump, sump pump, roof drain,
gutter, downspout, outside drainage system, or
related equipment.

15. Sudden or accldental tearing apart, cra~king,
burning, or bulging of a steam or water heating
system, an air conditioning system, or an
appliance for heating water. We do not cover loss
caused by or resulting from freezing under this
peril.
16. Falllng objects. This peril does not Include loss
to the Interior of a building or property contained
In the building unless the roof or an exterior wall

ID-CQ-02-01(1014)

of the building is first damaged by a falling
object. 'fVe do not cover loss to outdoor
equipment, awnings, fences, and retaining walls.
We do not cover damage to the falling object
itself.

17. Freezing of a plumbing, heating, air conditioning, or automatic fire protective sprinkler system, or of a household appliance, but
only If you have used reasonable care to:

a. Maintain heat In the building; or
b. Have shut off the water supply and drained
the systems and appliances of water.
We do not cover under" this peril:

c. Loss to an outdoor hot tub, spa, or swimming
pool, including any related plumbing; or
d. Loss to sidewalks, driveways, patios, or other
outdoor property.
tn this peril, a plumblng system does not include
a septic system, sump, sump pump, roof drain,
gutter, downspout, outside drainage system, or
related equipment.

18. Sudden

and accidental damage from
artlflclally generated electrical current. This
pert! does not include loss to a tube, transistor,
Integrated circuit, or similar electronic component unless caused by a sudden and
acclden1al Increase or decrease of artlficlally
generated electrical current. Our llmll of llablllty
under this peril is $2,500 for each damaged item
of personal property wllh a per occurrence
limit for all damaged Items of $5,000.

19. Volcanic eruptlon, meaning direct loss by
volcanic eruption, including volcanic blast, air
born shock wave, lava flow, and volcanic fallout,
except as to trees, shrubs, lawns, plants, and
grounds.
We do not cover loss caused directly or Indirectly
by earthquake, land shock wave, landslide, mud
flow, Ilda! wave, flooding, or earth sinking, rising,
or shifting, resulting from volcanic eruption,
except for direct loss by fire, theft, or breakage of
glass.
One or more volcanic eruptions that occur within
a 72-hour period wlll constitute a single volcanic
eruption.

20. Collision with another object or overturn.
This peril does not apply to livestock. Impact
with the ground or roadbed is not considered a
collision.
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21. Electrocution. This peril applies only to llvestock.
22. A direct attack by dogs or wild animals
causing mortal wounds. This perll applies only
to livestock. It does not include attack by dogs
owned by you or any person residing on the
insured location.

e.

Freezing, thawing, pressure, or weight of
water or ice, whether driven by wind or not, to
an awning, fence, concrete, pavement, patio,
swimming pool, foundation, retaining wall,
bulkhead, pier, wharf, or dock;

f.

Vandalism, malicious mischief, or breakage
of glass and safety-glazing materials, if the
building has been vacant or unoccupied for
more than 60 consecutive days Immediately
before the loss. A building being constructed
is not considered vacant or unoccupied;

23. Accidental shootfng. This peril applies only to
livestock. This peril does not Include loss
caused by any Insured, employee of an
Insured, or person residing on the Insured
location.

24. Loading, unloading, colllslon with another
object, or overturn whlle In transit. This perll
applies only to livestock and mobile
agricultural machinery. In transit means being
carried by vehicle.

g. Wear and tear, marring, scratching,
deterioration, inherent vice, hidden or latent
defect, or mechanical breakdown or failure;
h.

Mold, fungus, rust, electrolysis, wet or dry rot,
bacteria, or any other corrosion;

I.

Smog or contamination;

j.

Smoke from agricultural smudging or induslrial operations;

25. Drowning. This peril applies only to livestock.

26. Collapse

of a building onto mobile
agricultural machinery, meaning a building

collapse that would qualify for coverage under
peril 13 (collapse) that causes damage to your
mobile agricultural machinery. This peril
applies only to mobile agricultural machinery.

k. Settling, cracking, shrinking, bulging, or ex·
panslon of pavements, patios, foundations,
walls, floors, roofs, or ceilings;
f.

27. Special form. We insure for direct physical loss
to the property insured, except for any loss
excluded below. Under items a through m below,
any ensuing loss not excluded by any other
pollcy provision Is covered. We also cover under
peril 27 any loss which would have been
covered had perils 1 through 19 applied to your
covered property. We do not cover under thls
peril any loss excluded under SECTION f
EXCLUSIONS.
Exclusions Applicable to Perll 27

The followlng additional exclusions apply. We do
not cover under peril 27 any loss caused directly
or Indirectly by:

Birds, vennin, rodents, Insects, or domestic
animals. Hidden Insect or vennln damage
causing collapse, however, Is covered but
only as provided in peril 13 (collapse). The
word vennln, includes but is not limited to,
bats, beavers, coyotes, mice, porcupines,
raccoons, rats, skunks, snails, snakes, slugs,
or squirrels;

m. Pressure from or presence of tree, plant, or
shrub roots; or
n. Any pollutlon, contamination, or environmental impairment, unless the loss or
damage follows immediately as a result of a
loss caused directly by perils 1 through 10,
and then only to the extent of such direct
loss.

a. Theft, except as provided in peril 10;
b. Collapse, except as provided In peril 13;
c.

Accidental discharge or overflow of water or
steam from within a plumbing, heating, air
conditioning, or automatic fire protective
sprinkler system, or from a household
appliance, except as provided In peril 14;

d. Freezing of a plumbing, heating, air conditioning, or automatic ftre protective sprinkler
system, or household appliance, except as
provided In perll 17;
ID-CQ-02-01(1014)

If peril 27 applies to Coverage C, the following
addltlonal exclusions also apply. We do not cover
any loss caused directly or indirectly by:
o.

Breakage of eyeglasses, glassware, statuary,
bric-a-brac, porcelains, and slmllar fragile
articles, other than Jewelry, watches, bronzes,
cameras, and pho1ographic lenses. These
items are covered only if breakage results
from perils 1 through 10 or 12 through 19;

p.

Dampness or dryness of atmosphere or
extremes of temperature;
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q.

b.

Refinishing, renovating, or repairing property
other than watches, Jewelry, and furs;

Rain or other natural precipllation that seeps

or enters through or around doors, windows,
or other openings;

r.

Any malicious or harmful computer code,
Including but not limited to, computer virus,
trojan, worm, or spyware;

s.

Rain, snow, or sleet to personal property
that rs outdoors;

t.

Collislon, other than collision of the Insured
property with a land vehicle; or

c.

u. Sinking, swamping, or stranding of watercraft,
includlng their trailers, attached equipment, or
motors.
SECTION I EXCLUSIONS

d. Water below the surface of the ground,
Including water that exerts pressure on, or
seeps or leaks through a bulldlng, sidewalk,
pavement, driveway, foundation, swimming
pool, or other structure. This includes water
from a drain or plumbing system.

We do not cover loss under Section I resulting directly
or Indirectly from the following. Such loss Is excluded
regardless of any other cause or event contributing
concurrently or In any sequence to the loss.

Direct loss by perll 1 (fire), peril 4 (explosion), or
perll 10 (U,eft}, resulting from water damage Is
covered if these perlls apply to your covered
property.

1. Ordinance or law, meaning If because of any
loss caused by any covered perll you are required
during repairs or replacement to comply wllh any
ordinance or law regulating the construction,
repair, or demolltlon of your insured property
which Increases the cost of repairs or replacement beyond our obligation to repair or replace
with llke kind and quality, we do not cover !hat
increased cost. This exclusion Includes any
requirement that you test for, monitor, clean up,
remove, or respond In any way to pollutants.
Limited pollullon or ordinance or law coverage,
however, may apply to a Coverage A dwelllng
under SECTION I ADDITIONAL COVERAGES.

2. Earth movement, Including but not llmlted to,
earthquake, ·landslide, mine subsidence, mudflow,

earth sinking, rising, or shifting. Direct loss by
perll 1 (fire), perll 4 (explosion), perll 10 {theft), or
. peril 11 (breakage of glass or safety glazing
materials), resulting from earth movement Is
covered if these perils apply to your covered
property.

3. Water damage, meaning:

a. Flood, surface water, ice flow, waves, tidal
water, storm surge, tsunami, selche, overflow
of a body of water, or spray from any of
these, whether or not driven by wind. This
exctuslon applies even If an excluded peril Is
caused In whole or In part by man, the failure
of a man-made structure, or other non-natural
means;
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Water or sewage that backs up or overflows
from a sewage, septic, or drainage system, a
drain, sump, sump pump, or related
equipment. A blockage on the dwelllng
premises In a sewer or septic drain caused
by solid material that stops the flow of water
from a plumbing system In the dwelllng Is not
considered a backup or overflow. We do not,
however, cover any loss caused by a septic
tank that Is full or In need of servicing. We do
not cover the cosl to service, clear, or repair
your drains, sewer or septic system; or

4.

Neglect, meaning neglect of an Insured to use
all reasonable means to save and preserve
property at and after the lime of loss, or when
property Is endangered by a peril Insured against.

5. War,

including undeclared war, civil war,
Insurrection, rebellion, revolution, warllke act by
mllllary force or military personnel, destruction or
seizure of property for use for any military
purpose, and Including any consequence of any
of these. Discharge of a nuclear weapon will be
deemed a warlike act even if accidental.

6. Power, heating, or coolJng failure, unless the
fallure results from physlcar damage to power,
heating, or cooling equipment situated on the
dwelllng premises where the loss occurs. This
failure must be caused by a perll Insured against.

7. Depreclatlont decay, deterioration, change In
temperature or humidity, loss of market, or
from any other consequential or Indirect loss of
any kind.

8. Nuclear hazard, meaning any nuclear reaction,
radiation, or radioactive contamination, whether
controlled or uncontrolled or however caused, or
any consequence of any of these. Loss caused
by the nuclear hazard is not considered to be loss
caused by fire, explosion, or smoke, whether
these perils are speclffcally named or otherwise
Included within the perils insured against In
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Section I. If nuclear reacUon or radiation result In
fire, however, we witl pay for loss or damage
caused by that fire if otherwise covered by this
pollcy.

9. Weather conditions, meaning any weather
condition which results in:
a. Landslide, mudflow, or earth sinking, rising,
or shifting;
b. Flood, surface water, fee flow, waves, tidal
water, storm surge, tsunami, seiche, overflow
of a body of water, or spray from any of
these, whether or not driven by wind;

c. Water or sewage backing up through sewers,
drains, or a septic system; or

11. Any CD player, MP3 player, satelute radio
receiver, citizens band radio, scanning monitor, or
radar detector, whlle such device is in or upon
any motorized vehicle if the device is used
primarily in a vehicle. Such device is covered,
however, if it Is factory Installed In mobile agricultural machinery insured under Coverage D.
12. Any disc, CD, DVD, or other medium, including
downloaded media, while such items are in a
motorized vehlcre. This exclusion does not apply
to a prerecord~d software program avallable to
the public and purch86ed for use in a laptop or
desktop computer.

13. Any loss caused Intentionally by or at the
direction of any Insured.

I'
I

!
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14. Any loss caused by the possession or manud. Water below the surface of the ground,
including water that exerts pressure on, or
seeps or leaks through a bullding, sidewalk,
pavement, driveway, foundation, swimming
pool, or other structure.
Direct loss by peril 1 (fire), perll 4 (explosion), or
peril 1O (theft), resultlng from weather conditions
is covered if these perils apply to your covered
property.
Section I also does nof cover the following:

10. Any loss where one or more of the following at
any time directly or indirectly cause, contribute to,
or aggravate the loss:
a. Any conduct, act, failure to act, or decision of
any person, organization, or governmental
entity, whether intentional, wrongfur, negligent, or without fault;

b. Any faulty. Inadequate, or defective compaction, design, development, grading, planning,
siting, specifications, surveying, workmanship, or zoning;
c.

Any faulty, inadequate, or defective construction, remodeling, renovation, repair, workmanship, or materials, except as is speciflcally covered under paragraph f of peril 13
(collapse); or

d. Any maintenance of all or any part of any
property whether on or off the insured location.

Any ensuing loss not excluded by any other policy
provision, however, is covered if the loss is
caused by perlls 1 through 18, and they apply to
the loss.
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facturrng of a controlled substance.
15. Any loss caused by the intentional dispersal or
applfcatlon by anyone of pathogenic, poisonous,
bfotoglcal, or chemical materials.
16. Any land or water.
SECTION I CONDITIONS

1. Dwelling Not Owned by You. If we choose to
Insure a dwelllng premises under Section I not
owned by you, the Insured and appllcable
coverages are shown in the Declarations.
2.

Duties after Loss. In case of a loss to which this
Insurance may apply, the Insured must see that
the following duties are performed:

a. Give notice as soon as practicable to us, and
also to the police if the loss is suspected to
be caused by someonem violation of law. In
case of loss under the credit or bank card
coverage, also notify the issuing card
company;

I

b. Protect the property from further damage,
make reasonable and necessary repairs
required to protect the property, and keep an
accurate record of repair expenditures;
c.

Prepare an inventory of damaged or stolen
property showing in detail the quantity,
description, actual cash value, and amount of
loss. Attach to the Inventory all bills, receipts,
and related documents, that substantiate the
figures and ownership of property In the
Inventory;

d. As often as we may reasonably require:
show us your property: provide us with
records and documents we request and allow
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outdoor equipment, whether or not attached
to the buildings, for actual cash value at the
time of loss but not exceeding the amount
necessary to repair or replace.

us to make copies; and submit to examination
under oath while not in the presence of any
other Insured and sign the same; and

e.

Within 60 days after our request, submit to us
a signed, sworn proof of loss which sets forth
the followlng information to the best of the
lnsuredls knowledge and bellef:

(1} The time and cause of loss;
(2} The interest of the Insured and all others
In the property involved and all encumbrances on the property;
(3) Other insurance which may cover the
loss;

(4} Changes In title or occupancy of the
property during the term of the policy;

c.

We cover buildings Insured under Coverage
A, except for property described In paragraph
4 b above, as follows:

(1) When

the full cost of repair or
replacement for loss to a building under
Coverage A Is less than $5,000, we wlfl
pay the full cost of repair or replacement
without deduction for depreciation.

(2) If the llmlt of llablllty on the damaged
bulldlng Is less than 80% of its replacement cosl at the time of the loss, we wlll
pay the larger of the following:

I.

Actuat cash value of the damaged
part of the buildings; or

ii.

That proportion of the replacement
cost of the damaged part which our
llmit of liability on the building bears
to 80% of the full replacement cost of
the building.

(5) Specifications of any damaged property
and detailed estimates for repair of the
damage;

(6) An Inventory of damaged or stolen
property as described above;

(7) Receipts for additional Uvlng expenses
Incurred and records supporting any fair
rental value loss;

(8) Evidence or affidavit supporting a claim
under the credit card coverage stating the
amount and cause of loss; and
(9) Such other lnfonnatlon that we may
reasonably request.
3.

(3) If the limit of llabllity on the damaged
building ls at least 80% of its replacement
cost at the time of loss, we wlll pay the
full cost of repair or replacement of the
damaged part without deduction for
depreciation, but not more than the
smallest of the following amounts:

i.

The limit of llablllly appllcable to the
building;

Limit of Liability. Subject to the provisions of this
pollcy, the most we will pay for loss or damage

Ji. Th& cost to repair or replace the

from any occurrence Is the appllcable llmlt of
llablllty stated In the Declarations, In the policy
booklet, or In any appllcable endorsement.

damage on the same premises using
materfals of equivalent kind and
quality to the extent practicable; or

4. Loss Settlement. Subject to the applicable limits
stated In the Declarations, In the policy booklet, or
In any applicable endorsement, covered property
losses are settled as follows:

m.

The amount actually and necessarily
spent to repair or replace the
damage,

(4) When the cost to repair or replace
a.

We cover personal property, structures that
are not buildings, farm personal property,
and buildings Insured under Coverage E, for
actual cash value at the time of loss but not
exceeding the amount necessary to repair or
replace. If .repair or replacement results in
better than like kind or quality, the Insured
must pay for the amount of the betterment.

exceeds 5% of the appltcable llmll of
llablllty on the damaged building, we are
not liable for more than the actual cash
value of the loss until actual repair or
replacement Is completed. Such repairs
or rebuilding must be made at the same
location as where the loss occurred. Any
replacement structure must be of a
similar type and use.

b. We

cover floor coverings,
domestic
appliances, awnings, outdoor antennas, and

ID-CQ-02-01{1014)
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(5) You may make a clalm for the actual
cash value amount of the loss before
repairs are made. A claim for any
additional amount payable under this
provision must be made and construction
started within one year after the loss.

d. We do not cover any reducUon In value to
your Insured property after repairs
completed.

are

5. Loss to a Panel, Section, Pair, or Set. In case
of a loss to a panel, section, side, pair, set, or
part, Including a loss to cabinets, siding, roofing,
or carpet, we may elect to:

a.

b.

9.

Mortgagee Clause. The word mnortgageeo
Includes a trustee of a deed of trust. If a
mortgagee Is named In this policy, any loss
payable will be paid to the mortgagee and you, as
interests appear. If a payable loss is under
$10,000 and Is for repairs, however, payment
may, at our discretion, be made to you only. 1r
more than one mortgagee Is named, the order of
payment will be the same as the order or
precedence of the mortgages.
if we deny your clalm, that denial wlll not apply to
a valid claim of the mortgagee, If the mortgagee:
a.

Repair, replace, or restore, the panel, section,
side, pair, set, or part, to Its value before the
loss;

Notifies us of any change ln ownership,
occupancy, or substantial change in risk of
which the mortgagee Is aware;

b.

Pay the difference between the actual cash
value of the property before and after the
loss; or

Pays any premium due under this poUcy on
demand If you have neglected to pay the
premium; and

c.

Submits a signed, sworn proof of loss within

60 days after recetvlng notice from us of your

o. Pay the reasonable cost of providing a
substitute to match as closely as practlcable
the remainder of the outer covering, panel,
section, side, pair, or set.
We do not guarantee the availability of parts or
replacements. We are not obligated to repair,
match, or replace the entire pair, set, series of
objects, outer covering, or panel, when a section,
side, set, or part, Is lost or damaged.
6.

Glass Replacement. Covered loss for breakage
of glass wlll be settled on the basis of
replacement with safety 9lazlng materials when
required by ordinance or law.

7. Waiver of Subrogation. You may waive in
writing before a loss all right of recovery against
any person. If not waived, we may require an
assignment of rights for a loss to the extent that
payment Is made by us.
B.

Other Insurance. If you have other Insurance on
the property to which this policy app!tes, we will
not be Hable for a greater porlkln of any loss than
our pro rata share In excess of any deductible.
Our coverage Is excess, however, over any
restoration plan, home warranty, or simllar
coverage, whether or not It Is characterized as
Insurance.
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failure to do so.
Polley conditions relating to Arbitration, Sutt
Against Us, and Loss Payment apply to the
mortgagee,
If this policy Is canceled by us, notice will be
mailed to the mortgagee at least 10 days before
the date cancellation 1akes effect.
If we pay the mortgagee for any loss and deny
payment to you:
a.

We are subrogated to all the rights of the
mortgagee granted under 1he mortgage on
the property; or

b. At our option, we may pay to the mortgagee
the whoJe principal on the mortgage plus any
accrued Interest. In this event, we have the
right to.receive a full assignment and transfer.
c.

Subrogation wlll not Impair the right of the
mortgagee to recover the full amount of the
mortgagee~ claim.

Page 21 of 45

116

SECTION II O LIABILITY INSURANCE
COVERAGE F-1 D BODILY INJURY LIABILITY and
COVERAGE G D PROPERTY DAMAGE LfABILITY

If a claim Is made or a suit is brought against any
Insured for damages because of bodlly Injury or
property damage, caused by an occurrence lo
which this coverage applies, we will:
1.

Pay up to our limit of Uablllty for U,e damages for
which lhe Insured is legally llable (damages
Includes any awarded prejudgment Interest}; and

COVERAGE F-2 D PREMISES MEDICAL

Subject to the limit of liabllfty, we will pay reasonable
and necessary medical and funeral expenses
resulting from bodily Injury caused by an
occurrence as described below. This coverage does
not apply to you or residents of your household other
than residence employees. This coverage applies
only;

1. To a person on the Insured locatlon with the
permission of any Insured; or

2. Provide a defense at our expense by counsel of
our cholce. We may Investigate and settle any
claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our
obligation to defend any suit or claim ends when
our llmlt of llabillty Is paid In settlements or
Judgments.
Additional Payments. Under Coverages F-1 and G,
we wlll pay the following expenses In addition to our
llmlt of llabillty, but our obligatlon for these payments
ceases when our obllgation to defend ends:

1. Expenses for first ald to others Incurred by any
Insured for. bodily Injury covered under this
policy. We will not pay for first aid to you or any
other Insured;

2. Expenses incurred by us and costs taxed against
any Insured In any suit we defend. We do not
cover attorney fees or costs taxed against an
Insured that are associated with any part of a
judgment not covered by this policy;

3.

Premiums on bonds required In a suit defended
by us, but not for bond amounts greater than the
llmlt of llablllty provided by Section II of this policy.
We are not obligated to apply for or furnish any
bond;

2. To a person off the Insured locatlon, If the

bodily injury:
a.

Arises out of a condition In the insured
location or the roads or walkways
immediately adjoining;

b.

Is caused by the actlvlttes of any Insured;

c.

Is caused by the activities of a farm or
residence employee In the course of
employment by any Insured;

d. Is caused by an animal owned by or In the
care of any insured; or
e. ls sustained by any residence employee
and arises out of and In the course of
employment.
We cover only expenses Incurred within two years
from the date of occurrence. Any payment under this
coverage applies toward settlement of ·any claim for
. damages against any Insured. We may decflne to
make a payment under this coverage If you
disapprove of the payment
COVERAGEJ DNAMED PERSONS MEDICAL

4. Reasonable expenses incurred by any Insured at
our request, Including actual loss of earnings (but
not loss of other Income) up to $250 per day for
assisting us In the investigation or defense of any
claim or suH; and

5. Interest _on the entire judgment which accrues
after entry of the Judgment In any suH we defend
and before we pay, tender, or deposit In court that
part of the judgment which we cover and which
does not exceed the appllcable llmlt of llablllty.

ID-CQ-02-01(1014)
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Subject to the flmlt of liability, we will pay reasonable
and necessary medical and funeral expenses
resulting from bodily Injury caused by an
occurrence. This coverage applies only to persons
named in the Declarations for this Coverage J. Any
payment under this coverage applies toward
seHlement of any claim for damages against any
Insured. We cover only expenses Incurred within two
years from the dale of occurrence. We do not cover
any expenses resulting from sickness or disease.
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COVERAGE L []CUSTOM FARMING
Coverages F-1 and G also cover your custom

Exclusions. Section II Exclusions do not apply to
Coverage M. The follow ex.cluslons apply. We do not
cover under Coverage M any property damage:

farming.
1.

Additional Excluslons. Section II Excluslons apply
to Coverage L. The following addillonal exclusions
apply. Coverage L does not apply to:

2. To property owned by or rented to any Insured, a
tenant of any Insured, or a resident of any
lnsuredlS household. This exclusion does not
apply to a rented golf cart when It Is being used to
play golf on a golf course;

1. Any damage, Injury, or loss of use to the land or
crops upon which the custom farming is
performed or Is to be performed, arising from:
a.

The rnixlng or application of fertilizers,
herbicides, pesticides, fungicides, or other
chemical treatment of real property, seeds, or
crops;

b.

Cleaning of seed; or

c.

Any goods, prod ucts, or their containers,
manufactured, sold, handled, or distributed by
or on behalf of any Insured.

Caused Intentionally by any Insured who Is 13
years of age or older;

3.

Arising out of:

a. Any business;
b. The ownership, maintenance, use, loading, or
unloading of a motor vehicle or aircraft;

c.

Theft, mysterious disappearance, or
use;or

loss

of

d. Mechanical or electrical breakdown or failure,
wear and tear, latent defect, or Inherent vice;

2. Damage, Injury, or loss of use resulllng from:
a. A delay in or lack of performance by or on
behalf of any Insured of any contract or
agreement, whether written or oral; or

4. To tires;
5.

Caused by any goods, products, or containers
manufactured, processed, sold, handled, or
distributed by an Insured; or

6.

Arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release, or
escape of any pollutants.

b. The failure of any lnsuredls products or work
performed by or on behalf of any Insured to
meet the level of performance, qualtty,
fitness, or result warranted or represented by
an Insured.

3.

Property damage to an lnsuredts work arising
out of it or any part of It. An lnsuredr.s work
Includes operations or work performed by an
Insured or on the insuredta behalf. It also
Includes materials, parts, or equipment furnished
In connection with the lnsuredm work or
operations.

4.

Property damage to your product arising out of It
or any part of It. Your product means any goods
or products manufactured, sold, handled,
distributed, or disposed of by you In connection
with your custom farming.

Additional Conditions. The following addltfooaf
conditions apply to Coverage M:

1. Additional Duties. The Insured shall submit to
us within 60 days after the loss, a signed, sworn
proof of loss and exhibit the damaged property, if
within the lnsured[) control.

2. Application of Section I. If Section I of this
·policy also applies to a loss covered under
Coverage M, Section I is primary and Coverage
M is excess. You must pay any applfcable
Section I deductible before Coverage M applies.
3.

5.

Any custom farming conducted more than 100
miles outside the borders of the slate of Idaho.

Limit of Liability. Our limit of liabillty under
Coverage M for property damage arising out of
any occurrence wlll not exceed the lesser of:

COVERAGE MD DAMAGE TO PROPERTY OF
OTHERS

a. The actual cash value of the damaged

We wHJ pay for property damage to property of
others caused by an Insured.

b.

ID-CQ-02-01(1014)

property at the time of the Joss;
What It would then cost to repair or replace
the damaged property Wilh other property of
Ilka kind and quality; or
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c. The limit of llablfity stated In the Daclarations

2.

for Coverage M.
Our limit of llability is the most we will pay for any
occurrence regardless of the number of
insureds under this policy or persons or organizations sustaining property damage. Our llmlt of
Uabillty Is also the most we will pay for all
damages arising out of one or more occurrences
within a 24-hour period.
4.

No Coverage for Defense. We have no
obligation under Coverage M to provide a
defense against any claim or suit brought against
any Insured.

5.

Occurrence. Under Coverage M only. the
definition of occurrence Includes property
damage caused Intentionally by an Insured who
Is under 13 years of age.

6.

2.

Fire Legal. Coverage G covers property
damage to a lodging place and Its furnishings
rented to, occupied by, used by, or In the care of
an Insured, if such property damage arises out
of fire, smoke, or explosion. For purposes of this
fire legal coverage, the term Insured Includes
only you and those persons listed in paragraph 1
of the definition of Insured. The care, custody,
and control exclusion (exclusion 18) does not
apply to this extension of coverage.
Newly Acquired Locations. Section II applies to
a newly acquired location If ll qualifles as an
Insured location. You must notify us of this
acquisition on or prior to the next renewal date of
the policy or coverage wlll not apply. You must
pay any additional premium required.

4.

1. Arising from any lnsuredls business activities or
any professional service;

ID-CQ-02-01(1014)

Allslng from the maintenance, operation, use,
entrustment to others, loading, or unloading of
any of the following which any Insured owns,
borrows, rents, leases, or operates:
a. Any aircraft;
b.

Any motor vehicle; coverage, however,
app!Jes on the Insured location If the motor
vehicle is not licensed for road use and Is
used exclusively on the Insured location; or

c.

Any watercraft 1r 26 feet or more in length.

This excluslon does not apply to bodlly Injury
sustained by a residence employee maintaining,
loading, or unloadlng a motor vehicle In the
course of employment; it also does not apply to
Coverage J (Named Persons Medical);
5. Arising out of the use of any aircraft, watercraft, or
motorized land vehicle, Including any motor
vehicle, moblle agricultural machinery, or
recreational motor vehicle, while being used In
or following any prearranged or organized racing,
speed, or stunllng contest or activity, or In
practice or preparatlon for any such contest or
actMty;

I
l

6. Which results from liability arising out of -any
contract or agreement;
7. Arising out of custom farming unless coverage
Is Indicated under Coverage L In the Declarations;
8.

Caused directly or Indirectly by war, Including
undeclared war, clvll war, Insurrection, rebellfon,
revoluUon, warlike act by a mllitary force or
military personnel, or destruction or seizure or
use of property for any mllltary purpose, and
Including any consequence of these. Discharge of
a nuclear weapon will be deemed a warlike act
even ff accidental;

9.

Resulting from any act or omission of a
re&ldence or farm employee while away from
the Insured location if the employee is under lhe
control and direction of some person other than
an Insured;

SECTION II EXCLUSIONS

The followlng excluslons apply to all coverages under
Section II except Coverage M. Section II does not
cover bodily injury or property damage:

l

This exclusion does not apply to the use of
reasonable force by an Insured to protect a
person or property;

SECTION II ADDITIONAL COVERAGES

1.

:·

3. Which Is Intentionally caused by any Insured.

Our Settlement Options. At our option. we may
pay for the loss In money or may repair or replace
the property. We may settle the claim for loss to
property either with the owner or with you. At our
option, any property paid for or replaced will
become our property. We may Investigate and
settle any claim or suit we decide Is appropriate.

Section II Includes the followlng additional coverages:

Arising from any location which an Insured owns,
rents, leases. or controls, other than an Insured
location. This exclusion does not apply to bodily
Injury of a residence employee arising out of
and in the course of employment by an Insured;
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10. Caused by a substance released or discharged
from an aircraft In connection with dusUng or
spraying operations;
11. Arising out of the actual, alleged, or threatened
discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release,
or escape of any pollutants. This exclusion
applies only to occurrences arising from farming
or custom farming;
12. Caused by any goods, products, or containers
manufactured, processed, sold, handled, or
distributed by an Insured, except farming
products raised on the Insured location. Loss
arising out of the failure of seed sold by an
Insured to conform to the variety, type, purpose,
quaHty, or conditions specified by an Insured,
however, is not covered. This Includes but Is not
limited lo loss caused by any viral, fungal,
bacterial, or any other type of seed disease. The
term !Beado means seeds, bulbs, plants, roots,
tubers, cuttings, or other similar means of plant
propagation;

13. Sustained by you or any Insured as defined in
paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 of the definition of
Insured or by any other resident of your
residence premises;

14. Arising out of a violation of a criminal law, Youth
Rehabllltatlon Act, or similar law, except traffic
violations, if committed by any insured;

15. With respect to which any Insured under this

19. Property damage to work completed by or for an
Insured, any damage arising out of such work, or
out of the materials, parts, or equipment furnished
in connection wfth such work;

20. Property damage or Injury, or loss In value, to
livestock, goods, or products, including containers, which an Insured raises, manufactures,
sells, handles, or distributes;

21. Damages claimed for the withdrawal, Inspection,
repair, replacement, or loss of use of an
lnsured!A products, or work completed by or for
an Insured, or for any property of which such
products or work form a part, If such products,
work, or property are withdrawn from the market
or from use because of any known or suspected
defect or deficiency;

22. Punitive or exemplary damages;
23. Bodily Injury to any person ellglble to receive
any benefits required to be provided or voluntarily
provided by any Insured under any workerrs
compensation, non-occupational disease, dlsablllty, or occupational disease law;

24. Bodily Injury to a farm employee that arises out
of that e·mployeers work for you. We also do not
cover any damages that the spouse or any minor
children of the farm employee may have that
arise out of a farm employeets bodily Injury.
Thfs exclusion applies whether you may be liable
as an employer or In any other capacity;

policy Is also an Insured under a nuclear energy
liability potrcy Issued by a Nuclear Energy Liablllly
Insurance Association, Mutual Atomfc Energy

25. Property damage to an Insured location arising

Liability Underwriters, Nuclear Insurance Association of Canada, or any similar organization, or
would be an Insured under any such policy but for
Its termination upon exhaustion of Its limits of
llabllity;

26. Bodlly Injury under Coverage F-2 sustained by

16. Arising out of the molestation, corporal pu11ishment, or physical, sexual, emotional, or mental
abuse of any person; or

17. Arising out of the posting of any lnformaUon,
opinion, statement, or material of any kind in an
email, text message, or on the Internet by an
Insured, including postings on chat rooms, bulletin boards, social media, biogs, or gripe sites.
Section II also does not cover the following:

18. Property damage to property owned by, used by,
rented to, or in the care, custody, or control of any
Insured or the lnsuredrt employees, or as to
which any Insured or the insuredli employees
exercise physical control for any purpose;
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out of the allenallon (for example: sefllng, leasing,
separating, etc.) of that location;

any person residing on. the Insured location
except a residence employee to whom workerl!I
compensation does not apply;

27. Under Coverages F-2 and J:
a. Bodily Injury Involving hernia or back Injury,
unless It Is of recent origin, It Is accompanied
by pain at the time of occurrence, and It did
not exist prior to the date of the alleged injury;

b. Any person whne conducting their business
on the Insured location,
employees of that person;

c. Bodily

Including

the

Injury to the extent that any medical

expenses are paid or payable under the
provisions of any workerls compensation or

similar law: or
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d.

b. Immediately forward to us every notice,

Expenses for any treatment administered by
anyone not subject to state licensing and any
expense for the purchase or rental of
equipment not primarily designed to serve a
medical purpose;

demand, summons. or other process relatlng
to the occurrence; and
c.

28. Under Coverages F-1 and F-2, bodily Injury
sustained by any farm employee arising out of
employment;

At our request, assist in:

(1} Making settlement;
(2) The enforcement of any right of contribution or indemnity against any person or
organization who may be liable lo any

29. Bodily Injury or property damage:

Insured;
a.

Arising out of a rodeo or horse racing,
Including chariot or harness racing, or from
practice or preparations for any of these
actlvilles. This exclusion does not apply to an
insured~ participation In a riding club~
practice, preparation for, or performance in a
rodeo;

(3) The conduct of suits Including attending
hearings and trials; and
(4) Securing and giving evidence and
obtaining the attendance of witnesses.

b.

Arising out of the use of any horse rented by
an Insured to others;

2. Payment by an Insured. For any occurrence
Involving a potential claim against an Insured, an
Insured must not, except at the lnsuredi:s own

c.

Arising from riding Instruction given by an
Insured for compensation;

cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any
obllga1ion, or Incur any expense other than for
first aid to others at the time of the bodily Injury.

d. Arising out of the training, care, boarding,

3.

pasturing, or acl of breeding, of any horse not
owned by an insured; or

Dutleso Coverages F·2 and J. The Injured
person or claimant shall:
a.

e. Arising out of the lease of all or

part of the
Insured location for any activity involving
horses;

Give us a signed, written proof of loss
containing the Information we request, under
oath if required, as soon as practicable;

b. Submit to such medical or other examinations
30. Any occurrence covered under Section Ill; or

or evaluations by peraons selected by us
when and as often as we may reasonably
require;

31. The transmission of any communicable disease,
bacteria, virus, or parasite, by an insured.

c. At our request, submit to examination under
oath as often as we may reasonably require,

SECTION II CONDITIONS

and subscribe the same; and
1.

Duties after Loss. In case of an accident or
occurrence, the insured shall perform the

d.

followlng duttes to the extent possible:
a.

Give a written notice to us as soon as
practicable, which sets forth to the best of the
lnsuredcs knowledge and belief:

Execute authorization to allow us to obtain
copies of any medical or other reports or
records.

If a claim is being made because of the death of
an lnJured person, the person(s) making the claim
shall comply with paragraphs a, c, and d above.

(1) The identity of the policy and Insured:

4.
(2) Reasonably avaffable Information on the

Payment of Claim. A payment by us or any
Jnsured ls not an admission of liability.

time, place, and circumstances of the

occurrence;

5. Limits of LlabllltyD Coverages F-1 and G.
Regardless of the number of:

(3) Names and addresses of any claimants
and witnesses; and

a. Insureds under this policy;

(4} Such other Information that we may
reasonably request;

b. Persons or organizations sustaining dam·
ages, bodily Injury, or property damage; or

ID-CQ-02-01 (1014)
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c.

Claims made;

our liability for each occurrence is subject to the
following !imitations:
d. Under Coverage F-1, the bodily Injury
llabllity limit for each person stated In !he
Declarations Is the maximum amount we will
pay for all damages arising out of bodily
Injury sustained by one person resulting from
an occurrence, including any emotional
distress or other damages resulting from this
bodl(y fnJury and sustained by any other
person.
Subject to the bodily JnJury llmltatlon for
each person, the bodffy Injury llablllty limlt
for each occurrence stated In the Declarations Is 1he maximum amount we wlll pay for
all damages arising out of bodily Injury
sustained by two or more persons resulting
from an occurrence;
e. Under Coverage G, the property damage
liability limit for each occurrence stated in
the Declarations is the maximum amount we
will pay for all property damage resulting
from an occurrence;
f.

The per occurrence limit of liability for bodily
lnJury and the per occurrence limit of Uabillly
for property damage caused by farm
products produced on the Insured locatlon
are each 1he total aggregate llmlt of our
liability for all such occurrences during the
policy period; and

g. Subject to the above llmltatlons, the
applicable annual aggregate llmlt of Uability
shown in the Declarations is the most we will
pay for all damages from all occurrences
during 1he policy . period. This limitation
applies only to occurrences arising from
your farming activities.

i

6. Llmfts of liabllityo Coverages F-2 and J. Our
limit of llablllty per person tor Coverages F-2 and
J Is stated In the Declarations. This Is the
maximum amount we wfll pay for all covered
expenses incurred by or on behalf of each person
who sustains bodily Injury resulting from an
occurrence. This llmlt Is subject to reduction as
explained below.
a.

Our limit of llabllity in the aggregate for all
physical therapy, massage therapy, and any
treatment by or at the direction of a
chiropractor, per person per occurrence is
the lesser of $2,000 or the limit of ltabllity
stated In the Declarations.

b.

Our limit of tiabllity for funeral expenses per
person Is the lesser of $5,000 or the llmlt of
liability stated in the Declarations.

,i...

Subject to the limit of liability for each person, our
total limit of Uablllly for each occurrence for
bodily Injury sustained by two or more persons
Is 1he per occurrence limit of liability stated In the
Declarations.

I

7. Other Insurance. The insurance under Section ff
Is excess over any other valfd and collectible
Insurance. Coverages F-2 and J, however, are
primary coverages.

i

!·
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SECTION tu DAUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COVERAGE N D BODILY INJURY LIABIUTY and
COVERAGE O OPROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY

If a claim Is made or a suit Is brought against any
Insured for damages because of bodily Injury or
property damage, arising out of an occurronce
Involving an Insured 11ehfcle or a nonowned
vehlcle, we will:

part of the Judgment which we cover and which
does not exceed the applicable Umit of liabillty.

COVERAGE P D UNINSURED MOTORIST

1. Pay up to our llmlt of ilabllity for the damages for
which the Insured is legally liable (damages
Includes any awarded prejudgment Interest); and

We will pay damages which an Insured Is legally
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an
uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily Injury
sustained by an Insured and caused by an
occurrence. The ownerls or operator!£! llablllly for
these damages must arise from the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured motorvehlcle.

2. Provide a defense at our expense by counsel of

COVERAGE P-1 OUNDERINSURED MOTORIST

our choice. We may Investigate and setl!e any
claim or suit that we decide Is appropriate. Our
obl!gatlon to defend any claim or suit ends when
our limit of llabfllty Is paid In settlements or
judgments.

Additional Paymen1s. Under Coverages N and 0,

I·

We will pay damages which an Insured is legally
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an
underinsured motor vehicle because of bodlly
Injury sustained by an Insured and caused by an
occurrence. The ownerlf! or operatorw llabllity for
these damages must arise from the ownership,
maintenance, or use of the underlnsured motor

we will pay the followlng In addition to our limit of
liability, but our obligation for these payments ceases
when our obllgatlon to defend ends:

vehfcle.

1. Expenses for first aid to others incurred by any

Additional Definitions. The following additlonal defln111ons apply to Coverages P and P-1:

insured for bodily Injury covered under this
policy. We wlll not pay for first aid to you or any
o1her insured;

2. Expenses incurred by us and costs taxed against
any Insured in any suit we defend. We do not
cover attorney fees or costs taxed against an
Insured that are associated with any part of a
judgment not covered by this pollcy;

3. Premiums on bonds required In a suit defended

by us, but not for bond amounts greater than the
Hmlt of liability provided by this policy. We will also
pay up to $250 for the premium of any ball bond
required of an Insured because of an arrest In
connection with an accident resulting from the
use of an Insured vehicle. We are not obligated
to apply for or furnish any bond;

1. Insured means:
a.

b. Anyone occupying a nonowned vehlcle
whlle operated by you or your relative,
except a relative who owns a licensed motor
vehicle not Insured by this policy; or

c.

S. Interest on the entire Judgment which accrues
after enlry of the Judgment In any suit we defend
and before we pay, tender, or deposit In court that

ID·CQ-02-01 (1014)

Anyone occupying an insured vehicle.

2. Uninsured motor vehicle means a motor
vehicle:
a.

4. Reasonable expenses Incurred by any Insured at
our request, Including actual loss of earnings (but
not loss of other Income) up to $250 per day for
assisting us In the Investigation or defense of any
claim or suit; and

If you are a person, you and any relative,
except a relative who owns a licensed motor
vehlcle not Insured by this policy;

To which a bodily Injury liability bond or
policy does not apply at the time of the
occurrence;

b. For which an Insuring or bonding company
denies coverage or becomes Insolvent; or
c.

Which Is a hit-and-run motor vehlcle and
neither the driver nor the owner can be
Identified. The hit-and-run motor vehicle
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must hit an Insured, an Insured vehicle, cir a
vehicle that an Insured Is occupying.
3. Underfnsured motor vehicle means a motor
vehicle for which the sum of liablllty limits of all
applicable llablllty bonds or policies at the time of
an occurrence Is less than the llmlts of this
coverage. For an occurrence Involving only one
insured this means the sum of all applicable per
person limits compared to the per person llmlt of
this coverage. For an occurrence Involving lwo
or more Insureds, th!s means the sum of all
applicable per occurrence limits compared to the
per occurrence llmlt of this coverage.

P-1 under your policy applies to you, however,
whlle driving a motor vehicle Insured by us that
is owned by a relative;

4.

Bodily injury sustained by an Insured whlle
occupying a motor vehicle owned by any
insured If Coverages P and P-1 do not apply to
that motor vehicle;

5.

The llablllty of an owner or operator of an insured
vehicle or nonowned vehicle for bodily Injury

sustained by a passenger of that vehicle; or

6.

A motor vehicle cannot qualify as both an
uninsured motor vehicle and an underInsured motor vehicle.
4. An uninsured or underlnsured motor vehicle
does not Include any motor vehicle:
a. Owned or operated by a self-insured as
defined by any applicable motor vehicle law;

Additional Conditions. The foilowlng additional conditions apply to Coverages P and P-1;
t_

1. Limits of Uablllty. Under Coverages P and P-1,
the bodily Injury llabllity limit for each person
stated In the Declarations Is the maximum
amount we will pay for all damages arising out of
bodily Injury sustained by one person resulting
from an occurrence, Including any emotional
distress or other damages resulting from this
bodily Injury and sustained by any other person.

b. Owned by any governmental unit or agency;

c. Used as a residence;
d.

That does not collide with an Insured, an
Insured vehicle, or a vehfcle that an Insured
rs occupying, and neither the driver or the
owner can be lde11trfled;

e.

Owned by or furnished for the regular use of
you or any relative; or

f.

Which Is an Insured vehicle.

If both Coverages P and P~1 apply to the same
occurrence, our combined llmlt of Jiablllty for all
damages payable under both coverages for: (1)
each person shall be lhe appllcable Coverage P
llmlt of liability for each person; and (2) each
occurrence shall be the applicable Coverage P
Hmft of llablllty for each occurrence.

not limited to, golf carts, snowmobiles, trall bikes,
mopeds, dune buggies, or all-terrain vehicles.

2.

Nonstacklng of Limits. Regardless of the
number of Insured vehicles, Insureds, pollcles
of insurance with us, premium charges, clalms
made, or vehicles involved in the occurrence, the
most we will pay for all damages resulUng from
any occurrence Is the limit of liability shown In
the Declarations, subject to reduction as outlined
In the next paragraph.

3.

Reduction of Amounts Payable. The amount
payable under Coverages P and P-1 shall be the
lesser of our limit of flablllly stated In the
Declarations reduced by a and b below, or the
total damages for bodily Injury reduced by a and
bbelow:

apply to:
1. Bodlly Injury sustained by an Insured while
occupying a motor vehicle or trailer without the
permission of the owner;
2. The direct or Indirect benefit of any Insurer or selfInsured under any workerlfl compensation,
disability benefits, or slmllar law;
3.

Bodily Injury sustained by an Insured while
occupying a motor vehicle owned by or
ava!lable for the regular use of any Insured which
Is not an Insured vehlcfe. Any Coverage P or

ID-CQ-02-01(1014)
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Subject to the bodily Injury llmltatlon for each
person, the bodily Injury llablllty tlmit for each
occurrence stated In the Declarations Is Iha
maximum amount we wlll pay for all damages
arising out of bodily Injury sustained by two or
more persons resulllng from an occurrence.

5. An uninsured or underlnsured motor vehicle
does not Include any motorized vehicle designed
for recreation use off public roads, Including but

Additional Exclusions. Section Ill Exclusions and
the following additional exclusions apply to
Coverages P and P-1. Coverages P and P-1 do not

Bodily Injury for which a claim against the owner
or driver of the uninsured or underlnsured
motor vehicle is barred by the appllcable statute
of limitations, unless we received notice of the
claim before the statute of llmltatlons has explred.
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a. All sums paid or payable by or on behalf of
persons or organizations who may be legally
responsible for the bodily Injury to which this
coverage applies. This includes all amounts
paid under the liability coverage of this policy.
This also includes all applicable liablllty bonds,
or policies, regardless of whether such bonds
or policies have been exhausted by judgments
or payments; and

b. The sum of all amounls payable under any
workerrn compensation, disability, or similar
law.
Any payment under lhls coverage to or for an
Insured will reduce any amount that person Is
entilled to receive under this pollcyls llabllity
coverages.
4.

Payment of Loss. We wlll pay only after the
insured has satisfied all duties under Section Ill
Condltlons, paragraph 6 (Additional Duties of an
Injured Person o Coverages P, P-1, and Q) and it
has been determined by agreement, arbilraUon, a
final judgment, or other method agreed to by us,
that the damages which the Insured Is legally
entllled to recover under thfs coverage exceeds
the limits of all applicable bonds or policies. We
have the option to pay any amount due under this
coverage as follows:

a. To the Insured;
b.

If the Insured rs deceased, to lhe lnsuredm
surviving spouse; or

c.

To a person authorized by law to receive
such payment, or to a person who is legally
entitled to recover the damages that the
payment represenls.

5. Persons not entitled to recovery. A person who
Is not an Insured under Coverage P and P-1 is
not entllled to recover damages under these
coverages, !ncludlng damages for wrongful death
of an Insured.
6.

Hlt•and-Run Accident. At our request, the Insured shall make available for inspection any
motor vehicle or trailer that the Insured

mediator. In the event they cannot agree on a
mediator within 1Odays, either may request that a
mediator be selected by a judge of a court having
Jurisdiction. Both parties shall make disclosure to
each other of all required information at least 20
days prior to mediation. Each party shall pay onehalf of the cost of the mediator; except if the claim
Is settled through mediation, we shall pay the
medlalorrn full cost. A request for mediation can
be made within 10 days after a request for
arbitration and supersedes a request for
arbitration.

8. Arbitration and Litigation. If we and an Insured
disagree whelher the Insured is legally entitled to
recover damages from the owner or driver of an
uninsured or underlnsured motor vehicle or
disagree as to the amount of damages, either
party may make a written demand for arbitration.
Each party will select a competent, Impartial
arbitrator within 20 days of receipt of the written
demand. The two arbitrators will select a third
arbitrator. If they cannot agree upon a third
arbitrator within 10 days, either may request that
a Judge of a court having ju risdlctlon select a third
arbitrator. Both parties shall make disclosure to
each other of all Information as required by the
arbitrator(s} in the scheduling and discovery
order. Each party will pay the expenses it incurs,
lncludlng attorney fees and related costs, and
bear the expenses of the third arbilrator equally.
Arbitration will take place in Idaho in the county
where the policy was Issued unless both parties
agree otheiwlse. Local rules of law apply as to
arbitration procedure and evidence. A decision
agreed to by two of the arbitrators will be binding.

loss with the Information requested by us, either
the Insured or we may make a written demand
on the other for mediation to resolve a claim.
After mediation has been demanded, the parties
shall attempt to agree on a competent, Impartial
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At the option of either party, instead of arbitration,
a dispute as to the amount, if any, of the
lnsuredts loss owing under this coverage wlll be
determined ln a court of competent jurisdiction.
The party selectlng this option must make it in
writing and mall or hand deliver It to the other
party. If either party has already asked for
arbitration, the notice must be made no later than
20 days after nolice of arbitration was made.

9. Trust Agreement. If a claim or payment Is made
under Coverages P or P-1:
a.

We will be entitled to reimbursement of
payments we have made to an Insured to be
taken from the proceeds of any judgment or
settlement.

b.

Paragraph 24 (Our Right to Recover
Payment) under General Conditions
Applicable to This Policy applles to our

occupied at the time of a hit-and-run accident.
The Insured must notify the police within 24
hours of a hit-and-run accident.

7. Mediation. After the Insured submits a proof of

I·

I
,,

recovery rights.
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10. Nonblndlng Judgment. No judgment resulting
from a suit brought without our wrltlen consent Is .
binding on us, either In determining the llablllty of
the uninsured or underlnsured motor vehicle
operator or owner, or tlie amount of damages to
which the Insured Is entllled.

3.

The stranding, sinking, burning, collls!on, or
derailment of any conveyance in or upon which
the vehicle Is being transported; or

4. Theft.
COVERAGES oCOMPREHENSIVE

11. Interest. The term dam ages does not Include
interest. We are not liable for any interest on any
payment we make under Coverages P or P-1.
COVERAGE Q D MEDICAL

Subject to the limit of liability, we will pay reasonable
and necessary medical and funeral expenses resulting from bodily Injury caused by an occurrence as
described below.
The following are Insureds under Coverage Q:

1. Any person occupying an Insured vehicle with
your permission or the pennlsslon of an adult
relaUve, who sustains bodily Injury caused by
an occurrence resulting from the use of this
insured vehicle;
2.

You or your relatives who sustains bodily Injury
caused by an occurrence while occupying an
Insured vehicle or a motor vehicle not owned
by any Insured;

3. Any person who sustains bodily injury caused
by an occurrence while occupying a nonowned
vehicle operated by you or a relative; and
4.

If you are an individual, you or your relatives who
sustains bodily Injury when struck by a motor .
vehicle or trailer while a pedestrian, an equestrian, or while on a bicycle or other vehicle.

Any payment under this coverage applies toward
settlement of any claim for damages against any
insured. We cover only expenses incurred within two
years from the date of occurrence. No ·payment
under this coverage shall be subject to duplicate
payment under Coverages P, P·1, or any liability
coverage of this policy.

We will pay for any direct and accidental loss of, or
damage to, your insured vehicle and its equipment
not covered by Coverage T. We cover loss or
damage from missiles, falling objects, theft, collision
with animals, or accldental glass breakage under this
coverage.
COVERAGE Ta COLLISION AND ROLLOVER

We will pay for direct and accidental loss to your
Insured vehicle and Its equipment when it is hit by or
hits another vehicle or object, or rolls over. We will
waive any applicable deductible if the collision
Involves Insured vehicles of two or more of our
policyholders.
SECTION III ADDITIONAL COVERAGES

1. Loss to Personal Property. We will pay up to
$750 for loss to personal property being
transported by the Insured vehlcle if the loss
results from an occurrence involving an Insured
vehicle that is covered under Coverages R, S, or
T. We do not cover cash or securities under this
additional coverage. We do not cover loss by theft
of any personal property unless the loss Is
caused by the insured vehicle being stolen.

2. loss of Use by Thefto Reimbursement.
a.

Following a theft of an Insured vehicle
covered under Coverages R or S, we will
reimburse you for expenses for the rental of a
substitute automobile including taxicabs.

b.

Subject to our llmit of liability, our duty to
reimburse you begins after the theft has been
reported to us and the police, and terminates,
regardless of expiration of the polfcy period,
on 1he date the Insured vehicle is re1umed
to you, or on such earller date as we make or
offer settlement for this theft.

c.

Limit of Liability. Our limit of liability per day
and per loss for this coverage are shown in
the Declarations.

COVERAGE R fJ FIRE AND THEFT ONLY
We will pay for any direct and accidental loss of, or
damage to, your insured vahic1e and its equipment
caused by:

1. Fire, lightning, or windstorm;

3. Rental Car and Test Drive Coverage. If
2.

Smoke or smudge due to a sudden, unusual, and
faulty operation of any heating equipment serving
the premises In which the vehicle Is located;
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Coverages S and T apply to an Insured vehJcfe
they also apply to a private pa5Senger car,
pickup, or passenger van that Is rented, or test
driven by an Insured and quallfies as a
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nonowned vehicle. Coverage applies only If the
vehicle Is owned by a new or used automobile
dealer or rental car company. This coverage does
not apply to a relative who owns a motor vehicle
that Is insured by another Insurance company.
4.

Locks. We wlll pay up to $200 for the cost of rekeying or replacing the locks of an Insured
vehicle to which Coverage S applfes ff the keys
to the vehicle have been stolen during the policy
period. No deductible applies to this coverage.

5.

Loaned traller liability. Coverages N and O
apply to you or your adult relative for an
occurrence resulting from the permissive use of
your trailer by someone else. This does not apply
to the use of a traller for business purposes.

SECTION Ill EXCLUSIONS

Section Ill does not cover:

1. Damages arising out of the use of a vehicle to
carry persons for a fee. This exclusion does not
apply to a share-the-expense car pool;

2. Any vehicle rented or leased to others;

3. Damages artslng out of the use of a vehicle In a

9.

Damages caused directly or Indirectly by war,
Including undeclared war, clvll war, insurrection,
rebellion, revolution, warlike act by a military force
or military personnel, or destruction or seizure or
use of property for any military purpose, and
including any consequence of these. Discharge of
a nuclear weapon shall be deemed a warllke act
even If accidental;

11. Punitive or exemplary damages;

12. Bodlly Injury to anyone eligible to receive
benefits that an Insured either provides or is
required to provide under any workerm
compensation or occupational disease law;

property damage to:

a. A residence or private garage rented to an
lnsur.ed; or

4. Damages which are Intentionally caused by any

14. Under Coverages N, 0, P, and P-1, llabllity

6. Damages caused by nuclear reaction, radiation,
or radioactive contamination;

7. Any radar or similar detection device, or any
portable GPS or similar eleclronlc device;

arising out of any contract or agreement;

15. Under Coverage Q:
a.
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Bodily Injury sustained while an Insured
vehlcle Is used as a residence or temporary

living quarters;

b. Bodily Injury sustained by a person engaged
in the maintenance or repair of an Insured
vehicle;
c.

8. Any device or instrument designed for recording,
reproduction, amplification, receiving, or lransmltllng of sound, radio waves, microwaves, or
television signals; or tapes, records, CDs, DVDs,
discs, or other medium, designed for use with this
equipment. This exclusion does not apply to such
device or Instrument lf It is permanently installed
In the dash, trunk, or console opening at the time
of manufacture or by a dealer when the insured
vehicle is purchased new;

!.

13. Under Coverage 0, damage to property owned
by an Insured, or transported by, rented to, used
by, or in the care, custody, or control of an
Insured. This exclusion does not apply to

b. A nonownod vehicle if there is no
comprehensive or colllsion coverage on the
vehlcle;

5. Any nonowned vehicle while an Insured is
using It ln the business of selllng, repairing,
sel'\llclng, storing, or parking motor vehicles,
including road tesUng and delivery of a motor
vehicle;

!

10. Damages caused by the confiscation of Insured
property by a duly constituted governmental or
cfvil authority;

pre-arranged race, speed contest, or other
competition, or preparation for any of these
activities;

Insured;

I/ ·

Bodily Injury to anyone eligible to receive
benefits under any workerrs compensation or
similar law;

d. Any expenses for any treatment administered
by anyone not subject to state licensing and
any expense for the purchase or rental of
equipment not primarily designed to serve a
medical purpose; or
e.

Bodily injury arising from any lnsured!i use
a motor vehicle In the commission of a
felony;

of
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16. Under Coverages R. S, and T:
a.

traveling outside the state of Idaho in a state or
province which has a compulsory Insurance,
flnanclal responslblllty, or similar law applicable to
nonresidents, we will automatically provide the
required minimum amounts and types of
coverages if your pol!cy does not already provide
these coverages, but only to the extent required
by law and only with respect to the operation or
use of the Insured vehicle In that state or
province. The required coverage, however, will be
excess over any other valid and collectible
Insurance.

Any loss to a camper, camper shall, topper,
or other shell, unless llsted in the
Declaratlons for these coverages, or unless ft
qualifies for coverage as newly acquired
equipment under the definition of Insured

vehlcle;

b. Any loss to a camper, camper shell, motor
home, or trailer caused by moisture coming
through seals, joints, or cracks; or loss from
mold, fungi, or wet or dry rot;

c. Any loss by collapse, explosion, or Implosion
of any tank or container;
d.

2. Attached Trailers. A vehicle and an attached
trailer will be considered one vehicle under
Coverages N, 0, P, P-1, and Q, and separate
vehicles under Coverages R, S, and T. The

Any welder or compressor;

maximum applicable limits of liability in this policy
shall not be Increased In any way by this
paragraph.

a. Any equipment or accessories contained In
an insured motor home, camper unit, or
trailer, unless the equipment or accessories
are built in and forin a permanent part of the
vehicle;

f.

Any loss caused by recall of an Insured

vehicle;

g. Loss to tires, unless damaged concurrent
with other loss covered under Coverages R,
S, or T. This excluslon does not apply to loss
caused by vandalism, theft, or fire;
h.

Damages caused by wear and tear, freezing,
mechanical or electrical breakdown or failure;
any ensuing damage is covered If caused by
other loss covered under Coverages R, S, or

T;
I.

Damages to a11y vehicle caused by any fuel
or fu~I addltlve not approved by the vehicle!s
manufacturer;

J.

Any loss resulting from conversion, embezzlement, or secretion, by any person possessing the vehicle under any llen, rental, or
sales agreement; or

k.

Any loss to an Insured vehlcle caused by
the possession or manufacturing of a
controlled substance, including but not limited
to, methamphetamlnes; or

I·

3.

r

Other Vehicle Insurance in the Company. If
this pollcy and any o1her vehicle Insurance policy
Issued to you or your refatlve by us or Western
Community Insurance Company apply to the
same occurrence, the maximum limit of our
liability under all of the policies shall not exceed
the highest applicable limit of liabllfty under any
one policy. This is the most we will pay regardless
of the number of Insureds, clalms made, Insured
vehicles, or premium charges.

4. Payment by an Insured. For any occurrence
Involving a potential claim against an Insured, the
insured shall not, except at the insuredls own
cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any
obllgatlon, or Incur any expense other than for
first aid to others at the time of the occurrence.

I

5. Duties after loss. In case of an occurrence, the

!
i

Insured shan perform the following duties to the
extant possible:
a.

Give written notice to us as soon as
practicable, which sets forth to the best of the
lnsuredi. knowledge and belief:
(1) The

identity of the

policy and

the

Insured;

(2) Reasonably available information on the
time, place, and circumstances of the
occurrence;

,.

17. Under Coverage S, any loss resulting from
defective tllle or failure to obtain proper trtle.

(3) Names and addresses of any claimants
and available wttnesses; and

SECTION Ill CONDITIONS
1. Out of State Insurance. lf you have liability
Insurance under Seclion Ill and if an insured Is
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{4) Such other !nfonnatlon that we may
reasonably request;

1·
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b.

Immediately forward to us every notice,
demand, summons, or other process relating
to the occurrence; and

c.

At our request, assist in:

and related documents, that substantiate the
figures and ownership of property ln the
inventory;

d. As often as we may reasonably require:
exhibit tha damaged property, provide us with
records and documents we request and allow
us to make copies, and submit to examlna!Jon
under oath while not In the presence of any
other Insured and subscribe the same; and

(1) Making settlement;
(2) The enforcement of any right of contribution or Indemnity against any person or
organization who may be liable to any
Insured;

e.

(3) The conduct of suits, Including attending
hearings and trials; and

(1) The time and cause of loss;

(4) Securing

and giving evidence and
obtaining the attendance of witnesses.

(2) The Interest of the Insured and all others
in the Insured vehicle involved and all
encumbrances on the Insured vehicle;

6. Addltlonal Duties of an Injured Persono
Coverages P, P-1, and Q, If Coverage P, P-1, or
Q applies to a loss, the injured person shall:

.•

lnfonnatlon we request, signed under oath If
required, as soon as practicable;

(4) Changes In title of the Insured vehicle
during the term of the policy; and

Submit lo such medical or other examinations
(5) Such other information that we may
reasonably request.

or evaluations by persons selected by us
when and as often as we may reasonably
require;

c.

d.

At our request, submit to examlnallon under
oath as often as we may reasonably require,
and subscribe the same; and

8. Territory. This policy applies only to occurrences wflhln·the United States of America (USA)
and Canada. If applicable to your Insured

vehicle, Coverages R, S, and T only are
extended for trips Into that part of the Republic of
Mexico lying not more than 100 miles from the
boundary llne of the USA. Our llablllty will be
determined on the basis of cost at the nearest
USA point.

Execute authorization to allow us to obtain
copies of any medical or other reports and

records.
If a claim Is being made because of the death of
an Injured person, the person(s) making the claim
shall comply with paragraphs a, c, and d above.

WARNING: Automobile accidents In the Republic
of Mexico are considered a criminal offense,
rather than a civil matter. The insurance provided
by this policy wlll not meet Mexico automobile

7. Additional Duties after Losso Coverages R, S,
and T. If Coverage R, S, or T applies to a loss,

insurance requirements. If you are In an
automobile accident in Mexico and have not
purchased insurance through a licensed Mexican
Insurance company, you may be Jailed and may
have your automobl!e Impounded.

the Insured shall perform the following duties:
a.

Give notice as soon as practicable to us, and
also to the police if the loss is suspected to
be caused by someone!S violation of law;
9.

b. Protect the property from further damage,
make reasonable and necessary repairs
required to protect the property, and keep an
accurate record of repair expenditures;
c.

Prepare an Inventory of damaged or stolen
property showing in detail the quantity,
descrlplton, actual cash value, and amount of
loss. Attach to the fnventory all bills, receipts,

ID-CQ-02-01(1014)
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(3) other Insurance which may cover the
loss;

a. Give us a written proof of loss containing the

b.

Within 60 days after our request, submit to us
a signed, sworn proof of loss which sets forth
the following information to the best of the
lnsuredrs knowledge and belief:

Payment of Claim. Any payment is not an
admission of liablllty by any Insured or us.

10. Limits of Liability

o Coverages

N, 0, and Q.

Regardless of the number of:

a. Insureds or vehicles Insured under this
policy;
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b,

Persons or organizations sustaining damages, bodily Injury or property damage; or

c.

Claims made;

our liability for each occurrence Is subject to the
followlng limitations:

d. Under Coverage N, the bodily Injury liability
limit for each person stated in the
Declarations Is the maximum amount we will
pay for all damages arising out of bodily
Injury sustained by one person resulting from
an occurrence, including any emotional
distress or other damages resulting from this
bodily Injury and sustained by any other
person.
Subject to the bodily Injury llmitatfon for
each person, the bodily Injury liability limit
for each occurrence stated in the
Declarations Is the maximum amount we will
pay for all damages arising out of bodily
Injury sustained by two or more persons
resulting from an occurrence;
e.

f.

Under Coverage 0, the property damage
liability limit for each occurrence stated in
the Declarations is Iha maximum amount we
.will pay for all property damage resulUng
from an occurrence; and
Under Coverage Q, our llmlt of liabiHty per
parson Is stated in the Declarations. This Is
the maximum amount we wlll pay for all
covered expenses Incurred by or on behalf of
each person who sustains bodily Injury
resultlng from an occurrence. This llmtt Is
subject to reduction as explained below:
(1) Our limit of llabilily In the aggregate for all
physical therapy, massage therapy, and
any treatment by or at the direction of a
chiropractor, per person per occurrence
is the lesser of $2,000 or the limit of
liablllty stated In the Declarations; and
(2) Our limit of liabllity for funeral expenses
per person is the lesser of $5,000 or the
limit of liability stated in the Declarations.

Actual cash value is determined by the market
value, age, and condition, at the time the loss
occurred. The cost of repair or replacement is
based on the cost of repair agreed upon by us or
an estimate written based upon the prevailing
competitive price. The prevailing competitive prfce
means labor rates, and parts and material prices,
charged by a majority of repair facilities in the
area where the Insured vehicle is to be repaired.
We do not cover any reduction In value to your
Insured vehlcle after repairs are completed.

12. Non-Original Manufacturer Parts. Under Coverages R, S, and T, we have the right lo base our
payment on the cost of non-0rlglnal equipment
manufacturer parts provided they are certified by
CAP A., or a slmllar independent testing organization, as being equivalent to or better than
original equipment.

13. Betterment. Under Coverages R, S, and T,
deductions for betterment and replacement will be
made only for parts normally subject to repair and
replacement during the useful life of the insured
vehicle. Such deductions shall be the lesser of:
a.

An amount equal to the proportion that the
expired life of the part bears to the normal
useful life of the part; or

b. The amount which the resale value of the
vehicle Is increased by the repair or
replacement.

14. Loss Payable Clause. This clause applies If a
lienholder Is named in the Declarations.

a. If a payable loss Is for repairs only. we will
pay you. If a payable loss ls for the value of
the covered property, we wlll pay you and the
lienholder as their interests may appear. At
our option we may pay you and the lienholder
for any loss.

b. We cover the Interest of the llenholder unless
the loss Is intentionally caused by you or Is
the result of fraudulent acts or omissions on
your part.
c.

We may cancel this pollcy during the policy
period. We wlll mail notice of cancellatlon to
the lien holder at least 10 days before the dale
the cancellation takes effect.

11. Limit of Liability - Coverages R, S, and T. Our
lfmlt of llabllity under Coverages R, S, and T Is the
lesser of:
a.

The actual cash value of the Insured vehicle
or covered property; or

d.

If we make any payment to the lien holder we
will obtain their rights against any other party.

b.

The cost of repair or replacement using parts
of like kind and quality.

e.

We will pay the lienholder for their Interest
directly If the covered property has been
repossessed.

ID-CQ-02-01(1014)
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f.

c. Return the stolen property and pay for any

Policy conditions relaflng to Arbitration, Suit
Against Us, and Loss Payment apply to the
llenholder.

15. Loss Settlement. We have the right to settle a
loss with you or the owner of the property in one
of the fol!owlng ways:

damage due to the theft; or
d. Take the property at an agreed value, but It
cannot be abandoned to us.

Pay up to the actual cash value of the
property:

16. Other Insurance. The Insurance under Section Ill
Is excess over any other valid and collectlble
Insurance. Coverage Q, however, is primary
coverage.

b. Pay to repair or replace the property or part

17. Vehicle Registration. We insure only motor

a.

vehicles registered In the state of Idaho.

wllh like kind and quality. If the repair or
replacement results in better than like kind
and quality, you must pay for the amount of
the betterment;

SECTION IV D INLAND MARINE INSURANCE
:.·
the best of the lnsuredi:s knowledge and
belief:

The coverages under this section apply as Indicated
by endorsement. Applicable endorsements are llsted
in the Declarations. All Section IV policy provisions
apply to these endorsements unless an endorsement
specifically states otherwise.

(1) The time and cause of loss;

(2) The Interest of the Insured and all others
In the property involved and all encum·
brances on the property;

SECTION IV CONDITIONS
1. Duties after Loss. In case of a loss to which this
insurance may apply, the Insured must see that
the following duties are performed:
a.

Give notice as soon as practicable to us, and
also to the police if lhe loss is suspected to
be caused by someone!!! violation of law;

b.

Protect the property from further damage,
make reasonable and necesSl;lry repairs
required lo protect the property, and keep an
accurate record of repair expenditures;

c.

d.

e.

Prepare an Inventory of damaged or stolen
property showing In detail the quantity,
description, actual cash value, amount of
loss, and ownership of property. Attach to the
inventory all bills, receipts, and related
documents, that substantiate the figures and
ownership of property In the Inventory;
As often as we may reasonably require:
exhibit the damaged properly; provide us with
records and documents we request and allow
us to make copies; and submit to examination
under oath while not In the presence of any
other insured and subscribe the same; and
Within 60 days after our request, submit to us
the lnsuredts signed, sworn proof of loss
which sets forth the following lnformalion lo

IO-CQ-02-01(1014)

(3) Other Insurance which may cover the

loss;
(4) Changes in tltle during the term of the
policy;
(5) Specifications of any damaged property
and detailed estimates for repair of the
damage;
(6) An Inventory of damaged property as
described above; and
(7) Such other information that we may
reasonably request.
2.

Loss to a Pair or Set. In case of a loss to a
panel, section, pair, set, or part, we may elect to:
a.

Repair, replace, or restore, the panel, section,
side, pair, set, or part, to Its value before the
loss;

b.

Pay the difference belween the actual cash
value of the property before and after the
loss; or

c.

Pay the reasonable cost of providing a
substitute to match as closely as practlcable
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the remainder of the outer covering. panel,
section, side, pair, or sel

The actual cash value of the property; or
a.

We do not guarantee the availability of parts or
replacements. We are not obligated to match,
repalr, or replace the entire pair, set, series of
objects, outer covering, piece, or panel, when a
part is lost or damaged.

If repair or replacement results In better than llke
kind or quality, you must pay for the amount of
betterment. We do not cover any reduction In
value to your covered property after repairs are
completed.

3. Limit of Liability. Our applicable limit of liability is
shown In each endorsement or an accompanying
schedule.

The cost to repair or replace the property or
part with llke kind and quality.

5.

4. Loss Settlement. Subject to the limit of llabltity

Other Insurance. The insurance under Section
IV Is excess over any other valid and collectible
insurance.

stated In the endorsement or schedule, our
payment for covered losses shall be the lesser of:

POLICY ENDORSEMENTS
The coverage In your policy may be modified by
endorsement. Each of the following endorsements
may or may not apply to your policy. An endorsement
applies only when It is listed In the Declarations. In
addition to the endorsements In this booklet, other
endorsements may apply If listed In the Declarations.
The policy provisions apply to endorsements unless
an endorsement speclflcally states otherwise.
SECTION I ENDORSEMENTS

1104 (1014) Property Coverage Endorsement. Coverage E, and perils 1 through 9, apply to the followlng
property:

1. New bulldlngs or structures, or additions to
property covered under Coverage E, whlle under
construction on the Insured location:

2. Permanent buildings at a newly acquired premise
that qualJfies as an Insured location. We also
cover bulldlngs under construction, permanent
structures, fixtures, and fixed equipment, at this
premise; and
3.

Materials and supplles on the insured location to
be used in construction of the above covered
property.

You must report the new acquisitions on or before the
next policy renewal date and pay the appropriate
premium. New dwelllngs that qualify for Coverage A
are not covered under this endorsement. This
endorsement does not apply to an Insured location
outside the state of Idaho.

computed from the date of property acquisition. At our
discretion, the premium may not be bllled until the
next policy renewal.
Loss Settlement Clause. Loss covered under this
endorsement wlll be settled based on actual cash
value.
1109 (0108) Irrigation Equipment and Spare Truck
Parts Endorsement. Coverage D Is amended to
Include your irrigation equipment, including irrigation
pumps, burled water lines, electric pump motors,
panels, wiring, transformers, and permanenUy
installed or portable sprinkler lines and sprlnkler
equipment (including
any
sprlnklerli'I
electrical
equipment). In addltlon to the perils that apply to
Coverage D, this endorsement covers loss to your
pivot or wheel llnes caused by collapse If caused by
elther weight of Ice or snow or by mechanical failure.

Spare truck parts are Included in this endorsement If
Indicated In the Declaratrons.
Our limit of liability for this endorsement is indicated In
the Declarations. The coinsurance requirement under
Coverage D applles separately to this endorsement.

1111 (1014} Replacement Cosm Personal Property
Endorsement. Losses under Coverage C will be
settled at replace~ent cost. This endorsement also
covers domestic appliances, floor coverings, awnings,
outdoor antennas, and outdoor equipment, pertaining
to a dwelling Insured under Coverage A. Limitations
on this coverage are explained below.

1.
Limit of Liability. The total limit of additional Insurance for all properly covered under this endorsement
shall not exceed $300,000 until you report values of
the property to us. Additional premium is due and

ID-CQ-02-01(1014)

Property Not Eligible. Property listed below is
not ellglble for replacement cost settlement. Ally
loss to this property wlll be settled at aclual cash
value at the time of loss but not exceeding the
amount necessary to repair or replace.
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a.

Antfques, fine arts, paintings, statues, and
other articles, which by their Inherent nature
cannot be replaced with new items.

b.

Articles whose age or history contribute
substantially to their value, including but not
limited to, memorabilia, souvenirs, and
collectorsotems.

c. Personal property of others.
d. Articles not maintained ln good or workable
condition.
e. Artlcles that are outdated or obsolete and are
stored or not being used.
2.

Limit of Coverage. Subject to the Coverage C
limit of liablllty, we will not pay more than the
smallest of the following amounts under this
endorsement.

a.

Replacement cost at time of loss without
deduction for depreciation;·

b. The full cost of repair at time of Joss;

c.

400% of the actual cash value at lime of loss;

d. The actual cash value of any property
purchased or acquired used; or

e.

Any specfal limlt of liability applicable under
Coverage C.

Any payment under Coverage C that is not
subject to replacement cost coverage under this
endorsement reduces the Coverage C llmil of
llablllty available under this endorsement for the
same occurrence.

3. Addlttonal Provlslons.
a. When the replacement cost for the entire loss
under this endorsement e>tceeds $500, we
will pay no more than the actual cash value
for the loss or damage until the actual repair
or replacement is completed. You must
provide proof of replacement with purchase
receipts or other proof of purchase.

means the cost of a new
comparable quality and features.

article

of

1114 (1014) Borrowed Equipment Endorsement.
We cover under Coverage D, loss to moblle
agricultural machinery In which you have no interest
and Is not available for your regular use, provided
such machinery has been borrowed by either you or
your employees, and Is being used In the conduct of
your own farming operation. This coverage will apply
as excess over any Insurance that the owner has on
this property. Our Umit of liability per occurrence
under this endorsement is stated In the Declarations.
I116 (1014) Cosmetic Roof Damage Endorsement.
Coverages A and E do not cover cosmetic damage to
roof surfacing caused by wind or hail, meaning
marring, pitting, or other superflclal damage that
alters the appearance of the roof surfacing but does
not prevent it from functioning as a barrier to the
elements to the same extent as before the cosmetic
damage occurred.
1118 (0108) Scheduled Farm Personal Property
Endorsement. Coverage D is changed to cover only
the scheduled categories of farm personal property
listed In the Declarat!ons. The coinsurance clause Is
changed to apply indlvldually to each category.
1125 (1014) Sewage or Sump System Backup
Endorsement. Coverages A, B, and C are amended
to Include loss caused by water or sewage backup
into your Insured dwelling, meaning water or sewage
backup from a sewer, septic or sump system not
caused by peril 14 (Accidental discharge or
overflow of water). Section I Exclusions, except
exclusion 3 c, apply to this endorsement.

This coverage Is limited to damage to your dwelling
and personal property in the dwellfng. It does not
Include service, damage, or repair to a sewage,
septic; or sump system. The Coverage A and C limits
for this endorsement are stated in the Declarations.
Each limit Is the annual aggregate limit for all losses
during the policy period.

If a loss covered under this endorsement Is caused by
a broken sewer line on the resrdence premises, we
will pay up to $2,500 to excavate that sewer line, but
not to repair It. Any amount paid for excavation is
included in the lfmlt applicable to this coverage.

b. An Insured may make a claim for loss on an
actual cash value basis and then make claim
within one year after the loss for any
additional amount payable under this
endorsement.

c. Under this endorsement, replacement cost
means the cost at the time of loss of a new
item Identical to the one for which tha claim is
made. If an Identical item Is not available, it

ID-CQ-02-01(1014)
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I130 (0108) Ellmlnatlon of Livestock under Coverage D Endorsement. There is no coverage for fivestock under Coverage D.

1133 (1014} Limited Fungi, Wet or Dry Rot, or
Bacteria Coverage Endorsement.

1.

Definition. Fungi means any type or form of
fungus, including mold, ml!dew, mycotoxins,
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spores, scents, or lheir by-products which they
produce.

2.

5.

4.

a.

This endorsement applies only to perils and
losses which occur during the policy period.

b.

If there Is any loss to covered property not
caused in whole or in part by fungi, wet or
dry rot, or bacteria, our loss payment will not
be limited by the terms of this endorsement
except to the extent that fungi, wet or dry
rot, or bacteria, causes an Increase in the
loss. Any such Increase In the loss will be
subject to the tenns of this endorsement

Coverage. Coverage under this endorsement
applies only to dwellings insured under
Coverage A (Your Dwelllngs) and personal
property Insured under Coverage C {Personal
Property) located In those dwellings. We cover
direct, physical loss caused by fungi, wet or dry
rot, or bacteria, but only when such loss is the
result of perils 1-19 under SECTION I PERILS
INSURED AGAINST and only if all reasonable
means were used to save and preserve the
property from further damage resulting from the
peril Insured against. SECTION I ADDITIONAL
COVERAGES • Debris Removal does not apply
to any loss under this endorsement. The fungi or
bacterial exclusion In peril 14 (Accident discharge or overflow of water) does not apply to
coverage under this endorsement.

3.

Conditions,

Additional General Exclusion. Except as indicated above, we do not cover any loss caused
by fungi, wet or dry rot, or bacteria whether an
insured peril Is Involved or not. This exclusion
applies to all property Insured under Section I.

c.

The limitations of coverage under thJs
endorsement do not apply to loss from
fungi, wet or dry rot, or bacteria if such loss
Is a result of fire or llghtning.

d.

The pollcy provisions apply unless this
endorsement states otherwise.

J.

1171 {0108) Glass Deductible Waived Endorsement. No deductible applles to glass breakage to the
building(s) Insured under Coverage A. This endorsement does not apply to window framing or other
materlals that are not glass.

Limit of Llablllty. Our limit of liability for this
coverage for loss to each Coverage A dwelllng
and the personal property located in that
dwelllng ls stated In the Declarations. Our limit
of llablllty Is the most we will pay for:

1183 (1014) Increased Replacement Cost Endorsement. Our llmlt of liability applicable to a dwelling
Insured under Coverage A to which this endorsement
applles will be Increased by the percentage shown in
the Declarations for this endorsement If:

a.

The total of all loss caused by fungi, wet or
dry rot, or bacteria;

b.

The cost to remove fungi, wet or dry rot, or
bacteria from covered property:

c.

The cost to tear out and replace any part of
the covered property as needed to gain
access to the fungi, wet or dry rot, or
bacteria; and

d.

The cost of testing of air or property to
confirm the absence, presence, or level of
fungi, wet or dry rot, or bacteria whether
performed prior to, during, or after removal,
repair, restoration, or replacement. The cost
of such testing will be provided only to the
extent.that there is reason to believe that
there Is a presence of fungi, wet or dry rot,
or bacteria.

Our limit of liability is the most we will pay for the
total of all loss or costs under this endorsement
for the covered dwelling and personal property
located in that dwelling regardless of the
number of claims made during the pollcy period.
This limit does not Increase our limit of liability
under Coverage A or Coverage C.

ID-CQ-02-01(1014}

1.

You

Insure your dwelling for 100% of Its
replacement cost as we estimate based on the
accuracy of JnformaUon you furnish, and you pay
the premium we require;

2. You

accept any annual adjustment we make to
the Jlmit·appllcable to your dwelling and you pay
the additional premium; and

3. You notify us within 90 days of the start of any
additions or other physical changes that Increase
the value of your dwelling on the dwelllng
premises by $5,000 or more, and pay the
additional premium.
Subject to our limlt of llabillty, losses under this
endorsement are covered for the cost of repair or
replacement of the damaged part with new materials
without deduction for depreciation, but not more than
the amount spent to repair or replace the damage on
the same premises using new materlals of equivalent
kind and quality to the extent practical.
Paragraphs c (1), (2), and (3) of the Loss Settlement
paragraph of SECTION I CONDITIONS are deleted.
This endorsement is void If you fall to comply with its
provisions.
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Our calculation of the replacement cost of your
insured dwelling Is our estimate using software
widely used in the Insurance industry. You are
responsible to see that the limit that applies is
adequate to replace your property.

one that becomes uncontrollable or breaks out
from where ii was Intended lo be.

2. The bodily Injury or property damage arises
from the accidental above ground contact with
herbicides, pesticides, fungicides, or fertilizers,
caused by the appUcatlon of lhe same to an
Insured location and provided that:

SECTION II ENDORSEMENTS
1220 (1014) Combined Single Limit EndorsementCoverages F-1 and G. The Limits of Liablllly·
Coverages F-1 and G paragraph under SECTION II
CONDITIONS Is changed to read as follows:

a. The contact begins during the policy period;

5. Limit of LlabllltyD Coverages F-1 and G.
Regardless of the number of:

a.

Insureds under this pollcy;

b.

Persons or organizations sustaining damages, bodily Injury, or property damage; or

b.

The contact begins at an established time
and place;

c.

The contact ends no more than 7 days after
the beginning of the contact as identified in
the requirements of 2 b;

;·

d. The bodily inJury or property damage must
occur within 12 months of said application;
and

c. Claims made;
our liability for each occurrence ls subject to the
following llmltatlons:
d. Our total combined single limit of liability
under Coverages F-1 and G for all bodily
Injury and property damage resulting from
one occurrence shall not exceed the
applicable limit of liability stated in the
Declarations.

e.

f.

The per occurrence combined single limit of .
liability for bodily Injury and prope~
damage caused by farm products produced
on the Insured location Is also the total limit
of our liability for all occurrences during the
policy period.
Subject to the above limitations, the
applicable annual aggregate limit of liability
shown In the Declara1ions Is the most we will
pay for all damages from all occurrences
during the policy period arising from your
fannlng activities.

1223 (0108) Limited Pollution Coverage Endorse·
ment basic form. Coverages F-1 (Bodily Injury
Liability) and G {Property Damage Liability) apply to
bodily Injury or property damage caused by an
occurrence and arising out of the actual discharge,
dispersal, seepage, migration, release, or escape of

e.
3.

The application is not from an aircraft.

The bodily Injury or property damage arises out
of a short-term pollution event. As used in this
endorsement, a short-term pollutfon event means
a discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of
pollutants directly from eilher an Insured
location or mobile agricultural machinery
being operated by an Insured which:
a.

Begins during the poHcy period;

b. Begins at an identified time and place;
c.

Ends at an identified time within 7 days of the
beginning of the discharge, dispersal,
release, or escape of the pollutants as
Identified In the requirements of 3 b, and
ln~olves no further discharge, dispersal,
release, or escape of addlUonal amounts of
the pollutants after the end date;

d. Is reported to us within 37 days of Its
beginning;

e. ls not a repeat or resumption of a previous
discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of
!he same pollutants from essentially the
same source within 14 months of a previous
discharge, dispersal, release, or escape;

f.

Is a claim or suit by a non-governmental entity or

Is not covered under paragraphs 1 or 2
above;

private person and {b) the claim meets all the
requirements of one of the three following numbered
paragraphs:

g. Does not originate from an underground
storage tank; and

pollutants but only on the following conditions: (a) it

1. The bodily Injury or property damage arises out
of heat, smoke, or fumes from a hostile fire. As
used in this endorsement, a hostile fire means
ID-CQ-02-01(1014)

h.

Is not animal waste, which includes manure,

or a by-product of animal waste from:
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(I) Any fanning operation where animals,
Including fish, are fed and confined In any
pen, corral, shed, barn, or olher
enclosure; or
(ii) Any

anlmal waste collection device,
holding facility, or disposal system.

Llmlt(s) of Llablllty, Expenses and Defense Costs.

The llmit{s) of liability applicable to occurrences
under paragraph 3 Is shown In the Declarations with
reference to this endorsement. The per occurrence
limll of llabilily Is also the total aggregate limit of our
liability for all such occurrences during the policy
period. The limit(s) of llabillty appllcable to Coverages
F~"t and Coverage G applies to an occurrence under
paragraphs 1 and 2 above.
Claims expense and defense costs, for losses
covered under paragraph 3, reduce the limit of
liability, both per occurrence and aggregate limit of
liability, notwithstanding any other defense provisions
In the policy.
Excluslons. We do not cover:

(a) Under paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, any claim for treble
· damages, punitive damages, fines, penalUes,
monitoring tests, or slmllar assessments;
(b) Under paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, any c!alm for

nulsance or trespass;
(c) Under paragraph 3, any claim for bodily injury
which arises from or has as a component of the
bodlly Injury, asthma, cystic fibrosis, or any
other aliment caused by or aggravated by smoke
or any other pollutants that comes from any
agricultural burning, Including but not Jlmited to,
the burning of weeds, grasses, fann crops, crop
residue, or any other plant matter;
{d) Under paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, any loss, damage,
cost, or expense, directly or indlrecUy caused by,
contributed to by, resulting from, or arising out of
or In connecUon wltll any act of terrorism
regardless of any other cause or event contributing concurrently or in any other sequence to the
loss; or

(e) Under para!)raphs 1. 2, and 3, any Joss, damage,
cost, or expense, directly or indirectly caused by,
contributed to by, resulting from, or arising out of
or In connection with any action in controlling,
preventing, suppressing, retaliating against, or
responding to any act of terrorism.
An act of terrorism Includes any act, preparation
to act, or threat of action: (1) designed to
influence the government de Jure or de facto of
any nation or any political division, (2) In pursuit of
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political, religious, Ideological, or sfmilar
purposes, or (3) to Intimidate the public or a
section of the public of any nation, by any
person(s) whether acting alone or on behalf of or
in connection with any organization or
government de jure or de facto, and whlch:
(I) involves violence against any person;
(ll) Involves damage to property;
(Ill) endangers llfe other than that of the person
committing the action;
(Iv) creates a rlsk to health or safety of the public
or a section of the public; or
{v) Is designed to interfere with or to disrupt an
electronic system.

'I

I)
f.

Additional Provisions.

Except as speclftcally provided in paragraphs 1, 2,
and 3. and subJect to all condltlons stated in those
paragraphs, this endorsement does not apply to or
provide any coverage for any llablllty arising oui of the
actual, alleged, or threatened discharge, dispersal,
seepage, migration, release, or escape of pollutants.

If Coverage L (Custom Fanning) applles, all
Coverage L condlUons, llmltations, and exclusions
also apply to this endorsement.
Pollutants means any solid, l!quld, gaseous, or
thermal Irritant or contaminant, Including smoke,
vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, waste,
or anything defined by federal or state law as a
pollutant. Waste Includes materials to be recycled,
reconditioned, or reclaimed.

The policy provisions apply unless this endorsement
states otherwise.
1259 (1014) Accidental Death Endorsement. If you
or any of your unmarried children under age 25 who
qualify as an Insured dies as a result of an
occurrence, we wlll pay the llmlt of liability for this
coverage as Indicated In the Declarations. We do not
cover any death that resulls more than 90 days from
the date of the occurrence.

1. Addltlonal Exclusions. Except for exclusion 13,
Section JI Exclusions pertaining to bodlly Injury
apply to coverage under this endorsement. The
following exclusions also apply. We do not cover
any death:

a. Caused by suicide, attempted sulcfde, or any
intentionally self-Inflicted Injury, regardless if
the person Is Incompetent or suffers from a
mental Illness; or
b. To any Insured 81 years of age or older on
the date of occurrence; or
c.

Caused by heart attack, heart failure, stroke,
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any illness, disease, or physical ailment.

2. Notice and Proof of Claim. Upon notice of claim,
wa will provide a form for filing a proof of loss.
Payment under this coverage will be made as
follows:
a. In the case of death to a named Insured, to
the surviving spouse;

6. Injury sustained by any person as a result of an
offense directly or Indirectly relatecl to the
employment of this person by lhe insured;
7. Injury sustained by an Insured;

8. Injury arising out of the business pursuits of an
Insured;
9.

b. In the case of death to a qualifying chtld, to
you; or
c. If the beneficiary is deceased, to the estate of
the decedent.
1269 (0108) Limited Employerrs Liability Endorsement. Coverages F-1 and F-2 are extended to apply
to bodily lnJury caused by an occurrence and
sustained by a person perfonning labor for you In
your farming operation, but only if you are not
required by law to provtde workeris compensation
benefits or coverage for this bodlly injury. Coverage
F-2 does not apply to a person or their employees
whlle they conduct their business on the insured

Civic or public activities performecl for pay by an

Insured;
10. Injury arising out of the molestation, corpora!
punishment, or physical, sexual, emotional, or
mental abuse of any person;

11. Injury arising out of the posting of any
Information, opinion, statement, or material of any
kind on the Internet by an fnsured, including
postings on chat rooms, bulletin boards, social
media, biogs, or gripe sites;

12. Injury arising out of any material in an e-mail or
text message sent by an Insured; or

location.

13. Injury arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of any pollutants.

1282 (1014} Personal Injury Endorsement. Under
Coverage F-1, we cover personal injury. Personal
Injury means Injury other than bodily Injury arising

Additional Condition. Our applicable per occur-

out of one or more of the following offenses:

1. False arrest, detention or Imprisonment, or

rence limit of liability shown In the Declarations is
also the most we will pay for all damages from all
occurrences during the policy period.

malicious prosecution;

SECTION Ill ENDORSEMENTS

2.

Libel, slander, or defamation of character: or

1309 (1014) Employerrs Nonownershlp Liability
Endorsement. Coverages N and O cover your

3.

Invasion of privacy, wrongful eviction, or wrongful
entry,

llabUlty and the liability of your executive officers
arising out of the use of a nonowned motor vehicle
In your farming or household activities by any person
·
other than you.

Exclusions. SECTION II EXCLUSIONS do not apply
to this endorsement This endorsement does not
cover:
1. liability arising out of any contract or agreement;
2,

Injury caused by a violation of a criminal law or
ordinance:

3.

Injury arising out of Iha oral or written publication
of materials lf done by or at the direction of an
Insured with the knowledge that It Is false:

1. Oeflnltlon. In this endorsement, nonowned
motor vehicle means a motor vehicle, trailer,
or semi-trailer not ownad by, registered in the
name of, hired by, leased by, or loaned to you or
your executive officers.

2. Applicatton of Insurance.
a.

This endorsement does not apply to any
motor vehicle owned by any of your
executive officers or their spouses.

b.

This insurance does not apply to any motor
vehicle owned by or registered In the name
of a partner if your business is in the form of

4. Injury arising out of an oral or written publ!catlon
that was first published before the beginning of
the policy period;
5.

Injury caused by or at the direction of an Insured
with the knowledge that the Insured would violate
the rights of another and would Inflict infury;

ID-CQ-02-01(1014)

a partnership.

1312 (1014) Automobile Accidental Death Benefits
Endorsement.

Page42 of45

137

Death Benefit. We agree to pay $10,000 If an
Insured dies solely as the result of bodily Injury
caused by an occurrence whlle occupying or tf
struck by a motor vehicle. Death of the Insured

the tlme of the occurrence: otherwise, the
death benefit is payable to the Insured
decedentlS estate.

must occur within one year after the date of the
occurrence.

b. We shall have the right to have an autopsy
performed where it Is not forbidden by law.

Exclusions. The following additional exclusions apply
to this endorsement. This endorsement does not
cover:

The paragraphs titled Nondupllcatlon of Insurance
Benefits, Subrogatlono Our Right to Recover
Payment, and Other Insurance, do not apply to this
endorsement.

1.

Death caused by or resultlng from disease,
except infection resulting from bodily Injury to
which this insurance applies;

2.

Bodlly injury sustained by an Insured engaged
in the maintenance or repair of a motor vehicle;

3.

Bodily Injury to an Insured arising out of the
business of selling, repairing, servicing, storing, or
parking motor vehicles, including road testing or
delivery;

1313 (1014) Combined Single Limit EndorsementP and
P-1
(Uninsured
and
Coverages
Underlnsured Motorist). The limits of llablllty
paragraph pertaining to Coverages P and P-1 under
Additional Conditions applicable to Coverages P
and P-1 is changed to read as follows:

1. Limit of Llablllty. Regardless of the number of:

a. Insureds or vehicles Insured under this
policy;

4. Bodlly Injury to an Insured arising out of the
operation, loading, unloading, or occupying of a
publtc or commercial motor vehicle;

b.

Persons or organizations sustaining bodily
Injury; or

5. Bodlly injury to an Insured while occupying a
motor vehicle without the permission of the
owners; or

c.

Claims made;

6.

Bodily Injury to an Insured while occupying a

motor vehicle owned by or available for the
regular use of any Insured which is not an
Insured vehicle.
Conditions. The following addltlonal oondHlons apply
to this endorsement:

1.

Insured means only those persons llsted in the
Declarations as persons to whom this endorsement applies.

2. Notrce of Claim. The insuredls spouse or someone acting on behalf of the lnsuredls heirs shall:

a. Give us a signed, w,Itten proof of loss
containing the Information we request, under
oath If required, as soon as practical; and
b.

Execute authorization to allow us to obtain
copies of medical reports and records.

our liability for each occurrence is .subject to the
following llmltatlon: Our total combined single limit
of lfablllty under Coverages P and P-1 for all
bodily Injury resulting from one occurrence
shalt not exceed the applicable limit of liability
stated in the Declarations.

Separate Limits Requirements. We wt!I apply the
combined single limit to provide any separate ltmlts
required by law for bodlly Injury. This provision,
however, wlll not Increase our total limit of liability.
1320 (1014) Comblned Single Limit EndorsementCoverages N and O. The llmits of liability paragraph
pertaining to Coverages N and O under Section Ill
Conditions is changed to read as follows:

10. Limit of Liability. Regardless of the number of:

a. Insureds or vehicles Insured under this
pollcy;
b. Persons or organizations sustaining bodily
Injury or property damage; or

3. Payment of Deatfl BenefltD Autopsy.

c. Claims made:
a. If the insured decedent is survived by a
spouse who is a resident of the same
household at the time of the occurrence, the
death benefit Is payable to the decedenlffl
spouse. If the insured decedent was a minor,
the death benefit ls payable to any parent
who was a resident of the same household at
ID·CQ-02-01(1014)

L

our liability for each occurrence Is subject to the
following llmllatton:
Our total combined single limit of Dabllity under
Coverages N and O for all bodlly lnJury and
property damage resulting from one occurrence
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shall not exceed the applicable limit of liability
stated In the Declarations.

Separate Limits Requirements. We wlll apply
the combined single limit to provide any separate
limits required by law for bodily Injury and
property damage. This provision, however, will
not Increase our total llrnlt of liability.

endorsement applies. for a total loss we shall pay the
cos.I to replace the insured vehicle without deducUon
for depreciation. Our lfmlt of liability under this
coverage will not exceed the lesser of:

1. The cost of a new vehicle of the same make,
model, size, class, body type, and equipment as
your insured vehicle; or

1324 (1014) New Vehicle Loan Coverage Endorsement. For each Insured vehicle to which this

2. The amount you paid the dealer for the vehicle
when It was purchased.

endorsement applies, our ffmit of lfabilltyfor a covered
total loss shall be increased to cover the interest of a
lienholder In the vehrcle which exceeds the actual
cash value of the vehicle subject to the following:

Additional Exclusions. This endorsement does not
cover:

1.

The lfenholder must be fisted In the Declaratfons;

2.

The fienholder must be a financial institution
licensed or chartered under state or federal law;
and

3.

Our maximum llmit of llabllity is an additional 20%
of the actual cash value or the Insured vehicle at
the time of loss.

Additional Provisions.
1.

2.

Total loss In this endorsement means thal the
cost of repairs exceeds the actual cash value of
the Insured vehicle less salvage value.

1. An Insured vehicle that is damaged or stolen
more than one year past the date you bought It;
2. A motor vehicle that you lease or you do not
own; or
3.

Additional Provisions.

Resulting from overdue payments;

b.

Resulting from the cost of an extended
warranty, credit life or other Insurance; or

c.

replace within 60 days of the date of the loss, the

Insured vehicle that Is damaged or stolen.
2.

If a replacement vehlcle of Iha same make,
model, size, class, body type, and equipment Is
not available, we may require that you replace the
vehlcle with one that is similar in size, class, body
type, and equipment as we may determine.

3.

Total loss In lhis endorsement means that the
cost of repairs exceeds the actual cash value of
the Insured vehJcle less salvage value,

4.

This endorsement. applies only to an insured

Resulting from carry-over balances from

previous loans.

vehicle:

3. This endorsement applies only to an Insured
vehicle that:

a.

a. You purchased new from a new car dealer
and it had mileage of less than 1,000 miles
on the date of purchase;

4.

b,

Is financed under an original purchase lien;

c.

Is covered under Coverages S (Comprehensive) and T (Colllslon}; and

d.

Is a private passenger car or van, or a pickup.

This endorsement does not apply to any loss for
which you make claim under 1326 (0108) (New
Vehicle Additional Coverage Endorsement).

1326 (1014) New Vehicle Additional Coverage En·
dorsement. For each Insured vehicle to which this
ID-CQ-02-01(1014)
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1. This endorsement does not apply unless you

We do not pay any amount of a lien:
a.

An Insured vehicle that has been driven more
than 20,000 miles.

That is covered under Coverages
(Comprehensive) and T (Colllslon);

S

b. That you purchased new from a new car
dealer and it had mileage of less than 1,000
mUes on the date of purchase; and
c.

5.

That is a private passenger car or van, or a
pickup.

This endorsement does not apply to any loss for
which you make claim under 1324 (0108) (New
Vehicle Loan Coverage Endorsement).

1334 (1014) Roadside Assistance Endorsement.
We will pay for reasonable and necessary roadside
assistance expense caused by the dlsablement of
your Insured vehicle and Incurred at the place of
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disablement. Roadside assistance Includes only the
following:

2. The expense Incurred by you for taxicabs.

1. Unlocking the Insured vehicle If the keys have
been locked inside the vehlcle or If the keys have
been lost;

applies during a period starting on:

When Coverage Begins and Ends. Coverage

1. The date of loss if as a direct result of this loss
the Insured vehicle cannot be operated under Its
own power; or

2. Battery Jump and flat tire repair;

3. Labor for on-site mechanical repairs;

2.

4. Towing or winch-out service; or

If the insured vehicle is operable, the date you
authorize repairs and deliver the vehicle to the
repair shop.

5. Denvery of up to 3 gallons of gasoline, antifreeze.
or other motor vehicle fluids.

Regardless of lhe pollcy period, our liabllity for taxicab
or rental fees shall end on !he earliest of the following:

If you are pulling a trailer with your Insured vehicle,
ltems 2, 3, and 4 above also apply to the tralter if It or
your Insured vehfcle Is disabled.

1. Upon completron of repair or replacement of
property lost or damaged; or

2.
The limit applfcable to lhis coverage Is indicated In the
Declarations. No deductible applles to this coverage.
The limit for this coverage- is not Increased if both
your Insured vehicle and the trailer it is pulflng are
disabled.
1368 (1014) Car Rental Reimbursement Endorsement. if a loss exceeds the applicable deductible to
the Insured vehicle under Coverages S or T, we

agree to reimburse you for:

Upon such date as we make or tender settlement
for the loss or damage.

Limit of Liability. Our limit of lfabillty per day and per
accident for this coverage are shown In the
Declarations.
Other Coverage. This coverage shall not apply In the
event of a theft of the Insured vehicle for which

,.
I

:

:•

reimbursement of transportation expansa is provided
elsewhere In this polfcy.

1. The expense Incurred by you for the rental fee
(excludlrig all other charges) of a substitute automobile from a car rental agency or garage; or

ID-CQ-02-01(1014)
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llll,Fan11
p_o_ Box 4848 •

B11rem,.J1,I11tunl ltunrm,ce Cm,,pmty efldnlto

Pocatello, Idaho • 83205--4848

Fax: (800} 574-5066

March 2, 2016

Edgar Cook
491476 Hwy 95
Sandpoint, ID 83864

RE:

Sent Certified Mail

Insured: Edgar and Laurie Cook
Claimant: Joseph Stanczak
Policy No. Ol-A-028872-01
Date of Loss: 06n8/15
Claim No. 01038872012015062801

Dear Mr. Cook:
Late last week, l sent to you Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company's ("Farm Bureau's") coverage opinion
regarding the above-referenced matter in a letter dated February 23, 2016. That coverage opinion needed to be
updated with an analysis of the actual claim and settlement proposal that was submitted by Joseph Stanczak's
lawyer by his Jetter dated February 1, 2016 ("Settlement Proposal"), a copy of which I have attached to this
amended coverage opinion.
·
As such, please consider this letter Farm Bureau's amended coverage opinion and reservation of rights regarding
a claim that has been made against you by Joseph Stanczak with respect to a shooting that occurred at your·
property located at Bloom Lake, Idaho, on June 28, 2015.

Last fall you advised us of this potential claim and provided us with communications from Mr. Stanczak's
attorney indicating that he had been retained and would be in touch. However, we heard nothing further from Mr.
Stanczak or your on this potential claim, until recently when Fann Bureau received the Settlement Proposal from
Mr. Stanczak's counsel which will be summarized below. Farm Bureau has now reviewed the Settlement
Proposal, Edgar Cook's verbal statemeI?,t previously given in this matter, and other relevant documents and
information in making its coverage decision on this matter.
Now that an official claim has been made, we have evaluated this claim in light of the insurance policy you have
with Farm Bureau, specifically Country Squire Insurance Policy 01-A-038872-01 (the "Policy") with the Policy
period of January 26, 2015 - January 26, 2016. After reviewing the Policy and the information provided to date,
including your recorded statement, please be advised that there does not appear to be any insurance coverage
under the Policy for the injuries/damages that are being claimed by Mr. Stanczak, and given the questions raised
regarding coverage under the Policy, Farm Bureau hereby issues this reservation o(J-iglzts 110tice to you. Granted
our investigation is ongoing and we are happy to review any additional information you may provide us relative
to this claim, but at this point, please be advised that there likely is no coverage under the Policy for
Mr. Stanczak's claims.

BACKGROUND
Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook are the owners of real property located in Bonner County,
Idaho. The property consists of 200 acres, a lake called Bloom Lake, and a small cabin. It is our understanding
that neither you nor your wife reside in the cabin located on this property, and in fact, in your sworn statement
you indicated that the cabin and surrounding property are not close to where you actually reside and you only get
up to thls property every couple of years.
It does appear, however, that you do operate some sort of a campground on the real property near Bloom Lake. It
is our understanding that you do not charge an up-front fee for campers to use this campground and lake, but you
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do solicit voluntary financial donations from campers and that campers can leave in a donation box located at the
campground. You have indicated that the donations are just enough to pay the infrastructure costs for the
campground.
For the past seventeen (17) years, you have allowed one Michael Jessie Chisholm ("Chisholm") to reside in the
cabin on the real property in exchange for taking care of your property, including the lake, the cabin, and the
campground. It is unclear how Chisholm initially came into contact with you some seventeen ( 17) years ago or ·
how you got to know him. However, Chisholm has never and does not now receive any monetary remuneration
for his maintenance activities, that is, you have not and do not pay him a wage or salary of any sort.
There are no public utilities for the cabin and Chisholm pays for any gas, propane, or other supplies used for
heating or maintenance of the cabin and campground areas. You indicated that Chisolm's main responsibilities
include keeping the "lake up to specs"; keeping the weeds down; taking out the trash accumulated by the campers
using the property; and maintaining the road. You indicated that you also provide some equipment to Chisholm
in order to maintain the real property, including a weed eater, snowmobile, and diesel generator. You have stated
that you do not believe there is an employment relationship between Chisholm and you, the owners of this
property.
On June 28, 2015, Chisholm was involved in an altercation with Joseph Stanczak. Mr. Stanczak was apparently
camping at the campground when he and Chisholm had an argument and a physical altercation. From news
reports, the men may have eventually entered the cabin located on the real property. At some point, Chisholm
fired multiple shots from a .45-caliber automatic pistol at or in the direction of Mr. Stanczak and some of those
buUets struck Mr. Stanczak.
The Settlement Proposal contains Mr. Stanczak's version of the events. Mr. Stanczak alleges that on the evening
of June 28, 2015 Chisholm and his friend. Sarah Johns, were spending time with Mr. Stanczak and his girlfriend,
Susan Jackson, at the Bloom Lake Campground. Mr. Stanczak alleges that Chisholm became intoxicated. Mr.
Stanczak was aJso intoxicated as his medical records indicate that his blood alcohol level was 0.24. At some point
in the evening, Chisholm invited Mr. Stanczak and Susan Jackson into a cabin located at the campground because
Mr. Stanczak and Susan Jack.<ion claimed to be having trouble fighting off the mosquitoes. Mr. Stanczak alleges
that sometime after arriving at the cabin (its unclear how much time had passed) Chisholm began acting
belligerently and inappropriately towards Susan Jackson. An argument ensued, and Mr. Stanczak left the cabin
and started walking towards Susan Jackson's pickup. As he was waJking, Chisholin apparently exited the cabin
and pulled out a .45 caliber handgun and shot Mr. Stanczak twice, once in the back and once in the left arm.
Chisholm then jumped into his truck and drove away from the scene. He crashed his truck and tried to hide in the
woods, but was later apprehended by the police and taken into custody.
Chisholm was subsequently charged with aggravated battery with a deadly weapon and use of a deadly weapon in
commission of a felony. In reviewing the repository for the pending criminal case, it appears Mr. Chisholm
bonded out of jail in late August 2015. Trial was set for January 11, 2016, but on January 5, 2016 Chisholm
entered an Alford plea of guilty to the charge of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, which the Judge
accepted. The use of a deadly weapon in commission of a felony charge was apparently dropped. Chisholm's
sentencing is currently set for March 8, 2016.
Mr. St.anczak survived the shooting, but was hospitalized for a period of time. Back in July, Mr. Stanczak
retained counsel who have advised you that they may be making a claim against you and have asked that you to
report this potential claim to Fann Bureau. Again, you have previously provided Fann Bureau with that letter.
Mr. Stanczak's Settlement Proposal contains additional information regarding his injuries and claimed damages
against you because of Chisholm's actions. Mr. Stanczak's claims against you allege negligence based upon the
condition of your premises, namely the Bloom Lake Campground. Mr. Stanczak: a1so alleges a theory of recovery
based upon agency, i.e., that you are responsible for the actions of Chisholm.
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Mr. Stanczak alleges that he incurred just over $80,000 in medical expenses arising from the shooting. The lion's
share of these expenses relate to $30,000 for the life flight and $41,000 for expenses relating to his hospital stay at
Kootenai Medical Center from June 28-30, 2015. The other expenses relate to follow-up treatment, imaging,
medical and anesthesia services, and follow-up visits. Mr. Stanczak also alleges that he will require $10,000 in
future medical care for physical therapy services and pain medication.
Apparently, one of the bullets is still lodged in Mr. Stanczak's pelvic bone and cannot be removed because of its
proximity to an artery. The bullet apparently causes Mr. Stanczak regular pain. Mr. Stanczak claims to have
previously worked as a welder but alleged in the letter that he can no longer work as a welder because of his
injuries. Mr. Stanczak alleges that he made nearly $50,000 a year as a welder and that he has past lost wages in
the amount of nearly $30,000 and a potential loss of future earning capacity of $840,000 based upon his 21 years
until retirement age. In the Settlement Proposal, Mr. Stanczak also notes that he has a claim for pain and
suffering between the range of $500,000 to $3,000,000.
Mr. Stanczak concludes his Settlement Proposal by making a settlement offer in the amount of $950,000.

You have previously inquired whether there is any coverage under the Policy and whether Farm Bureau will be
defending you against any claim that Mr. Stanczak may make against you and your wife. To be clear, the only
issue this coverage opinion addresses is whether this potential claim by Mr. Stanczak will be covered under your
Farm Bureau insurance policy. We are not analyzing and offer no opinion as to whether Mr. Stanczak has any
direct valid legal claim against you and your wife, whether Chisholm was your employee, whether you and your
wife would have vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondent superior etc. We seriously doubt whether
Mr. Stanczak can make such a claim against you, but in the event that he does, there does not appear to be any
insurance coverage for that claim.
THE POLICY

The Po1icy has three separate coverage sections: Section I (Property), Section II (Liability), and Section III
(Automobile). (fu case you do not have your copy handy, I am enclosing another copy of the certified Policy and
Declaration sheets.) As this claim does not relate to a property or auto loss, only Section II is implicated and will
be addressed.
The Policy Declarations list only the individuals Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook as the
"Insureds." Therds no business or other entity insured by this Policy. The Policy Declarations also note that the
Policy period is 1/26/2015 - 1/26/2016. The Policy Declarations for Section II Liability Coverage include
coverage for Bodily Injury Liability (coverage Fl) and for Premises Medical Coverage (coverage F2). The Policy
Declarations also note that premises under Section II includes "Location 02," one residence and 200 acres, which
js the Bloom Lake Jocation and cabin. Finally. the Policy Declarations state that Section II coverage is subject to
four endorsements, including: Endorsement I220 (Combined Single Coverage Llmits). Endorsement I269
(Limited Employer's Liability Endorsement), Endorsement I282 (Personal Injury Endorsement), and
Endorsement I287 (Limited Pollution Coverage Endorsement).
The Policy contains a number of relevant definitions, including the foUowiog:

Business means a full-time or part-time trade, profession, occupation, or activity,
engaged in for compensation, other than farming or custom farming ....

Farming means the production of fruit, nuts, or field crops, or the raising or
keeping of livestock, fish, or bees, or the raising of mink, fox, or similar small
mammals for fur production ....
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Insured means you or the entity named in the Declarations. The following are
also insureds:
1. If you are a person, insured also means, if residents of your household, your
spouse, your relatives, and minors in the care of you or your relatives ....

Insured location means:

1. A location listed in the Declarations where you maintain a form or residence,
including private approaches;

Insured location does not include property where a business is conducted.

Occurrence means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the
same harmful conditions, which results in unexpected bodily injury or property
damage during the policy period. All bodily injury and property damage
resulting from a common cause wi11 be considered the result of one occurrence.

Relative means a person related to you by blood, marriage, or adoption, who is a
resident of your household, include a ward or foster child. This definition applies
only if you are a person.
Residence employees means someone employed by you who performs duties in
connection with the maintenance or use of the residence premises. This .
includes a person who perfonns duties for you elsewhere of a similar nature not
in connection with your business or farming.
Residence premises means, if shown in the Declaration: (a) a dwelling that is
your principal residence, including its grounds and private garages, or (b) that
part of any other building where you reside. A residence premises does not
include any part of a building used for business.
Section II Liability Coverage contains two relevant coverages. Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) and F2 (Premises
Medical Coverage). Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) allows for the following coverage:

If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for damages because
of bodi]y injury or property damage, caused by an occurrence to which this
coverage applies, we will:

1. Pay up to our Jimit of Jiability for the damages for which the insured is
legally liable (damages includes any awarded prejudgment interest); and
2. Provide a defense at our expenses by counsel of our choice ....
The Policy provides coverage under Coverage F2 (Premises Medical Coverage) as follows:
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Subject to the limit of liability, we wiJl pay reasonable and necessary medical and
funeral expenses resulting from bodily injury caused by an occurrence as
described below. This coverage does not apply to you or residents of your
household other than residence employees. This coverage applies only:

l. To a person on the insured location with the permission of any insured ....
Both of the above-described coverages are subject to several exclusions. including the following:
The following exclusions apply to all coverages under Section II . . . . Section II
does not cover bodily injury or property damage:
1. Arising from any insured's business activities or any professional service;

3. Which is intentionally caused by any insured. This exclusion does not apply
to the use of reasonable force by an insured to protect a person or property.

14. Arising out of a violation of a criminal law ... if committed by any insured.
Two relevant Policy endorsements state the followfog:
I269 (0108) Limited Employers Liability Endorsement. Coverages F-1 and F-2
are extended to apply to bodily injury caused by an occurrence and sustained by
a person performing labor for you in your farming operation ....
I282 (1014) Personal Injury Endorsement. Under Coverage F-1, we cover
personal injury. Personal Injury means injury other than bodi1y injury arising
out of one or more of the following offenses:
1. False arrest, detention or imprisonment. or malicious prosecution;
2. Libel, slander, or defamation of character; or
3. Invasion of privacy, wrongful eviction, or wrongful entry.
(Bold emphasis in original.)

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF IDAHO LAW REGARDING
CONSTRUCTION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS
The Idaho courts have set forth certain rules for determining whether a claim is covered by an insurance policy.
An insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the insured and must be construed the same way as any
other contract. See Auto Club Ins. Co., Inc. v. Tyrer, 560 F. Supp. 755 (D. Idaho 1983), ajf'd, 734 F.2d 20 (9th
Cir. 1984); see also Anderson v. Title Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 875, 655 P.2d 82 (1982). Like any other contract, an
insurance policy is to be construed as a whole, the court looking to the plain and ordinary sense of the words used
in the policy. See Miller v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 108 Idaho 896, 702 P.2d 1356 (1985); see also Juker v.
Am. Livestock Ins. Co., 102 Idaho 644, 637 P.2d 792 (1981); Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505,600
P.2d 1387 (1979). Absent ambiguity, words are to be given their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. See
Meckert v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 108 Idaho 597, 701 P.2d 217 (1985). Where the language of the insurance
policy is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for construction thereof and coverage must be determined
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according to the plain meaning of the words employed. See Kromrei v. AID Ins. Co. (Mut.), 110 Idaho 549, 716
P.2d 1321 (1986).
Where the language of the insurance policy is susceptible to only one meaning, that meaning will be given effect.
See Burgess Famis v. New Hampshire Ins. Grp., 108 ldaho 831, 702P.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1985). Where a word or
phrase in an insurance policy has a settled legal meaning or interpretation, that meaning will be given effect even
though other interpretations are possible. See Nielsen v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 223, 596
P.2d 95 (1979); Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cook, 92 Idaho 7,435 P.2d 364 (1967). See also Mut. of
Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4, 843 P.2d 154 (1992). However, not every word and phrase in an insurance
contract needs to be defined. See id.; see also State Fann Fire & Cas. v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693, 946 P.2d 1333
(1997).
COVERAGE ANALYSIS
Refen-ing to the Policy language above, your Policy only applies to "bodily injury" caused by an "occmTence" for
which coverage applies. The plain and unambiguous provisions of the Policy cited above preclude coverage for
the purposeful and intentional shooting of Mr. Stanczak by Chisholm. There is no coverage for the damage or
injuries suffered by Mr. Stanczak as a result of the referenced shooting under the Policy under either Section ll Fl
(Bodily Injury Liability) or F2 (Premises Medical Coverage). There also is no coverage for Mr. Stanczak's
claimed injuries under any other coverages provided for in your Policy.
A.
Section II Fl (Bodily Injury Liability).
Again, Section II Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) provides coverage to an Insured if a claim is made or a suit is
brought against the Insured for damages because of bodily injury caused by an occurrence. Chisholm is not
covered for his actions under Section 11 Fl. First, Chisholm is not a named Insured under the Policy. The Policy
was issued just to you and your wife, and the Policy Declarations only list the two of you as the named Insureds.
There is no business or other entity listed as an Insured. Chisholm is not a "relative'' who might be considered an
additional insured under the Policy. There is no definition or other provision under the Policy that would include
Chisolm as an Insured. Because he is not an Insured, Chisolm is not entitled to coverage under the Policy. To the
extent you had a "business" related to your Bloom Lake property, no such business is insured under the Policy
and no employees of that business are insured by the Policy.
Secolld, even if Chisholm was somehow an Insured under the Policy no occurrence occurred under Coverages Fl
or F2. Again, an occunence is "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the same harmful
conditions, which results in unexpected bodily injury ...." Webster's Online Dictionary defines "accident" as a
"sudden event ... that is not planned or intended and that causes damage or injury." The shooting in question
was not an accident because it was not a sudden event that was not intended. Rather, if Chisholm shot Mr.
Stanczak multiple times as reported, his actions were most likely intended to cause injury. Likewise, the shooting
did not cause unexpected bodily injury. The shooting caused bullet wounds to Mr. Stanczak, which is the
expected injury when pointing and shooting a gun at another man.

Courts agree with this interpretation. The Texas Court of Appeals in Texas Farm Bureait Unde,writers v.
Graham, 450 S.W.3d 919, 926-28 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014) recently confirmed the majority view and found no
coverage under an insurance policy for a shooting because it was not an accident nor did it cause unexpected
injuries. See also Home Owners Ins. Co. v. Chammus, Case No. 299412, slip op. at 2-3 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Neal, 304- Ga. App. 267, 268-70 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); Stone v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mui.
Ins. Co., 34 S.W.3d 809 (Ky. App. 2000) (shooting was clearly not an accident, intent to harm inferred from
nature of act of pointing and shooting gun at victim.); Norman v. Ins. Co., 239 S.E.2d 902, 905-06 {Va. 1978);
Harris v. Richards, 867 P.2d 325 (Kan. 1994) (intent to injure inferred since serious bodily injury was natural
consequence of shooting gun into back of occupied truck); Barton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 527 So. 2d 524 (La. App. 3
Cir. 1988) (intentional act exclusion barred coverage under policy for shooting through a door knowing someone
was on other side); Allstate v. Peasley, 80 Wn. App. 565 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (criminal act exclusion applied in
shooting case as exclusion meant an act for which a criminal conviction may result).
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You also repmted that Mr. Chisholm may allege that he did not intentionally aim and shoot at Mr. Stanczak, but
rather, he only intended to fire warning shots at Mr. Stanczak which accidently did, in fact, hit Mr. Stanczak and
cause injury to him. Even if that is the case and the evidence comes out which supports this assertion by Mr.
Chisholm, it is doubtful that said fact will change the coverage analysis under your Policy. While there does not
appear to be any Idaho law on this point, other courts have still found that in this situation there is no
"occurrence" under an insurance policy because there still was an intentional act of firing a gun irrespective of
whether the gun was aimed at the shooting victim and regardless of whether the shooter intended to actually cause
physical harm to the shooting victim. The injury suffered by the victim was still the natural consequence of the
intentional acts of picking up a loaded gun, aiming in the direction of the victim, and pulling the trigger. Berry v.
McLemore, 795 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1986) (no occmTence under policy even though shooter only fired warning
shots; intentional act of firing weapon sufficed to find no coverage); Allstate v. Cannon, 44 F.Supp. 31 (E.D.
Mish. 1986) (fact that rifle was discharged intentionally resulting in finding of no occurrence under the policy and
no coverage despite fact shooter meant to only fire warning shots).
In Jight of the foregoing, Mr. Stanczak's claims related to his injuries and damages do not descdbe an
"occurrence," and without an occurrence under the PoJicy, there is no coverage for Mr. Stanczak's injuries or
damages.

Third, even jf Chisholm was an Insured under the Policy and an occurrence occurred under the Policy, there are
specific Policy exclusions that would also bar coverage for Mr. Stanczak's claims. Mr. Stanczak has argued that
the operation of the campground was a business activity of yours because you invited or licensed campers to
come on to your property for a voluntary donation. They will further argue that Chisholm was your employee,
because even though he was not paid a wage or salary he was paid to do work on your property by vh1ue of the
fact that you allowed him to reside in your cabin on this property without paying rent. If Chisholm was somehow
your employee {ignoring that he would likely still not be performing duties within the scope of his employment)
given that you had some business related to the operation of Bloom Lake and the campground, then Mr.
Stanczak's claims would still be spedfically excluded under Section II Exclusion Number 1 because you have no
insurance coverage under this Policy arising out of any of your "business activities." This would be the case
even, if as you have indicated, your operation of the campground and lake was only a break even proposition as
best given the fee collections generated from campers.
In looking at whether an activity is a business pursuit, the courts will typically look at: whether the activity is
customary to a business pursuit and whether the objective and purpose of the activity are commercial in nature,
and in furtherance of the business, or the means oflivelihood. Blacks v. Fireman's Fund American Ins., 115
Idaho 449 (Ct.App. 1989). Applying these factors, your activity of offering up campground sites in exchange for
a voluntary fee, may be considered a business pursuit as its objective may be deemed to be commercial in nature.
And it does not appear to matter whether you made a profit on this activity for it to be considered a business
pursuit which would then bar any coverage for that activity under your Po1icy.
Similarly, Section II Exclusion Number 3 excludes bodily injury intentionally caused by an Insured. Thus, even
if Chisholm was somehow found to be an Insured under the Po1icy-which he is not-his intentional act of
shooting Mr. Stanczak would be excluded. Again, Chisolm may say that he did not intentionally cause bodily
injury to Mr. Stanczak, but that he was shooting warning shots. The intentional act of shooting a gun near a
person is sufficient grounds to deny coverage under Section II Exclusion Number 3. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herman,
551 N.E.2d 844 (Ind. 1990) (Intentionally firing gun into a fleeing crowd is an egregious act and intent to injure
may be inferred as a matter of law).
Finally, Section II Exclusion Number 14 excludes bodily injury that arises out of the violation of a criminal Jaw
by an Insured. As noted above, Chisolm has entered a guilty plea for the charge of aggravated battery with a
deadly weapon. The type of guilty plea entered by Chisolm is called an Alford plea. Under Idaho law, an Alford
plea occurs where a defendant enters a plea of guilty, but asserts that he or she is innocent. Irrespective, an Alford
plea is a guilty plea. State v. Salisbury, 143 Idaho 476, 147 P.3d 108 (2006). A judge has discretion to accept an
Alford plea and will do so only where there is sufficient evidence that that the prosecution would Jikely be able to
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persuade a jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, it sounds like the judge
presiding over the criminal case has accepted Chisholm's Alford plea, thus finding that the prosecution would
likely be able to convict Mr. Chisholm of this crime if it moved forward.

In this situation, because Chisholm entered a guilty Alford plea, he admits to violating criminal law. Chisholm
gave up his defenses to the shooting charge by entering into the Alford plea. He and others are bound by ms
admission and abandonment of his defenses. One court has noted the following:
Under an Alford plea, a defendant maintains innocence while entering a plea of
guilty because the defendant concJudes that his interests require entry of a guilty
plea and the record before the court contains strong evidence of actual guilt. A
guilty plea is an admissfon of aH the elements of the criminal charge. Guilty pleas
must be rooted in fact before they may be accepted. Accordingly, courts treat
Alford pleas as having the same preclusive effect as a guilty plea. The collateral
consequences of a guilty plea may not be avoided by the simultaneous assertion
of illllocence.

Cortese v. Black, 838 F.Supp. 485, 492 (D. Colo. 1993). See also, Merchants Mutual Ins. Co. v. Arzillo, 98
A.D.2d 495, 472 N.Y.S.2d 97 (N.Y.App.Div. 1984) (with Alford type plea, the issues representing the essential
elements of the crime have necessarily been judicially determined by the acceptance of the plea); State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co. v. Sallak, 140 Ore. App. 89, 914 P.2d 697 (Or.Ct.App. 1996) (acceptance of plea is the equivalent of a
judicial determination of each of the material elements of the crime).
Chisholm admits to violating a criminal law. So, even if Chisholm was an Insured under the Policy and an
occurrence did occur, it arose out of a violation of Idaho criminal law and the intentional act exclusion of the
Policy is therefore implicated. Therefore, there is no coverage. See Colorado Fann Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Snowbarger, 934 P.2d 909 (Colo. Ct.App. 1997) (guilty plea to intentional criminal act precluded coverage under
homeowners insurance policy; no duty to defend or indemnify; intent cannot be relitigated so as to avoid the
intentional act exclusion of an insurance policy); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Groshek, 161 Mich.App. 703,
411 N.W.2d 480 (Mich.Ct.App. 1987) (defendant's guilty plea established the necessary intent to make the
insurance policy's exclusionary clause applicable).
Bottom line, under Section II Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) of the Policy, there does not appear to be any coverage
for the injuries and damages that Mr. Stanczak may claim arising out of being shot by Chisholm.

B.

Section Il F2 (Premises Medical Coverage).

For all the same reasons, there is no coverage for Mr. Stanczak's potentially claimed medical expenses under
Section II F2 (Premises Medical Coverage) of the Policy. This section does not require that the actors be insured.
Rather, it gives coverage for medical costs for those who suffer bodily injury caused by an occurrence to those
who are on the fosured location with permission of an Insured. From what we understand, there may be no
dispute that Mr. Stanczak was on the insured location with permission, if he in fact was camping at the
campground on your property.
However, there was still no occurrence as that term is defined in the Policy. As outlined above, shooting
someone is not an accident and does not caused unexpected injuries. Without an occurrence causing bodily
injury, there is no coverage under Section II F2 (Premises Medical Coverage) of the Policy for Mr. Stanczak's
potentially claimed medical expenses.
Even if there was an argument that there was an occurrence under the Policy, the same exclusions, specificaJly
Exclusion Nos. 1, 3 and 14 identified and discussed above, would preclude coverage for any medical expenses
claim by Mr. Stanczak arising out of the shooting.
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As such, there is no coverage for any claimed medical expenses of Mr. Stanczak under Section II F2 (Premises
Medical Coverage) of the Policy.

C.

Other Language of the Policy.

Someone mny argue that Chisholm somehow is a "resjdence employee" under the Policy and that as result
thereof, coverage for Mr. Stanczak' s claims exists. As outlined above, the Policy does define a residence
employee as someone who performs duties in connection with the maintenance or use of a "residence premises."
Certain coverages are then provided for those residence employees, for example, to the extent they are hurt on an
insured premise or insured location. However, Chisholm is not a residence employee as that term is defined in the
Policy. The maintenance that employee performs must be in connection with the "residence premises," which is
also a defined term in the Policy. That term is limited to a dwelling that is the insured's principal residence or
part of any other building where the insured resides. You have made it clear in your statement that neither you
nor your wife reside in the cabin or at Bloom Lake. In addition, the Policy only affords coverage for the actions
of residence employees that occur off an insured location and are caused by activities within the residence
employee's course and scope of the employment by you, the Insured. Neither of these requirements is satisfied
here because the shooting allegedly occurred on an insured location and Chisholm was not acting in the course
and scope of his employment by you.
In addition, the same exclusions under Section II would bar coverage for Mr. Stanczak's claims even if Chisholm
was somehow found to be a "residence employee" as that term is defined in the Policy.
We have also confirmed that none of the Policy "endorsements" provide or contemplate any additional coverage
that would cover Mr. Stanczak's claims. None of the endorsements provided on the declaration sheet for this
Policy are applicable. For example, Endorsement 1269 (0108), the Limited Employers Liability Endorsement,
only contemplates coverage for someone injured while engaging in farming activities. Chisholm did not engage
in farming activities as contemplated by the Policy definition. Similarly, Endorsement 1282 (1014), the Personal
Injury Endorsement, does not contemplate coverage for injuries arising from an intentional shooting but rather
deal with personal injury resulting from specific offenses like false arrest, libel and slander, and invasion of
privacy.

CONCLUSION
As a result of the foregoing analysis and our investigation to date, there does not appear to be coverage for the
injuries and damages that Mr. Stanczak may assert. As such, Farm Bureau is hereby reserving any rights and
defenses which may now exist and all rights and defenses which it may later have under all the term.c,, conditions,
provisions and exclusions of your insurance Policy with Farm Bureau This letter is intended to provide you with
an explanation of Parm Bureau's current position in relation to the investigation of Mr. Stancz.ak's potential claim
and the lack of coverage for that claim under the terms of the Policy. This letter does not alter in any way or
amend the terms of the Policy, nor is this letter intended to provide an exhaustive recitation of Farm Bureau's
coverage position on all matters discussed herein. Fann Bureait reserves all rights aud defenses which may

now exist and all rights and defenses wl,ich it may hereafter have under any or all of the tenns, co1tditio11s,
provisiom;, e11dorsements1 and exclusions of the Policy whether or ,wt they are referenced in this feller. Fann
Bureau specifically reserves its rights to add additional defenses to coverage and to modify or amend this
coverage position based upon further investigation of the facts and circumstances pertaining to this matter or
based upon any additional information you or anyone else may provide. Farm Bureau also reserves the right to
seek a judicial determination of its rights and obligations, if any, under the Policy.
To the extent additional information is provided or a specific claims is made, Farm Bureau wHl certainly continue
to investigate this claim even though it does not appear any coverage would exist under the Policy for Mr.
Stanczak's claims. However, no act of any Fann Bureau representative while investigating this claim shall be
construed as waiving any company rights. Farm Bureau reserves the right, under the Policy, to continue to deny
coverage to anyone claiming coverage under the Policy related to the shooting that is the subject of this coverage
opinion.
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Fann Bureau also reserves the right to supplement or update this Jetter. No actions taken by or on behalf of Farm
Bureau in connection with this claim sha11 constitute an admission of liability or an admission of coverage under
the Policy that is at issue.
In addition, please be aware of your continuing obligation to fu]ly and completely cooperate in connection with
this matter, together with your obligation to keep Farm Bureau fully informed and apprised of developments as
they proceed. Again, it is our understanding that no lawsuit has yet been filed against you by Mr. Stanczak. In
the event you are served with any other demand or lawsuit, please notify me immediately and forward copies of
all documents served on you to my attention so that I can continue my coverage review.

If you have any questions as to the content of this coverage position letter, please feel free to contact me.

Sinc~rely,

~

·
:

Steve Johnso' ;.

.. . :

-

Sr. Regional Claims Manager
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co
1250 S. Allante Ave, Boise, ID 83709
(208) 947-2478

SJ/js
cc:

File

Enclosures: (1) Policy, (2) 2/1/16 Settlement Demand from Wes Larsen to Farm Bueau.
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I.

I

208.345.2000 MAIN
BOD.122.2889 TOIJ,.FRBE
208.3855384 FAX

March 22, 2016
via Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested

I

I:
1
!: ,
!·

Edgar and Laurie Cook
c/o Elmira Store & Cafe
490870 Highway 95
Sandpoint, ID 83864

:.

,.

Re:

Claim No. 01038872012015062801
Claim by Josepla Stanczak
Policy No. 01-A-028872-01
Date of Loss: June 28, 2015
MTBR&F File No. 13900.0252

I

I-

i

Dear Mr. Cook:
Our firm has been assisting your insurance company, Fann Bureau Mutual Insurance Company
("Fann Bureau") with its investigation and coverage determinations regarding the claim being
made by Joseph Stanczak for the injuries that he sustained at your north Idaho property at
Bloom Lake when he was allegedly shot by Michael Chisholm on June 28, 2015. We
understand that Farm Bureau has previously provided you with two separate reservation of
rights notices ("ROR Notices") wherein it indicated to you that there did not appear to be any
coverage under your Farm Bureau policy for the claims of.Mr. Stanczak, but that it was
continuing with its investigation and reserving all rights in the meantime.

i:

The purpose of this letter is to advise you that Farm Bureau has now completed its
investigation. We are not aware of any additional information that has been provided to Farm
Bureau by you or Mr. Stanczak's attorney since Farm Bureau sent out its prior ROR Notices.
Nor are we are aware of any information that would otherwise change the coverage analysis
contained within those prior ROR Notices.
As such, Farm Bureau has concluded that there is no coverage under your Farm Bureau
insurance policy for any claim arising out ofthe incident that occurred on your property on June
28, 2015 involving Joseph Stanczak and Michael Chisholm. As such, Fann Bureau will not be
able to provide you with a defense for any claim or resulting lawsuit filed by Mr. Stanczak. Nor
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Edgar and Laurie Cook
March 22, 2016
Page2

will Farm Bureau be able to indemnify you for any resulting judgment arising from any such
Jm.ysuit or this claim. By separate letter, a copy of which is enclosed, we have advised Mr.
Sfanczak's attorney of this coverage determination.
Fann Bureau bases this denial of coverage on the policy's insuring agreement, as well as other
coverage provisions and Jimitations set forth in the policy imd which were described to you in
detail in the prior ROR Notices which are incorporated herein by reference. Farm Bureau
reserves the right to rely upon any and all defenses of non-coverage and does not admit any
obligations under the policy. Certainly. if Farm Bureau is provided additional information from
you or others regarding Mr. Stanczak's claim or the subject incident, then Farm Bureau reserves
the right to modify this denial of coverage determination to the extent that additional
information is detennined to be relevant to this coverage determination.

j.
I.

j=

Farm Bureau continues to fuJly and expressly reserve all rights and defenses which may now
exist and all right and defenses which it may hereinafter have under any and all of the terms,
conditions, provisions, and exclusions of the policy, as wel1 as all endorsements thereto,
irrespective of whether or not they are referenced in its prior ROR Notices. Farm Bureau
specifically reserves its right to add additional defenses to coverage and to modify and amend
its coverage determination based UP,On :further investigation of the fact or circumstances
pertaining to this matter or upon the discovery or notice of facts not currently available to it.

t·

No actions taken by or on behalf of Farm Bureau in connection with this claim shall constitute
an admission of liability or an admission of coverage under the.subject Farm Bureau policy.
If you have any questions, please give me a call.

JLM/peb
Enclosure

I

1·
i'

!
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MOFFATT
THOMAS
Attorneys at Law

James L. Martin
(208) 385-5303
jlm@moffan.com

MAILING ADDRESS:
PO Box 829
Boise ID 83701-0829

PHYSICAL ADDRESS:
101 S Capitol Blvd 10th Fl
Boise ID 83702-7710

www.moffan.com

208.345.2000 MAIN
800.422.2889 TOLL-FREE
208.385.5384 FAX

June 2, 2016
via Overnight Delivery

Edgar and Laurie Cook
c/o Elmira Store &. Cafe
490870 Highway 95
Sandpoint, ID 83864

Re:

Claim No. 01038872012015062801
Claim by Joseph Stanczak
Policy No. 01-A-028872-01
Date of Loss: June 28, 2015
MTBR&F File No. 13900.0252
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Cook:

On May 12, 2016, Joseph Stanczak ("Stanczak") filed a Complaint for Damages in Bonner
County, Idaho (the "Complaint") against Ed W. Cook and Laurie Cook, as husband and wife,
and doing business as Bloom Lake Campground and also Jesse Chisholm. That case is now
pending in Bonner County as Civil Case No. 2016-679. That Complaint was provided to your
insurance carrier Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company ("Farm Bureau"). Farm Bureau
asked that my law firm evaluate the allegations and claims asserted in that Complaint to see if it
changes in any manner, Fann Bureau's prior insurance coverage positions where it denied any
duty to defend or indemnify you for the claims that were or might be asserted against you by
Stanczak. (See my denial letter to you dated March 22, 2016 and Farm Bureau's initial
reservation of rights letters that were sent to you dated February 23 , 2016, and March 2, 2016).
The Complaint seeks damages for Stanczak's injuries when he was shot by Chisholm on June
28, 2015, at the Bloom Lake Campground, which is owned by Ed and Laurie Cook ("You" or
"the Cooks"). Stanczak alleges that the Bloom Lake Campground is a "for profit" campground
owned and operated by You. He also alleges that Chisholm was your employee because he
acted as caretaker of the Bloom Lake Campground.
The factual allegations in the Complaint are similar to those alleged in previous correspondence
from Stanczak's counsel. Stanczak alleges that on June 28, 2015, he was camping at the Bloom
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Edgar and Laurie Cook
June 2, 2016
Page 2

Lake Campground with his girlfriend, Sally Johns. Chisholm invited Stanczak and Sally Johns
into a cabin located at the Bloom Lake Campground to stay the night. Chisholm allegedly
became intoxicated and an argument ensued between Chisholm and Stanczak. Stanczak left the
cabin, and as he was walking away from the cabin, Chisholm fired a .45 caliber handgun at him.
Two bullets struck Stanczak, one in the arm and one in the back. Stanczak sustained serious
injuries. Chisholm left the scene and was later apprehended by law enforcement. Law
enforcement found several other firearms at the cabin at the Bloom Lake Campground.
Stanczak has alleged four causes of action in his Complaint: (1) Premises Liability against the
Cooks and the Bloom Lake Campground; (2) Negligent Supervision of Chisholm against the
Cooks and Bloom Lake Campground; (3) Strict Liability against Chisholm; and (4) Negligent,
Reckless, and Tortious Misconduct against Chisholm.
This letter does not analyze the legal viability of each of these causes of action that have been
a-sserted against You and Chisholm by Stanczak. Rather, we have simply analyzed whether the
allegations and claims contained in the Complaint trigger any insurance coverage under your
Farm Bureau insurance policy ("Policy") that was not previously reviewed and discussed in
Farm Bureau's prior coverage opinions that You have been provided. After conducting a
review of this newly filed Complaint, Farm Bureau is still of the opinion that there is no
coverage under your Farm Bureau insurance policy for the allegations and claims asserted by
Stanczak.

THERE IS NO COVERAGE FOR THE ALLEGATIONS
CONTAINED IN THE COMPLAINT
As you know, Farm Bureau has previously advised You that there is no coverage under your
Farm Bureau Policy for the claims Stanczak has made against You.
Section I (Property) and Section II (Liability) are the two sections of the Policy that are
implicated. Farm Bureau originally denied coverage for the shooting incident under Section II
on the following grounds: First, Chisholm is not an insured under the policy. Second, no
"occurrence" occurred under the Policy because the intentional shooting of a firearm does not
fall within the definition of "occurrence" under the Policy. In short, the intentional shooting of
a firearm was not an accident. Third, there is an exclusion under the Policy that precludes
coverage for claims arising from business activities. Stanczak argued previously that the
Bloom Lake Campground was a business. Farm Bureau denied coverage on the grounds that
the claim appeared to be related to a business activity. Fourth, there is an exclusion under the
Policy for claims arising from intentional acts of an insured. Farm Bureau denied coverage to
Stanczak's claim because the act of shooting a gun by Chisholm was intentional, to the extent
that Chisholm was somehow considered an insured under the Policy. Fifth, the Policy contains
an exclusion for claims that arise out of the violation of a criminal law by an insured. Chisholm
has pied guilty, via an Alford plea, to aggravated battery with a deadly weapon and is currently
incarcerated and serving his time in prison for this incident. Thus, Farm Bureau denied
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coverage based upon the criminal law exclusion and Chisholm's guilty plea, to the extent that
Chisholm was an insured under the policy.
Farm Bureau also previously denied coverage under Section I (Property) of the Policy for
reasons 2-5 above. Farm Bureau also looked at and considered other portions of the Policy and
the endorsements and was unable to identify any other provisions or endorsements which would .
give rise to any coverage for Stanczak' s injuries and claim.
Farm Bureau has now performed this same review again in light of the filing of the Complaint
to confirm its prior coverage position. Again, it has determined that the allegations contained in
the Complaint do not give rise to any coverage under your Farm Bureau Policy.

A.

The Premises Liability Cause of Action Against the Cooks and Bloom Lake
Campground

The first cause of action is a premises liability claim against the Cooks and Bloom Lake
Campground. Stanczak alleges that the Cooks and Bloom Lake Campground owed a duty to
Stanczak as an invitee of the Campground. Stanczak alleges that the Cooks and Bloom Lake
Campground breached this duty when they failed to take ordinary and reasonable care to keep
the premises safe and/or to warn Stanczak about Chisholm's reasonably foreseeable conduct,
namely, Chisholm becoming intoxicated and discharging a firearm. Stanczak alleges that this
breach of duty caused his damages. Stanczak does not state that Chisholm pointed the gun at
him and fired. Rather, he alleges that as Stanczak was walking away, Chisholm fired rounds
from his .45 caliber handgun and two of these rounds struck Stanczak.
The premises liability cause of action against the Cooks and Bloom Lake Campground does not
trigger coverage under the Policy. While the Cooks are named insureds under the Policy, no
"occurrence" occurred to trigger coverage under either Section I or Section II of the Policy. An
occurrence means "an accident ... which results in unexpected bodily injury or property
damage." Chisholm admitted the elements of his offense when he entered into his plea
agreement. One of these elements is the intent to batter someone. This admission precludes
coverage because it was not an accident resulting in unexpected bodily injury. In addition, the
allegations in the Complaint continue to assert that the Cooks were running a for-profit business
at the Bloom Lake Campground. As the shooting as alleged by Stanczak, arose from the
Cooks' alleged "business activities", it is also not covered per the business activities exclusion
contained within your Policy.

B.

The Negligent Supervision Claim Against the Cooks and Bloom Lake
Campground

Stanczak alleges that the Cooks and Bloom Lake Campground had a duty to supervise their
agent/employee Chisholm from injuring guests at the Campground. He alleges that the Cooks
and Bloom Lake Campground breached this duty by failing to prevent Chisholm from
becoming intoxicated and discharging a weapon. He alleges that the Cooks and Bloom Lake
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Campground breached the duty by failing to protect Stanczak or warn Stanci;ak from the
dangers posed by Chisholm becoming intoxicated and discharging a firearm. Stanczak alleges
that these breaches caused his injuries and damages.
The same grounds as outlined above for denying coverage for the first cause of action for
premises liability exist for denying the second cause of action for negligent supervision. There
was no occurrence and the cause of action asserted relates to business activities that You are to
have alleged to have conducted on your property. In short, your Farm Bureau Policy did not
provide commercial general liability protection or coverage. You did not purchase that kind of
an insurance policy from Farm Bureau and the Policy you did purchase specifically excludes
any coverage from any "business activity" or claim arising out of a "business activity".
C.

The Strict Liability Claim Against Chisholm

Stanczak alleges that Chisholm was engaged in the ultra-hazardous activities of maintaining a
loaded firearm on the premises, handling a loaded firearm while intoxicated while in close
proximity to Stanczak, and firing a loaded firearm while intoxicated. Stanczak alleges that he
was not aware that Chisholm had a firearm, that it was pointed in his general direction, or that
the firearm was loaded. The same grounds as outlined above require denial of coverage for this
cause of action. Chisholm is not a named insured under the Policy. Farm Bureau is not aware
that you had anyone working for you or employed by you in any capacity. Moreover, the
shooting was not an occurrence and, per the allegations contained in the Complaint, it relates to
the insureds' business activities and there is no coverage for the same.
D.

The Negligence, Reckless, and Tortious Conduct

Stanczak alleges that Chisholm owed a duty to him of reasonable care to handle the firearm in a
safe manner, not to handle or discharge the firearm while intoxicated, and to protect those
around Chisholm from an unreasonable risk of harm. Stanczak alleges that Chisholm breached
these duties by handling the firearm in an unsafe manner while intoxicated, maintaining a
dangerous condition on the premises by having a loaded gun, failing to give warning to
Stanczak of the hazard on the premises, and exposing him to an unreasonable risk of harm on
the premises. Again, the same grounds as outlined above required denial of coverage for this
cause of action. Chisholm is not a named insured under the Policy. The shooting was not an
occurrence and, per the allegations contained in the Complaint, it relates to the insureds'
business activities and there is no coverage for the same.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Farm Bureau has once again concluded that there is no coverage
under your Farm Bureau insurance policy for any claim arising out of the incident that occurred
on your property on June 28, 2015, involving Joseph Stanczak and Michael Chisholm. As
such, Farm Bureau will not be able to provide you with a defense for the lawsuit filed by Mr.
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Stanczak in Bonner County. Nor will Farm Bureau be able to indemnify you for any resulting
judgment or settlement arising from that lawsuit.
We hope that you have already obtained your own attorney to defend this action and if you
haven't we would suggest that you immediately do so. You certainly will need to act _timely to
respond to the allegations in the Stanczak Complaint and take the appropriate actions to defend
that matter.
Farm Bureau bases this denial of coverage on the Policy's insuring agreement, as well as other
coverage provisions and limitations set forth in the Policy and which were described to you in
detail in the prior Denial and ROR Notices which are incorporated herein by reference. Farm
Bureau reserves the right to rely upon any and all defenses of non-coverage and does not admit
any obligations under the Policy. Certainly, if Farm Bureau is provided additional information
from you or others regarding Mr. Stanczak's claim, the subject incident, or resulting lawsuit,
then Farm Bureau reserves the right to modify this denial of coverage determination to the
extent that additional information is determined to be relevant to this coverage determination.
Farm Bureau continues to fully and expressly reserve all rights and defenses which may now
exist and all right and defenses which it may hereinafter have under any and all of the terms,
conditions, provisions, and exclusions of the policy, as well as all endorsements thereto,
irrespective of whether or not they are referenced in its prior Denial and ROR Notices. Farm
Bureau specifically reserves its right to add additional defenses to coverage and to modify and
amend its coverage determination based upon further investigation of the fact or circumstances
pertaining to this matter or upon the discovery or notice of facts not currently available to it.
No actions taken by or on behalf of Farm Bureau in connection with this claim shall constitute
an admission of liability or an admission of coverage under the subject Farm Bureau Policy.
NEW DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION FILED BY FARM BUREAU
Finally, to confirm that Farm Bureau has neither a duty to defend or indemnify You with
respect to the claims asserted in the Complaint, Farm Bureau has filed an insurance declaratory
judgment action in Bonner County, Idaho against You. The attached Amended Complaint is
being sent up to be filed in that action. We will get you served with that Amended Complaint
once it is filed and the appropriate summonses have been issued.
Please consult with vour own attornev regarding this separate legal action which has now
been filed against You. Again the purpose oftliis separate lawsuit is to confirm Farm
Bureau's lack of any obligation to defend or indemnifv You related to the claims asserted by
Stanczak. Once the Amended Complaint is served upon You, you will have twenty (20) days
to respond to this complaint as well.
Again, we would strongly recommend that you have your own attorney advise you and
represent you regarding these two different matters. If you have .a lawyer already, please have
them contact me so that we can discuss these issues.
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Very tru y yours,

1
1.·

~~
es L. Martin

JLM/peb
Enclosure
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·..·'; E. OF llJ.t\HO

;~HH Y OF

JAMES, VER.N'ON & WEEKS~ P.A.
WES S. LAR.SE-W', ISB #9134
1626 Lh:J,ooln Way
Coeur d'Aleµ;, JD 83814

t30HHEH

.(:H ..IUOICIAL DIST.
11
'\ I'l' )',, I ',J
i.'.U"f b l'\i\/, VI I 2
.,
J..,

Tele:phabe: (;208) 667~0683
Fa~ilpili;; (ZOS) 6~4~1684

CL£Hl{ DiS~i'iiGT COU~T

-~OEPliTY~ ""

IN TFI$ D.ISTWCT COUltl' Ol11 'l'HEFmS'f JUDICIAL DI~TR!CT OF TiiIE
$.'l'Al'lt OF IDA.BO, IN ;\ND JOR 11FlJ1; COUNTY OF DQNNER
JOSEPH STANCZAK~
Plaintiff,

Co\se No. CIf. 2J DH~ -

L_(?r-/Cj

CO!v!PLAJNT FOR J)Afvft\OES
EP W. COOK, and LAURIB COO~
iµdtvid1~a.lly, -~ husband apg wifee
and tl/b/a &LOOM LAKE
·
f.:!Af.1,PGROUND; ~nd Ml:CH.Al:!L
J:ESSE CI·llSHOLM, mdividually,

Def.end.Mrs.

Plainti.ff. by i.md through W.s mromey o.f :re~ord, Wes.$. Llll'fleJ.1. pf J~mes, Vemon ~ W(llelgl,
P.A., heyeby 09.mpla.lns ~nd all@ges a.s f<',!Uow$:

I.
I.. 1

~..ll~1Rlf.Wllltm1 l!!il~.9~J'IQj'!a ,6@)~
~ f J®J;Pij STAJ'-.JGZAJ(; At all tJ.mes material h~r0t0) Plaintitf Jos~ph

S~zak re~ded J.:o .ijmmda.ry Coonty, State of Idahos Plaintiff mourred ~W0l{$ personal injUti~
~ a direet and ;Proxime.te :r:¢i!fl.Jlt of the Dife-.11chmts /!~ts E,ll:ld mnis.sio.ns, and, ~~oh of them. in
1

aoxmer

Co\Qlt=y, Stat€) ofldmlo.

1.2

Qg~ANJ',]J;> Y( 1~0I$.i Upoo huQl;.nl!,'ttlqn mid b~li~f~ ~ a,,ll times r;rmwr al

b~e.to DQfmd®t Ed W. Cook residl(id Ul ijower ColJl't/.:y, State of Idaho, Md wa» m~l'l.'i~d to

AS.SIGNED TO
JUDGI BUCHANAN
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Pefe.udai-it I,aµ,.ie Cook, Upon inf01mation ~nd b~lief,

at

all times material hereto Defendant Ed

W, Cool< owned and operated th~ Bloom Li:lke Campground in Bonn.er Coµ.nt-;, State of Idaho, as

a priva~ for~proftt busine$s, tog~ther with Defendant Lauri" Cook.
1.3

~l':llM:\'t:ff. i.P;1.JJ1Ji <:;:..QQI~ Opon il;tfor.mation arid beli~f, f;\t all times me\tt}rifl.l

hereto Dofemdant La1.Jrie Cook reisided in Bonner Couu·cy-1 State of Xdab.0 1 and was 1nanied to

D.e!0ndaut Ed W. Coo~. Uf,1Qtl. infon1l~ti~.n end l:ieliet at ~11 tu1.1.@s 1P,,a,terl11l 1li;,ret0 D.~f~nd..ant U.ude.
Cook owµ.ed and opeiat~d tl;le '.Blqom L~ke Qrunpgro1rod in. Boroer Coi,mty, State of ld.;dio, as a

private for ..proflt l)U1.l1Jl~S&, toieth!.;ll' with D~end&it Er:!. W, CQt>k,
.1.4

D~~L~f..OQM t,AIIB ~ MPQRO:miQ.; Upon information aµd b~li~f

and at all times l'l;ltit~ril\l hereto. J)ef011clant Bloom Lal(e Ca'{Ilpgrouud is a for-pro6.t caqipgrouru.i

and rr;s;oreatiqn~ a:r!:Ja loc;i.ue-d in Bo:p.n~t Couut')I, Stat~ ofldabo, privately ownijd. im.d op~awd by
Defendants Ed W. Cook; Md U!urle Cook. Plaintiff was ivjured on or ~bout June is, :2015, while

~taying at th.e Bloom J:Jike ~mpivourw.

1.5

QEf'Rt'WAtf!....ML~L .J~~SE QiilSHQ.LM; At all ti.mCIS m•"iaJ he~.

Pefer~t Mfoh~

Jll~tile

Chhlhohn ~~id~d mBonqer CPWJ.tr, Stat,;>, of Idaho, at the ofl.1'.'etaker's

cabin of fu; Bloom Lflkgi Cronpgi'O ~4, Up~m Ln:ft:i1,nmioii !m!'.l bel.iet at a.11 t:i,m.es nin:retifl.l b.0,"etQ

Deff$n<mnt Chlaht>lm w~ tlie em.plQyoe. :.md/or t\~ft\1 ofD@fondt1nts Eel W. Cook. U\t-ltie Cool~ ;md
BloQm t,el~@ CwJilpgr~uJl.d, A1.'1,d wiii tht µ!':)$1: ~d c~r(t)tah:.e~· of th~ cronpgro'-!n.d,
1.6

1'hb Cow·t ha!ll Juris4iotjop. attcl vemu~ i$ ~~rop:ri~t~ by virtu~ Qt' ld~b.9 Codi,, §§ 5,.

404 <Uld 5~~14.
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I.I.

2, 1

!JllfNE~~,iIIOM§

Plaintiff :r~alkige$ anq irworporatea l:>y refe.x~nce all other paragraphs of

~

Cor!.lplai..ut as if fif$t forth l~C!ll'eiii.

2.Z

Ou or a.boitt Jmtc 28, 2015, Plaintiff Joseph Stan~zak. and his wrlfriend, Susan

Jaokson. were camping at th~ Bloom Leke C~mpw9unq in B0.on1r. Co1.mty, Idaho, The coupl~ h1:1_d
~t.ay0d at the campground a. ew tim,@~ .t»·,vlo1J$ly that zitr.11.m~t'. 1!le cnmp!W)und an(.! rec,:eAtia~l
area w~re ow1:t.ed and opew.ted by Def0nd~1iJs &t W. C9ok ~d L!Ulti~ CQok,

Z.3

Defendant Mlch~l Jesse ChJsholm.t fh.~ host tmd Qaretaker of the '.8loom Lake

Ca.m.pg?OUJ;ld) visited wlt.11 Plfdo.Af.f aud ISµs&n at their c:M.J:esite and helped th~m set -up camp,

:Oefe:t1,~l;Itl.t Chiaholro w~ ~QCQ,mpam,ed by hfa ifrlfri®d, 8flX~b "Sally'' Jotma. Later in the eve.\li,:i.g,
:t;)efon.dtn\t Chisholn.1 rovited Plair1ti:ffaud Sm,1.u, tri i$tay at the Bloom L~e car-0taker's oabin,
2.4

Whll$ at ~ e~'etaker.' ~ oabin, a..t9:@r Suaan Qa,d ~one tQ bed? ~f,ndant Chisl10lm

became i:n,tox.icated V\,ith alr,iobol and be~M ~wig vvitb Plaintiff. Plaintiff ~c:iid~d te l~av~ tlw

cabin arid return to the campsite. However, as Plaintiff walk'ld away from tp,1 oabin. P0fen.dfmt. in.
bis h)toxiGated sttit~. nxel.i ro'UllQij with a, .4S 9~1iber hmi.4gnn. Two Qf the~e roi,m~ st:ru.Qk P-utlmlff

in th~ upper left arm and upper b~tJ~ with th@ latter bull~ traveling

d0,wi1

and b~c<;nning

pt;1rxri,anently l(,di~ in bis pelvic pone,

i.s.

Followini the shootin~ Plaintiff. was tab~1 to a. local hol',lpital by beUcQpter anQ was

@dmitted a$ au inpatit1nt.
2.6

Loe(:!!} law onf()fQe.ntent sub~equ.eutly found several ti.rearms sto:re~ in the BlQom

Lal<:: Caw.pgroi1nd ~ar~~· s 0a'hm.,
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III.
3.1

~AY~~...f21..AC11.Qt{

PlaiQ1iff realleges a11d incorporates by reference all other :tm:cagraphs of tbfo

Complaio,r. ijS if a~t fm.th herein.

Fi}:.st C~nJ~ ,oj' A_'!R.'!»t ..b.:~k~

.{A.JiJ.<!,.lJm,n~ill!,~-~ilY~ti~~~C,_m.~
Plaintiff realleses ~ i11001porates by rnfoir~nc.~ all otp.er P,flfflgl'aph& of thfo

3.2.1

Co:mplaint {li; if $et forth. h~rm:ri.,

3.2.2 Defendat:1-ts Ed W. Cook., La:urie Cook, and Bloom Lake Cmppgr-OUJ'l.4, as
ovrur:;rs and/or po$.1sessoxs of l~.x1,d 1 J.iad a dut;y to tbeil' il:rvitetl~t ~oci~ guesm, and lice:nse,is,
inc;h,i4ini tlw Pl~iutiff. to insp@ct {md keep the premis~s :r~asi;mab\y safe and WE!l'D ofknowi
dangers.

3.4.3 Dr,,fendfm:ts Ed W. Coqk. Latnie Cook; and B~oom. ~J(~ Catnpground., 11:tld
each r;,f

t).wm.

failed to exerofa~ ordinary and reasonable cru·~ to ke.ep th~ pre1~1is@s

r0a£1ona.µly .\I life frqm au.cl to :wam Plajnti!f PfDe:f¢.ndant (;bisholm' s feasona.bly for~eeable
oondw~.

J.lA De:fo.~ ~ts JE<l. W, Co~k~ L.at;irl~ Cook, a:nq Bloom trike CwnpgrotJml. and

@a9h o-f th~~

1:,re~c~d

tlii~ dufy by f~lllilt to w~ guuJ protect P.laintJf:f i\'00:1 a fir@at'm.

b~mg diseharg?d by I;etbas:laut Cbishohµ wbil@ iu.-w;x:ioo.ted on the Defel,ldan~ 1 prnperty,
3.2..5 A.a a dire~t and pFWrimate l'e!llult of th~ Pefend&ntl.l' aot3 0r Oll'\issfonsi
Plaintiff Wt!.S serioµsl.y injt.tted. Plamtiif ha.'> 1n~t1!':recl. ru1d ~vm Likely

COi}Il!U)C

to inc.ur

damages, These dan.1age.s U'lGl.iide tn,edfoal e.,,;pe:us!;lS, los.t wageii, out..of~poc;ket 0Jtp0ns~$,

au4 oth_er a.pens~s to~ pr9v~d at the time of4~1, all to s~d :rt~xtifs gen1.?ral dmmigea
in an MlOUllt now ~kno'Wll., The&; damage~ fL_irther i;nalude pl,'J.;,S'.ical injury, dimir. i~heo
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ability to fmlction. at home a:od wctrk, disfigurem~ut, anxiety, frustration, conoem., and
general etnotional 11pset ·

S~~t\d C~~WU.~.timu NMJ~@~d-&~nriffll!!
.(A,s _t1> J}efeat:§am1t Ed"':, ~fJ~l&, l,a1pje !;g(J,k,.a1Jd lt~!!l.14!l~e.,&;amp~·o_tQMJ)

3.2.6 Piaintiffreallegea and iucorponrtes by rwfenmce all other pa:ragr~pbs of this
Complaint as if set forth herein.
3.2. 7 Defelidiw.1·s Ed W. Cook;, Laurie Co9k, and Blqom Lake Cl!Jll.pground
breached a common la.w duty qf t'lllij~Ot)J1ble 9lll'~ by foiling to J)l'Qp~ly s'!.lpervise. their

agent/~mpl9yee, Defen~ant Mich~eil J@i,$.e Chisholm., to px-c:vcnt injury tq cainpground
invitees end lioens~es o:q th@ir prop.irty, includini the Plai.p,tiff.
3.2.8

Defendants Ed W. Cook, Lau,rie Cook,, and Bloom Lak1;1 Ctunpgroun,d, a.ud

each Qf th~m, breached the common law duty of reasonabl~ gare by fmUng

to

pr~p~ly

supervise Defendant CWsholm to prev~t him from becoming intm;icated ~d dischargm;

fir~. which could result in injury to canwwound .invitees and lic?ruiees, incfoding th~

Plaintiff.

3..2.9 Defen,~ts Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook, and 13looni Li:!k@ Campgr<:iund, an,.d

each of them, breached the eommo.n law dut, of reasonabl~ oare py failing to protect ftqm

or WE\l'n Pl~tiif of the dfu.1gon, pos~d by Defenc4int Chiiholm becoming intoxicat~d an.d
discharging firearms.

3.2.10 A! a pro~im!;!.te re~ult cfD,rendant~ E(l W. Cook; L~mrie Coo~ and Bloom
Lake Cm.npgrol.!.nd's tir~aclies of duty, e..c."tB, and omfasions

ii.s

d~$oribe:d ab.ov~. Plaiutiff

was injured by multiple .45 Galiber rounds while at the Bloom Lake Cam.wgrotmd.

COM'.PLAil'>IT FOR DAMAOES • s
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3.2.11 D@fendant Micha,1 Je~se Chisho.lm1 while in the cours~ and scope of his
en1ployJ+1~mt itnd agency as host and o~t<1ker of the Bloom La.le@ Cai;npg:round. viobited

statu(:ory ®d oommon law duties by discharging a firearm while intoxicated.
3.~.U As a dir;;:pt and proximate t'esult of the Qe:fenclan:ts' acts or om:il3sioua.

and oth~r t>Jq.'.ii,tmi~s to be fll'OV!i?d (:lt the time of trial. an to allid Plamtiff s geniraj, dami:lies
ill a:n amount now tlD./cnown. Tb~tJ~ dw].1flg@S fll.rthijr include physical hajury, dimloished

3

.z. D PJ~i.rrtlff' r~all~g©& ~ i,nomipo:,;,at~s by r@f'e~.no~ ~11 flth~r pailJ.gf-aph~ qftbis

Com1h1mt as if s,t forth b~~m;
J.Z.14 Defenda.nt lv:ijQhii~1 J~r,(tl ChJshohu wa.e in'liag<m in ultra. .JmzfwclQus

ootivitles, iri91~ hut ~Qt Jmdw.d w;
a.

Mru.otra,i:ofng i loru:tet:I tir~-u on. tbe prtimfoe:;1;

b.

H.an.dU,Hi a loaded fi.ri::arru <>1hile l.nt0~ictttecl, in clos~

pronm.ity
c,

t,, Plaintiff and oihm'Si and

Flrlu& a loaded :.(ire;um wbile iiitoX..ic~ted, reeulti:u~ mPlaiut.if'f

b1m1g faj1Jr~d.

3.;i, lS. PlQintiff diq not JQ10,v 'tha:t Om@l&mt ChlshoJrn h,,d a hfl.nd!P,Ul. thf!t the ~m
WM pointed

in his eerter-"11 dirii:ction. or thtit th~ gun, was load@d. Plemtif!ba~ hfa bae.k tlUmcl
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by a roµnd fil'ed from a flr?arm,
3.2,16 Defendant Chisholm is Jiabl~

tQ

Plaintiff for all ~ e s proxiroa~ly ea_t'ISed.

by ~ch o.f srud activities, regc\,fdless of the degree of ~e or ue~Ugenc~ on the pa~ of the

~ .:i, l 7

As a direct a11ti proxim.ate r~$W.t of th~ De:fol'l.rl~llt' Ii ~ts or oinh,ision&~

J?lei.intiff w.as ~lou~ly mjur!ii4, Plaintiff hwi hwiJrre~ ang will likely contm.1,.te to incu.r
~ s . These d;;i.~g.~s inclyde modioa.1 ~xpeiJS®$ 1 lost wage.s, o~lt,..of--poc~t exp~WiflS,
@4 othet f:'Ipens~3 to be p~·ovcd at the ti:t(le of ~l,

all to s.aid P-lah1tiff s genet~ damages

ir.. i.µi amount now unkno'llv.o.. Those c.mtm:1.g!.ls furthet' in.Glud~ physical hajWY, dim,W84.ed
ability to function at home and w~n·ll;, disi!igux~,m01It, an.~ety. fi:usttatkm., ci;:,ncei'II., !'lnd
general enio1;ional ups"t.

L-,.~.to I!,feng99t Mi®nfll J easp ,Q!!sue!wl
3.4-. l 8 :Pli:tiutU'fi."Cilalleg@S. IUld in(:;orporate~ by referetioc all other par~gt'i4phs ofthia
Complaint a~ if see forth lwr~ln.
$.2.19 At all ti:mes matetjal h~-eto, Piofenc:!a.11t Chhholm had

~~'tam

duties

Jrnposed l.lp.On him by law, wbieh P~fepd~t then ap.q thm·e owed to Pla.4J.tiff, in~lU(iiug the

duties to han?l~ his gi.m in a manmw tna.t was eaf01 tP not hand!~ or di$01J.EIJ:g~ the gun whHe
intoxic-;at~d, aml to pmU:ct pliiu:sona

O'I:),

thi,: ptewis~s from. Ullre~l.ie>J;).able risk of harp.t

Pefend11nt torti9usly. l).egligently, r,1.13,d r~cklessly breached f1eiid d1,1tio.s by:
I..\.

H@s.iling tile ,45 caUber handsun in

~ UD!}fJ.fe lll~er

whll~

intoxicated, result.ing in i..njury to Plaintiff;
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1

"t "

I

1:,.

Mah:i.taini:ng

l,l,

dqerous eondition on the premises, including a

loaded gun;

o.

Failin~ i'Q g:jve wm'lling to Plaintiff of hazards on the preltli~ea; and

d.

ExpoSllli Plaintiff to an unn,asonable risk of harm on the premie1es.

3.2.20 Ail n direct a;nd p,:oxh;nate ~ult of Defendant's tortious., MgligE;nt, end

of trial, al.11;{.) said Plaintiffs generi:tl dti.mager, in an a:mount now u.ruo1ov,,1t1. These c:lamages
fu.iilJ~ inchl~ physieal injur11 din:rillished ability to function at home and wo-:i:~,

disfigurement, m.ID~ty, ft1,1strati<m, coucem, iilnd gel;l(i;tal el'JlotionaJ ups~t,

rv.

mAXlttttll~

mrei.EJFOF~ Pl§Ui.d pray~ fQ jurl~~P.t agairult U,l~ ~te.Pdmrtlii, ~..;I ~oh ~f th\®!, iv.
said

~

t}:it.cee1'.ib.;m $1 O~OOQ.00 U;m will fully tt:ltq f.~ixly Q!lt11pi.me/l!:a him for his injw.'i~B lllld

chunn;1113, m.elu~ij l!ms of past, pr~~Ci?nt. 11nd futur~ m~dica! flxpi.,ns~; lost wa~es rwJ:i !03:s of
~ g o~ity; past, pr@sQnt, and· fh~ pain. au~ .suff~rini; and loss of. t3nJOJIU'"Wnt r;,f life,

1Pi@tb.er. w!t,h aitor.ney's fe~s} oosw tmd iri~re~ and aueh otb.~r reH~f ~s the Co¥rt may ct~~nu

Dated tbiJ3 10th d~y of May, 201(i.

JAMES, VERNON&. WEEKS P.A.
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MICHAEL T. HOWARD, ISB No. 6128
WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS, a
Professional Service Corporation
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-2103
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
mth@winstoncashatt.com
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Attorneys for Defendants Cook

2
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4
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7
8

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

9
10

11

FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMP ANY OF IDAHO,
Case No. CV 2016-0590

12
Plaintiff,

EDGAR AND LAURIE COOK'S ANSWER,
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, AND
COUNTERCLAIM

13
vs.

14
15
16

EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR., and LAURIE
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife, and
JOSEPH STANCZAK,

17

Fee Category:
Fee: $136.00

I. 1.

Defendants.

18
19

1.

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

20

For answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants Edgar and Laurie Cook ("Cooks") admit, deny

21

and allege as follows:

22

1.1

23

Cooks admit those allegations contained in Paragraphs 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22,
25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, and 32 of Plaintiffs Complaint.

24

25
26

1.2

Paragraphs 1 and 6 of Plaintiffs Complaint require no answer from Cooks, and is therefore
denied.

ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
PAGE - I

P~t///4an-~

t& 'tfatt

A "RO=ESSlONAL SE"l\/lCE C.OR.?ORATlON
250 Norli'meet Blvd., &Jrta 206
Coe<ur d' Alene, ,dsho B3814
Phooe: (208) 667-2103
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1

3.6

2
3

As a result of FBMI' s breach, Cooks have and will continue to suffer direct and consequential
damages in an amount greater than $10,000 to be proven at the time of trial.

4.

SECOND COUNTERCLAIM - DECLARATION OF COVERAGE

4.1

A justiciable controversy exists between Cooks and FBMI regarding whether the Policy issued

4

5
to Cooks provides coverage for defense or indemnity of the claims alleged in Stanczak's First

6

Amended Complaint.

7
8

4.2

Cooks seek an Order, declaring coverage for defense and indemnity of the claims by Stanczak.

9
10
11

12

W H E R E F O R E, having fully answered Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendants Cook pray that:

1.

Plaintiff take nothing by its Complaint;

2.

Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and without cost to Cooks;

3.

Judgment be granted in favor of Cooks for all counterclaims against FBMI and damages

13
14
15

be awarded in an amount to be proven at trial, but more than the jurisdictional amount of

16

the magistrate court;

17

3.

18
19

Cooks recover all costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to LC. §12-121, §10-1210, and LC.
§41-1839; and

4.

For such other relief the Court deems just and equitable.

20
21
DATED this 5th day of August, 2016.

22
23
24

LT. HOWARD, ISB No. 6128
MICI
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, a Professional
Service Corporation
Attorneys for Defendants Cook

25
26
ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
PAGE-4
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I hereby certify that I caused a true and
complete copy of the foregoing to be D mailed,
postage prepaid; D hand delivered; ~ sent
via facsimile on August 5, 2016, to:

4
5
6

7

James Martin
Moffatt Thomas
PO Box 829
Boise, ID 83701-0829
Fax: (208) 385-5384

8
9

MICH

10

888932

11

12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23

24
25

26
ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
PAGE- 5
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AT
CLERK,

DISTRICT C©tJRT

Deputy

JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
Wes S. Larsen, ISB #9134
1626 Lincoln Way

Coeur d'Aleu.e, ID 83814
TELEPHONE: (208) 667-0683
FACSlMILE: (208) 664-1684
Attorneys for Joseph Stanczak

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF BONNER

FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
CO:MPANY OF IDAHO,

Case No. CV 2016-0590

Plaintiff.

DEFENDANT STANCZAK'S

vs.

EDGAR WILKINS COOK, .TR. and LAURIE
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife; and
JOSEPH STANCZAK,
Defendants.

ANSWER TO AMENDED
COMPLAINT FOR

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Fee Categories: I(l )(b)
Fees: $0.00

Defendant Joseph Stanczak, as and for an Answer to Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Company of Idaho's Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, pleads and al.leges

as follows:

FIRST DEFENSE
Plaintiff Farm Bureau's Amended Complaint, and each and every allegation contained
therein., fails to state a claim against Defendant Stanczak upon which relief can be gr.anted.

Defendant Stanczak's Answer To Amended Complaint fQr Declaratory Judgment - I
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SECOND DEFENSE
Defendant Stanczak denies each and every allegation contained in Plaintiff Fann Bureau's
Amended Complaint, unless expressly and specifically hereinafter admitted.
1.

Defendant Stanc7..ak admits the allegations asserted in Para~ph 1 of Plaintiff's

Amended Com.plaint.
2.

Defendant Stanczak is without knowledge or information sufficient to fonn a belief

as to the truth of the allegations asserted in Paragraph 2 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, and
accordingly denies the 5arne.
3.

Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 3 of Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint.
4.

Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 4 of Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint.

TIJRTSDICTION AND VENUE
5.

Defendant Stanczak admits the alJegations asserted in Paragraph 5 of Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint.

6.

Defendant Stanczak admits the al.legations asserted in Paragraph 6 of Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint.
7.

Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 7 of Plaintiff's

Am.ended Complaint.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
8.

Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 8 of Plaintiff's

Am.ended Complaint.
Defendant Stanczak's Answer To Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment - 2
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Regarding Paragraph 9 of Plaintiff's Amended Com.plaint, Defendant Stanczak

admits that the Cook Policy bas a number of provisions that are implicated and applicable to this
dispute. However, Defendant Stanczak denies that the Cook Policy has a number of exclusions
that are implicated and applicable to this dispute.
10.

Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs

Amended Complaint.
11.

Regarding the acreage of the Bloom Lake Property, Defendant Stanczak is without

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations asserted in
Paragraph 11 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, and accordingly denies the same. Defendant
Stanczak admits that the Bloom Lake Property includes Bloom Lake and a small cabin.

12.

Regarding the statement in Paragraph 12 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, '"For

the past seventeen years and up until approximately June 28, 2015." Defendant Stanczak is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations asserted, and
accordingly denies the same. Defendant Stanczak admil~ all other allegations in Paragraph 12 of
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
13.

Defendant Stanczak is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief

as to the truth of the allegations asserted in Paragraph J3 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, and
accordingly denies the same.
14.

Defendant Stan.czak is without knowledge or information sufficient to fo~ a belief

as to the truth of the alJegatio:ns asserted in Paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, and
accordingly denies the same.
15.
as

Defendant Stanczak is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief

to the truth of the allegations asserted in Paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, and

Defendant Stanc7.ak's Answer To Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment"' 3

176

03/08

01/09/2017

16:23

PAGE

JVW

12086641684

, ....

accordingly denies the same.
16.

,.1

Defendant Stanczak is without knowledge or information sutlicient to form a belief

as to the truth of the allegations asserted in Paragraph 16 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, and
accordingly denies the same.

17.

Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 17 of Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint.
J8.

Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs

Amended Complaint.
19.

Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs

Amended Com.plaint.
20.

Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 20 of Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint.
21.

Defendant Stanczak adm.its the allegations asserted in Paragraph 21 of Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint.

22.

Defendant Stanc:;r..ak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 22 of Plaintiffs

Amended Complaint.
23.

Defendant Stanczak is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief

as to the truth of the allegations asserted in Paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs Amended CompJaint, and
accordingly denies the same.
24.

Defendant Stanczak is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief

as to the truth of the alJegations asserted in Paragraph 24 of PJain.tiff's Amended Complaint, and
accordingly denies the same.
25.

Regarding Paragraph 25 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Defendant Stanczak

Defendant Stanc7..lil.k's Answer To Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment -- 4
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acknowledges and admits that three letters from Fa.mi Bureau to the Cooks are attached to
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as Exhibits "B", "C", and "D~'. However, Defendant St.ancz.ak is
without knowledge or information sufficient to fonn a belief as to the truth of the allegations
asserted in Paragraph 26 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint regarding whether such letters include
all of Farm Bureau's conclusions regarding its coverage position, and accordingly denies the same.
26.

Regarding Paragraph 26 of Plaintiffs Amended Complai.nt, Defendant Stanczak

admj.ts the allegations asserted regarding a Complaint for Damages (hereinafter "Stanczak's
Original Complaint") he filed in Bonner County on May 12, 2016, although Stanczak's Original
Complaint was subsequently amendec;l on July 7. 2016.

27.

Regarding Paragraph 27 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, Defendant Stanczak

denies the allegation that Stanczak's Original Complaint included a cause of action for "'Negligent,

Reckless, and Tortious Misconduct" against Chisholm, as Sta.nc7.ak.'s Origio.al Complaint instead
in.eluded a da.im for "Negligent, Reckless, and Tortious Con.duct" against Chisholm. Defendant
Stanczak admits all other allegations in Paragraph 27 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
28.

Regarding Paragraph 28 of Plaintiff's Amended Corn.plaint, Defendant Stanczak

denies the allegation. that Stanczak's Original Complaint alleged that "Chisholm left the scene and
was later apprehended by law enforcement." Defendant Stancz.ak admits all other allegatfons in
Paragraph 28 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint regarding Stanczak's Original Complaint.
29.

Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 29 of Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint.

Defendant Stanczak's Answer To Amended CompJaint for Declaratory Judgment- 5
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COUNT 1-DECLARATORY RELIEF
30.

Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 30 of Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint.
31.

Defendant Stanc7.ak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 31 of Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint.
32.

Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 32 of Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint.
33.

Defendant Stanczak denies the allegations asserted in Paragraph 33 of Plainti.:ff's

Amended Complaint.
34.

Defendant Stanczak denies the allegations asserted in Paragraph 34 of Plaintiff's

Amended Com.plaint.
35.

Defendant Stanczak denies the allegations asserted in Paragraph. 35 of Plaintiffs

Am.ended Complaint.

WHEREFORE, Defendant Stanczak prays for judgment as foUows:
1.

For declaratory judgment finding that (a) Plaintiff Farm Bureau owes under a

contract of insurance a duty to defend the Cooks in the Stanczak Lawsuit and a duty to indem11ify
the Cooks for any adverse judgment or settlement that may arise out of the Stanczak Lawsuit and
claims, and (2) there is insurance coverage under the Cook Policy for the claims and damages
asserted by Stanczak against the Cooks arising out of the shooting incident th.at occurred on the
Cook's Bloom Lake Property on or about June 28, 2015;
2.

That Defendant Stanczak be awarded attorney fees and costs incurred in defending

this action, pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 10-1210, 12-120, 1.2-121, 12-123, and 41 ~1839, Rules 54
Defendant Stanczak's Answer To Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment- 6
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and 57 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure) and other applicable law; and

3.

For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

DATED this 10th day of August, 2016.
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

Attorney for Defendant Joseph Stanczak
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
~
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of August 2016, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the folJowing persons in the foUowing manner:
James L. Martin
Tyler J. Anderson
Benjamin C. Ritchie
MOFFATT. THOMAS, BARRETI, ROCK & FIELDS,
CHARTERED
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

__ E-m.aU
Hand Delivery
Facsimile
_ _ Federal Express

=:K

P.O. Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Fax: (208) 385-5384
jb:n@moffatt.com
tya@moffatt.com
bcr@moffatt.com
Attorneys for PlaintiffParm Bureau

t----- - -- - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -;
Michael T. Howard
WINSTON & CASHATT
250 Northwest Blvd., Ste. 206
Coeurd'Alen.e, Idaho 83814
Fax: (208) 765-2121
mth@winstoncashatt.com
Attorney.for Defendants Cook
Stephen F. Smith
Attorney at Law, Chtd.
102 Superior Street
Sandpoint, ID 83 864
Fax: (208) 255-4325
steve@stevesmithlaw.com
Attorney.for Defendants Cook

__ U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid
__ E-mai.l
_ _ Hand Delivery
---2'( Facsimile
_ _ Federal Express

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

- - E-mail

Hand Delivery
Facsimile
_ _ Federal Express

X
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James L. Martin, TSB No. 4226
Tyler J. Anderson, 1Sli No. 6632

B~njamin C. Ritchie, ISB No. 7210
MOFFATT", THOMAS, BARREIT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise. Idaho 83 70 l
Telephone (208) 345-2000

Facsimile (208) 385-5384
jlm@moffatt.com
tya@moffatt.com
bcr@moffatt.com
13900.0252

Attorneys for Defendant Fann Bureau Mutual
Insurance Company of Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

vs.
EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR. and LAURIE
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife, and
JOSEPH STANCZAK.

Case No. CV-2016-0590

·FARM BUREAU MUTUAL
•INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO'S
REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM AND
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Defendants,

FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO'S REPLY
TO COUNTERCLAIM AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1
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EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR. and LAURIE

FRANCES COOK. husband and wife,
Counterclaimants,
VS.

FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAHO,
Counterdefendant,

Count.erdefendant Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company ofTdaho (''Farm
Bureau"), by and through their undersigned counsel ofrecord, and without admitting liability or
damages to CountcrcJahnants Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook (the "Cooks"),
and without assuming the burden of proof as to any issue in this litigation, answer the allegations
of the Cooks' Counterclaim, dated August s,:2016, as follows:
i

FIRST DEFENSE
'

The Cooks' Counterclaim failk to state a cause of action upon which relief can be

.

granted.
i

SECO.lt,lD DEFENSE
Fann Bureau denies each andjevery allegation, paragraph, claim, and theory of
I

the Counterclaim which is not expressly and !specifically admitted herein. .Farm Bureau denies
the allegations based on its belief that the all~gations are incorrect, false, and misconstrue facts,
or based upon the lack of sutlicicnt infonnat~on or knowledge to admit or deny the allegations.

FIRST COUNTERCLAI!M- BREACH OF CONTRACT
1.

Fann Bureau admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 3.1 of the

Cooks' Counterclaim.

FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO'S REPLY
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With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraph 3.2·of the Cooks'

Counterclaim, Farm Bureau admits the Cook~ paid Farm Bureau the premiums for the insurance
policy they obtained from Fann I3ureau. Because the terms or phrase ""all conditions precedent
to coverage" is not defined and can be subject to different interpretations, Farm 8ur~au denies
the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 3.2 of the Cooks' Counterclaim.
3.

Fann Bureau admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 3.3 of the

Cooks' Counterclaim.

4.

Faun Bureau denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 3.4 of the

Cooks' Counterclaim.
5.

Fann Bureau denies the allegations contained in Para.graph 3.5 of the

Cooks' Counterclaim.
6.

Fann Bureau denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 3.6 of the

Cooks' Counterclaim.

SECOND COUNTERCLAIM~ DECLARATION OF COVERAGE
7.

Farm Bureau incorporates and realleges all preceding paragraphs as

though fully set forth herein.
8.

Fann Bureau admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 4.1 of the

Cooks' Counterclaim.
9.

Responding to the alle:gations contained in Paragraph 4.2 of the Cooks'

Counterclaim, Fann Bureau denies that it is required to defend or indemnify the Cooks from the
claims made by Stanczak.
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AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

By raising the following defenses, Famt Bureau makes no admission of any kind
and doe~ not assume any burden of proof or production not othermse properly resting upon it in
this lawsuit. Rather, Farm Bureau merely identifies defenses to preserve them for all proper uses
under applicable law. Farm Bureau has yet to complete discovery in this case, the result of
which may reveal additional defenses to the Counterclaim. As such, Fam1 Bureau reserves the
right to supplement, modify, or delete defen~s after discovery is comp]eted.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The Cooks may have failed to,mitigate their damages, if any, as required by law.
TlllRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The Cooks' counterclaims are:barred, either in whole or in part, by the doctrine of
waiver.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The Cooks' counterclaims are barred~ either in whole or in part, by the doctrine of
estoppel.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
The Cooks' counterclaims are barred, either in whole or in part. by the doctrine of
laches.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The Cooks' counterclaims are barred because there is no coverage for the claims
asserted by Stanczak under the insurance policy jn question.
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SEVF:NTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
.Faun Bureau has or may ha.ve other affirmative defenses which are not known at
this time, but which may be ascertained in the future; .Fann Bureau reserves the right to assert
each and every such other affinnat1ve defense that may be so ascertained.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Fann Bureau prays for judgment:
1.

Dismjssing the Counterclaim against Farm Bureau, with pre,iudice,

without granting any relief against it;
2.

Awarding Farm Bureau its reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred in

defending this action;
3.

For other such relief as the Court deems to be just and equitable under the

circumstances.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Farm Bureau hereby demands a jury trial for the Cooks' counterclaim for Breach
of Contract, pursuant to Rule 38 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

DA TED this 18th day of August, 2016.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

. Martin-Of the Firm
omeys for Defendant Farm Bureau
utuaJ Insurance Company of Jdaho
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of August, 2016, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF
IDAHO'S REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL to be
served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Michael T. Howard

& CASH A TI
250 Northwest Blvd., Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
Attorneys.for Edgar and Laurie
WINTON

(X) U.S. Mail, Postagt> Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Cook
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

Wes S. Larsen
JAMES, VERNON

& WEEKS, P.A.

1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Facsimile: (208) 667-0683
Attorneys jhr .Joseph Stanczak

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail

( ) Facsimile
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James L. Martin, ISB No. 4226
Tyler J. Anderson, ISB No. 6632
Benjamin C. Ritchie, ISB No. 7210
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK
FIELDS, CHARTERED
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101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
jlm@moffatt.com
tya@moffatt.com
bcr@moffatt.com
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I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 28, 2016, Michael Chisholm shot Joseph Stanczak twice with a .45
caliber handgun. The two had an altercation outside of a cabin near a small lake called Bloom
Lake in Bonner County, Idaho. Chisholm shot Stanczak and then fled the scene in his pickup,
and later on foot after he wrecked his pickup. Stanczak survived, but alleges that he suffered
severe injuries and damages arising from the shooting. After the shooting, Chisholm was
arrested and charged with aggravated battery. He pled guilty to this charge before this Court in
January of2016 and this Court sentenced him in March of 2016.
The real property where the shooting occurred is owned by Edgar and Laurie
Cook. At the time of the shooting, the Cooks had a personal insurance policy in place with Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho that gave them coverage for their various
properties, including the Bonner County property, liability insurance, and automobile insurance.
After he was shot, Stanczak made a claim against the Cooks for his injuries and damages and
later filed a civil lawsuit against them in Bonner County for the injuries and damages. The
Cooks tendered the initial claim and then the defense of the lawsuit to Farm Bureau. Chisholm is
not a named insured under the Cooks' Farm Bureau policy.
Coverage under the policy can only be triggered by an "occurrence," which is
defined as an accident that causes unexpected bodily injury. Farm Bureau denied coverage to the
Cooks because, among other things, the shooting was not an occurrence under the Farm Bureau
policy, as it was not an accident. Chisholm pled guilty to the offense of aggravated battery,
which includes elements of intentional conduct. There was no occurrence under the Cooks'
Farm Bureau policy. Farm Bureau further denied coverage based upon several exclusions,
including that the claim cannot arise out of the violation of criminal law, that the claim cannot
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arise out of intentional conduct, and that the claim cannot arise out of the Cooks' business
activities.
In May of 2016, Fmm Bureau filed this action for declaratory judgment seeking a
determination that there is no coverage for Stanczak's injuries and damages under the Cooks'
Farm Bureau policy. The defendants have answered. In this Motion for Summary Judgment,
Farm Bureau demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact on the question of
whether coverage exists under the Farm Bureau policy for the shooting. There is no coverage.
One threshold issue for the Court is whether the shooting was an accident that caused unexpected
bodily injury. It was not, as Chisholm has admitted that his actions constituted aggravated
battery. Based upon the grounds outlined herein, Farm Bureau requests that the Court grant its
Motion for Summary Judgment and declare that there is no coverage under the Farm Bureau
Policy and, thus, Farm Bureau has no duty to defend or indemnify the Cooks for any claims
made by Stanczak.
II.

A.

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS

Bloom Lake Campground and Michael Chisholm.

Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook (the "Cooks") are the owners
ofreal property located in Bonner County, Idaho. The property consists of 200 acres, a
campground, a lake called Bloom Lake, and a small cabin (the "Bloom Lake Property"). The
Cooks have owned the Bloom Lake Property since 1950. Amended Complaint for Declaratory
Judgment ("Am. Cplt.") ,r,r 10, 11; Edgar and Laurie Cook's Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and
Counterclaim ("Cooks' Answer") ,r 1.1.
The Cooks have never charged a fee for individuals to use the campground and
lake, but they do solicit voluntary financial donations from users which can be left in a donation

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
c1ient:421s907_3
COMPANY OF IDAHO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-2

196

box located at the campground. Up until the late 1990s, the Cooks would allow logging on the
Bloom Lake Property and then they would use the funds to pay for maintenance of the Bloom
Lake Property. In the late 1990s, Michael Jesse Chisholm ("Chisholm") contacted the Cooks
and asked ifhe could stay in the cabin and maintain the Bloom Lake Property. The Cooks
agreed and Chisholm began caring for the Bloom Lake Property. See Edgar Cook's Recorded
Statement attached as Ex. A to the accompanying Declaration of Steven Johnson ..
Chisholm has cared for the Bloom Lake Property since that time. His
responsibilities include keeping the weeds down, taking out the trash accumulated by campers,
and maintaining the road. The Cooks provided some equipment to Chisholm in order to
maintain the real property, including a weed eater, snowmobile, and diesel generator. The Cooks
never paid Chisholm for his work at the Bloom Lake Property. They did not consider him their
employee. They did not control or instruct him on his job responsibilities. There are no public
utilities for the cabin and Chisholm paid for any gas, propane, or other supplies used for heating
or maintenance of the cabin and campground areas. Declaration of Steven Johnson ,r 9, Ex. A.
B.

The Cooks' Insurance Policy.

The Cooks have a Country Squire fann insurance policy with Farm Bureau that
insures, among other things, the Bloom Lake Property (the "Policy"). 1 The Policy has three
separate coverage sections: Section I (Property), Section II (Liability), and Section III
(Automobile). The Policy Declarations list only the individuals Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and
Laurie Frances Cook as the "Insureds." Because this is a personal policy, there is no business or

1

The Policy and Declarations are attached to Farm Bureau's Amended Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment, ,r 8, Ex. A. The Cooks and Stanczak both admit that the Policy attached
to the Amended Complaint is a true and correct copy in their respective answers.
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other entity insured by this Policy. The Policy Declarations also note that the Policy period is
1/26/2015 - 1/26/2016. The Policy Declarations for Section II Liability Coverage include
coverage for Bodily Injury Liability (coverage Fl) and for Premises Medical Coverage (coverage
F2). The Policy Declarations also note that premises under Section II includes "Location 03,"
one residence and 200 acres, which is the Bloom Lake Property, including the cabin. 2 Finally,
the Policy Declarations state that Section II coverage is subject to four endorsements, including:
Endorsement I220 (Combined Single Coverage Limits), Endorsement I269 (Limited Employer's
Liability Endorsement), Endorsement I282 (Personal Injury Endorsement), and
Endorsement I287 (Limited Pollution Coverage Endorsement).
The Policy contains a number of relevant definitions, including the following:

Business means a full-time or part-time trade, profession,
occupation, or activity, engaged in for compensation, other than
farming or custom farming ....

Farming means the production of fruit, nuts, or field crops, or the
raising or keeping of livestock, fish, or bees, or the raising of mink,
fox, or similar small mammals for fur production ....
Insured means you or the entity named in the Declarations. The
following are also insureds:
1. If you are a person, insured also means, if residents of your
household, your spouse, your relatives, and minors in the care of
you or your relatives ....

Insured location means:
2

The Policy also provides coverage for the property where the Cooks have their
personal residence, along with a mobile home and a 135 acre farm in Sandpoint, Idaho (location
2 in the Policy) and another separate residence and 7 acres in Sandpoint (location 4 in the
Policy).
•
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1. A location listed in the Declarations where you maintain a form
or residence, including private approaches;

Insured location does not include property where a business is
conducted.

Occurrence means an accident, including continuous or repeated
exposure to the same harmful conditions, which results in
unexpected bodily injury or property damage during the policy
period. All bodily injury and property damage resulting from a
common cause will be considered the result of one occurrence.

Relative means a person related to you by blood, marriage, or
adoption, who is a resident of your household, including a ward or
foster child. This definition applies only if you are a person.
Residence employees means someone employed by you who
performs duties in connection with the maintenance or use of the
residence premises. This includes a person who performs duties
for you elsewhere of a similar nature not in connection with your
business or farming.
Residence premises means, if shown in the Declaration: (a) a
dwelling that is your principal residence, including its grounds and
private garages, or (b) that part of any other building where you
reside. A residence premises does not include any part of a
building used for business.
Section II Liability Coverage contains two relevant coverages, Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) and
F2 (Premises Medical Coverage). Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) provides the following coverage:
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for
damages because of bodily injury or property damage, caused by
an occurrence to which this coverage applies, we will:
1. Pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the
insured is legally liable (damages includes any awarded
prejudgment interest); and
2. Provide a defense at our expenses by counsel of our choice ....
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The Policy provides coverage under Coverage F2 (Premises Medical Coverage) as follows:
Subject to the limit ofliability, we will pay reasonable and
necessary medical and funeral expenses resulting from bodily
injury caused by an occurrence as described below. This
coverage does not apply to you or residents of your household
other than residence employees. This coverage applies only:
1. To a person on the insured location with the pe1mission of any
insured ....
Both of the above-described coverages are subject to several exclusions, including
the following :
The following exclusions apply to all coverages under Section II
. . . . Section II does not cover bodily injury or property
damage:
1. Arising from any insured's business activities or any
professional service;

3. Which is intentionally caused by any insured. This exclusion
does not apply to the use of reasonable force by an insured to
protect a person or property.

14. Arising out of a violation of a criminal law . .. if committed
by any insured.
Two relevant Policy endorsements state the following:
I269 (0108) Limited Employers Liability Endorsement. Coverages
F-1 and F-2 are extended to apply to bodily injury caused by an
occurrence and sustained by a person performing labor for you in
your farming operation ... .
I282 (1014) Personal Injury Endorsement. Under Coverage F-1,
we cover personal injury. Personal Injury means injury other than
bodily injury arising out of one or more of the following offenses:
1. False arrest, detention or imprisonment, or malicious
prosecution;
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2. Libel, slander, or defamation of character; or
3. Invasion of privacy, wrongful eviction, or wrongful entry.
(Bold emphasis in original.)
C.

The Shooting.

On June 28, 2015, Joseph Stanczak ("Stanczak") and his girlfriend Susan Jackson
were camping at the Bloom Lake Property. Chisholm invited Stanczak and his girlfriend into the
cabin located on the Bloom Lake Property. A dispute arose between Chisholm and Stanczak.
Chisholm had a .45 caliber handgun and shot Stanczak twice, injuring him. Chisholm then left
the scene, but was later apprehended by local authorities. Am. Cplt.

,r,r 18-20; Cooks' Answer

,r,r 1.1, 1.5; Defendant Stanczak's Answer to Amended Complaint for Declaratory Damages
("Stanczak's Answer")
D.

,r,r 18-20.

Chisholm's Arrest, Plea Agreement and Sentence in the Criminal Case.

Chisholm was arrested on June 28, 2015, and was charged with two counts:
Count !--Aggravated Battery pursuant to Idaho Code section 18-907; and Count II -Enhancement - Use of a Deadly Weapon in Commission of a Felony. Declaration of
Benjamin C. Ritchie ("Ritchie Deel.") ,r 2, Ex. A (hereinafter referred to as the "Chisholm
Criminal Case"). Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-907, aggravated battery is:
Aggravated battery defined. (1) A person commits aggravated
battery who, in committing battery: (a) Causes great bodily harm,
permanent disability or permanent disfigurement; or (b) Uses a
deadly weapon or instrument .. ..
Battery is defined as follows:
Battery defined. A battery is any: (a) Willful and unlawful use of
force or violence upon the person of another; or (b) Actual,
intentional and unlawful touching or striking of another person
against the will of the other; or (c) Unlawfully and intentionally
causing bodily harm to an individual.
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IDAHO CODE§ 18-903. Idaho Code section 19-2520 allows for an extended sentence when
battery is committed with the use of a firearm.
Chisholm entered and executed an Acknowledgment of Alford Plea in the
Chisholm Criminal Case on January 5, 2016, which this Court ultimately accepted, which stated,
in part:
1.
I understand that a defendant may plead guilty to a felony
charge, even though he/she claims to be innocent of the charge, or
does not admit to all of the elements of such charge. This is
known as a North Carolina v. Alford guilty plea.

2.
In order for the court to accept a guilty plea, pursuant to the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), I understand that the Court must make
the following findings:
That there exists a strong factual basis to support the guilty
plea;
That the defendant's guilty plea is voluntarily, knowingly
and understandingly made;

3.
When the Court accepts a guilty plea, pursuant to North
Carolina v. Alford, a defendant must understand that the Court will
treat the defendant as though he/she were in fact guilty of all the
elements of such felony offense. The Court willnot accept a guilty
plea, pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, unless the court record
reflects that the guilty plea was voluntary, and was also an
intelligent choice among the alternatives available to the
defendant.
Ritchie Deel.

,r 3, Ex. B.

Chisholm also executed a Guilty Plea Advisory Form that informed

him of his constitutional rights. Ritchie Deel.

,r 4, Ex. C.

At the hearing on the plea, Chisholm

acknowledged that he understood the plea offer from the State of Idaho and that he was giving
up his rights to contest the charges. Ritchie Deel. ,r 5, Declaration of Barbara E. Mayne ,r 4,
Ex.A.
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A sentencing hearing was held on March 8, 2016, as a result of Chisholm's guilty
plea in the Chisholm Criminal Case. Ritchie Deel.

,r 5, Declaration of Barbara E. Mayne ,r 5,

Ex. B. The Court, in sentencing Chisholm to two years fixed and eight years indeterminate,
made the following comments:
And really, I don't know that the word is a Jekyll and Hyde, but
it's - Mr. Chisholm, in some ways you are two different people. I
note that everyone that came into this courtroom is in support of
you. And you, since you've lived in this county, you have given a
lot to the community . . . . It is concerning to the Court that you,
though, that people have to realize too, though, that your whole life
was built on a lie. You are not 66. You were born in 1952. You
used a number of different aliases . . . . But you have two children.
One that you abandoned as an infant and never paid, from the
Court. And the child has no relationship with you. Never
supported that child. Your son thought you were dead and just
recently discovered after 30 years that his father was actually alive.
You didn't support either of your children. Three marriages. You
were declared dead by your family. So those are the kinds of
things I'm trying to balance. It is hard for the Court to understand.
But you did come here and make a better life. And start giving
back to the community. It is concerning that I've read letters about
your great military service and PTSD and - because none of that is
true. You have to, you know, you kind of built this fantasy life
that you have. That you were a Vietnam vet and you're not a
Vietnam vet. I get the person is a member of the military service.
I take very seriously somebody claiming that they were when
they're not. Those kinds of things.
So then, that, the problem is you don't tell the truth. So like it is
hard for me to give much truth to what vou say happe11ed that
night. . . . You were all drinki11g. . . . But the victim didn't have
a g1111. And you shot him hvice and the shot, the wound is·to the
back. Let's be clear about that. It's not to the front. And then,
as Mr. Taylor said, if you are in an altercation and are fearful and
you shoot someone, you don't hop in your pickup truck with two
loaded weapons and take off. Wreck your truck. Go two miles out
in the woods, hide, and when the police were looking for you. I'm
glad there was a dog. Because from their perspective in reading
the reports, you, they thought you were in a shooting stance. You
had the weapons next to you, fully loaded. There was a bullet in
the firing position. And that, and you, the drug, the dog attacked
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you. But I'm afraid you could have shot an officer or an officer
could have shot you. That's not what we're, what I'm judging.
But that's what the facts show the Court. So, all this is very
concerning.
And that's what I'm trying to balance. And this case, tlzis Court
cannot sav that it is all right to shoot a person and to flee and to
be tracked by the police and that you get probation. That doesn't
deter you or anyone else from shooting a person. That - you have
to take responsibility. Mr., for all you know Stanczak was dead.
Because you shot him and ra11. And luckily medical got there and
he did not die. Or you would be charged with murder. So there
have to be consequences. And that's what this Court has to
balance. That's my job.
Id (emphasis added).

The Court entered a formal felony Judgment on March 8, 2016, in the Chisholm
Criminal Case, confirming its finding that Chisholm was guilty of Felony Aggravated Battery.
Ritchie Deel.

,r 6, Ex. D.

Chisholm was sentenced to incarceration. No appeal was filed and his

conviction remains intact.
E.

The Insurance Claim and Farm Bureau's Response.

In July of 2016, Stanczak obtained counsel to assert a claim against Chisholm and
the Cooks and Farm Bureau for injuries and damages arising out of the lawsuit. On February 1,
2016, Stanczak, through his counsel, made a demand on Farm Bureau for damages for Stanczak
under the Policy arising out of the June 28, 2015, shooting. Ritchie Deel.

,r 7, Ex. E.

On

March 2, 2016, Farm Bureau sent a letter to the Cooks denying coverage for the claim made by
Stanczak. Am. Cplt.

,r 25, Ex. B; Cooks' Answer ,r 1.1.

Farm Bureau analyzed the potential

coverage under Section II Liability Coverage, including Bodily Injury Liability (Coverage Fl)
and Premises Medical Coverage (coverage F2) of the Policy. Farm Bureau made the following
conclusions:
•

Neither Chisholm nor Stanczak were insureds under the Policy;
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•

No occurrence occurred under the Policy;

•

Even if Chisholm was an insured under the Policy and an occurrence
occurred, the business pursuit, intentional acts, and criminal acts
exceptions to coverage preclude coverage for Stanczak's injuries; and

•

No other provision in the Policy afforded coverage for Stanczak's injuries.

Farm Bureau noted that the claim was still under investigation, but that it was reserving its rights
under the Policy to deny coverage ~nd that Farm Bureau would welcome any additional
information from the Cooks about the claim. Id. No further information was forthcoming. In
fact, at no time prior to the filing of this declaratory judgment action have the Cooks challenged
Farm Bureau's denial of this claim.
On March 22, 2016, Farm Bureau sent another letter to the Cooks stating that
Farm Bureau had completed its investigation and advised the Cooks that it was denying the
claim relating to the Chisholm shooting on the grounds set forth in its March 2, 2016, letter. Am.
Cplt.

,r 25, Ex. C; Cooks' Answer ,r 1.1.
F.

The Stanczak Lawsuit and Farm Bureau's Response.
On May 12, 2016, Stanczak filed a complaint against Chisholm and the Cooks for

injuries and damages arising from the June 28, 2015, shooting (the "Stanczak Complaint" or the
"Stanczak Tort Action"). Stanczak alleges premises liability against the Cooks, negligent
supervision against the Cooks, strict liability against Chisholm, and negligent, reckless, and
tortious conduct against Chisholm. Throughout the Stanczak Complaint, Stanczak alleges that
Chisholm was the employee and/or agent of the Cooks. Am. Cplt.

,r 1.1.

,r 26, Ex. E; Cooks' Answer

The Cooks tendered the defense of this lawsuit to Farm Bureau.
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On June 2, 2016, Farm Bureau sent additional correspondence to the Cooks
addressing whether there might be coverage for the allegations contained in the Stanczak
Complaint. Am. Cplt.

,r 25, Ex. D; Cooks' Answer ,r 1.1.

Once again, Farm Bureau found no

coverage for the allegations contained in the Stanczak Complaint, citing to the same grounds as
noted in its prior denials.
On June 7, 2016, Stanczak filed an Amended Complaint against Chisholm and the
Cooks (the "Amended Stanczak Complaint") in the Stanczak Tort Action. Ritchie Deel.

,r 8,

Ex. F. The Amended Stanczak Complaint deleted references that the Cooks operated the Bloom
Lake Property as a for-profit enterprise. The Amended Stanczak Complaint also modifies its
references to Chisholm, calling Chisholm just an agent of the Cooks and not an "agent and/or
employee." The Cooks also tendered the defense of this lawsuit to Farm Bureau. On August 22,
2016, Farm Bureau sent a letter to the Cooks' counsel denying coverage for the allegations
contained in the Amended Stanczak Complaint. Ritchie Deel.

,r 9, Ex. G.

Farm Bureau stated

that the modified allegations failed to alter the coverage opinion previously given to the Cooks
by Farm Bureau.
Farm Bureau also addressed whether the independent torts of premises liability
and negligent supervision could be considered "occurrences" under the Policy. Farm Bureau
cited to several decisions from the Idaho courts rejecting this argument. Farm Bureau also
reasoned that the nature of the torts of negligent supervision and premises liability is whether the
conduct was foreseeable. Namely, if the conduct and damage were foreseeable, then the
tortfeasor can be held liable for negligent supervision and premises liability, because the
tortfeasor should have prevented the harm. However, an "occurrence" only occurs under the
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Policy if the harm was unexpected. Because Stanczak is alleging that the harm was foreseeable,
there was no occurrence under the Policy.
Chisholm never has made a request to Farm Bureau to defend him in the Stanczak
Tort Action. He has never claimed that he was an employee of the Cooks. He has not tendered
the defense of the Stanczak Tort Action to Farm Bureau with a request that Farm Bureau defend
him. Nor have the Cooks ever claimed that Farm Bureau should be providing Chisholm a
defense to the Stanczak Tort Action.

G.

The Action for Declaratory Judgment.
Farm Bureau originally filed its Complaint for Declaratory Judgment on May 2,

2016 (hereinafter referred to as the "Farm Bureau Dec. Action"). Upon receipt of the Stanczak
Tort Action, Farm Bureau filed an Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment on June 3,
2016, requesting a declaration that there is no coverage for the Cooks' claim and the Stanczak
Complaint. Farm Bureau named Stanczak in the Farm Bureau Dec. Action as a defendant under
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 57(b) and Idaho Code section 10-1211. Given the various
communications directly from Stanczak's counsel, it was clear he was claiming an interest in the
Cook's insurance Policy.
The Cooks filed their answer to the Amended Complaint for Declaratory
Judgment on August 5, 2016, and also asserted Breach of Contract and Declaration of Coverage
counterclaims against Farm Bureau, alleging that the allegations contained in the Amended
Stanczak Complaint create a potential for coverage under the Policy. Stanczak answered the
Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment on August 10, 2016.
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III.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Court is well versed in the legal standard for adjudicating a motion for
summary judgment. "Under Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
judgment is proper if 'the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw."' Silicon Int'/ Ore, LLC v. Monsanto Co., 155
Idaho 538,544,314 P.3d 593,599 (2013) (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)). If a review of the evidence
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then summary judgment should be granted. Smith v.

Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718-19, 918 P.2d 583, 587-88 (1996). "The
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact is on the moving party,"
and the Court should "construe the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion for summary judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Wesco

Autobody v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881,890,243 P.3d 1069, 1078 (2010). Given these standards,
summary judgment is improper "if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw
conflicting inferences from the evidence presented." McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391,394,
64 P .3d 317, 320 (2003). However, a "mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the
facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary
judgment." Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552,556,212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009).

IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

General Principles of Idaho Law Regarding Construction of Insurance
Contracts.
The Idaho courts have set forth certain rules for determining whether a claim is

covered by an insurance policy. An insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the
insured and must be construed the same way as any other contract. See Auto Club Ins. Co., Inc.
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v. Tyrer, 560 F. Supp. 755, 758-59 (D. Idaho 1983), aff'd, 734 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1984); see also
Anderson v. Title Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 875,878,655 P.2d 82, 85 (1982). Like any other contract,

an insurance policy is to be construed as a whole, the court looking to the plain and ordinary
sense of the words used in the policy. See Miller v. Farmers Ins. Co. ofIdaho, 108 Idaho 896,
899, 702 P.2d 1356, 1359 (1985); see also Juker v. Am. Livestock Ins. Co., 102 Idaho 644,645,
637 P.2d 792, 793 (1981); Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505,509,600 P.2d 1387,
1391 (1979). Absent ambiguity, words are to be given their plain, ordinary, and popular
meaning. SeeMeckertv. Transamericalns. Co., 108Idaho597,601, 701 P.2d217,221 (1985),
superseded by statute on other grounds. Where the language of the insurance policy is clear and

unambiguous, there is no occasion for construction thereof and coverage must be determined
according to the plain meaning of the words employed. See Kromrei v. AID Ins. Co. (Mut.), 110
Idaho 549, 553-54, 716 P.2d 1321, 1323-24 (1986).
Where the language of the insurance policy is susceptible to only one meaning,
that meaning will be given effect. See Burgess Farms v. NH Ins. Grp., 108 Idaho 831, 834, 702
P.2d 869, 872 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985). Where a word or phrase in an insurance policy has a
settled legal meaning or interpretation, that meaning will be given effect even though other
interpretations are possible. See Nielsen v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 223,
226,596 P.2d 95, 98 (1979); Mut. ofEnumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4, 8-9, 843 P.2d 154, 15859 (1992). However, not every word and phrase in an insurance contract needs to be defined.
Id. at 8, 843 P.2d at 158.
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B.

There Is No Coverage Under the Policy for the Insurance Claim for the
June28,2015,Shootin~
The Cooks made a claim to Farm Bureau for the allegations made against them by

Stanczak for Stanczak's injuries and damages. Stanczak memorialized his claim against the
Cooks and Farm Bureau in Stanczak's counsel's demand letter of February 1, 2016, which
basically stated that Chisholm shot Stanczak and fled the scene. Stanczak alleged that Chisholm
was either the Cooks' agent or employee. Based upon the information from the Cooks and the
February 1, 2016, demand letter, there is no coverage for Stanczak's claim against the Cooks
under the Policy.

1.

There is no coverage under Section II Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) for
Stanczak's claim against the Cooks.

Section II Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) coverage under the Policy provides
"coverage to an Insured if a claim is made or a suit is brought against the Insured for damages
because of a bodily injury caused by an occurrence." Am. Cplt.

1 8, Ex. A, Policy p. 22

(emphasis in original). There is no coverage under Section II Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) for
Stanczak's claim against the Cooks on, at least, the following grounds:

a.

Stanczak is not an insured under the Policy.

Section II Fl only applies to a claim brought against an Insured under the Policy.
Under the Policy, an Insured is the individual named in the Policy Declarations or "insured also
means, if residents of your household, your spouse, your relatives, and minors in the care of you
or your relatives .. .. " Am. Cplt. 18, Ex. A, Policy p. 2 (emphasis in original). The Policy
Declarations list only the Cooks as Insureds and you would expect that given this a personal farm
policy, not a commercial general liability policy. Am. Cplt. 1 8, Ex. A. There is no business or
other entity listed as an Insured. Chisholm is not a "relative" who might be considered an
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additional insured under the Policy. There is no definition or other provision under the Policy
that would include Chisholm as an Insured. Because he is not an Insured, Chisholm is not
entitled to coverage under the Policy. To the extent the Cooks had a "business" related to the
Bloom Lake Property, no such business is insured under the Policy and no employees of that
business are insured by the Policy.

b.

No occurrence occurred under the Policy.

Even if Chisholm was somehow an Insured under the Policy, no occurrence
occurred under Section II Fl. Again, occurrence is a defined term and is defined as "an accident,
including continuous or repeated exposure to the same harmful conditions, which results in
unexpected bodily injury or property damage during the policy period. All bodily injury and

property damage resulting from a common cause will be considered the result of one
occurrence." Am. Cplt.

,r 8, Ex. A, Policy p. 3 (emphasis in original).

The Idaho Supreme Court

has applied the following definitions for the term accident:
An accident within accident insurance policies is an event
happening without any human agency, or, if happening through
such agency, an event which, under circumstances, is unusual and
not expected by the person to whom it happens. A more
comprehensive term than "negligence," and in its common
signification the word means an unexpected happening without
intention or design.
Black's Law Dictionary 14 (5th ed. 1979).

ac • ci • dent (ak' si dent), n. 1. an undesirable or unfortunate
happening, unintentionally caused and usually resulting in harm,
injury, damage, or loss; casualty; mishap: automobile accidents. 2.
any event that happens unexpectedly, without a deliberate plan or
cause .... Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary 9.

Mut. of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4, 9-10, 843 P.2d 154, 159-60 (1992). The shooting in
question was not an accident because it was not an unexpected happening without intention or
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design. Chisholm intentionally pulled the trigger several times and ended up shooting Stanczak
multiple times. Whether he intended to actually shoot Stanczak is irrelevant given he had
admitted to aggravated battery already and, irrespective, he clearly intended to pull the trigger on
his gun and in doing so, put into play the injuries that the Stanczak ultimately received.
Likewise, the shooting did not cause unexpected bodily injury. The shooting caused bullet
wounds to Stanczak, which is the expected injury when pointing and shooting a gun at another
man.
Courts agree with this interpretation. The Texas Court of Appeals in Texas Farm
Bureau Underwriters v. Graham, 450 S.W.3d 919, 926-28 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014), recently

confirmed the majority view and found no coverage under an insurance policy for a shooting
because it was not an accident, nor did it cause unexpected injuries. In that case, a homeowner
sought reimbursement from his insurance company for legal expenses incurred in defending a
wrongful death action that arose after the homeowner shot and killed a would-be burglar. One of
the issues addressed by the Texas Court of Appeals was whether the shooting could be
considered an "accident" under the policy, thus affording coverage for the legal expenses
incurred. The evidence demonstrated that the homeowner intended on shooting the gun at the
decedent, but there was an allegation in the wrongful death complaint that the shooting occurred
because of negligence or gross negligence. The court refused to find an accident, and held:
A claim does not involve an accident or occurrence when ... direct
allegations purport that the ... circumstances confirm that the
resulting damage was the natural and expected result of the
insured's actions, that is, was highly probable whether the insured
was negligent or not ... The natural result of an act is the result
that ordinarily follows, may be reasonably anticipated, and ought
to be expected. This standard is objective. A person is held to
intend the natural and probable results of his acts even ifhe did not
subjectively intend or anticipate those consequences
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Graham, 450 S.W.3d at 928 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The court found that the type

of injury that occurred was a natural and probable consequence of shooting a loaded gun at
someone. As such, there was no accident affording coverage under the policy. The same
situation occurred here, Chisholm pulled the trigger on a loaded gun in the direction of Stanczak
causing him injuries. Stanczak's injuries are the natural result of those actions.
The California Court of Appeals made a similar finding recently in Bilyeu v. State
Farm General Ins. Co., Case No. B262117 (Cal. Ct. App. September 1, 2016) (available at 2016

WL 4547658). In that case, Bilyeu and Cowgill were next door neighbors. Bilyeu allegedly
threatened Cowgill's dog and daughter, so Cowgill struck or punched Bilyeu in the face. He
suffered broken ribs and a traumatic brain injury. Cowgill was arrested and convicted by the
jury of battery with serious bodily injury. Cowgill argued that he acted in self-defense, but the
jury in the criminal case convicted him and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. The court of
appeals in the criminal case found that Bilyeu suffered extensive injuries and that the jury would
have had to suspend belief to find that Cowgill acted in self-defense and that Bilyeu's injuries
were caused by one blow and a fall to the ground. Bilyeu later filed a civil suit against Cowgill
for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and the jury awarded him and his
wife $6.3 million and $1.25 million respectively, rejecting the self-defense affirmative defense.
State Farm refused to indemnify Cowgill, "[r]elying on Cowgill's admission that he 'struck'
Bilyeu and the two juries' rejection of Cowgill' s claim of self-defense and defense of another.
State Farm explained that the Bilyeus' claim was not covered by the policy because it was not an
'accident[al]' 'occurrence' and because it was an excluded, 'intentional' act." Bilyeu, slip op.
at 3. Cowgill then assigned his rights to assert a claim against State Farm to Bilyeu, which it did,
and the lower court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm.
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Bilyeu appealed, asserting a number of issues as to coverage under the policy for
his own injuries. The California Court of Appeals found that Cowgill's conduct was not an
accident. It noted that Cowgill:
[F]rankly admitted that he did precisely what he intended to do: He
struck Bilyeu in the face. This act was intentional. Although
Cowgill asserted that he undertook this intentional act in selfdefense or in defense of his daughter, two juries-the criminal jury
that heard the assault charges against him and the civil jury that
awarded the Bilyeus $6.3 million-specifically and necessarily
found that Cowgill did not reasonably act in self-defense. These
jury findings are binding.

Bilyeu, slip op. at 4. Bilyeu argued that the prior juries' rejection of Cowgill's claim for selfdefense is not binding in this dispute. The court noted that the same issue of self-defense was
litigated and that Bilyeu does not get a third bite at that apple of the self-defense issue. Id., slip
op. at 5. Bilyeu also argued that while Cowgill intended on hitting Bilyeu in the face, Cowgill
did not intent to injure him as greatly as he did. The court rejected this argument, stating
When an insured intends the acts resulting in the injury or damage,
it is not an accident 'merely because the insured did not intend to
cause injury. The insured's subjective intent is irrelevant.' " ...
["the term 'accident' refers to the insured' s conduct, rather than the
unintended consequences of that conduct"]..)

Id. (citations omitted) . The court also found that because no occurrence occurred under the
policy, it was not necessary to address the application of various exclusions, because the claim
never fit into the policy coverages. Id., slip op. at 4.
This case is very similar to the case at hand. Pursuant to the Chisholm Criminal
Case, Chisholm is already deemed to have committed battery, and it should not be re-litigated in
this case. Also, it is irrelevant that Chisholm only fired warning shots and did not intend on
hitting Stanczak. Also it is irrelevant if Chisholm will now say he acted in self-defense. These
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arguments contradict the criminal conviction. In addition, his commission of an intentional act,
the firing of the gun at Stanczak, takes his actions out of coverage under the Policy, regardless as
to whether he intended on injuring Stanczak or not. Also, while Farm Bureau has included
analysis as to the application of various Policy exclusions, the Court need not address those as
Chisholm's firing of the gun takes his actions out of any coverage under the Policy, as no
occurrence occurred. See also Home Owners Ins. Co. v. Chammus, Case No. 299412, slip op. at
2-3 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2011) (available at 2011 WL 4953499) (where shooter intentionally
fired a gun and hit another individual, the shooting created a direct risk of harm and could not be
deemed an accident); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Neal, 304 Ga. App. 267, 268-70 (Ga. Ct. App. 201 O);
Stone v. Ky. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 34 S.W.3d 809, 812-14 (Ky. App. 2000) (shooting was

clearly not an accident, intent to harm inferred from nature of act of pointing and shooting gun at
victim.); Norman v. Ins. Co., 239 S.E.2d 902, 905-06 (Va. 1978); Harris v. Richards, 867 P.2d
325, 327-28 (Kan. 1994) (intent to injure inferred since serious bodily injury was natural
consequence of shooting gun into back of occupied truck); Barton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 527 So. 2d
524, 525-26 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988) (intentional act exclusion barred coverage under policy for
shooting through a door knowing someone was on other side); Allstate v. Peasley, 910 P.2d 483,
484-85 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (criminal act exclusion applied in shooting case as exclusion
meant an act for which a criminal conviction may result).
It is anticipated that the Cooks will argue that Chisholm did not intend on hitting
or injuring Stanczak, rather, that he only fired warning shots. Indeed, at his sentencing hearing,
he said:
I grabbed my gun and I went outside to get between [Stanczak] and
the cab of his truck ... And he came back at me and that's when I
drew my gun and fired a couple of warning shots. I had no idea
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that I even struck Mr. Stanczak. And the alleged shot in the back,
he was grazed once in the arm. And as he was lunging at me, one
went here, traveled down his body and lodged in his pelvis. I did
not intentionally shoot Mr. Stanczak. It was unfortunate. I did fire
the weapon. And I did not shoot him in the back. I shot him
accidentally up top and that's where the bullet traveled.
Declaration of Barbara E. Mayne ~ 5, Ex. B. The Cooks may argue that there are issues of
material fact about Chisholm's state of mind at the time of the shooting. They will likely argue
that an occurrence did occur under the Policy because Chisholm did not have the intent to injury
Stanczak and that actually hitting him was an accident. Even if the Court accepted this as true, it
must still find that no occurrence occurred under the Policy. As shown above, gunshot wounds
are the natural consequence of intentionally pointing a gun at someone and pulling the trigger.
Also, the other circumstances surrounding the shooting do not lead to a conclusion that the shots
were warning shots. Stanczak was shot from behind and Chisholm fled the scene at the shooting.
Even if Chisholm was firing warning shots, no occurrence occurred under the Policy.
In Safeco Insurance Co. v. Butler, 823 P.2d 499 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992), the
insured took several loaded handguns and got into his vehicle in order to pursue some
individuals who blew up his mailbox with firecrackers. The insured pursued the individuals'.
pickup at high speeds through the city. The pickup eventually stopped and the insured exited.
The insured testified that the occupants of the pickup exited and the insured believed that he was
going to be attacked, so he started shooting at the truck in order to break off any confrontation.
One of the bullets hit one of the occupants of the pickup, injuring him. Other witnesses stated
that no one got out of the pickup and that the insured just started shooting. The injured
individual eventually filed suit against the insured, and the insured tendered the defense to his
insurance company. The insurance company denied the claim on the grounds that no occurrence
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occurred because no accident occurred and also denied coverage based upon an intentional act
exclusion. The insurance company eventually filed suit, requesting a declaration that there was
no coverage, and the lower court granted a motion for summary judgment on the coverage issue
in the insurance company's favor. The insured appealed and argued that the insured did not
mean to shoot the victim or cause him injuries and did not foresee that his shots would cause
injuries. The insured argued that the injury must have been caused by an unintentional ricochet.
The Washington Court of Appeals analyzed whether an accident occurred and found that "no
reasonable person could the reach the conclusion that Zenker's injury was unforeseeable."

Safeco, 118 Wn.2d at 401. It held:
On the day of this incident, he intentionally fired his gun at an
occupied, metal truck. Under the facts of this case, no reasonable
person could conclude Butler was unaware of the possibility of
ricochet, or that a ricochet might hit an occupant of the truck.
Therefore, Zenker's injury is not the result of an "accident," and
Safeco has no obligation to provide coverage to the Butlers for that
lllJury.

Id. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's holding.
The same is true in this case. The fact that Stanczak sustained gunshot wounds
from Chisholm firing a loaded gun near him is not an unexpected happening without intention or
design. Chisholm was aware that the firing of the gun could have resulted in injury. The mere
fact that he did not intend to hit Stanczak does not make his pulling the trigger and the
subsequent injuries an "occurrence." See also authority cited supra; Berry v. Mclemore, 795
F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1986) (no occurrence under policy even though shooter only fired warning
shots; intentional act of firing weapon sufficed to find no coverage); Allstate v. Cannon, 44 F.
Supp. 31 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (fact that rifle was discharged intentionally resulting in finding of no
occurrence under the policy and no coverage despite fact shooter meant to only fire warning
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shots); Orr v. Jurick, Case No. 205107 (Mich. Ct. App. June 18, 1999) (available at 1999 WL
33441236) (No occurrence occurred under the policy because plaintiffs injury was the
foreseeable result of the insured' s intentional act of bringing a loaded weapon into a
confrontational, tense atmosphere.).
No occurrence occurred under the Policy because Chisholm plead guilty to the
charge of aggravated battery in the Chisholm Criminal Case, which is an intentional tort. That
conviction is final and cannot be appealed. Again, battery is defined as "[w]illful and unlawful
use of force or violence upon the person of another," "[ a]ctual, intentional and unlawful touching
or striking of another person against the will of the other," or "[u]nlawfully and intentionally
causing bodily harm to an individual." IDAHO CODE§ 18-903. The criminal Judgment
unequivocally states that Chisholm is guilty of criminal battery. Ritchie Deel. ,I 6, Ex. D.
Therefore, Chisholm's actions were intentional and/or willful, so they cannot constitute an
occurrence under the Policy. See Colo. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Snowbarger, 934 P.2d
909, 911 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997) (guilty plea to intentional criminal act precluded coverage under
homeowner's insurance policy; no duty to defend or indemnify; intent cannot be relitigatetl so
as to avoid the intentional act exclusion ofan insurance policy); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.

Groshek, 411 N.W.2d 480,484 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (defendant's guilty plea established the
necessary intent to make the insurance policy's exclusionary clause applicable).
The Cooks may argue that Chisholm did not plead guilty to the offense of
aggravated battery, but rather, he entered into an Alford plea in the Chisholm Criminal Case, so
there is inadequate evidence that he acted intentionally. This argument has no merit. In this
situation, because Chisholm entered a guilty Alford plea, he admitted to violating criminal law.
Chisholm gave up his defenses to the shooting charge by accepting the Alford plea. He and
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others are bound by his admission and abandonment of his defenses. One court has noted the
following:
Under an Alford plea, a defendant maintains innocence while
entering a plea of guilty because the defendant concludes that his
interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the
court contains strong evidence of actual guilt. A guilty plea is an
admission of all the elements of the criminal charge. Guilty pleas
must be rooted in fact before they may be accepted. Accordingly,
courts treat Alford pleas as having the same preclusive effect as a
guilty plea. The collateral consequences of a guilty plea may not
be avoided by the simultaneous assertion of innocence.
Cortese v. Black, 838 F. Supp. 485,492 (D. Colo. 1993). In Harden v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co., 605 S.E.2d 37 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004), defendants named in a lawsuit alleging child

molestation tendered the defense of the claim to their homeowners' insurance company. The
insurance company successfully moved for summary judgment, arguing that there was no
coverage because no occurrence occurred. One of the arguments the insurance company made in
support of its assertion that no occurrence occurred was that the insured entered an Alford plea
on the criminal charge of child molestation. The Georgia Court of Appeals, in affirming the
lower court's decision, held:
Harden' s guilty plea under Alford placed him in the same position
as ifhe had been convicted of child molestation, and "the collateral
consequences flowing from an Afford plea are the same as those
flowing from an ordinary plea of guilt." Accordingly, evidence
that Ronald Harden entered an Alford plea of guilt to child
molestation was sufficient to establish a prima facie case that State
Farm had no duty under the terms of the policy to provide
coverage or a defense to Mr. Harden.
Harden, 605 S.E.2d at 38. See also, Eberle v. Nationwide Mut'l Ins. Co., Case No. 2013-CA-

000898-MR, slip op. at 6-8 (Kty. Ct. App. May 6, 2016) (available at 2016 WL 2609311)
(Insured' s conviction pursuant to Alford plea establishes that the elements necessary to convict
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him were factually satisfied, thus precluding insurance coverage); Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Arzillo, 98 A.D.2d 495, 501-02 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (with Alford-type plea, the issues
representing the essential elements of the crime have necessarily been judicially determined by
the acceptance of the plea); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sallak, 914 P.2d 697, 700 (Or. Ct.
App. 1996) (acceptance of plea is the equivalent of a judicial determination of each of the
material elements of the crime).
In this case, Chisholm admitted to the intentional offense of aggravated battery,
including all of the elements to that offense. No occurrence occurred because Chisholm acted
intentionally. As such, there absolutely can be no coverage under the Policy under Section II Fl
for Stanczak' s claim.
c.

Specific Policy exclusions bar coverage for Stanczak's claim
against the Cooks.

Even if plaintiffs were able to get past this initial coverage question, there are also
specific exclusions contained within the Policy that would still preclude coverage for Stanczak's
claim against the Cooks.
i.

The violation of criminal law exclusion.

Section II Exclusion Number 14 excludes bodily injury that arises out of the
violation of a criminal law. Am. Cplt. 1 8, Ex. A, Policy p. 25. As noted above, Chisholm has
entered an Alford guilty plea for the charge of aggravated battery in the Chisholm Criminal Case.
An Alford plea is a guilty plea. State v. Salisbury, 143 Idaho 476,479, 147 P.3d 108, 111
(2006). A judge has discretion to accept an Alford plea and will do so only where there is
sufficient evidence that the prosecution would likely be able to persuade a jury to find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge in the criminal case accepted Chisholm's
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Alford plea, thus finding that the prosecution would likely be able to convict Chisholm ofthis
crime if it moved forward. Again, because Chisholm entered a guilty Alford plea, he admitted to
violating criminal law. Chisholm gave up his defenses to the shooting charge by entering into
the Alford plea. He and others are bound by his admission and abandonment of his defenses.

See authority outlined, supra and infra.
Chisholm plead guilty in the Chisholm Criminal Case on January 5, 2016.
Stanczak did not send his demand letter to Farm Bureau and the Cooks until February 1, 2016.
By the time Stanczak sent his demand letter to Farm Bureau and the Cooks, there could be no
coverage under the Policy under Exclusion Number 14, as the claim arose out of a violation of
criminal law. So, even if Chisholm was somehow found to be an Insured under the Policy and it
was also found that an occurrence had occurred, this exclusion would preclude coverage.
ii.

The business activities exclusion.

Stanczak argued in his demand letter that the operation of the campground was a
business activity of the Cooks because they invited or licensed campers to come onto the Bloom
Lake Property for a voluntary donation. Stanczak has also submitted that Chisholm was the
Cooks' employee, even though he was not paid a wage or salary, because he was paid to do work
on the Bloom Lake Property by virtue of the fact that the Cooks allowed him to reside in the
cabin on the Bloom Lake Property without paying rent. If Chisholm was somehow the Cooks'
employee or agent (ignoring that he would likely still not be performing duties within the scope
of his employment) given that there was some business related to the operation of Bloom Lake
Property, then Stanczak's claims would still be specifically excluded under Section II Exclusion
Number 1 because the Cooks have no insurance coverage under this Policy arising out of any of
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the insureds' "business activities." This would be the case even if the operation of the
campground at the Bloom Lake Property was only a break-even proposition.
In looking at whether an activity is a business pursuit, the courts will typically
look at: whether the activity is customary to a business pursuit and whether the objective and
purpose of the activity are commercial in nature, and in furtherance of the business, or the means
oflivelihood. Blacks v. Fireman 's Fund Am. Ins., 115 Idaho 449, 453, 767 P.2d 824, 828 Idaho
(Ct. App. 1989). Applying these factors, the Cooks' activity of offering up campground sites in
exchange for a voluntary fee may be considered a business pursuit as its objective may be
deemed to be commercial in nature. It does not appear to matter whether the Cooks made a
profit on this activity for it to be considered a business pursuit, which would then bar any
coverage for that activity under the Policy, even if Chisholm was somehow found to be an
Insured under the Policy and it was also found that an occurrence had occurred.

iii.

The intentional act exclusion.

Similarly, Section II Exclusion Number 3 excludes bodily injury intentionally
caused by an Insured. Thus, even if Chisholm was somehow found to be an Insured under the
Policy-which he is not-his intentional act of shooting Stanczak would be excluded. Again,
Chisholm may say that he did not intentionally cause bodily injury to Stanczak, but that he was
shooting warning shots. The intentional act of shooting a gun near a person is sufficient grounds
to deny coverage under Section II Exclusion Number 3. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herman, 551 N.E.2d
844, 845-46 (Ind. 1990) (Intentionally firing gun into a fleeing crowd is an egregious act and
intent to injure may be inferred as a matter of law).
There is no coverage for Stanczak's claim against the Cooks under Section II Fl
of the Policy.
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2.

There is no coverage under Section II F2 (Premises Medical
Coverage) for Stanczak's claim against the Cooks.

For all the same reasons, there is no coverage for Stanczak's claimed medical
expenses under Section II F2 (Premises Medical Coverage) of the Policy. This section does not
require that the actors be insureds under the Policy. Rather, the Policy gives coverage for
medical costs for those who suffer bodily injury caused by an "occurrence" to those who are on
the insured location with permission of an Insured. Am. Cplt. ,r 8, Ex. A, Policy p. 2. For
purposes of this motion, Farm Bureau will assume that Stanczak was on the insured location with
permission and that he was camping at the campground on the Bloom Lake Property.
However, there was still no occurrence as that term is defined in the Policy. As
outlined above, shooting someone is not an accident and does not caused unexpected injuries.
Without an occurrence causing bodily injury, there is no coverage under Section II F2 (Premises
Medical Coverage) of the Policy for Mr. Stanczak's claimed medical expenses.
In addition, even if there was an argument that there was an occurrence under the
Policy and Chisholm was deemed to be an Insured under the Policy, the same exclusions,
specifically Ereclusion Nos. !(business activities), 3 (intentional acts) and 14 (violation of
criminal law), identified and discussed above, would preclude coverage for any medical
expenses claimed by Stanczak arising out of the shooting.
As such, there is no coverage for any claimed medical expenses of Stanczak under
Section II F2 (Premises Medical Coverage) of the Policy.
C.

There Is No Coverage Under the Policy for the Stanczak Complaint or the
Amended Stanczak Complaint.
Farm Bureau also seeks a ruling that there is no coverage or duty to defend the

Cooks relating to the Stanczak Complaint and the Amended Stanczak Complaint. As a general
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rnle, an insurer must defend a suit against the insured where the complaint alleges facts which, if
trne, would bring the case within the policy coverage. Pendle bury v. W Cas. & Sur. Co., 89
Idaho 456,464,406 P.2d 129, 134 (1965). The duty to defend exists so long as there is a
genuine dispute over facts bearing on coverage under the policy or over the application of the
policy's language to the facts. Constr. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Assurance Co. ofAm., 135 Idaho 680,
682-83, 23 P.3d 142, 144-45 (2001). Farm Bureau asserts that there is no genuine dispute over
facts bearing on coverage. 3
1.

There is no coverage under the Policy for the Stanczak Complaint or
the Amended Stanczak Complaint because they were filed after
Chisholm's guilty plea.

The timing of the filing of the Stanczak Complaint and the Amended Stanczak
Complaint preclude coverage under the Policy. Again, Farm Bureau reminds the Court of the
following relevant events:
•

6/28/2015: The shooting and Chisolm's arrest.

•

6/29/2015: Criminal charges are filed against Chisholm in the Chisholm
Criminal Case.

3

Though not part of the Court's consideration here, Farm Bureau is of the opinion that it
will be difficult for Stanczak factually and legally to prove his claims for negligent supervision
and premises liability against the Cooks. On the negligent supervision claim, there does not
appear to be any evidence that the Cooks knew or should have known that Chisholm had violent
tendencies. Edgar Cook called Chisholm "perfect" and said he would hire Chisholm again in his
statements. There does not appear to be any event at the Bloom Lake Property involving
Chisholm that would put the Cooks on notice that Chisholm would shoot someone. On the claim
for premises liability, there also does not seem to be any evidence that the Cooks created a
foreseeable risk of harm in allowing Chisholm to be present at the Bloom Lake Property. In
addition, Chisholm's presence at the Bloom Lake Property does not constitute a "dangerous
condition" on land sufficient as a matter of law to implicate the Cooks under a theory of
premises liability. The duty implicated by Stanczak's allegations concerns the control of
Chisholm's conduct, not the physical condition of the premises or activities conducted thereon.
See Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. Simon, 662 N.W.2d 373, slip op. at 4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003).
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•

1/5/2016: Chisholm enters a guilty plea in the Chisholm Criminal Case.

•

3/8/2016: This Court in the Chisholm Criminal Case accepts the guilty
plea and sentences Chisholm. Chisholm has not appealed the sentencing
in the Chisholm Criminal Case.

•

5/2/2016: Farm Bureau files the Farm Bureau Dec. Action.

•

5/12/2016: Stanczak files the Stanczak Tort Action against the Cooks and
Chisholm.

•

6/3/2016: Farm Bureau files an amended complaint in the Farm Bureau
Dec. Action reflecting that the Stanczak Tort Action has been filed and
tendered to Farm Bureau.

•

6/17/2016: Stanczak files the Amended Stanczak Complaint the Stanczak
Tort Action.

Farm Bureau submits that it is unnecessary to analyze the allegations contained in the Stanczak
Complaint or the Amended Stanczak Complaint because the timing of the plea in the Chisholm
Criminal Case cut off any potential coverage under the Policy. As outlined above, Policy
Exclusion Number 14 precludes coverage for a claim arising out of the violation of criminal law.
In addition, coverage under the Policy requires that there be an occurrence, which is an accident.
The allegations in the Stanczak Tort Action relate to Chisholm's actions in shooting Stanczak,
which constituted violation of criminal law. The criminal law that was violated requires intent.
Therefore, Policy Exclusion Number 14 was implicated on January 5, 2016, the date of the plea.
In addition, the question of whether an occurrence occurred was absolutely determined on
January 5, 2016, when Chisholm admitted to the charge of aggravated battery.
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Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dahms, Case No. 1-14-1392 (Ill. Ct. App.
May 19, 2016) (available at 2016 Westlaw 2941713 ), is a somewhat procedurally similar case.
In that case, on October 9, 2012, Enadeghe was a cab driver in Chicago and pulled his cab up to
a crosswalk near Dahms, a pedestrian. Dahms' briefcase allegedly came into contact with the
cab and Enadeghe left his cab to pursue Dahms. A scuffle ensued and Dahms struck Enadeghe
with his briefcase. On October 9, 2012, Enadeghe filed a tort action against Dahms alleging
negligence and battery. Before Enadeghe filed suit, Dahms had informed his insurance
company, Country Mutual, of Enadeghe's claim. Country Mutual denied the claim on
September 5, 2012, because no occurrence occurred and because of the criminal acts exclusion in
Dahms' policy. On December 10, 2012, Country Mutual filed an action for declaratory
judgment that there was no coverage for the October 9, 2012, event. On March 20, 2013, Dahms
was convicted of aggravated battery. On September 25, 2013, Dahms filed a counterclaim for
declaratory judgment against Country Mutual, along with breach of contract and bad faith causes
of action. With respect to the application of the criminal acts exclusion, the Illinois Court of
Appeals held that the criminal acts exclusion unequivocally went into effect at the time of
Dahms' criminal conviction.
Cotmtry Mutual could not automatically assume that Dahms' s
striking of Enadeghe was a criminal act before he was convicted,
because there were less culpable interpretations of what may have
occurred, including negligence or self-defense. But those
competing interpretations became irrelevant after Dahms's
criminal conviction. His conviction for aggravated battery meant
that a jury had found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Dahms had,
in fact, committed a crime ... At that moment, Country Mutual
could not be accused of self-serving, unbridled discretion in
determining that Dahms 's conduct constituted a criminal act;
Country Mutual could point to a jury verdict based on the highest
burden ofproof known to our legal system. At that moment, the
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applicability of the criminal-acts exclusion became clear and free
from doubt.

Country Mut'l Ins. Co.

,r 76 (emphasis added).

The court held that Country Mutual only had a

duty to defend from the time of the filing of the tort case until Dahms' conviction. Id.,

,r 79.

The Court should apply a similar holding in this case. Chisholm entered his
guilty plea on January 5, 2016. By entering his plea, he admitted that a crime had been
committed relating to the shooting of Stanczak in June of 2015. Policy Exclusion Number 14
went immediately into effect, over four months before the filing of the Stanczak Tort Action. At
the same time, Chisholm admitted that he intentionally battered Stanczak, which means an
occurrence did not occur. The Court need not even consider the allegations of the Stanczak
Complaint and Amended Stanczak Complaint because the violation of criminal law exclusion
was already in effect and no occurrence had occurred, excluding any coverage. The Court
should grant Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment.
2.

There is no coverage under the Policy for the allegations contained in
the Stanczak Complaint.

Even if the Court considers the allegations contained in the Stanczak Complaint,
there is no coverage under the Policy. Again, the Stanczak Complaint seeks damages for
Stanczak's injuries when he was shot by Chisholm on June 28, 2015, at the Bloom Lake
Property. Stanczak alleged that the Bloom Lake campground is a "for profit" campground
owned and operated by the Cooks. Stanczak also alleged that Chisholm was the Cooks'
employee and/or agent because he acted as caretaker of the Bloom Lake Property. Am. Cplt.

,r 26, Ex. E; Cooks' Answer ,r 1.1.
The factual allegations in the Stanczak Complaint are similar to those alleged in
previous correspondence from Stanczak's counsel. Stanczak alleges that on June 28, 2015, he
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was camping at the Bloom Lake Property with his girlfriend, Sally Johns. Chisholm invited
Stanczak and Sally Johns into a cabin located at the Bloom Lake Property to stay the night.
Chisholm allegedly became intoxicated and an argument ensued between Chisholm and
Stanczak. Stanczak left the cabin, and as he was walking away from the cabin, Chisholm fired a
.45 caliber handgun at him. Two bullets struck Stanczak, one in the arm and one in the back.
Stanczak sustained serious injuries. Chisholm left the scene and was later apprehended by law
enforcement. Law enforcement found several other firearms at the cabin at the Bloom Lake
Property. Id.
Stanczak alleged four causes of action in his Complaint: (1) Premises Liability
against the Cooks and the Bloom Lake Campground;4 (2) Negligent Supervision of Chisholm
against the Cooks and Bloom Lake Campground4; (3) Strict Liability against Chisholm; and
(4) Negligent, Reckless, and Tortious Misconduct against Chisholm. The Court should find that
there is no coverage for the allegations contained in the Stanczak Complaint.

a.

The Premises Liability Cause of Action against the Cooks.

The first cause of action in the Stanczak Complaint is a premises liability claim
against the Cooks. Stanczak alleges that the Cooks owed a duty to Stanczak as an invitee of the
campground. Stanczak alleges that the Cooks breached this duty when they failed to take
ordinary and reasonable care to keep the premises safe and/or to warn Stanczak about
Chisholm's reasonably foreseeable conduct, namely, Chisholm becoming intoxicated and
discharging a firearm. Stanczak alleges that this breach of duty caused his damages. Stanczak

4

As there is no entity called the Bloom Lake Campground and the Bloom Lake
Campground is not an insured under the Policy, only the allegations against the Cooks will be
analyzed.
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does not state that Chisholm pointed the gun at him and fired. Rather, he alleges that as Stanczak
was walking away, Chisholm fired rounds from his .45 caliber handgun and two of these rounds
struck Stanczak.
The premises liability cause of action against the Cooks does not trigger coverage
under the Policy. As outlined above, while the Cooks are named Insureds under the Policy, no
occurrence occurred to trigger coverage under either Section I Fl or F2 of the Policy. In
addition, as outlined above, the violation of criminal law exclusion was already in effect at the
time of the filing of the Stanczak Complaint. Also, the allegations in the Stanczak Complaint
assert that the Cooks were running a for-profit business at the Bloom Lake Property. As the
shooting, as alleged by Stanczak, arose from the Cooks' alleged "business activities," it is also
not covered per the business activities exclusion contained within the Policy, outlined above.
b.

The Negligent Supervision Claim against the Cooks.

Stanczak alleges that the Cooks had a duty to supervise their agent/employee
Chisholm from injuring guests at the Campground. He alleges that they breached this duty by
failing to prevent Chisholm from becoming intoxicated and discharging a weapon. He alleges
that the Cooks breached the duty by failing to protect Stanczak from or warn Stanczak of the
dangers posed by Chisholm becoming intoxicated and discharging a firearm. Stanczak alleges
that these breaches caused his injuries and damages.
The same grounds as outlined above for denying coverage for the first cause of
action for premises liability exist for denying the second cause of action for negligent
supervision. There was no occurrence, and the cause of action asserted arose from the violation
of a criminal law. In addition, the cause of action relates to business activities that the Cooks are
alleged to have conducted on Bloom Lake Property. In short, the Policy did not provide
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commercial general liability protection or coverage and the benefits bargained for by the Cooks
specifically exclude any coverage from any "business activity" or claim arising out of a
"business activity."

c.

The Strict Liability Claim against Chisholm.

Stanczak alleges that Chisholm was engaged in the ultra-hazardous activities of
maintaining a loaded firearm on the premises, handling a loaded firearm while intoxicated while
in close proximity to Stanczak, and firing a loaded firearm while intoxicated. Stanczak alleges
that he was not aware that Chisholm had a firearm, that it was pointed in his general direction, or
that the firearm was loaded. The same grounds as outlined above require denial of coverage for
this cause of action. Chisholm is not a named insured under the Policy. The Cooks did not have
a commercial general liability policy for their farm and properties. They had a personal general
liability policy that insured the Cooks and their relatives. There was no coverage for any
employee or agent of the Cooks. Moreover, the shooting was not an occurrence and, per the
allegations contained in the Stanczak Complaint, it relates to the Cooks' business activities, for
which there is no coverage. In addition, as outlined above, the violation of criminal law
exclusion was already in effect at the time of the filing of the Stanczak Complaint.

d.

The Negligence, Reckless, and Tortious Conduct Claims
against Chisholm.

Stanczak alleges that Chisholm owed a duty to him of reasonable care to handle
the firearm in a safe manner, not to handle or discharge the firearm while intoxicated, and to
protect those around Chisholm from an unreasonable risk of harm. Stanczak alleges that
Chisholm breached these duties by handling the firearm in an unsafe manner while intoxicated,
maintaining a dangerous condition on the premises by having a loaded gun, failing to give
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warning to Stanczak of the hazard on the premises, and exposing him to an unreasonable risk of
harm on the premises. Again, the same grounds as outlined above required denial of coverage
for this cause of action. Chisholm is not a named insured under the Policy. The shooting was
not an occurrence and, per the allegations contained in the Stanczak Complaint, it relates to the
Cooks' business activities and there is no coverage for the same. In addition, as outlined above,
the violation of criminal law exclusion was already in effect at the time of the filing of the
Stanczak Complaint.

3.

There is no coverage under the Policy for the allegations contained in
the Amended Stanczak Complaint.

Consideration of the allegations contained in the Amended Stanczak Complaint
does not lead to coverage under the Policy. As outlined above, in the Amended Stanczak
Complaint Stanczak deleted references to the fact that the Cooks "operated" the Bloom Lake
Campground as "a private for profit business." It also appears that Stanczak deleted the
reference that Chisholm was an employee of the Cooks, but still left in the reference to him being
the Cooks' agent. In paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 in the Stanczak Complaint, he alleges that the
Cooks "owned and operated" the Bloom Lake Campground and that it was a "private for

profit business." The Amended Stanczak Complaint states that the Cooks owned the
campground and Stanczak deleted the reference that it was a "private for profit" business.
In paragraph 1.4, the Stanczak Complaint read that the Cooks owned and

operated the campground, where the Amended Stanczak Complaint states simply that the Cooks
owned the Bloom Lake Campground. Stanczak also previously alleged in the Stanczak
Complaint that Bloom Lake Campground is a "for profit" campground and privately owned by
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the Cooks. In paragraph 1.4 of the Amended Stanczak Complaint, Stanczak deleted the adjective
"for profit" in front of his references to "campground."

For Stanczak's causes of action against the Cooks, Stanczak in his negligent
supervision claim, paragraph 3 .2. 7, instead of alleging that the Cooks failed to supervise their
"agent/employee," he alleges in the Amended Stanczak Complaint that the Cooks failed to

supervise their "agent" and deleted references to "employee." Stanczak made similar changes to
paragraph 3.2.11 of the Amended Stanczak Complaint. He alleges that Chisholm was acting
"while in the course and scope of his agency" as host and caretaker instead of alleging that
Chisholm was acting "while in the course and scope of his employment and agency."
(Emphasis added.)
The allegations contained in the Amended Stanczak Complaint do not bring the
case within the coverage under the Policy. The focus of the amended allegations seems to be on
whether Chisholm was the Cooks' agent instead of employee and whether the Cooks were
operating the campground as a for-profit enterprise. As outlined above, the main thrust of Frum
Bureau's denial is that the claim arises out of the violation of a criminal law and intentional act
and no occurrence occurred. The allegations in the Amended Stanczak Complaint do not change
the conclusion of no coverage under the Policy.
Farm Bureau also submits that the business activities exclusion also precludes
coverage of the allegations contained in the Amended Stanczak Complaint. Whether or not the
Cooks were actually "operating" the campground "for profit" is not the key basis for the denial
of coverage. Farm Bureau has previously cited to Coverage Section II, Exclusion Number 1,
which precludes coverage arising from the insured's business activities. Even with the new
allegations, Farm Bureau still asserts that the business activities exclusion applies. The Cooks
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are insureds, and this claim relates to their business activities of having a campground on their
property. The Court should find no coverage for the allegations contained in the Amended
Stanczak Complaint.
4.

There is no coverage for the allegations corresponding to the Premises
Liability and Negligent Supervision claims even if the Court considers
them separately from the underlying intentional tort committed by
Chisholm.

The Cooks may argue that the Court must consider the two allegations against the
Cooks found in the Amended Stanczak Complaint, namely premises liability and negligent
supervision, as separate from the underlying intentional tort committed by Chisholm. They may
argue that the allegations that the Cooks failed to keep their premises in a reasonably safe
condition and/or negligently supervised Chisholm are separate occurrences under the Policy and
afford coverage thereunder. This argument has no merit. There still is no coverage afforded
under the Policy on the following two grounds:

First, the Idaho Supreme Court has rejected this argument. While there are cases
from other jurisdictions that look at these torts separately, Idaho has rejected this line of
authority. Under Idaho law, the courts must look at the actions that actually caused the harm.
For example, in Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4,843 P.2d 154
( 1992), an insurance company brought an action for declaratory relief against its insured, Shirley
Wilcox, seeking a ruling that there was no coverage under a homeowners insurance policy for a
lawsuit brought against her and her ex-husband by a number of minor foster children who were
abused in her home by Wilcox's ex-husband. The insurance company argued that there was no
occurrence under the applicable policy. The minor foster children alleged in the underlying case
that Wilcox herself failed to report abuse to law enforcement, failed to report to her ex-husband's
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employer his tendencies to molest, and negligently failed to protect the children. The lower
court found that Wilcox's actions in failing to report her husband's actions or failing to protect
the children from her husband' s tendencies constituted an error in judgment, so it found that
there was an occurrence under the policy.
The Idaho Supreme Court reversed this holding. It applied the following
definitions for the word "accident," which is pm1 of the definition of the term "occurrence":
An accident within accident insurance policies is an event
happening without any human agency, or, if happening through
such agency, an event which, under circumstances, is unusual and
not expected by the person to whom it happens. A more
comprehensive term than "negligence," and in its common
signification the word means an unexpected happening without
intention or design.
Black's Law Dictionary 14 (5th ed. 1979).

ac • ci • dent (ak' si dent), n. l. an undesirable or unfortunate
happening, unintentionally caused and usually resulting in harm,
injury, damage, or loss; casualty; mishap: automobile accidents.
2. any event that happens unexpectedly, without a deliberate plan
or cause ....
Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary 9 (1989).

Mut: of Enumclaw, 123 Idaho at 8-9, 843 P.2d at 158-59. The Court stated that its role was to
look at Wilcox's actions, and not the actions of her ex-husband, because she was the only one
whose actions could be covered under the insurance policy in question. The Court held:
Looking to Wilcox's alleged conduct, we find that it is not an
"occurrence" under the policies because it was not the conduct
which caused injury. The injury suffered by the minors is child
molestation. While the acts or failure to act by Wilcox may have
created or contributed to the environment which permitted her exhusband's conduct, Wilcox did not commit the acts complained of
by the twelve anonymous plaintiffs. Therefore, the Enumclaw
Policy and the Wilcox Policy do not provide coverage for Wilcox.
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Id. The Court found that the event causing the damage in the underlying complaint was her exhusband's abuse, not her alleged negligence for failure to supervise her ex-husband nor the
failure to report the abuse. The Court held there was no occurrence under the policies in
question and that the insurance companies owed no duty to defend its policyholder.
The Idaho Supreme Court came to a similar holding in State Farm v. Doe, 130
Idaho 693, 946 P.2d 1333 (1997). In that case, parents of a minor child brought suit against
insureds who operated an in-home day care. The minor child was allegedly abused by the
insureds' son, who worked at the in-home daycare. The parents of the minor child brought suit
against the insured for a number of causes of action, including the same two claims Stanczak has
asserted against the Cooks-negligent supervision of its agent and premises liability. The
insureds made a claim to their insurance company for coverage of the underlying suit, and the
insurance company, State Farm, filed an action for declaratory relief, arguing that there was no
occurrence under the policy and thus, no coverage. The district court agreed and the insureds
appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that intentional acts caused the damage, and not
any of the other claims, including negligent supervision and premises liability. State Farm, 130
Idaho at 695-96, 946 P.2d at 1335-36. 5

5

Other courts agree with Idaho's treatment of this issue. Allstate Ins. Co v. JJM, 657
N.W. 2d 181 , 183-84 (Mich. Ct. App 2002) (court found no occurrence under an insurance
policy when minor party-goer molested another passed-out party-goer, notwithstanding
allegations of negligent supervision and premises liability, because an intentional act caused the
harm, not an accident); Fire Ins. Exch. v. Cornwell, 90 P.3d 978, 980 (Nevada 2004) (named
insureds' failure to prevent their adult son's sexual seduction of minor neighbor was not an
"accident," and, thus, their allegedly negligent supervision of their son was not a covered
"occurrence" under the Uability coverage of homeowners' insurance policy); Ojjhuas v. Guthrie,
746 N.E.2d 685, 688-89 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (insureds' allegedly negligent supervision of
juvenile and their allegedly negligent entrustment of a gun to him were not "occurrences"
separate and apart from the underlying intentional tort); Allstate v. Hill, Case No. 261543, slip
op. pp. 2-3 (Mich. Ct. App. August 16, 2005) (available at 2005 WL 1959560) (artful pleading
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Idaho law requires the Court to look at the actions that caused the harm in
question, and whether those actions constitute an occurrence. Here, Chisolm shooting Stanczak
was what caused the harm in question and those actions do not constitute an occurrence and,
thus, it is not covered under the Policy.

Second, even if the Comi were to look separately at the allegations of the
Premises Liability and Negligent Supervision causes of action, they would not constitute
occurrences under the Policy. The natures of these causes of action both involve foreseeability,
i.e., what the negligent party knew or should have known. In Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211,
222, 723 P.2d 755, 769 (1986), superseded by statute on other grounds, the court analyzed the
tort of negligent supervision and found that the duty "extends to the protection and safety of
"others" foreseeably endangered." In McDonald v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 109 Idaho 305,308,
707 P.2d 416,419 (1985), the court found that a premises liability claim can arise when the
landowner negligently creates a foreseeable risk of harm. Stanczak alleges in the Stanczak
Amended Complaint that the Cooks "failed to exercise ordinary and reasonable care to keep the
premises reasonably safe from and to warn Plaintiff of Defendant Chisholm's reasonable
foreseeable conduct."
The very nature of these two torts is that the harm was expected because it was
foreseeable, and that the tortfeasor should have prevented the harm. Because Stanczak is

by alleging claims for negligence does not get around requirement that event causing harm must
be an occurrence under an insurance policy).
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alleging that the harm was foreseeable, it was not unexpected, so again, there was no occurrence
under the Cooks' policy. 6
Here, the Stanczak Amended Complaint alleges that the actions of the Cooks
were foreseeable in not reasonably caring for their premises and failing to properly supervise
Chisholm. Because these actions were allegedly foreseeable, they cannot be considered an
occurrence because they were not unexpected. The Court should find that there is no coverage
for the allegations relating to Stanczak's claims of Premises Liability and Negligent Supervision
of Chisholm.
D.

Because There Is No Coverage Under the Policy for Stanczak's Claim, the
Stanczak Complaint or the Amended Stanczak Complaint, the Court Must
Dismiss the Cooks' Counterclaims Against Farm Bureau.

The Cooks have asserted two counterclaims against Farm Bureau, one for Breach
of Contract and one for Declaration of Coverage. As outlined above, there are no issues of
material fact that coverage does not exist for Stanczak's claim, the Stanczak Complaint, or the
Amended Stanczak Complaint. The Cooks allege in their Breach of Contract Counterclaim that
"the allegations made in Stanczak's First Amended Complaint create a potential for coverage

6

In Mountain State Mutual Casualty Co. v. Hauser, 221 P.3d 56 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009), a
restaurant employee was sexually assaulted by her supervisor. She brought suit against her
employer, alleging claims for negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and negligent retention of
the supervisor. The restaurant tendered the defense of the lawsuit to its insurer and the insurer
filed an action for declaratory judgment, asking the court to rule that there was no coverage for
the claims. The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer and the victim,
now standing in the shoes of the bankrupt insured restaurant, appealed. The Colorado Court of
Appeals affirmed, first holding that the event causing the damage, sexual assault, was not an
occurrence under the policy because it was not an accident. The court also found that the
tortfeasor had a history of committing violent crimes and for mistreating and assaulting female
employees. The court found that because the actions of the tortfeasor were foreseeable based
upon prior conduct, it could not "conclude that the negligent hiring and supervision by [the
restaurant] was an 'occurrence' or 'accident' within the meaning of the policy." Hauser, 221
P.3d at 61.
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under the Policy." Under Idaho law, there must be coverage under an insurance policy in order
for an insured to recover on a breach of contract claim. Robinson v. State Farm Mut 'l Auto. Ins.

Co., 137 Idaho 173, 180, 45 P.3d 829, 836 (2002). Without coverage, there can be no breach of
the Policy. The Court should dismiss the Cooks' Breach of Contract Counterclaim. In addition,
implicit in the Court's granting of Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment on its
Declaratory Judgment action should be a dismissal of the Cooks' cause of action for Declaration
of Coverage.
V.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Farm Bureau respectfully requests that the Court grant
its Motion for Summary Judgment and rule that there is no coverage under the Policy for
Stanczak's claim against the Cooks, no coverage under the Policy for the allegations contained in
the Stanczak Complaint, and no coverage under the Policy for the allegations contained in the
Amended Stanczak Complaint. As such, Farm Bureau has no duty to defend or indemnify the
Cooks or Chisholm for the claims asserted by Stanczak.
DATED this 18th day of October, 2016.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

Art r.neys for Defendant Farm Bureau
tual Insurance Company of Idaho
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of October, 2016, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF FARM
BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Michael T. Howard
WINTON & CASHATT
250 Northwest Blvd., Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
Attorneys for Edgar and Laurie Cook

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Wes S. Larsen

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, PA

1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684
Attorneys for Joseph Stanczak
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

0:::

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

0
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR. and LAURIE
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife, and
JOSEPH STANCZAK,

Case No." CV-2016-0590

PLAINTIFF FARM BUREAU MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.
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COMES NOW, the plaintiff, Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company ofldaho,
by and through undersigned counsel of record, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and
hereby submits its Motion for Summary Judgment.
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company ofldaho's Motion for Summary
Judgment is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Company ofldaho's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Declaration of Benjamin C.
Ritchie, the Declaration of Steven Johnson, the Declaration of Barbara E. Mayne and the Court's
record on file.
DATED this 18th day of October, 2016.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK
FIELDS, CHARTERED

&

ttorneys for Defendant Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAHO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served by the
method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Michael T. Howard
WINTON & CASHATT
250 Northwest Blvd., Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
Attorneys for Edgar and Laurie
Cook

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Wes S. Larsen
James, Vernon & Weeks, PA
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684
Attorneys for Joseph Stanczak

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
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EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR. and LAURIE
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife, and
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DECLARATION OF STEVEN
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Defendants.
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1.

I am a Senior Regional Claims Manager with Farm Bureau Mutual

Insurance Company of Idaho ("Farm Bureau").
2.

My job duties included the investigation of claims made to Farm Bureau,

the supervision of claims examiners and adjusters, the maintenance of claims files, and the
payment and processing of approved claims.
3.

I am familiar with the claims investigation process for Farm Bureau. For

each claim made to Farm Bureau, a claims file is prepared and maintained. The claims file
contains all documents relating to the investigation of the claim along with notes prepared by the
claims examiner regarding the investigation and status of the claim. These claims files are
prepared and kept in the ordinary and normal course of business.
4.

Recorded interviews of insureds are regularly conducted by claims

examiners for Farm Bureau when claims are made.
5.

All recordings and transcripts of interviews conducted in the course of

investigating a claim are stored in the corresponding claims file in the ordinary and normal
course of business.
6.

In the summer of 2015, Edgar and Laurie Cook made a claim to Farm

Bureau under their policy relating to a shooting that occurred on their real property. The claim
number for the claim is 01038872012015062801.
7.

As part of the investigation of the claim, a claims adjuster, Brenda

Speakman, who reported to me, conducted a recorded telephone interview of Edgar Cook on
August 5, 2015.
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8.

After the interview was conducted, Farm Bureau prepared a transcript of

the recorded telephone interview on August 6, 2016 as part of its normal business practice.
9.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the transcript

of the recorded telephone interview with Edgar Cook on August 5, 2015. Both the recording and
the transcript of the recording were placed and stored in the claims file for Edgar and Laurie
Cook's insurance claim.
I certify under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the
foregoing is true and correct.
DATED this Jj_ day of October, 2016.
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Insured:
Policy No.

Edgar Cook
01038872012015062801

This is Brenda B Speakman a Farm Bureau Insurance claims representative and I'm conducting a
recorded interview. Today I am speaking with Edgar Cook. The date is August 5, 2015. The time
is 11:06am. And we are speaking with regards to our policy number 01-038872-01. And
regarding a general liability claim for damages a claimed by an individual um who claims to
have been uh shot on uh on some property.
Q
A

Edgar are you aware that I'm recording this interview?
Yes.

Q
A

And do I have your permission?
Of course.

Q

A

Okay alright so I um, I'm pulling up a claim document that we received from.James
Vernon & Weeks and in that it claims a shooting at Bloom Lake on June 28· 2015 and
they are indicating that they represent Joseph Stanczak, S-T-A-N-C-2-A-K who was shot
um, by a Michael Jessie Chisholm, C-H-1-;5-H-O-l-M, on June 28, 2015. So the assertion is
that um, Joseph's oh was shot by Michael. So the purpose of this interview then is to
establish your relationship or lack of relationship um, with these individuals. Alright so
let's first talk about Bloom Lake uh do you have property there?
Yes I own the lake and 200 acres.

Q
A

Okay so you own Bloom Lake?
Correct

Q
A

Okay and then.
My wife and I, my wife and I.

Q
A

Okay and 200 acres around the lake?
Uh about 80 percent of it.

Q
A

Okay alright and do you have structures on the property then?
Yeah we have a cabin and yeah we have a cabin yes.

Q
A

Okay and what's the cabin for? Who used the cabin?
Um, uh whoever we, there (inaudible) is to live in it and take care of the property while
we are not up there.

Q
A

Okay so the property is not close to where you reside?
No.

1
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Q
A

Okay so it's a cabin, so is this cabin then for recreational use for you guys when you guys
are in the area?
Yeah we have done that in the past.

Q
A

Okay alright and so who currently maintains that cabin?
Mike (inaudible)

Q

Okay and what type of relationship do you have with him arrangement, I should say,
arrangement you have with him for him to maintain that cabin?
Well he gets to stay in the cabin and he suppose to maintain and keep the lake up to
specs and there was no paid work. You know he's not on our payroll and so uh he keeps
the place clean and parked out. So it looks nice. And we've had he lake for I don't know
65 years.

A

Q
A

Okay.
And Mike has worked for the Blue Lake has done that work for about 17 years.

Q

Okay and how did that uh arrangement start then so 17 years ago how did that all um
become you know the plan of action of the maintenance of the lake?
Well we needed someone up there because there was so much uh going on at the lake
that was bad.

A

Q
A

Uh huh.
And he was, he was uh go up there and straighten it up and it was a lot going on that we
couldn't control.

Q
A

Okay.
So he, we allowed him to live up there all year round. And and he would take care of the
facility and he has been doing that for 17 years.

Q
A

Okay what are some of the things that he does?
He goes around. He takes trash out um, just (inaudible) sometimes we have 200 people
up there fishing and hiking and enjoying the area.

Q
A

Uh huh.
On the holidays, 18 camp sites. And uh rather beautiful and parked outs. Four outhouse
and uh he keeps the uh weeds down and repairs the road once in a while.

Q
A

Okay so is Bloom Lake then sounds like it has actual, has actual it's a functioning camp
area. Do people pay to camp there?
Only by donation only

Q
A

Okay and do they have to book it or is it first come first serve?
It's first come, first serve.
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Q
A

Okay and where do they normally leave their donation?
We have two donation boxes that are locked and they just drop them in.

Q
A

Do you find that people do donate?
Oh yeah we, we try to collect the uh box every Sunday and it's just enough to pay the
infrastructure cost.

Q
A

Okay alright and have you ever paid anybody to maintain the property?
Never.

Q

A

Okay and how is it that Mike Chisholm became the individual that you um agreed to
have this arrangement?
17 years ago he loved the lake up there. And he said he loved to be up there and keep it
and that was 17 years ago which law now you could stand, stay in the cabin if you do
that because it would be a load off our shoulders.

Q
A

Okay so does he provide for himself in that cabin?
Yes.

Q
A

Okay do you pay the utilities in the cabin, are there utilities or Is it utility free cabin?
It's a utility free and he supplies all the uh gas and propane and all the things he needs
to operate. I don't supply that at all.

Q
A

Okay and do you have.
(inaudible) this cabin.

Q
A

So that property in Bloom lake do you then insure that particular cabin like you would a
home? Do you have insurance on that particular cabin?
Yes you guys are insuring it

Q
A

Okay alright and uh does he have anybody else living there with him?
No he's supposed to be up there by himself but I guess he has friends once in a while.

Q

Okay.
We don't, we don't track that.

A

Q
A
Q

A

Okay so he doesn't have a family
No.
Okay alright and then I understand from our conversation prior to you know starting this
recording that you don't really know that much about the circumstances that happened
that day on June 28th but can you share with me what you do know?
Well I know what the paper says and what other people say.
3
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Q
A

Okay.
(inaudible) went down there quite load and drunk and arguing and fighting went to go
break lt up and I assume this gentleman got mad and turned on him or did something
causing to endanger my, I, I don't know what the circumstances are I just guessing.

Q
A

Okay so does it sound like Joseph was then a camper there? He was camping?
Yeah he was camping in the lower side of the lake.

Q
A

Okay what, do you know if he was camping with family and things like or was it just him
by himself?
I'm not really sure.

Q
A

Okay.
I don't have those details. That would probably be in the police report.

Q
A

Okay have you talked to Michael about this?
No not directly. He's in jail.

Q

Oh I see okay. Alright so what's happening with the cabin right now? Who's taking care
of it or living there?
It's empty.

A

Q
A

I
I'

Okay. Alright so how did you first become aware of this situation was it thru the mail
that you received from James Vernon & Weeks?
Oh yes thru the mail.

Q
A

Okay.
And you know we've already, we've gotten two letters from him that one you have and
one that's in the mail to you know. And it's four pages long.

Q
A

Okay alright have you made any attempts to call Michael or to visit him, Michael
Chisholm?
It's very difficult to do that. No I have not.

Q
A

Okay and you said he's in jail. Do you know where he is in jail?
Bonner County jail.

Q
A

Okay do you know what they are holding him for?
Aggravated.

Q

Specifically.
Aggravated assault I think. I haven't seen anything.

A

4
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Q
A

Okay.
The stuff you read in the papers is you can't believe everything.

Q
A

Okay so that's where your getting some of your information is from the papers?
Most of it.

Q

Okay alright um, just back to Michael a little bit more um, and his um, relationship with
you in terms of the maintenance of the property. Uh did you provide him with supplies
to maintain the property like uh brooms?
Yeah.

A

Q
A

Other equipment.
Yeah we, yeah he was suppose to take care of the property. He weeded it and kept it
clean and took out the trash and took it to the dump and.

Q
A

But did you provide any of the equipment that he used?
Oh yeah the weed eater uh snowmobile, some of that equipment yes.

Q
A

Okay did he use any of his own equipment do you know?
Oh yes I think he used his own chainsaw when he had to and uh he had his own
equipment. We had a diesel generator up there it supplies the power.

Q
A

Okay.
And that's about all we provided.

Q
A

And so he used, he used your snowmobile and your weed eater. Did you ever supply hi
with any product like um, any weed killing product or seeds or anything like that?
No.

Q
A

And.
No.

Q

And did you say were there any port a potties up there or any uh?
He had, he had four out house.

A

Q
A

Q
A

Okay and how about the servicing of those outhouses what's entailed with uh the
servicing?
If they get full we have a truck come up and pump the out. They are big concrete
reservoirs.
Okay.
Yeah. And normally once a year we will put lie in there and that usually takes care of it.
We don't have to have it pumped.

5
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Q
A

Okay
And they, there is (inaudible) for out in the woods, not just the regular

Q

So did Michael is Michael the one who would then report to you um the status of those
out houses and whether they you know look like they may need to be pumped or not?
Oh yeah he would report to me and let me know that there needed something needed
to be taken care of or sometimes uh he would get the friend in Bloom Lake which I have
about 100 members and they would come out and help him. Like one time we had 100
people come out in two different groups. They went out and cleaned up the woods and
forest and it's a beautiful area for use by everybody.

A

A

Oh that's very nice. So it sounds like there is an organization who volunteers you said
friends of Bloom Lake. They volunteer to maintain the place as well?
Yeah they maintain and also they build things. Like they help me build the doc, the boy
scouts built the doc and then there is a library for children who uh built and donated by
one of the campers . And it's uh a very nice place

Q
A

And do people maintain that uh?
Yeah they do.

Q
A

And do the friends of Bloom lake who maintain it or is it going to be Michael?
Friends, the friend of Bloom Lake is there is no official organization. We just call them
the friends of Bloom lake cause they do good things for us.

Q
A

Oh got it okay.
It's all volunteer, the whole operation is volunteer.

Q
A

Okay.
Including Mike Chisholm.

Q

Okay well lets define a little bit more about what some of the other individuals do there
and then give me an example of what some of the friends do for the area?
Build the docs, build the library for the children, um, repair things. There is not too
much up there.

Q

A

Q
A

Q
A

Okay do they coordinate with Michael on that or do they do It somewhat independently
ordotheyyouknow?
No they most, they mostly coordinate with Michael to make sure that it gets done
properly.
Okay do they normally, do they ever come to you first or do they normally go thru
Michael?
No they go thru Michael. I usually am not involved.

6
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Q
A

Okay and then does Michael kind of report back to you what's going on?
Yeah and I mean, I might get up there every couple years.

Q
A

Okay.
I don't go up there very often .

Q
A

Okay have you even known Michael to have any issue, incidents like this in the past over
the 17 years?
No he's been perfect and uh all the people up there loved him. He even uh plays a
harmonica at the camp ground and supplies then with fire wood and really good
relationship for 17 years.

Q
A

Okay have you ever known him to create any problems up there at all?
No he's been very good.

Q

A

Okay alright um I guess one last question if you were to uh mail him in for any, anything
does he have a mailing address that would take it to Bloom Lake or um, where does he
get his ma ii?
I believe, I believe he has a PO Box in Palmyra or at at the Post Office at Palmyra store.

Q
A

Okay.
I don't know, I don't know what number that is but.

Q
A

Okay alright it do you have any question for me or anything else you'd like to add?
No if uh I guess I guess you're going to be defending me against this but are you, are you
defending me or the insurance company?

Q

Oh so what we do is we, I'm just, I'm the claims adjuster here in Walt Denning's office
and I'm collecting the information just to find out your relationship with this individual
and then from there I put it in the claim file and my boss in Boise will take a look at it
and then he'll decipher you know what he needs to do and how he needs to interact um
with the parties involved. So you'll find out more information a time goes on. Um we
will get somebody to give you a call back in just a bit now that I have the right number
for you. Well have them give you a call and fill you in and let me you know.
Okay the old number must have been our land line that we disconnected several years
ago.

A

Q

A

That's what I was thinking yeah cause I've been having a tough time. So now I have 2906912 so I'll just go ahead and pass that number along. ·
Yeah I keep it under my pillow at night

Q
A

Okay alright sounds good.
Okay.

7
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I

I

Q

A

Alright let me go ahead and conclude formally then. So I've been speaking with Ed Cook.
The time Is now 11:23am. and we've been speaking with regards to an incident that we
have reported occurring on June 28, 2015 involving Michael Chisholm and have you
been aware that I've been recording this interview correct?
Correct.

Q
A

And I had your permission?
Correct.

Q

Alright I'm going to go ahead and turn it off.

8
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Telephone (208) 345-2000
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Attorneys for Defendant Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Company of Idaho

(!)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST filDICIAL DISTRICT

a::::

0

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMP ANY OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR. and LAURIE
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife, and
JOSEPH STANCZAK,

Case No. CV-2016-0590

DECLARATION OF BENJAMIN C.
RITCHIE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.
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1.

I am one of the attorneys for Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance

Company of Idaho in the above-noted matter and have personal knowledge with respect to the
matters contained herein.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the Register

of Actions in the criminal case State ofldaho v. Michael Jesse Chisholm, Case Number CR2015-0003326, which was adjudicated in Bonner County, Idaho (hereinafter referred to as the
"Chisholm Criminal Case") ..
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of the

Acknowledgement of Alford Plea dated January 5, 2016 in the Chisholm Criminal Case, which
my office obtained from Bonner County.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy of a Guilty Plea

Advisory Form executed by Michael Chisholm in the Chisholm Criminal Case, which my office
obtained from Bonner County.
5.

In June of 2016, my office requested and obtained from Bonner County,

Idaho compact discs containing audio files of the 1/5/2016 plea hearing and the 3/8/2013
sentencing hearing in the Chisholm Criminal Case. I instructed our firm's word processor Barb
Mayne at my office to prepare written transcripts of the hearings.
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy of the Felony

Judgment entered against Michael Chisholm in the Chisholm Criminal Case, which my office
obtained from Bonner County.
7.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "E" is a true and correct copy of a demand

letter received dated February 1, 2016 sent by Wes S. Larsen and sent to Farm Bureau.
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8.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy of the First

Amended Complaint for Damages filed in Bonner County case number CV-2016-679.
9.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "G" is a true and correct copy of a letter dated

August 22, 2016 prepared and sent by my office to Michael Howard on behalf of Edgar and

I·

I

Frances Cook.
I certify under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the
foregoing is true and correct.
DATED this /

r

~

day of October, 2016.

Benjamin C. Ritchie
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of October, 2016, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing DECLARATION OF BENJAMIN C. RITCHIE IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFF FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:
Michael T. Howard
WINTON & CASHATT
250 Northwest Blvd., Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
Attorneys for Edgar and Laurie
Cook

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Wes S. Larsen

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS,

PA

1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684
Attorneys for Joseph Stanczak
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Idaho Repository - Case Numl- · Result Page

Case Number Result Page
Bonner
1 Cases Found.
State of Idaho vs. Michael Jesse Chisholm
No hearings scheduled
Ca se : CR-2015-0003326 District Judge : =~~:~~aa~·
Charges : Violation Date Cha rge

1

A~~~~t$26,745.50 ~1::::~~::ing

Citation Degree Disposition

06/28/2015 Il9-2520
Enhancement-Use of a
Deadly Weapon in
Commission of a
Felony
Officer: Stella 223, W.
Phillip, 2000
06/28/2015 IlS-907 BatteryAggravated
Officer: Stella 223, W.
Phillip, 2000

Felony
Finding: Dismissed on
Motion of Prosecutor
Disposition
date: 01/05/2016
Fines/fees: $0.00
Felony Finding: Guilty
Disposition
date: 03/08/2016
Fines/fees: $1,745.50
Credited time {Yes):
58 days
Det Penitentiary: 2
years
Indet Penitentiary: 8
years

Register
of
Date
actions:
06/29/2015 New Case Filed - Felony
06/29/2015 Prosecutor assigned Shane L. Greenbank
06/29/2015 BOND SET: at 50000.00
06/29/2015 Change Assigned Judge
Court Minutes Hearing type: Probable Cause for Complaint Hearing
date: 6/29/2015 Time : 2: 14 pm Courtroom: Court reporter : Minutes
0612912015
Clerk : Melissa Seek Ta pe Number: 2 Defense Attorney: Prosecutor:
Shane Greenbank
06/29/2015 Order Finding Probable Cause
06/29/2015
06/29/2015
06/29/2015
06/29/2015

Felony Criminal Complaint
Case Sealed
Case Sealed
Court Log- PC for Search Warrant CTRM# 2 TIME: 214 to 238

06/29/2015 Search Warrant issued
06/30/2015 Jail Booking Sheet
06/30/2015 Notification of Rights
06/30/2015 Wa iver of Extradition
06/30/2015 Hearing Scheduled (In Custodies 06/30/2015 02 :00 PM)
06/30/2015 Jail Information Sheet
Court Minutes Hearing type: In Custodies Hearing date: 6/30/2015
Time: 1:30 pm Courtroom : Court reporter: Minutes Clerk: Susan
0613012015
Ayerle Tape Number: 2 Defense Attorney : Prosecutor: Shane
Greenbank
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0613012015

2

Result Page

Hearing result for In Custod ies scheduled on 06/30/2015 02:00 PM:
Hearing Held FIRST APPEARANCE ON FELONY CHARGE

06/30/2015 Case Un-sealed
06/30/2015 Case Un-sealed
Defe ndant : Chisholm, Michael Jesse Order Appointing Public Defender
0613012015
Public defender Public Defenders
No Contact Order: Criminal No Contact Order Filed Comment: None
0613012015
Expiration Days: 184 Expiration Date: 12/31/2015
07/01/2015
07/01/2015
07/01/2015
07/01/2015

Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 07/08/2015 01 :30 PM)
Notice of Hearing
Plaintiff's Response To Request For Discovery
Plaintiff's Request For Discovery

Notice Of Appearance, request for tiemly preliminary hearing, motion
07/01/2015 to release on own recognizance or reduction of bond; notice of
hearing
07/01/2015 Defendant's Request For Discovery
07/01/2015 Defendant's Response To Request For Discovery
Notice Of Appearance, request for timely priliminary hearing, motion
07/02/2015 to release on own recognizance or reduction of bond; notice of
hea ring
07/02/2015 Defendant's Response To Request For Discovery
07/02/2015 Defendant's Request For Discovery
07/06/2015 Driving Record Requested
07/06/2015 Plaintiff's Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery
Miscellaneous Paymen t: Tape/copy Time Fee Paid by: Keith Kinnaird
0710812015
Recei pt number: 000974 3 Dated : 7/8/2015 Amount: $5.00 (Cash)
Miscellaneous Payment: Court Tape Sales Tax Paid by: Keith Kinnaird
0710812015
Receipt number: 0009743 Dated: 7/8/201 5 Amoun t: $ .08 (Cash)
07/08/2015 Jail Information Sheet

I.

07/08/2015 Prosecutor's Verified Petition for an Increase in Bail
07/08/2015 Amended Complaint Filed
Court Minutes Hearing type: Preliminary Hearing date : 7/8/2015
Time: 1:34 pm Courtroom: Cou rt reporter: Minutes Clerk: Susa n
0710812015
Ayerle Ta pe Number: 3 Defense Attorney: Daniel Taylor Prosecutor:
Shane Greenbank
Hearing result for Preliminary scheduled on 07/08/2015 01:30 PM:
07/08/2015 Hearing Held CONTINUED TO JULY 22ND - AMENDED TIME OF 9:30
AM

0710812015

Hear!ng result for Preliminary scheduled on 07/08/2015 01 :30 PM:
Continued

07/08/2015 Change Assigned Judge
07/08/2015 Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary 07/22/2015 09:30 AM)
07/08/2015 Notice of Hearing
07/08/2015 Second Amended Criminal Complaint Filed
07/08/2015 Search Warrant returned
07/09/2015 Prosecutor's Verified Petition for an Increase in Bail
07/09/2015 Notice Of Hearing
07/09/2015 Order Regarding Petition for an Increase in Bail
07/09/2015 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 07/10/2015 09:45 AM)
07/09/2015 Plaintiff's Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery
07/09/2015 Plaintiff's Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery
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07/10/2015 BOND SET: at 150,000.00
Court Minutes Hearing type: Request for Bond Increase Hearing date:
7/10/2015 Time: 10:01 am Courtroom: Court reporter: Minutes
0711012015
Clerk: Sandra Ra sor Tape Number: 4 Defense Attorn ey: Daniel Taylor
Prosecutor: Shane Greenbank
Hearing r~sult for Hearing Scheduled scheduled on 07/10/2015 09:45
AM: Hearing Held
Hearing _result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled on 07/10/2015 09:45
0711012015
AM: Motion Granted
07/10/2015 Jail Information Sheet
07/10/2015 Exhibit List
07/14/2015 Third Amended Complaint Filed
07/21/2015 Letter to Judge from MJ Young
0711012015

07/21/2015 Letter to Judge from C Wright
Court Minutes Hearing type: Preliminary Hearing date: 7/22/2015
Time: 10:29 am Courtroom: Court reporter: Minutes Clerk : Ann
0712212015
Phillips Tape Number : 4 Defense Atto rney: Daniel Ta ylor Prosecutor:
Shane Greenbank
07/22/2015 Order Holding Defendant To Answer To District Court
07/22/2015 Information
07/22/2015 Jail Information Sheet
Hearing result for Preliminary sched uled on 07/22/2015 09:30 AM:
0712212015
Prelimin ary Hearing Waived (bound Over)
07/22/2015 Change Assigned Judge
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment/District Court 08/17/2015 09:00
0712212015
AM)
07/23/2015 Plaintiff's Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery
07/27/2015 Motion for Order Approving Property Bond
07/31/2015 Order Approving Property Bond - is DENIED
Mot_ion to Rele~se on Own Recognizance or for Reduction of Bond;
0810512015
Notice of Hearing
Hea ring Scheduled (Motion for Bond Reduction 08/17/2015 09:00
0810512015
AM) or Release
Court Minutes Hearing type: Arraignment Hearing date: 8/17/2015
Time : 9:16 am Courtroom: Court reporter: Val La rson Minutes Clerk:
0811712015
Cheri e Moore Tape Number: 1 De fense Atto rney: Daniel Taylor
Prosecutor: Shane Greenbank
Hearing result for Arraignment/District Court scheduled on
08/17/2015 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter:
0811712015
Val Larson Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated:
Less Than 100 Pages
Hearing resu lt for Arrai gnment/District Court scheduled on
08/17/2015 09:00 AM: Arraignment/ First Appearan ce
Hearing resu lt for Arraignmen t/District Court scheduled on
0811712015
08/1 7/2015 09:00 AM : Plea of Not Guilty, Set for Jury Trial
Hearing resul t for Moti on for Bond Reduction sched uled on
0811712015
08/1 7/2015 09:00 AM : Motion Granted or Rel ease

0811712015

0811712015

A Plea is entered for charge: - NG (!18-907 Battery-Aggravated)Count I

0811712015

IA Plea is en tered for charge : - NG (I1 9-252 0 Enhancement-Use of a
Deadly Wea pon in Commissi on of a Felony) - Count II

08/17/2015 BOND SET: at 100,000.00
08/17/2015 Felony Arraignment Rights Form
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08/17/2015 Jail Information Sheet
08/18/2015 Plaintiff's Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery
08/19/2015 Motion for Order Approving Amended Property Bond
08/24/2015 Amended Pledge and Property Bond
08/24/2015 Order Approving Amended Property Bond
08/24/2015 Bond Posted - Property (Amount 100000.00 )
08/25/2015
08/25/2015
08/28/2015
08/28/2015
08/28/2015
09/16/2015
09/23/2015

Notice to Defendants
Waiver of Extradition
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 10/23/2015 10:00 AM)
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial - 3 Days 11/16/2015 09 :00 AM)
Notice Of Trial and Pretrial Order
Defendant's First Specific Request For Discovery
Plaintiff's Supplemental Response to Specific Request for Discovery

1011512015

Ex Parte Motion for appoval of additional emergency funds for
ball istics expert, per I daho code 31-1608

Affidavit in support of Daniel D. Taylor in support of Ex Parte motion
10/15/2015 for approval of additional emergency funds for ballistics expert, per
Idaho code 31-1608
1011612015

Order Approving Additional Emergency Funds for Ballistics Expert, Per
I daho Code§ 31-1 608

10/16/2015 Waiver of Speedy Trial
10/19/2015 Subpoena Issued- Deputy Jordan Thompson c/o BCSO
10/19/2015 Subpoena Issued- Detective Gary Johnston, BCSO
10/19/2015 Subpoena Issued - deputy Jordan Thompson,BCSO
1011912015

Objection to defendant's _exparte motion for approval of additional
emergency funds for bal11st1cs expert

Motion to Suppress; Notice of Hearing November 24m 2015 at
2 :30pm
Hearin g Scheduled (Motion to Suppress 11/24/2015 02:30 PM)
1011912015
De fendants
Defendant's Motion in Limine Object ing to 608(b) Evidence; Notice of
1011912015
Hearing November 24, 2015 at 2 :30pm
Hearing Scheduled (Motion ·in Li mine 11/24/2015 02:30 PM)
1011912015
defendants
1011912015

10/19/2015 Brief in Support of Motion in Limine Pursuant to IRE 608(b)
10/20/2015 Defendant's Witness List
Court Minutes Hearing type: Pretrial Conference Hearing date:
10/23/2015 Time: 10:35 am Courtroom : Court reporter: None
1012312015
Minutes Clerk: Linda Oppelt Tape Number: 1 Defense Attorney:
Daniel Taylor Prosecutor: Shane Greenbank
1012312015

Hearing r~sult for Jury Trial - 3 Days scheduled on 11/16/2015 09 : 00
AM: Continued

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 10/23/2015
10/23/2015 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: None Number
of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less Than 100 Pages
10/23/2015 Notice Of Hearing/Trial
10/23/2015 Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 12/18/2015 10:00 AM)
10/23/2015 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial - 3 Days 01/11/2016 09 :00 AM)
10/23/2015 Waiver Of Speedy Trial - See Courtlog

ll/l0/ 2015 Sheriff's Return on Criminal Subpoena Service - Jordan Samuel
Thomson served 10-23- 15

Hearing result for Motion in Limine scheduled on 11/24/2015 02:30
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11/19/2015 PM: Continued
Hearing result f?r Motion to Suppress scheduled on 11/24/2015
1111912015
02:30 PM: Continued
11/19/2015 Hearing Rescheduled (Motion to Suppress 12/01/2015 09:30 AM)
11/19/2015 Hearing Rescheduled (Motion in Limine 12/01/2015 09:30 AM)
11/19/2015
11/20/2015
11/20/2015
11/25/2015

Amended Notice of Hearing
Subpoena Issued- Detective Gary Johnston, BCSO
Subpoena Issued- Deputy Jordan Thompson, BCSO
Continued (Motion to Suppress 12/08/2015 02:00 PM)

11/25/2015
11/25/2015
11/25/2015
11/25/2015

Continued (Motion in Limine 12/08/2015 02:00 PM)
Amended Notice of Hearing
Subpoena issued-Detective Gary Johnston Dec 8, 2015 2p.m.
Subpoena issued-Deputy Jordan Thompson Dec 8, 2015 2p.m.
Sheriff's Return on NON Service - Jordan Samuel Thomson 1210112015
UNSERVED
Sheriff's Return on Subpoena Service - Gary John Johnston served
1210112015
11-30-15
12/02/2015 Witness List
Sheriff's Return on Service - Subpoena Jordan S. Thomson served
12-03-2015
Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion to Suppress - Motion in Limine
Hearing date: 12/8/2015 Time: 2:21 pm Courtroom: Court reporter:
1210812015
Diane Bolan Minutes Clerk: Cherie Moore Tape Number: Ctrm 1
Defense Attorney: Daniel Taylor Prosecutor: Shane Greenbank
Hearing result for Motion in Limine scheduled on 12/08/2015 02:00
PM: District Court Hearing Held - Court Reporter: Diane Bolan 1210812015
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages - TO BE ADDRESSED AT TRIAL IF NEEDED
1210412015

1210812015

1210812015
12/09/2015
12/09/2015

Hearing result for Motion to Suppress scheduled on 12/08/2015
02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held - Court Reporter: Diane Bolan
- Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than
100 pages
Hearing result for Motion to Suppress scheduled on 12/08/2015
02:00 PM: Motion Granted in part
.
Plaintiff's Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery
Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Suppress

Court Minutes Hearing type: Pretrial Conference Hearing date:
12/18/2015 Time: 10:33 am Courtroom: Court reporter: Amy Brown
1211812015
Minutes Clerk: Linda Oppelt Tape Number: 1 Defense Attorney:
Daniel Taylor Prosecutor: Shane Greenbank
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 12/18/2015
10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held - Leave Trial Set Court
1211812015
Reporter: Amy Brown Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Less Than 100 Pages
12/18/2015 Notice Of Hearing
12/18/2015 Hearing Scheduled (Entry of Plea 12/28/2015 01:30 PM)
1211812015

Hear)ng result for Entry of Plea scheduled on 12/28/2015 01:30 PM:
Continued

12/18/2015 Hearing Scheduled (Entry of Plea 12/29/2015 09:15 AM)
12/18/2015 Amended Notice of Hearing
12/22/2015 Amended Notice of Hearing
12/22/2015 Continued (Entry of Plea 01/05/2016 02:30 PM)
Court Minutes Hearing type: Entry of Plea Hearing date: 1/5/2016
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Time: 2:30 pm Courtroom: Court reporter: Byrl Cinnamon Minutes
01/05/2016 Clerk: Cherie Moore Tape Number: Ctrm 1 Defense Attorney: Daniel
Taylor Prosecutor: Shane Greenbank
Hearing result for Entry of Plea scheduled on 01/05/2016 02:30 PM:
District Co urt Hea ring Held - Court Reporter : Byrl Cinn amon 0110512016
Number of Transc ript Pages for this hearing estim ated : less than 10
pages
Hearing result fo r Entry of Plea scheduled on 01/05/2016 02:30 PM:
0110512016
Guilty Plea or Ad mission of Guilt
Dismissed by Motion of the Prosecutor ":'ith heari_ng_ (!19-2520
0110512016 Enhancement-Use of a Deadly Weapon in Comm1ss1on of a Felony)
Hearing result for Jury Tria l - 3 Days scheduled on 01/11/2016 09:00
0110512016
AM: Change Plea to Guilty Before Trial
01/05/2016 Guilty Plea Advisory and Form
01/05/2016 Acknowledgement of Alford Plea
Order for Presentence Investigation Report and Substance Abuse
0110512016
Assessment
01/05/2016 PSI Face Sheet Transmitted
01/06/2016 Order Dismissing Count II
01/06/2016 Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing/District Court 03/08/2016 02:00 PM)
01/06/2016 Notice of Hearing
01/13/2016 Plaintiff's Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery
03/03/2016 Subpoena Issued - Leonard M Sanders
03/03/2016 Subpoena Issued - John W Hobday
03/03/2016 Subpoena Issued - Edgar W Cook
03/03/2016 Subpoena Issued - John L La Point
03/03/2016 Defendant's Amended Witness List
03/04/2016 Declaration of Service - John La Pointe Served on 3-3-16
03/04/2016 Declaration of Service - Leonard Sauders Served on 3-3-16
03/04/2016 Declaration of Service - Edgar Cook Served on 3-3-16
03/04/2016 Declaration of Service - Jon Hobday Served on 3-3-16
03/07/2016 Notice Of Filing Character reference letters/letters of support
Miscellaneous Payment: Tape/copy Time Fee Paid by: Keith Kinnaird
03/08/2016 Receipt number: 0003568 Dated: 3/8/2016 Amount: $5.00 (Credit
card)
Miscellaneous Payment: Court Tape Fee Paid by: Keith Kinnaird
03/08/2016 Receipt number: 0003568 Dated: 3/8/2016 Amount: $1.25 (Credit
card)
Miscellaneous Payment: Court Tape Sales Tax Paid by: Keith Kinnaird
03/08/2016 Receipt number: 0003568 Dated: 3/8/2016 Amount: $.08 (Credit
card)
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Keith Kinnaird
03/08/2016 Receipt number: 0003568 Dated: 3/8/2016 Amount: $3.00 (Credit
card)
Court Minutes Hearing type: Sentencing/District Court Hearing date:
3/8/2016 Time: 2: 11 pm Courtroom: Court repo rter: Diane Bolan
0310812016
Minutes Clerk: Cherie Moore Tape Number: 1 Defense Attorney:
Daniel Taylor Prosecutor: Shane Greenbank
Hearing result for Sentencing/District Court scheduled on 03/08/2016
02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Repo rter: Diane Bolan
0310812016
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated : More Than
100 Pages
03/08/2016 Court Accepts Guilty Plea (IlB-907 Battery-Aggravated)
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Sentenced To Incarceration (I18-907 Battery-Aggravated)
03/08/2016 Confinement terms: Credited time: 58 days. Penitentiary
determinate: 2 years. Penitentiary indeterminate: 8 years .
03/08/2016 STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action
03/08/2016 Property Bond Exonerated (Amount 100,000.00)
03/08/2016 Jail Information Sheet
03/08/2016 Felony Judgment (Sentence Imposed) - 5 Pages
03/30/2016 Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence, ICR 35
03/30/2016 Defendant: Chisholm, Michael Jesse Appearance Susie D Jensen
Notice o~ Assignment Change - Attorney Jensen appears/ Attorney
0313012016
Taylor withdrawn
Order Denying Rule 35 Sentence Reduction and Notice of Right to
0410512016
Appeal
04/26/2016 Motion and Stipulation for Restitution
04/28/2016 Order of Restitution
05/05/2016 Notice of Loss of Right to Vote
Notice of Withdrawal After Entry of Judgment Pursuant to ICR 44.1 0610212016
Attorney S. Jensen PD
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By
06/07/2016 The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Cecilia Reid Receipt number: 0008309
Dated: 6/7/2016 Amount: $17.00 (Credit card)
Miscellaneous Payment: Registered Mail Fee Paid by: Cecilia Reid
06/07/2016 Receipt number: 0008309 Dated: 6/7/2016 Amount: $2.34 (Credit
card)
Miscellaneous Payment: Tape/copy Time Fee Paid by: Cecilia Reid
06/07/2016 Receipt number: 0008309 Dated: 6/7/2016 Amount: $5.00 (Credit
card)
Miscellaneous Payment: Court Tape Fee Paid by: Cecilia Reid Receipt
0610712016
number: 0008309 Dated: 6/7/2016 Amount: $1.25 (Credit card)
Miscellaneous Payment: Court Tape Sales Tax Paid by: Cecilia Reid
06/07/2016 Receipt number: 0008309 Dated: 6/7/2016 Amount: $.08 (Credit
card)
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Cecilia Reid
06/07/2016 Receipt number: 0008309 Dated: 6/7/2016 Amount: $3.00 (Credit
card)
Miscellaneous Payment: Tape/copy Time Fee Paid by: Ciecilia Reid
06/07/2016 Receipt number: 0008340 Dated: 6/7/2016 Amount: $5.00 (Credit
card)

0610712016

Miscellaneous Payment: Court Tape Fee Paid by: Ciecilia Reid Receipt
number: 0008340 Dated: 6/7/2016 Amount: $1.25 (Credit card)

Miscellaneous Payment: Court Tape Sales Tax Paid by: Ciecilia Reid
06/07/2016 Receipt number: 0008340 Dated: 6/7/2016 Amount: $.08 (Credit
card)
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Ciecilia Reid
06/07/2016 Receipt number: 0008340 Dated: 6/7/2016 Amount: $3.00 (Credit
card)

Connection: Public
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STATE OF IDAHO

L

F

County of BolJl!er /

FILED

1/05 [h

AT i{ :'50 O'ClOCK
f M
CLERK
DISTRICT COURT
~

D£PUTV

State of Idaho v.
Case No.

G~; ~b<1 lf':::>.,,
l -S-- _.

~j L {a

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ALFORD PLEA
NOTICE: DEFENDANT MUST READ AND INITIAL EACH PARAGRAPH

/'0::&

1. -I understand that a defendant may plead guilty to a felony charge, even though
he/she either claims to be innocent of the charge, or does not admit to all of the elements of
such charge. This is known as a North Carolina v. Alford guilty plea.

~ 2. In order for the court to accept a guilty plea, pursuant to the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), I understand that the
Court must make the following findings:

'.YY\ t, a. That there exists a strong factual basis to .support the guilty plea;
~ b. That the defendant's guilty plea is
understandingly made;

voluntarily, knowingly and

':c'.!d~. , c. That the defendant understands the elements of the charge, the potential
defenses and his/her right against self-incrimination; and
,... ~ d. '!'h?.t fue defe!?d~t !! 2W~!'~ 9f th~ <.'t:rn~ennenees of Ms/her v.uiltv nlea and
-the rights that are waived by such guilty plea.

.

~

-

~ 3 . When the Court accepts a guilty plea, p~uant to North Carolina v. Alford, a
defendant must understand that the Court will treat the defendant as though he/she were in
f~ct guilty of all the elements of such felony offense. The Court will not accept a guilty plea~
pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, unless the court record reflects that the guilty plea was
voluntary, and was also
intelligent choice among the alternatives available to the
defendant

an

~ <4. I consent that the judgment be entered against me, without a trial of any kind, even

though I do not admit that I committed all of the elements of the offense to which I plead
guilty. I further recognize that the Court, upon entry of this plea, will make a finding that I
am guilty.

267

I·

<. .

i

II

I
___ 5. In signing this form, I hereby attest and acknowledge that I have discussed my
guilty plea, pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, with my attorney and that I fully understand
this type of guilty plea and the consequences which result.
Dated this

·$

I hereby attest and acknowledge that I have fully discussed a guilty plea, pursuant to
North Carolina v. Alford, with the above named defendant.

Dated this

2)

day of

_---"j..._Clv--.....
______, 20_.

V
el for Defendant
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DECEIVE ,

n

JUN I O 2016

BY: _ _ _ _ __

u

(i)}8@Jif
~j I
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FILED
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:z: ~0

AT
CLERH

)_
f"' '!!_i

~'CLOCK
.f _M .'
DISTRICT COURT -

h:it>

DENTY

t.

I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TID: COUNTY 0}~ BONNER

''
I

GUILTY PLEA ADVISORY AND FORM

I

TO BE FILLED OUT BY THE DEFENDANT
Defendant's Name:
Date:
Age:

/ -

5' -

((Lcfunsd Cfi<51,d"1

;)___o / 0

Sign~

Case Number:

bC

i,_

~)

c,£7-LL_
.-

·:> ">

l_ G

Date of Birth:

STATEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

(Please initial each response)
1. You have the right to remain silent. You do not have to say anything about the crime(s) you are
accused of committing. If you elect to have a trial, the State may not call you as a witness or ask
you any questions. If you do decide to testify the State will be permitted to ask you questions and
anything you say can be used as evidence against you in court.
I understand that by pleading guilty I run waiving my right to remain silent as to the elements of
the crime(s) to which I am entering this plea. >t,&:e,.._.

2. The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of guilty to the crime(s) in this
case. Even after pleading guilty, you will still have the right to refuse to answer any question or to
provide any information that might tend to show you committed some other crime(s). You can
also refuse to a"!lswer or provide any information that might tend to increase the punishment for the
crime(s) to whi9h you are pleading guilty.
I understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case, I still have the right to remain silent
with respect to any other crime(s) and with respect to answering questions or providing
information that- may increase my sentence.\M.,e ,..

.

3. You have the right to be represented by an attorney. If you want an attorney and cannot pay for
one, you can ~k the Judge for an attorney who will be p~the county. You may be required to
reimburse the c.ounty for the cost of this representation.
,
·
.. .
. .
..
_· ~.'
.... ··- ~-~ .... - . --·
-::. ... -..--~ -~.
.
~ . .
GUILTY PLEA ADVISORY FORM
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1

I

4. You are presumed to be innocent. You will be found guilty if: 1) you plead guilty in front of the
Judge; or 2) yo~ are found guilty at a jury trial .

..

I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to be presumed innocent.~/

5. You have the right to a speedy and public jury trial before twelve persons. A jury trial is a court
hearing to determine whether you are guilty or not guilty of the charge(s) brought against you. In a
jury trial, you have the right to present evidence in your defense and to testify in your own defense.
You are not required to do so, however. The State must convince all of the jurors of your guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
I understand t.J;lat by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to a speedy and public jury trial.
~/

.

6. You have the right to question (confront) the witnesses testifying against you. This occurs during a
jury trial. At trial, the State must prove its case by calling witnesses to testify under oath in front of
you, the jury, and your attorney. Your attorney could then cross-examine (question) each ·witness.
You could also call witnesses of your choosing to testify on your behalf. If you do not have the
funds to bring those witnesses to court, the State will pay the cost of bringing your witnesses to
court and will ~ompel their attendance by the use of the subpoena power of the court.

..

I ~derstand that by plea~ guilty I ~ wai~g my right ~ t i o n (confront) the witnesses
agamst me an~ present witnesses and evidence m my defense:

· /

7. The State has t4e burden of proving you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
I understand tb,at by pleading guilty, I am waiving my right to require the State to prove my guilt
beyond a reaso~able d o u b t . ~
_ ·(; .
-,~,»,.,.

.

.

.,(.fi,~ ·

QUESTIONS REGARDING ABn..~YTO ENTER PLEA

(Please answer every question. If you do not understand a question, consult your attorney
before answering.)

Please Circle and Initial 011e
1. Do you read and write the English language?

YESVNO_

If not, have you been provided with an interpreter to help you fill out this form?

YES

NO

Do you want an Interpreter?

YES

NO V--

.,.

2. What is your true and legal name?

~.

r(l ~ e,1 r?cE l
m

~l A:~ Y~~£Jc- S c,;:J

,eh f.lc{ -:r: ~ i s hot wt

3. What was the ~gbest grade of school you completed?_ __,/......0__ ________

_

4. If you did not cpmplete high school, have you received either a general
education diplC!hia or high school equivalency diploma?

GUILTY PLEA ADVJg(}RY FORM
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5. Are you currently under the care of a mental health professional?

YES

NO~

6. Have you ever been diagnosed with a mental health disorder?

YES

NO

v"

If so, what was the diagnosis and when was it made?

- - -- -- -- - - -- -- -

7. Are you currently prescribed any medication?

NO V--

YES

If yes, whatmedications are you talcing at this time? - - - - - -- -- - - -- -

If you answered "yes," have you taken your prescription medication
during the J ast 24 hours?

YES

NO

8. In the last 48 hours, have you taken any medication or drugs,
including QVer the counter, or drank any alcoholic beverages
which you believe affect your ability to W1derstand these questions
and to make a reasoned and informed decision in this case?

YES

N O ~·

9. Are you under the influence of any alcohol, drugs, or other
medication at this time?

YES

NO~

10. Are you ca~able of understanding these proceedings?

YES

11. Do you claim that you are mentally incapable of understanding
these proceedings or what it means to plead guilty to a crime?

YES

v"" NO_
NO~

'

12. Is there anything going on in your life that affects your ability
to enter a v~luntazy guilty plea?

YES

13. Are you having any difficulty in understanding what you are
doing by ~ g out this form?

YES

NO/

14. Is there anY:pther reason that you cannot make a reasoned and
informed d~cision in this case?

YES

NOV

If yes, what)s the reason? _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ __

GUILTY PLEA ADVISORY FORM
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3

PLEA AGREEMENT
15. Is your guilty plea the result of a plea agreement?

If so, what ;J.re the terms of that plea agreement?
See attached Addendum A.
Jf a written plea agreement was done, have you read this
plea agreement?

YES VNO_

16. Do you llllderstand your plea agreement?

L

17. There are two types of plea agreements.
describes tl:te type of plea agreement:

YES,/ NO_

Please initial the one paragraph below which

a. I understand that my plea agreement is a binding plea agreement. This means that if the

District,Court does not impose the specific sentence as recommended by both parties, I will
be allo'W'ed to withdraw my plea of guilty and proceed to a jury trial. _ _ __ _
b. I Wlders:tand that my plea agreement is a non-binding plea agreement. This means that the
1
Court i~ not bound by the agreement or any sentencing recommendations, and may impose
any se,n.tence authorized by law, up to the maximum sentence. Because the Court is not
bound ~y the agreement, if the District Court chooses not to follow the agreement, I will
not hav~ the right to withdraw my guilty plea.

Me_,,

,,

18. Has your a~omey or anyone else forced or coerced you in
any way into accepting this plea agreement?

·,

YES_NO /

19. Have any otJier promises been made to you that have influenced
your decisiC?n to plead guilty?
20. Has anyon~·told you what your sentence will be?
If so, what tave you been promised?

21. Is this a cotlditional guilty plea in which you are reserving your
right to app~al any pre-trial issues?

YES

22. Have you waived your right to appeal your judgment of conviction
as part of y9ur plea agreement?

YES_NO /

i

NO /

23. Have you waived your right to appeal your sentence as part of
your plea ~eement?

YES_NO

J

GUILTY PLEA ADVISPRY FORM
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Under whatcondition can you appeal your sentence?

24. Do you understand that by pleading guilty you will waive
( or give up) any defenses, both factual and legal, that you
believe you· may have in this case?

YES /No_

25. Have you discussed the elements of the offense(s) for which
you are charged with your attorney?

POTENTIAL SENTENCE
I am charged with the crime(s) of:
,
Aggravated Bw,:tery, I.C. §§ 18-903, 18-907

Use of a Firearm or Deadly Weapon During
the Comm.issiop. of a Crime, LC. § 19-2520

I understand the Minimum & Maximum - Fine
and Imprisonment:
Up to 15 years in prison/Up to $50,000 fine.

An additional 15 years in prison.

r
26. If you plead guilty to more than one crime do you understand that your
sentences f€~r each crime could be ordered to be served either concurrently
( at the srun~ time) or consecutively (one after the other)?
YES j/'. NO
27. Do you understand that if you plead guilty and you commit crimes
in the futur~, this conviction could be considered the future
case and cquld cause more severe penalty in the future case?

m

YEsv'' NO_

'

ADDITIONAL cpNSEQUENCES OF A GUILTY PLEA
28. Are you c\;trently on probation or parole?

If so, do yoh tmderstand that a plea of guilty in this case could be
the basis of\a violation of that probation or parole
(WlllCH MEANS THAT ANY SUSPENDED SENTENCE
COULD B;E IMPOSED AND ANY PAROLE REVOKED)?

,.

v

YES_NO

YES_

NO

aware

29. Are you
that if you are not a citizen of the United States,
the entry ofa plea or making of factual admissions could have
consequen~~s of deportation or removal, inability to obtain legal
status in the United States, and or denial of an application for

United StatFs citizenship?

YES VNO_

!

'·
GUILTY PLEA ADVISORY
FORM
'•
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30. Does the crime to which you will plead guilty require you to
register as sex offender? (I.C. § 18-8304)

YES

31. Are you aware that if you plead guilty you may be required
to pay restitution in this case? (I.C. §19-5304)

YEs/~o_

32. Are you pl~ading guilty to a crime for which you may
be required:to pay the costs of prosecution and
investigatiqn? (I.C. § 37-2732 (k)), (I.C.R 33(d)(2))

YES_NO ~

a

If so, have you and the State agreed upon the amount of this
reimburseiµent?
If you havef what is the amount?

NOV"

YES/ NO_

ut--2 d~f'{'i,;..&l

33. Have you $eed to pay restitution as a condition of your plea
agreement?;
34. If the amount of restitution has not been agreed upon, do you
understand that you cannot withdraw your guilty plea even
if the restitution amount is determined to be higher than you thought
it might be br should be?
l
35. Is a license·suspension required as a result of a guilty plea in
this case? ·

YES

NO

YES_

No/

36. Do you uncterstand that if you plead guilty you will be required to
submit a DNA sample and Right Thumbprint impression to
the State? (J.C. § 19-5506)

YES / ' N o _

37. Are you pl~~ding guilty to a crime for which the Court could
impose a fine for a crime of violence of up to $5,000, payable to
the victim ~fthe crime? (LC§ 19-5307)

YES_NO

,

~

•>

38. Do you un~erstand that if you plead guilty to a felony, you will lose
your right to vote in Idaho during the period of your sentence?
(Id. Const. art.6, §3)

YES ./NO_

~

39. Do you un~erstand that ifyou plead guilty to a felony, you will lose
your right tQ hold public office in Idaho during the period of your
sentence? (J.d. Const. art.6, §3)
40. Do you un{erstand that ifyou plead "guilty to a felony, you wiII lose
your right toI perform jury service in Idaho during the period of your

seatenee?

qa-. C0nst-. art.6, §3)

GUILTY PLEA ADVISORY FORM

YES_L_NO_
06/14
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41. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony, you will lose
your right to purchase, possess, or carry firearms? (LC. § 18-310)
42. Do you understand that by pleading guilty to a felony, you run the
risk that if you have new felony charges in the future, you could
be charged !15 a Persistent Vfo]ator? (lC §§ 19-2514, 37-2739)

I
I

YESVNO_

YES-VNO
-. - -

I·,

II
i

RELATIONSHIP WITH YOUR ATIORNEY
I

43. Have you had sufficient time to discuss your case with your attorney?

YES / N O _

44. Have you had adequate time to fill out this form?

YESVNO_

..
45. Have you liad adequate access to your attorney's assistance in
filling out tp.is form?

YESVNO_

46. Have you told your attorney everything you know about your case?

YES v" NO_

j

47. Your attorney can obtain various items from the prosecutor relating
to your case. Tiris may include police reports, witness
statements, ,tape recordings, photographs, reports of scientific testing,
etc. This is:-called "discovery." Have you reviewed the evidence
provided to-xour attorney during discovery?

YES/. NO

48. Do you WaJi.t your attorney to take any further action in this case?

YES

i

-- -NO/

f

49. If you are iiot a citizen of the United States, have you talked to your
attorney alJ?ut the impact of your guilty plea on deportation, on your
legal status}n the United States and on obtaining United States
citizenship?,
50. Do you unqerstand that no one, including your attorney, can force you
to plead guµty in this case?
51. Are you satisfied with your attorney's representation?

YES/
- - NO-YES v' NO

If not, please state why you are dissatisfied?

ENTRY OF PLEA
52. Are the ~ers throughout this form your own answers?

YESV""'NO_

53. Are you e~emg y-0ur plea freely and vehmtaFily?

YES/-NO_ _

GUILTY PLEA ADVISORY FORM

I
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54. Do you understand the consequences of entering a guilty plea?

YES

vNO_

55. Are you admitting to all the elements of the crime(s) to which you
are pleading guilty?

YES

/No_

Or are you pleading guilty because you are entering an Alford Plea?

YES~O_

56. Jfyou are e:ptering an Alford Plea, do you understand that the Court
will consider you just as guilty as if you enter a non-Alford plea?

YES./ NO_

57. Have you had any trouble answering any of the questions in his
form wbich_you could not resolve by discussing the issue(s) with
you attomej?

YES_NO ~

58. If you wer<provided with an interpreter to help you fill out this form,
have you bad any trouble understanding your interpreter?

YES_NO

59. Do you neJd any additional time before you enter your guilty plea(s)?

YES__ NO~

V

1

60. Do vou llllderstand that if the Court accepts your guiltv pJea(s) that
you. may not be able to withdraw your plca(s) at a later date?
61. Is there anything else you want to tell the court about that's affecting
your decision to plead guilty?

YES_NO /

-

I have answered the questions on pages 1-9 of this Guilty Plea Advisory Form truthfully,
understand all of tl,ie questions and answers herein, have discussed each question and answer with my
attorney, and ha've completed this form freely and voluntarily WITH A COMPLETE
UNDERSTANDING OF THE CHARGE(S) TO WHICH I AM PLEADING GUILTY AND
WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF TIIlS PLEA.
:ty.
Furthermore, no otjf has forced me or threatened me to plead

"

DATE:

1-S-.lZ?(b

I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I HAVE DIS
QUESTIONS ANJ? ANSWERS WI1H MY CLIENT.
DATE:

SSED IN DETAIL THE FOREGOING

l / 5 Y\ {.p

GUILTY PLEA ADVISORY FORM
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POST PLEA RIGHTS
A presentence investigation will be ordered by the Court unless both you and the State waive
that report and the Court approves that waiver. The Court may order evaluations as part of this
investigation AND THESE REPORTS WILL BE USED TO DETERMINE YOUR SENTENCE.
You have the right to remain silent during all proceedings and interviews from now until
sentencing WHICH INCLUDES THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION AND ANY COURT
ORDERED EVALUATIONS.
The information in the presentence interview and any evaluations (which will include any
statements you make in these processes) will be used by the Court in determining your sentence.
In particular if ypu are ordered to undergo a psychosexual evaluation (which can include a
polygraph examination), a domestic violence evaluation, a substance abuse evaluation or a
mental health exa,nination (which can include a psychological or psychiatric examination) you
will be asked extensive questions and your answers to those questions may be used against you
during sentencing.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Have you discµssed the right to remain silent with your attorney?
Do you underitand the nature of these rights?
Do you understand that you may waive these rights?
Have you wa~ved any of these rights in your plea agreement?
Do you have a,ny questions concerning either these rights or the waiver
of these rights.?
6. Have you disc;.ussed with your attorney your rights regarding your
attorney's att~ndance and presence during the presentence
investigation _gr these various evaluations?
7. Do you want the Court to order any particular evaluations to assist the
Court in deterprining your sentence in this case?

YES ~NO
YES v N O YES -v"'NO_
YES_L"NO_
YES_No/

YES v'°NO_
YES

NO~

If yes, which evaluations and why?

I ACKNOWLEDGE THE FOREGOING POST PLEA RIGHTS.

,

VZl!tl/L (!kl(
D

ENDAN

I ACKNOW}.,EDGE THAT I HAVE DIS
ABOVE WITH MY CLIENT.

I -- s- ~;;i..01/:=>

{T'-

Date

ED THE POST PLEA RIGHTS LISTED

V
Date

GUILTY PLEA ADVISORY FORM
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IN THE OISTRJCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT Of
THE STATE OF IOAHO IN ANO FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

Case No.: CR-2015-3326

STA TE OF IDAHO
vs.

PRETRIAL SETILEMENT AGREEMENT

MICHAEL JESSE CHISHOLM.
AKA: MICHAEL ALLEN PEDERSON •

- - - -

.. - -

--

OF FER EXPmES: 115/16

- - - ----- - - - - ------ ------ - -- - -

T he State offers t h at in,,exchange for the Defendant's gulltv plea(s) to:
Count

Charae

AGGRAVATED BATTERY

I

Statutorv Maximum Penalty

0-15 years prison/ 0 - $50,000 Fine

And Defendant's agreement to:

[El

Waive rights to appeal conviction and sentence {as described below).

t8)

Pay restitution: ft~ titution to victim - amount to be determined.

It will agree and recorn!"end as follows:

[8]

Sentence recommendation: State will limit its underlving sentencing recommendation to 5 fixed, plus
5 indeterminate, for a unified sentence of 10 years; State will seek full restitution for victim's
injuries; Standard fines and costs will be requested; •
Dismissal: State will dism.is-s -Counts 11, USE OF A FIREARM OR DEADLY WEAPON
DURING THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME, [extends- the 15 year penalty for Aggravated
Battery bv an afditional 15 years prison!.

will agree not t-0 pursue the additional chi l penalty of $5,000 to the victi:m per
19-5307, [this hrovision is in addition to restituUon. fines and eosts. J.

Other; State will

Other. DEFENhANT JS FREE TO MAKE SEPARATE RECOM.lVJENDATIONS.

NOTE: THE STATE'S'.;SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION (5 CONOlTfONED UPON NO FTAs (INCLUDING PRESENTENCE INTERVIEW} AND NO NEW CRIMINAL LAW VIOLATIONS BEFORE THE
r=:
TENCING

..

Dated: 26 October 2015'

~

BY SIGNING BELOW, l SfGNIFY THAT I ACCEPT THE ABOVE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT OFFER AND IN
CONSIOERATJOI') THEREOF DO KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY HEREBY WAIVE THE FOLLOWING
RIGHT$:
'
I.
Z.

The right to:appeal the conviction;
The right to) itppe11l simtence (except to the eirtent the term of actual incarceration or the fine is greater than is
recommended herein).

\·/ DATE
1 / tfu·

.I

I
I

A

/
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STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF BONNER
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FILED 3/8/2016 02:42 PM
MICHAEL W. ROSEDALE
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF,THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,
vs.
Michael Jesse Chisholm
Defendant.
DOB~
DL NONE JD

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CR-2015-0003326

FELONY JUDGMENT
(SENTENCE IMPOSED)

- - - - - - - - - - -- - --)
On Tuesday, March 08, 2016, before the Honorable Barbara Buchanan, District
Judge, you, MICHAEL JESSE CHISHOLM, personally appeared for a sentencing hearing.
Also appearing were Shane Greenbank, Prosecuting Attorney for Bonner County, Idaho,
and your Counsel, Daniel Taylor.

WHEREUPON, the previously ordered presentence report having been filed, and the
Court having ascertained that you have had an opportunity to read the presentence report
and review it with your lawyer, and you havil'.lQ been given the opportunity to explain,
correct or deny parts of the presentence report, and .recommendations having been made

by counsel for the State and by your lawyer, and there being no legal reason given why
judgment and sentence should not then be pronounced, the Court did then pronounce its

sentencing disposition as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that you, MICHAEL JESSE CHISHOLM, having been
advised of and having waived your constitutional rights to a) trial by jury; b) remain silent;
_and_ c) confront wjtnesses,.and thereaf!~r hC§''{i~g .P!~d g~ilty !o_the. ~rin1_i~.c:1I offla~~~(~)
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charged in the Information on file herein as follows:

Count 1 - tdaho Code §118-907
Battery-Aggravated, a Felony,
ARE GUilTY OF THE CRIME(S} SO CHARGED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Idaho Code §19-2513, you are
sentenced as follows: You are committed to the Idaho State Board of Correction for a total
unified sentence not to exceed 10 years, commencing with a fixed term of 2 years, to be
followed by an additional 8 years indeterminate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that you are assessed and ordered to pay a fine in the
amount of $1000, inclusive of all counts, to the Clerk of the Court. Such fine shall be paid

in full within forty eight months of your release from custody.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that you are assessed and ordered to pay court costs in
the amount of $245.50, inclusive of all counts, to the Clerk of the Court. Such costs shall
be paid in full within forty eight months of your release from custody.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that you shall reimburse the County for the expenses
incurred in the defense of this case in the amount of $500, inclusive of all counts, to the
Clerk of the Court. Such reimbursement shall be paid in full within forty eight months of
your release from custody.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that you shall pay restitution pursuant to any Order of
Restitution fifed in this case. In the event the amount of restitution has not yet been
determined, the State has sixty days from today's date to either request a restitution
hearing or to submit a stipulated restitution order and judgment, unless an extension of
time is authorized by this Court. If ordered, such restitution shall be paid in full within forty
eight months of your release from custody.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Idaho Code §19-5506, you are
required to provide a DNA sample and a fingerprint impression. Wherefore, you shall pay

$100 restitution to help offset costs incurred by any of the foUowing entitled law
enforcement agencies for the_expense of DNA analysis: Idaho state police, county or city

law enforcement agencies. or the office of the attorney general, county prosecuting
attorneys or city attorneys.
. ......... . . .
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that you shall pay to the Idaho Department of
Corrections an amount not to exceed one-hundred dollars ($100) which will be used as
reimbursement for its costs of conducting your Presentence Investigation. Such
reimbursement shall be paid in full within forty eight months of your release from custody.

tT IS FURTHER ORDERED that payments for any fine, court costs, reimbursement,

and restitution ordered herein shall be made payable to the Clerk of the Court in cash,
certified check, cashier's check, or money order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any bail posted in this matter shall be exonerated,
provided that any deposit shall be applied pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2923.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that you shall be given credit for all time served on the
above charge(s). The parties stipulate that you have accrued 58 days pre-sentence jail time
for which you shall recieve credit.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that you are committed to the custody of the Idaho State
Board of Corrections, and are remanded to the custody of the County Sheriff for transport
to the same.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that you have a right to appeal this order to the Idaho
Supreme Court Any notice of appeal must be filed within forty-two (42) days of the entry
of the written order in this matter.

YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that if you are unable to pay the costs of an appeal,
you have the right to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis or to apply for the

appointment of counsel at public expense. If you have questions concerning your right to
appeal, you should consult your present lawyer.

DATED: March 8, 2016.
BARBARABUC~
District Judge
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RECEIPT BY DEFENDANT
I, the undersinged defendant, hereby acknowledge receipt of a copy of the foregoing
order.
/'
DATED: March 8, 2016.

(-.......· \.
J. HALL, WITNES
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the q'f'\ day ot_lrla_-1-A~
"'_1'.~ - - - - - - - ·
a true and correct copy of the foregoing was ~ I J o w s:

t,01l,.

Shane Greenbank, Bonner County Prosecutor
Served via interoffice mail.
Daniel Taylor, Attomey¥orfendant
Served via:
ail
[
If mailed, m
:

J Hand Delivered

[ ] Fax

't:xt:P~ [ ]Hand Delivered

[ J Fax

Bonner County Sheriff's Offi~
Served via:

Idaho Department of Corrections
centralrecords@idoc.idaho.gov
Probation & Parole
dist1@idoc.idaho.gov
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JAMES, VERNON~ WEEKS, P.A.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
MELANIE E. BAILLIE
LEANDER L. JAMES*
DANIEL M. KEYES*• 0
WESS. LARSEN*• 0
STEPHEN J. NEMEC*f

DoUGLAS A. PIERCE*
CRAIG K. VERNON*
SUSAN P. WEEKS
STEVEN C. WETZEL+

ALL ATTORNEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO
tREGlSTER ED PATENT ATfORNEY
*LICENSED IN WASHINGTON
0

LICENSED IN MONTANA
•LICENSED IN ALASKA

•LICENSED lN UTAH

+OF COUNSEL

February 1, 2016

***FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES ONLY***
r--

Steve Johnson
Regional Claims Manager
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company
1250 S. Allante Avenue
Boise, ID 83709
Re:

Claim Number:·
Date of Loss:
Your Insured:
Our Client:

010388720120·1506280]
June 28, 2015
Edgar Cook
Joseph Stanczak

Dear Mr. Johnson:
This letter constitutes Joseph Stanczak's settlement proposal. Joseph is entitled to recover
from your insured the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate him for the
damages proximately caused by Mr. Cook's negligence.

FACTS:
On June 28, 2015, Joseph Stanczak and his girlfriend, Susan Jackson, were camping on
your insured's property, known as the Bloom Lake Campground. Bloom Lake was a private
campground open to the public for recreational use, and Joseph and Susan had camped at the
lake for a couple of weekends already that month. 'The campground caretaker, Michael Jesse
Chisholm, and Mr. Chisholm's friend, Sarah "Sally" Johns, had been spending time with Joseph
and Susan whi1e they were camping. Although he was acting as the caretaker of the campground,
Michael Chisholm consumed alcohol to the point of intoxication during the time he spent with
Joseph and Susan. At some point that evening, Mr. Chisholm invited Joseph and Susan to spend
the night in the caretaker's cabin because they were having trouble fighting off mosquitos while
in their tent. However, after Joseph and Susan arrived at the cabin, Mr. Chisholm became
belligerent and inappropriate towards Susan. After a verbal argument~ Joseph left the cabin and
walked toward Susan's pickup truck to go back to his tent. However, as Joseph was walking
1626 LINCOLN WAY, COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83814

TELEPHONE: (208) 667-0683

OFFICES ALSO LOCATED IN BOISE, IDAHO AND SEATILE,

~l!Rffi?8tB~

FACSIMILE: (208) 664-1684
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away from Mr. Chisholm and toward the truck, Mr. Chisholm pulled out a .45 caliber handgun
and shot Joseph twice: once in the back and once in the left arm. Mr. Chisholm then jumped into
his own truck and drove away (while still intoxicated) from the scene of the shooting. After
crashing his truck, he was eventually found hiding in the woods by local authorities using
canines. Mr. Chisholm was charged with aggravated battery (I.C. § 18-907) and use of a deadly
weapon in commission of a felony (l.C. § 19-2520). The police report is attached, as well as
photographs of Joseph's wounds.

LIABILITY:
Under Idaho law, the duty that owners and possessors of land owe to a land entrant
depends on whether the entrant is an invitee, licensee, or trespasser. A licensee is a visitor who
goes upon the premises of another with the consent of the landowner in pursuit of the visitor's
purpose. The duty toward a licensee is such that a landowner is required to share knowledge of
dangerous conditions or activities on the land with the licensee. Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400,
401, 732 P.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1987). The landowner also owes a duty to a licensee to avoid
willfully or wantonly injuring him, and to refrain from exposing him to dangerous
instnunentalities on the premises which are unknown to the licensee. Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,
105 Idaho 649, 652, 671 P.2d 1112 (Ct. App. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 107 Idaho 593, 691
P.2d 1208 (1984).
Joseph entered onto your insured's property at Bloom Lake pursuant to the purpose of
fishing and camping and enjoying the lake. Joseph could be considered a licensee on your
insured's property; thus, Mr. Cook owed Joseph a duty to share knowledge of dangerous
conditions or activities on the land, to avoid willfully or wantonly injuring him, and to avoid
exposing him to dangerous instrumentalities on the premises. Mr. Cook breached this duty by
exposing Joseph to a dangerous and violent individual, Michael Chisholm, with a criminal
background and multiple firearms in his possession (which he stored in your cabin). As the
owner of the property, your insured knew or should have known of this dangerous condition on
his land. In contrast, Joseph did not know, and was unable to take precautions for his own safety.
Mr. Chisholm's actions resulted in Joseph's injuries. Thus, Mr. Cook~s breach of his duty to
Joseph was the proximate cause of Joseph's injuries.
In the event that your insured's property at Bloom Lake was open to the public, and that

Mr. Cook required or solicited "donations" from campers (as is suggested by the Facebook posts
attached hereto), then Idaho law would mandate a higher duty of care towards Joseph, who
would be considered an invitee:
An invitee is one who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose
connected with the business conducted on the land, or where it can reasonably be
said that the visit may confer a business, commercial, monetary or other tangible
benefit to the landowner. Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 347 P.2d 341 (1959). A
landowner owes an invitee the duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe
condition, or to warn of hidden or concealed dangers. Bates v. Eastern Idaho
Regional Medical Center, 114 Idaho 252,253, 755 P.2d 1290, 1291 (1988).
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Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 400, 871 P.2d 814, 817 (] 994); see also Martin v.
Brown, 56 Idaho 379, 54 P.2d 1157 (1936). Moreover, "[it] is the proprietor's superior
knowledge of the perilous instrumentality and the danger therefrom to persons going upon the
property. It is when the perilous instrumentality is known to the owner or occupant and not to the
person injured that a recovery is permitted." Martin, 56 Idaho at 379, 54 P.2d at 1158; see also
Morgan v. State, Dept. of Public Works, 124 Idaho 658,665,862 P.2d 1080, 1087 (1993).
Mr. Cook was required under Idaho law to maintain his premises in a reasonably safe
condition. This would entail performing background checks on all caretakers, inspecting the
caretaker cabin and property for any hidden or concealed dangers or perilous instrumentalities
(such as guns), and warning Joseph and others of these dangers. Your insured did not do so.
'
In response to any argument that Mr. Chisholm was not Mr. Cook' s employee, please be
informed that this does not prevent Mr. Cook from being liable. Idaho law recognizes agency
relationships created by apparent authority. Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 147
Idaho 109, 113, 206 P.3d 473, 477 (2009). Apparent authority may arise even when actual
authority is absent. The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained:
Apparent authority is created when the principal "voluntarily places an agent in
such a position that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with the business
usages and the nature of a particular business, is justified in believing that ·the
agent is acting pursuant to existing authority." Clark, 95 Idaho at 12, 501 P.2d at
280. See also Bailey, supra; Tri-Circle, Inc. v. Brugger Corp., 121 Idaho 950,
955, 829 P.2d 540, 545 (Ct.App.1992); Hieb v. Minnesota Farmers Union, 105
Idaho 694, 697, 672 P.2d 572, 575 (Ct.App.1983). "Apparent authority differs
from express and imp]ied authority in that it is not based on the words and
conduct of the principal toward the agent, but on the principal's words and
conduct toward a third party." Tri-Circle, 121 Idaho at 954-55, 829 P.2d at 54445.

Landvik by Landvik v. Herbert, 130 Idaho 54, 59, 936 P.2d 697, 702 (Ct. App. 1997). In like
manner, Idaho Supreme Court has stated:
Section 2.03 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency defines "apparent authority" as
"the power held by an agent or other actor to affect a principal's legal relations
with third parties when a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to
act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal's
manifestations." Restatement (Third) of Agency, § 2.03 (2006). The rationale for
imposing liability under apparent authority is so "[aJ principal may not choose to
act through agents whom it has clothed with the trappings of authority and then
determine at a later time whether the consequence of their acts offers an
advantage." Id. at§ 2.03, comment c.

Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109, 113-14, 206 P.3d 473, 477-78

(2009).
02/08/2016 11 :17 AM 96497_5228
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Even if Mr. Chisholm was not officially your insured's employee or his property
caretaker, he was still Mr. Cook's agent. Joseph reasonably believed that Mr. Chisholm was the
caretaker at Bloom Lake, and his belief is traceable to your insured's manifestations as the
property owner: Mr. Cook allowed Mr. Chisholm access to his property and the caretaker's cabin
at Bloom Lake, and he allowed Mr. Chisholm to hold himself out to the public (including to
Joseph) as the caretaker of the property. Furthermore, in light of visitor postings on the Bloom
Lake Facebook page (see the attached Facebook posts), other visitors to the area have also
believed that Mr. Chisholm was the owner/caretaker at Bloom Lake. Your insured cannot, as the
Supreme Court states, clothe Mr. Chisholm with the "trappings of authority" and then suddenly
remove that authority simply because it proves inconvenient.
As shown above, Joseph has a viable claim against your insured for the injuries he
incurred on Mr. Cook's property at the hands of one with apparent authority to care for and
oversee his property. Your insured owed a duty to Joseph to keep the premises safe, to warn him
of dangerous conditions and activities on the land, and to prevent Joseph from being harmed on
the property. Your insured also owed a duty to perfom1 a background check on and properly
supervise his agent, Mr. Chisholm. Your insured's breach of these duties resulted in Joseph
being injured.

DAMAGESffREATMENT:
After Mr. Chisholm shot Joseph and the authorities were called, Bonner County EMS
came to assist and Joseph was flown by Life Flight Network to Kootenai Medical Center in
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, trauma code red. At Kootenai Medical Center, Joseph complained of
significant left hip pain as well as left shoulder and deltoid pain. Henry Amon, Jr., M.D.,
performed an abdominal ultrasound to rule out blood in the abdominal cavity; he also performed
an ultrasound of the left leg. CT scans of the head, neck, chest, abdomen, and pelvis were used to
assess Joseph's wounds. Scott Brown, D.0., noted a comminuted fracture of the left iliac crest.
He also noted a retained foreign body (the bullet) localized to the lateral aspect of the bladder on
the left. Vascular surgeon Christopher Ward, M.D., noted that because of the location of the
bullet in the iliac fossa/pelvic bone, iliac artery or vein injury would be high risk, and also put
Joseph at risk for limb ischemia, hemorrhage, and damage to adjacent structures during repair or
even death. Dr. Ward suggested proceeding with diagnostic laparoscopy surgery. Trauma
surgeon Antoine Sarkis, M.D., performed the surgery. Dr. Sarkis noted that Joseph had one
gunshot wound with entry at to the left subscapular region, and that the bullet traveled through
the left lateral chest wall and abdominal wall, then entered the pelvis, causing a fracture to the
left ilium. The bullet was lodged in the retroperitoneal region of the pelvis in proximity of the
external iliac artery and vein. Dr. Sarkis also noted that Joseph had another wound in the left
deltoid region that was related to another bullet that grazed over the area causing injury to the
skin and superficial subcutaneous layer. Joseph was taken to the operating room, and a small
incision was made at the umbilicus and pneumoperitoneum and a 5 mm port was introduced.
Two additional ports were placed in the lower abdomen. During the laparoscopy, Dr. Sarkis
could see that there was no evidence of intraperitoneal injury. However, due to the location of
the bullet in relation to the iliac artery, Dr. Sarkis was unable to remove the bullet from Joseph's
pelvis. Following the laparoscopy, Dr. Sarkis closed the bullet entry wounds.
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Following the surgery, Joseph was admitted to Kootenai Medical Center's intensive care
unit in critical but stable condition. He was discharged on June 30, 2015.
On July 6, 2015, Joseph arrived at Boundary Community Hospital and saw Robert Yost,
M.D., for a wound recheck and to get pain medication. Dr. Yost advised Joseph to continue to
pack the wound on the back once per day, apply antibiotic dressings and use pain medication as
prescribed for pain. On July 18, 2015, Joseph returned to Boundary Community Hospital for a
prescription medication refill and to have the gunshot wounds redressed.
On August 5, 2015, Joseph presented at Orthopedic Surgery and Sports Medicine in
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, to follow up with Scott Brown, D.O. Dr. Brown noted that Joseph had
pain with pressure applied to the iliac crest/ASIS, and had pain with active and passive hip
motion. The doctor also noted that Joseph's other symptoms included fever, weakness,
instability, fatigue, loss of motion, pain, sleep disturbances, limit of motion and radiation of pain
on the injury involved side. His symptoms were worse with activity, when sitting, while walking
and climbing stairs. Dr. Brown noted that the symptoms would worsen as the day progressed.
Upon reviewing new imaging, Dr. Brown noted progressive healing of the left iliac wing
fracture. No interval change in position. The retained cartridge from the gunshot was also
visualized. Dr. Brown gave Joseph a prescription for physical therapy with emphasis on HEP.
On August 12, 2015, Joseph went to Boundary Community Clinic to get established with
a primary care provider near his home and to obtain follow-up care for the gunshot wound. He
met with Michael Snyder, M.D. Joseph reported that his symptoms were severe, with a pain level
of 5/10 at rest and 7/10 with activity. Dr. Snyder prescribed Endocet to be taken every four hours
for pain. Joseph followed up with Dr. Snyder on October 19, 2015, for pain management.
Joseph still experiences debilitating pain each day due to the .45 ca1iber slug that is
pennanently embedded in his pelvic bone. He is in need of further medical treatment and
physical therapy, but has exhausted the funds available to him via the Crime Victims
Compensation Fund and does not have health insurance due to his inability to work. Mr.
Chisholm's careless actions have left Joseph with permanent pain and no way to continue in his
welding profession or obtain the medical treatment he stil1 needs.
Joseph has incurred the following medical expenses to date:
Provider
Life Flight Network
Kootenai Medical Center
Kootenai Health
Anesthesia Associates of Coeur d'Alene
Boundary Community Hospital
Kootenai Imaging
Boundary Community Clinic
Orthopedic Surgery and Sports Medicine
Medicine Man Bonners Ferry
Safeway Nos. 1470 and 2954
Total

Date(s) ofService
06/28/15
06/28/15; 06/29/15; 06/30/15
06/28/15
06/28/15
07/06/15
06/28/15
08/12/15; 10/19/15
08/05/15

Charge
$30,800.00
41,198.22
4,326.00
2,200.00
356.00
390.00
358.00
100.00
240.85
343.98
$80,313.05
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Medica] records and bil1s are attached, separated by provider.
FUTURE MEDICAL TREATMENT:
As noted above, Dr. Brown prescribed physical therapy. However, Joseph has not been
able to obtain the therapy because he has no way to pay for it, and the physical therapists in his
area will not provide treatment on credit. At two times weekly and $200/session, eight weeks of
physical therapy amounts to $3,200.00. Please recognize that this is simply an estimate; Joseph
will likely need more than 16 therapy sessions. Furthermore, he would need at least one
additional follow-up visit with Dr. Brown (as directed), and regular follow-up visits with Dr.
Snyder as primary care provider, as well as updated imaging. This equates to roughly $1,000.00
of additional physician treatment. Furthermore, due to the extreme pain generated by the bullet
being lodge in Joseph's pelvic bone, he will need perpetual refills of prescription pain
medication, which for a twelve-month period totals about $1,800.00. Total future medical
treatment and medication is therefore in excess of $10,000.00.
LOST WAGES AND LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY:
Joseph previously worked as a welder for Advanced Paint and Construction in Montana
prior to moving to Bonners Ferry, Idaho a few months before the shooting to care for his ill
fiance. While working for Advanced, Joseph earned $24.00/hour and worked full-time. His job
duties required him to crawl into difficult spaces, be on his feet or in awkward positions for
hours at a time, and occasionally lift over 75 lbs. He made roughly $50,000.00 a year as a welder
due to his trained skills.

Although Joseph had intended to work as a welder again for Advanced or a similar
company following his relocation, he is now not able to work because of his injuries - and his
injuries make him a worker's compensation liability to future employers. The pennanentlyembedded bullet in his pelvic bone causes him constant pain, especially with activity. He has
been prescribed physical therapy but, due to having no job, no income, and no health insurance
cannot afford to obtain the necessary treatment. He is scared and uncertain about how long he
will be unemployable in his trained profession, and how he will obtain further treatment and pay
living expenses without income or insurance.
To date, Joseph has past lost wages equal to $29,760.00 (31 weeks X 40 hours/week X
$24.00/hour). Furthermore, there is no indication that he will ever be able to work again as a
welder given the permanent nature of his injuries and the physical job requirements, especially
because of the bullet's dangerous proximity to the iliac artery. As Joseph is currently 44 years
old, he has at least 21 working years ahead of him. Even at a modest salary of $40,000.00/year,
this still equates to $840,000.00 in lost future wages. While this wage loss amount could be
discounted in the future should Joseph obtain the remaining treatment he needs and find some
sort of part-time work that does not aggravate his injuries, the amount of lost future wages and
lost earning capacity is still substantial.
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GENERAL DAMAGES:
Joseph's general damages fall between the range of $500,000.00 to $3,000,000.00.
CONCLUSION:
Joseph suffered greatly during the months following his injury, and could very easily
have died. He still has significant pain because of the injury and is unable to obtain continuing
medical treatment due to a lack of health insurance and income. Your insured is 100% liable for
Joseph's injuries and inability to work, as but for your insured's negligence Mr. Chisholm would
not have shot Joseph in the back on June 28, 2015.
Although liability is clear and Joseph's damages are astronomical, he is reasonable and
recognizes the expense and risks of proceeding with litigation. I am therefore authorized to offer
settlement in the amount of $950,000.00.
Please contact me within sixty (60) days from the date of this letter, either via phone at
(208) 667-0683 or via email at wes@jvwlaw.net, to discuss the resolution of Joseph's claims.
Sincerely,
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

!1.L::!~
Attorney at Law

Encls.
cc: Joseph Stanczak (without enclosures)
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AUG 15 2016
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BAAAffi
ROCK & FIELDS, CHTD. '

JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
WES S. LARSEN, ISB #9134
1626 Lincoln Way

Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-0683

Facsimile: (208) 664-1684

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST .nJDICIAL DISTRICT OF'THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
JOSEPH STANCZAK,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2016-679
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR

vs.

DAMAGES
ED W. COOK and LAURIE COOK,
individually and as husband and wife;

BLOOMLAKECAMPGROUND;and
MICHAEL JESSE CIIlSHOLM,

individually,
Defendants.

Plaintiff.. by and through his attomey of record, Wes S. Larsen of James, Vernon & Weeks,
P.A., hereby complains and alleges as follows:

I.
1.1

IDENTITY OF THE PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
PLAINTIFF JOSEPH STANCZAK: At all times mate1ial hereto, Plaintiff Joseph

Stanczak resided in Boundary Comity, State ofldaho. Plaintiff incurred serious personal injuties
as a direct and pl'oximate result of the Defendants' acts and omissions, and each ofthem, in Boime1·
County, State ofldaho.
1.2

DEFENDANT ED W. COOK: Upon information and belief, at all times material

hereto Defendant Ed W. Cook resided in Bonner County, State of Idaho, and was manied to
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES - 1
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Defendant Laurie Cook. Upon information and belief, at all times material hereto Defendant Ed
W._ Cook owned real property lmown as the Bloom Lake Campground in Bonner County, State of
Idaho, together with Defendant Laurie Cook.
1.3

DEFENDANT LAURIE COOK: Upon information and belief, at all times mate1ial

hereto Defendant Lamie Cook resided in Bonner County, State of Idaho, and was mani.ed to

Defendant Ed W. Cook. Upon information and belief, at all times material hereto Defendant Laurie
Cook owned real property known as the Bloom Lake Campground in Bonner County, State of
Idaho, together with Defendant Ed W. Cook.
1.4

DEFENDANT BLOOM LA.KE CAMPGROUND: Upon informa~on and belief

and at all times material hereto, Defendant Bloom Lake. Campground is a campground and

.

recreational area located in Bonner County, State ofldaho, privately owned by Defendants Ed W.
Cook and Laurie Cook. Plaintiff was injured on 01· about June 28, 2015, while staying at the Bloom
Lake Campground.
1.5

DEFENDANT MICHAEL JESSE CHISHOLM: At all times mate1ial hereto,

Defendant Michael Jesse Chisholm resided in Bonner County, State of Idaho, at tbe caretaker's
cabin of the Bloom Lake Campground. Upon information and belief, at all times material hereto
Defendant Chisholm was the agent of Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook, and Bloom Lake
Campgl'Ound, and was the host and cai:~taker of the campground.
1.6

This Court has jurisdiction and venue is appropriate by virtue of Idaho Code §§ 5-

404 and 5-514. _
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II.

2.1

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this

Complaint as if set forth herein.
2.2

On or about June 28, 2015, Plaintiff Joseph Stanczak. and his girlfriend, Susan

Jackson, were camping at the Bloom Lake Campground in Bonner County, Idaho. The couple had
stayed at the campground a few times previously that summer. ~he campground and recreational
area were owned by Defendants Ed. W. Cook and Laude Cook.
2.3

Defendant Michael Jesse Chisholm, the host and caretaker of the Bloom Lake

Campground, visited with Plaintiff and Susan at their campsite and helped them set up camp.
Defendant Chisholm was accompanied by his gidfriend, Sarah "Sally'' Johns. Later in the evening,
Defendant Chisholm invited Plaintiff and Susan to stay at the Bloom Lake caretaker's cabin.
2.4

While at the caretaker's cabin, after Susan had gone to bed, Defendant Chisholm

be~ame intoxicated with alcohol and began arguing with Plaintiff. Plaintiff decided to leave the
cabin and 1·eturn to the campsite. However, as Plaintiff walked away from th~ cabin, Defendant, in
bis-intoxicated state, fired rounds with a .45 caliber handgun. Two of these rounds struck Plaintiff
in the upper left arm and upper back, with the latter bullet traveling down and becoming
pe1manently lodged in his pelvic pone.

2.5

Following the shooting, Plaintiff was taken to a local hospital by helicopter and was

admitted as an inpatient.
2.6

Local law enforcement subsequently found several firearms stored 1n the Bloom

Lake Campground caretaker's cabin.
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3.1

CAUSES OF ACTION

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this

Complaint as if set forth herein.
First Cause of Action: Pa·emises Liability

(As to Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook. and Bloom Lake Campground)
3.2.1

Plaintiffl'ealleges and incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this

Complaint as if set forth herein.
3.2.2 Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook, and Bloom Lake Campground, as
owners and/or possessors of land, had a duty to their invitees, social guests, and licensees,
including the Plaintiff, to ·inspect and keep the premis~ reasonably safe and warn of known
dangers.
3.2.3 Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook, and Bloom Lake Campground, and
each of them, failed to exercise· ordimuy and reasonable care to keep the premises

reasonably safe from and to wam Plaintiff ofDefendant Chisholm's reasonably foreseeable
conduct.
3.2.4 Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook, and Bloom Lake Campground, and
each of them, breached this duty by failing to wam and protect Plaintiff :from a firearm
being discharged by Defendant Chisholm while intoxicated on the Defendants' property.
3.2.5 As a dfrect and proximate result of the Defendants' acts or omissions,
Plaintiff was seriously injured. Plaintiff has incurred and will likely continue to incur
damages. These damages include medical expenses, lost wages, out-of-pocket expenses,
and other expenses to be proved at the time of trial, all to said Plaintiff's general damages

in an amount now unknown. These damages further include physical injury, diminished

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES - 4

298

ability to fum~tion at home and work, disfigurement, anxiety, frustl'ation, concem, and

, I

I

general emotional upset.

!

~

I

Second Cause of Action: Negligent Supe1'Visio11 .

(As to Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook, and Blooin Lake Campground)

3.2.6 Plaintiffrealleges and incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of1his
Complaint as if set forth.herein.
3.2.7 Defendall1s Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook, and Bloom Lake Campgl'Ound
breached a common law duty ofreasonable care by failing to properly supervise their agent,
Defendant Michael Jesse Chisholm, to prevent injury to campground invitees and licensees
on their property, including the Plaintiff.
3.2.8 Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook, and Bloom Lake Campground, and
each of thein, breached the common law duty of reasonable ~are by failing to properly

supervise Defendant Chisholm to prevent him from becoming intoxicated and discharging
firearms, which could result in injury to campground invitees and licensees, including the
Plaintiff.
3.2.9

Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook, and Bloom Lake Campground, and

each of them, breached th~ common law duty of reasonable care by failing to protect from

or warn Plaintiff of the dangers posed by Defendant Chisholm becoming intoxicated and
discharging firearms.
3.2.10 As a proximate result of Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook, and Bloom
Lake Campground's breaches of duty, acts, and omissions as desclibed above, Plaintiff

was injured by multiple .45 caliber rounds while at the Bloom Lake Campground.
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3.2.11 Defendant Michael Jesse Chisholm, while in the course and scope of his
agency as host and caretaker of the Bloom Lake Campground, violated statutory and

common law duties by discharging a firerum while intoxicated.

3.2.12 As a direct and proximate resuit of the Defendants' acts or omissions,
Plaintiff was seriously injured. Plaintiff has incurred and will likely continue to incur
damages. These damages include medical expenses, lost wages, out-of-pocket expenses,
and other expenses to be proved at the time of trial, all to said Plaintiff's general damages
in an amount now unknown. These damages further include physical injwy, diminished
ability to function at home and wol'lc, disfigurement, anxiety, frustration, concern, and
general emotional upset.

Third Cause of Action: Strict Liability

(As to Defendant Michael Jesse Chisholm)

3.2.13 Plaintiffrealleges and incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this
Complaint as if set forth herein.
3.2.14 Defendant Michael Jesse Chisholm was engaged in ultra-hazardous
activities, including but not limited to:
a.

Maintaining a loaded firew.m on the premises;

b.

Handling a loaded firearm while intoxicated, in close

proximity to Plaintiff and others; and
c.

Firing a loaded fireann while intoxicated, resulting in Plaintiff
being injured.

3.2.15 Plaintiff did not know that Defendant Chisholm had a hand~ that the gun
was pointed in his general direction, or that the gun was loaded. Plaintiff had his back turned
F[RST AMENDED COMPLAlNT FOR DAMAGES • 6
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to Defendant Chisholm and did not expect Defendant to discharge a fireru.m, or to be 'injured
by a round fired from a firerum.
3.2.16 Defendant Chisholm is liable to Plaintiff for all damages proximately caused
by each of said activities, regardless of the degree of care or negligence on the pru.1 of the ·

Defendant.
3.2.17 As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's acts or omissions,

!!
I
l

I
1

I
j

Plaintiff was seriously injured. Plaintiff has incurred and will likely continue to incm·

damages. These damages include medical expenses, lost wages, out-ofwpocket expenses,
and other expenses to be proved at the time of trial, all to said Plaintiff's general damages
in an amount now unknown. These damages fiuther include physical injury, diminished
ability to function at home and work, disfigurement, anxiety, frustration, concern, and

general emotional upset.

Fow·th Cause of Action: Negligent, Recldess, and Tortious Conduct

(As to Defendant Michael Jes.9e Chisholm)
3.2.18 Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference al] other paragraphs of this
Complaint as if set f01th herein.
3 .2.19 At all times material hereto, Defendant Chisholm had certain duties
imposed upon him by law, which Defendant then and there owed to Plaintiff, including the .
duties to handle his gun in a manner that was safe, to not handle ot· discharge the gun while
intoxicated, and to protect persons on the p1'emises ftom unreasonable risk· of harm.

Defendant tortiously, negligently, and recklessly breached said duties by:
a.

Handling the .45 caliber handgun in an unsafe manner while

intoxicated, resulting in injury to Plaintiff;
FlRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES - 7
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b.

Maintaining a dangerous condition on the premises, including a
loaded gun;

c.

Failing to give waming to Plaintiff of hazards on the premises; and

d.

Exposing Plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm· on the premises.

3.2.20 As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's tortious, negligent, and
reckless acts or omissions, Plaintiff Joseph Stanczak was seriously injured. Plaintiff has
incurred and wilt likely continue to. incur damages. These damages include medical
expenses, lost wages, out-of-pocket expenses, and other expenses to be proved at the time
of trial, all to said Plaintiff's general damages in an amount now unknown. These damages
furthel' include physical injury, diminished ability to function at home and work.
disfigurement, anxiety, frustration, concern, and general emotional upset.

IV.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE Pl~ffprays for judgment against the Defendants, and each of them, in
said sums exceeding $10,000.00 that will fully and fairly compensate.him for his injuries and

damages, including loss of past, present, and future medical expenses; lost wages and loss of
eaming capacity; past, present, and future pain and suffering; and loss of enjoyment of life,
together with attorney's fees, costs and interest and such other relief as the Court may deem
appropriate.
I

Dated this

~

day of July, 2016.
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS P.A.

Wes S. Larsen, ISB #9134
wes@jvwlaw.net
Attorney for Plaintiff Joseph Stanczak
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES - 8
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MOFFATT
THOMAS
Attorneys at Law

James L. Martin
(208) 385-5303

jlm@moffatt.com

MAILING ADDRESS:
PO Box 829
Boise ID 83701.0829

PHYSICAL ADDRESS:
IOI S Capitol Blvd 10th A
Boise ID 83702-7710

,uww.moffatt.com

208.345.2000 MAIN
800.422.2889 TOLI.,FREE
208.385.5384 FAX

~ugust 22, 2016

Michael T. Howard
Winston & Cashatt Idaho
250 Northwest Blvd., Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

Re:

Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho v. Edgar Cook, Jr. and Laurie
Co_ok, et al.
MTBR&F File No. 13900.0252

Dear Mr. Howard:

•

We are in receipt of your letter dated August 9, 2016, which included a courtesy copy of the
First Amended Complaint filed by Joseph Stanczak ("Stanczak") against Michael Chisholm
("Chisholm") and Ed and Laurie Cook (the "Cooks"). On behalf of the Cooks, you tendered
the defense of the First Amended Complaint to our client, Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Company ofldaho ("Farm Bureau"), and asked that the company review the same and advise
you as to.Farm Bureau's coverage position in light of the filing of this First Amended
· Complaint;

l

Farm Bureau has now had a chance to review the First Amended Complaint and its prior
coverage positions and based upon the same, we have been instructed to inform you that Farm
Bureau stands on its prior coverage position relative to this matter. The filing of this First
Amended Complaint does not change Farm Bureau's position that there is no coverage under
the Cook's insurance policy with Farm Bureau, and thus, there is no duty to defend or
indemnify the Cooks for the claims being asserted by Stanczak.

A.

The First Amended Complaint

In the First Amended Complaint, it appears that Stanczak deleted references to the fact that the
Cooks "operated" the Bloom Lake Campground as "a private for profit business." It also
appears that Stanczak deleted the reference that Chisholm was an employee of the Cooks, but
still left in the reference to him being the Cooks' agent. In paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3, in the prior
. original complaint Stanczak alleges that the Cooks "owned and operated" the Bloom Lake
Campground and that it was a "private for profit business." The First Amended Complaint
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states that the Cooks owned the campground and Stanczak deleted the reference that it was a
"private for profit" business.
In paragraph 1.4, the original Complaint read that the Cooks owned and operated the
campground, where the First Amended Complaint states simply that the Cooks owned the
Bloom Lake Campground. Stanczak also previously alleged in the original Complaint that
Bloom Lake Campground is a "for profif' campground and privately owned by the Cooks. In
the amended paragraph 1.4, Stanczak deleted the adjective "for profit" in front of his
references to "campground."
For Stanczak's causes of action against the Cooks, Stanczak in his negligent supervision claim,
paragraph 3.2.7, instead of alleging that the Cooks failed to supervise their "agent/employee,"
he alleges that the Cooks failed to supervise their "agent" and deleted references to
"employee." Stanczak made similar changes to paragraph 3.2.11. That is he alleges that
Chisholm was acting "while in the course and scope of his agency" as host and caretaker
instead of alleging that Chisholm was acting ''while in the course and scope of his employment
and agency".
Your letter of August 9, 2016, did not provide any analysis as to why the filing of the First
Amended Complaint should change Farm Bureau's prior coverage position. Nor did it describe
the above-referenced changes that were made by Stanczak or how those changes might impact
Fann Bureau's prior coverage analysis. We are happy to review your thoughts in that regard
should you provide them. Nevertheless, without the benefit of your thoughts, we have
proceeded to conduct the review you requested.
B.

Analysis
1.

The Amended Allegations

As it appears that Stanczak only amended the allegations in the complaint that related to the two
causes of actions asserted against the Cooks, namely the Negligent Supervision and Premises
Liability claims. This, our review, is limited to whether these new amended allegations against
the Cooks, trigger coverage under the Cooks' policy. As no changes were made to the
allegations Stanczak made against Chisholm, we need not analyze coverage for the claims
against him and simply reiterate that there is no coverage for the allegations against Chisholm
as outlined in previous correspondence.
From the changes made by Stanczak in his First Amended Complaint, it appears he is unsure
whether the Cooks themselves operated the campground and if so, whether they intended to
make a profit operating the campground. He also appears to recognize that the Cooks did not
pay Chisholm a salary or wages, but that he did get to live at the cabin for free in exchange for
keeping up the campground and doing other work for the Cooks--thus, the change in the
amended complaint alleging Chisholm was just the Cooks' agent as opposed to their agent and
employee.
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These new a11egations do not change Farm Bureau's coverage opinion. Whether or not the
Cooks were actually "operating" the campground "for profit" is not the key basis for the denial
of coverage. Fann Bureau has previously cited to Coverage Section II, Exclusion Number 1,
which precludes coverage arising from the insured's business activities. Even with the new
allegations, Fann Bureau still asserts that the business activities exclusion applies. The Cooks
are insureds, and this claim relates to their business activities of having a campground on their
property. In looking at whether an activity is a business pursuit, the courts will typically look
at: whether the activity is customary to a business pursuit and whether the objective and
purpose of the activity are commercial in nature, and in furtherance of the business, or the
means of livelihood. Blacks v. Fireman's Fund American Ins., 115 Idaho 449 (Ct. App. 1989).
Applying these factors, the Cooks' activity of offering up campground sites in exchange for a
voluntary fee, may be considered a business pursuit as its objective may be deemed to be
commercial in nature. It does not appear to matter whether the Cooks made a profit on this
activity for it to be considered a business pursuit which would then bar any coverage for that
activity under the business activities exclusion. The fact of the matter is the Cooks had a
campground on their property for which they or Chisholm accepted a fee from campers to stay
at the campground.
Fann Bureau preciously cited to several other exclusions, including preclusion of coverages for
bodily injury intentionally caused by an insured or bodily injury arising out of the violation of a
criminal law by an insured. These exclusions only apply if the insured acted intentionally or
violated a criminal act. While these exclusions apply to Stanczak's allegations against
Chisholm, to the extent he is an insured under the Cooks' policy, they would also apply to the
Cooks to the extent Stanczak alleges, like he has here, that Stanczak was Cooks' agent.
Regardless, the main thrust of Farm Bureau's denial for the shooting of Stanczak by Chisholm,
whether as alleged in the original Complaint or the First Amended Complaint, is that no
"occurrence" occurred under the Cooks' policy. Pursuant to the Cooks' policy, "occurrence" is
defined as:

Occurrence means an accident, including continuous or repeated
exposure to the same harmful conditions, which results in
unexpected bodily injury or property damage during the policy
period. All bodily injury and property damage resulting from a
common cause will be considered the result of one occurrence.
(emphasis added). Section II Liability Coverage of the Cooks' policy contains two relevant
coverages, Fl (Bodily Injury Liabi1ity) and F2 (Premises Medical Coverage). Both of these
coverages require an occurrence to trigger coverage. Webster's Online Dictionary defines
"accident" as a "sudden event ... that is not planned or intended and that causes damage or
injury." The shooting in question was not an accident because it was not a sudden event that
was not intended. Indeed, recently, Chisholm pied guilty and was sentenced for the felony
crime of aggravated battery. One of the elements to that felony is that the battery must be
actual and intentional. Therefore, Chisholm's actions in shooting the gun and hitting Stanczak
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fall outside the definition of an occurrence under the Policy, because it was not an accident.
Chisolm likewise told the judge that he intentionally fired the gun in Stanczak's direction. The
Cooks' policy only provides coverage for bodily injury caused by an occurrence, which is
defined as an accident which results in unexpected bodily injury. The shooting of the gun was
not an accidi;mt and thus there was no covered occurrence. Farm Bureau must therefore stand
by the authority cited in its March 2016 letter to the Cooks regarding occurrences and Alford
pleas. As there was no occurrence, that can be no coverage and without coverage, there is no
duty to defend.

2.

Alleged Negligent Supervision and Premises Liability as
"Occurrences"

In reviewing the First Amended Complaint, we have also analyzed whether the Cooks' alleged
failure to properly supervise Chisholm and/or their alleged failure to take reasonable care in
caring for their premises could constitute an "occurrence" separate from the shooting. Even
viewing these allegations independently from the underlying intentional tort, coverage does not
exist.

First, while there are cases from other jurisdiction that look at these torts separately, Idaho has
rejected this line of authority. Under Idaho law, the courts must look at the actions that actually
caused the harm.
For example, in Mutual ofEnumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4,843 P.2d 154 (1992) an insurance
company brought an action for declaratory relief against its insured, Shirley Wilcox, seeking a ruling that there was no coverage under a homeowners insurance policy for a lawsuit brought
against her and her ex-husband by a number of minor foster children who were abused in her
home by Wilcox's ex-husband. The insurance company argued that there was no occurrence
under the applicable policy. The minor foster children alleged in the underlying case that
Wilcox herself failed to report abuse to law enforcement, failed to report to her ex-husband's
employer his tendencies to molest, and negligently failed to protect the children. The lower
court found that Wilcox's actions in failing to report her husband's actions or failing to protect
the children from her husband's tendencies constituted an error injudgment, so it found that
there was an occurrence under the policy.
The Idaho Supreme Court reversed this holding. It applied the following definitions for the
word "accident," which is part of the definition of the term "occurrence":
An accident within accident insurance policies is an event
happening without any human agency, or, if happening through
such agency, an event which, under circumstances, is unusual and
not expected by the person to whom it happens. A more
comprehensive term than "negligence," and in its common
signification the word means an unexpected happening without
intention or design.

i
I
i-
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Black's Law Dictionary 14 (5th ed. 1979).

ac • ci • dent (ak'si dent), n. 1. an undesirable or unfortunate
happening, unintentionally caused and usually resulting in hann,
injury, damage, or loss; casualty; mishap: automobile accidents.
2. any event that happens unexpectedly, without a deliberate plan
or cause ....

I-

Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary 9 (1989).

Mutual ofEnumclaw, 123 Idaho at 8-9, 843 P.2d at 158-159. The Court stated that its role was
to look at Wilcox's actions, and not the actions of her ex-husband, because she was the only one
whose actions could be covered under the insurance policy in question. The Court held:
Looking to Wilcox's alleged conduct, we find that it is not an
"occurrence" under the policies because it was not the conduct
which caused injury. The injury suffered by the minors is child
molestation. While the acts or failure to act by Wilcox may have
created or contributed to the environment which permitted her exhusband's conduct, Wilcox did not commit the acts complained
ofby the twelve anonymous plaintiffs. Therefore, the Enumclaw
Policy and the Wilcox Policy do not provide coverage for Wilcox.

Id. The Court found that the event causing the damage in the underlying complaint was her exhusband's abuse, not her alleged negligence for failure to supervise her ex-husband nor the
failure to report the abuse. The Court held there was no occurrence under the policies in
question and that the insurance companies owed no duty to defend its policyholder.

,.(·

The Idaho Supreme Court came to a similar holding in State Farm v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693, 946
P.2d 1333 (1997). In that case, parents of a minor child brought suit against insureds who
operated an in-home day care. The minor child was allegedly abused by the insureds' son who
worked at the in-home daycare. The parents of the minor child brought suit against the insured
for a number of causes of action, including the same two claims Stanczak has asserted against
the Cooks--negligent supervision of its agent and premises liability. The insureds made a claim
to their insurance company for coverage of the underlying suit, and the insurance company,
· State Farm, filed an action for declaratory relief, arguing that there was no occurrence under the
policy and thus, no coverage. The district court agreed and the insureds appealed. The
Supreme Court affirmed, finding that intentional acts caused the damage, and not any of the
other claims, including negligent supervision and premises liability. State Farm, 130 Idaho at
695-696, 946 P.2d at 1335-1336.
Other courts agree with Idaho's treatment of this issue. Allstate Ins Co v. JJM, 254 Mich.App
418; 657 N. W. 2d 18 J (Mich. Ct. App 2002) (court found no occurrence under an insurance
policy when minor party-goer molested another passed-out party-goer, notwithstanding
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allegations of negligent supervision and premises liability, because an intentional act caused the
harm, not an accident); Fire Ins. Exchange v. Cornwell, 90 P.3d 978 (Nevada 2004) (named
insureds' failure to prevent their adult son's sexual seduction of minor neighbor was not an
"accident," and, thus, their allegedly negligent supervision of their son was not a covered
"occurrence" under the liability coverage of homeowners' insurance policy); Ofjhuas v.
Guthrie, 140 Ohio App.3d 90, 746 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (insureds' allegedly
negligent supervision of juvenile and their allegedly negligent entrustment of a gun to him were
not "occurrences" separate and apart from the underlying intentional tort); Allstate v. Hill, Case
No. 261543, 2005 WL 1959560 (Mich. Ct. App. August 16, 2005) (artful pleading by alleging
claims for negligence does not get around requirement that event causing harm must be an
occurrence under an insurance policy).

Second, the nature of the allegations relating to negligent supervision and premises liability
against the Cooks precludes coverage. Under the definition of occurrence, the harm must be
unexpected. Under Idaho law, the torts of negligent supervision and premises liability both
involve foreseeability, what the negligent party knew or should have known. See Sterling v.
Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986) and Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244,985 P.2d
669 (1999). The very nature of these torts is that the harm was expected because it was
foreseeable, and that the tortfeasor should have prevented the harm. Because Stanczak is
alleging that the harm was foreseeable, it was not unexpected, so again, there was no
occurrence under the Cooks' policy. See Mountain State Mut. Casualty Co. v. Hauser, 221
P.3d 56 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009) (Where harm alleged by victim of assault by manager was
foreseeable from owner's knowledge and actions in negligently hiring, supervising, and
retaining manager, no occurrence occurred under insurance policy).
3.

.,:

Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing, Farm Bureau has once again concluded that there is no coverage
under the Cooks' Farm Bureau insurance policy for any claim arising out of the incident that
occurred on the Cooks' property on June 28, 2015, involving Joseph Stanczak and Michael
Chisholm.

1·

i

As such, Farm Bureau will not be able to provide the Cooks with a defense for the underlying
lawsuit, including the First Amended Complaint, filed by Mr. Stanczak in Bonner County. Nor
will Farm Bureau be able to indemnify the Cooks for any resulting judgment or settlement
arising from that lawsuit.
Farm Bureau bases this denial of coverage on the Cooks' policy's insuring agreement, as well
as other coverage provisions and limitations set forth in the Cooks' policy and which were
described to you in detail in the prior Denials and ROR Notices which are incorporated herein
by reference. Farm Bureau reserves the right to rely upon any and all defenses of non-coverage
and does not admit any obligations under the Cooks' policy.
Certainly, if Farm Bureau is provided additional information from you or others regarding Mr.
Stanczak's claim, the First Amended Complaint, the subject incident, or resuJting lawsuit, then
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Farm Bureau reserves the right to modify this denial of coverage determination to the extent
that additional information is determined to be relevant to this coverage determination.
Farm Bureau continues to fully and expressly reserve all rights and defenses which may now
exist and all right and defenses which it may hereinafter have under any and all of the tenns,
conditions, provisions, and exclusions of the policy, as well as all endorsements thereto,
irrespective ofwhether'or not they are referenced in its prior Denials and ROR Notices. Farm
Bureau specifically reserves its right to add additional defenses to coverage and to modify and
amend its coverage detennination based upon further investigation of the fact or circumstances
pertaining to this matter or upon the discovery or notice of facts not currently available to it.
No actions taken by or on behalf of Farm Bureau in connection with this claim shall constitute
an admission of liability or an admission of coverage under the subject Farm Bureau Policy.

Steve Johnson
Stephen F. Smith
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James L. Martin, ISB No. 4226
Tyler J. Anderson, ISB No. 6632
Benjamin C. Ritchie, ISB No. 7210
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK
FIELDS, CHARTERED

-
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101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
jlm@moffatt.com
tya@moffatt.com
bcr@moffatt.com
13900.0252
Attorneys for Defendant Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Company of Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR. and LAURIE
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife, and
JOSEPH STANCZAK,

Case No. CV-2016-0590

DECLARATION OF BARBARA E.
MAYNE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

DECLARATION OF BARBARA E. MAYNE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
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I, BARBARA E. MAYNE, declare and state as follows:
1.

I work as a Word Processor for Moffatt Thomas, the law firm representing

Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho in the above-noted matter, and have
personal knowledge with respect to the matters contained herein.
2.

I have been a word processor at Moffatt Thomas for 33 years and over the

years have prepared numerous transcripts of recorded hearings similar to those attached hereto.
3.

In August of 2016, I was given audio recordings of the 1/5/2016 plea

hearing and the 3/8/2016 sentencing hearing in the criminal case entitled State ofIdaho v.

Michael Jesse Chisholm, Case Number CR-2015-0003326, which was adjudicated in Bonner
County, Idaho.
4.

From those audio recordings, in August 2016, I prepared transcripts of

5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the transcript

both hearings.

for the 1/5/2016 plea hearing.
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of the transcript

for the 3/8/2016 sentencing hearing.
I certify under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the
foregoing is true and correct.
DATED this 18th day of October, 2016.

DECLARATION OF BARBARA E. MAYNE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of October, 2016, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing DECLARATION OF BARBARA E. MAYNE IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFF FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:
Michael T. Howard
WINTON & CASHATT
250 Northwest Blvd., Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
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TRANSCRIPTION OF HEARING ON ENTRY OF PLEA

Judge:
Chisholm:
Bailiff:
Greenbank:
Taylor:

First Judicial District Judge Barbara A. Buchanan
Michael Jesse Chisholm, Defendant
Unidentified Female
Shane L. Greenbank, Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Daniel D. Taylor, Bonner County Public Defender

Judge:

Mr. Chisholm is present with Mr. Taylor. Mr. Greenbank is here for the State.
This is the time scheduled for entry of a plea. Mr. Chisholm has filled out a
written plea and an acknowledgment of Alford plea. Mr. Chisholm, would you
please stand and be sworn?

Chisholm:

Yes Your Honor.

Bailiff:

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give shall be the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Chisholm:

I do.

Judge:

You may be seated.

Chisholm:

Thank you.

Judge:

I have to ask you a series of questions to make sure that your plea is both knowing
and voluntary.

Greenbank:

Your Honor? Before we proceed. I just want to advise the Court. I don't think
it's an issue. The security downstairs had noted the odor of alcohol on the
defendant. The bailiff tested him with a BAC. It came back a .027. Because
that's well below the legal limit I don't believe that it is something that would
impact the voluntarilyness, knowingly, voluntarily. And with an understanding of
his rights, guilty plea. So - but I did want the Court to be aware of it.

Judge:

Note that that would be probably the equivalent of one drink. Well below the
legal limit. Mr. Chisholm, apparently you have consumed some alcohol.

Chisholm:

I have not today, Your Honor.

Judge:

Okay. So you feel fully capable of understanding everything that's happening?

Chisholm:

Oh definitely, Your Honor.

Judge:

Okay. Do you have any difficulty reading or understanding English?

Chisholm:

No.
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Judge:

And did you read, initial and sign both these documents?

Chisholm:

I did.

Judge:

Is there anything in the documents you don't understand or want to ask a question
about?

Chisholm:

Everything I didn't understand I went over with Mr. Taylor. And I understand
everything fully.

Judge:

Okay. Are your answers true and con-ect?

Chisholm:

Yes.

Judge:

And you just said that you had Mr. Taylor's help filling it out when you needed
it?

Chisholm:

Yes, I did.

Judge:

And you've been represented by Mr. Taylor throughout this case?

Chisholm:

I have.

Judge:

Are you satisfied with his representation?

Chisholm:

Very satisfied.

Judge:

Have you fully discussed your case with him?

Chisholm:

Yes, I have.

Judge:

You haven't been diagnosed with any mental health disorders, and you 're not
under the care of a mental health professional? Is that right?

Chisholm:

That's correct.

Judge:

There's a pretrial settlement agreement. And it is attached as, to the end of the
written plea. It provides that you will plead guilty to one count of aggravated
battery. That crime has a prison sentence ofup to 15 years. And a fine ofup to
$50,000. The State at sentencing will limit its recommendations to five years
fixed, five years indeterminate. That's a unified ten year sentence. And will seek
full restitution for the victim's injury, standard fines and costs. The State will
dismiss Count Two, the use of a firearm enhancement. The State will agree not to
pursue a civil penalty of $5,000 to the victim. You 're free to make your own
recommendations. So, am I understanding that the State is going to recommend,
though, five years of imprisonment and another five years indeterminate?

Greenbank:

That's correct, Your Honor.
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Judge:

The Court, excuse me. So, Mr. Chisholm, did you understand what the State's
recommending?

Chisholm:

Yes I do.

Judge:

And you understand the State's offer?

Chisholm:

Yes.

Judge:

And do you understand that the Court isn't bound by that. A judge can give you a
greater sentence than the State recommends or a lesser sentence?

Chisholm:

I understand, yes.

Judge:

And do you understand that if the judge does give you a harsher sentence, you
don't have the right to withdraw your guilty plea?

Chisholm:

Yes.

Judge:

You can appeal the sentence, but the plea still stands. You are pleading under the
North Carolina v. Alford case. And what that means, and you've filled out the
form, is that you're agreeing with it that there is a strong factual basis for the plea,
and that if you went to trial you could be found guilty. And you want to take
advantage of the State's offer. Am I correct on that?

Chisholm:

Yes.

Judge:

Both sides agree that there is a strong factual basis for a plea in this case?

Greenbank:

Yes, Your Honor.

Taylor:

Yes, Your Honor.

Judge:

And court, the Court actually heard a motion to suppress on this case. Or a
motion in limine, I think it was. And so the Court is familiar with the facts as
well and agrees that there is a factual basis to support the guilty plea. And
Mr. Chisholm, you understand that the effect of an Alford plea at sentencing, you
get sentenced as if you pled guilty?

Chisholm:

Yes.

Judge:

Has anyone done anything to get you to enter this plea against your will?

Chisholm:

No, Your Honor.

Greenbank:

There are the rights waivers at the bottom of the pretrial settlement agreement as
well.
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Judge:

Yes. That by entering into the plea agreement you waive your right to appeal
your conviction. And your right to appeal your sentence unless, as I said, you got
a harsher sentence than the State recommends, then you can appeal. Do you
understand that?

Chisholm:

Yes, I do.

Judge:

And do you want to go forward with this plea agreement today?

Chisholm:

Yes I do, Your Honor.

Judge:

Do you have any questions?

Chisholm:

I believe they've all been answered by counsel.

Judge:

I'll find then that you've knowingly and voluntarily entered into the written plea,
the Alford plea. Accept and file these documents. I find they're knowingly and
voluntarily made with a full understanding of the potential consequences. We'll
set a sentencing date or a pre-sentence investigation. We have time on Tuesday,
March 8, at two in the afternoon. Will the, will this one take longer?

Greenbank:

If, if

Judge:

[inaudible] testify with him.

Greenbank:

I don't know at this time. But I would anticipate that it will take longer.

Taylor:

I would anticipate that too.

Judge:

So shall we set this - will an hour be long enough?

.Taylor:

Maybe. I honestly can't say at this point, Your Honor.

Judge:

Okay.

Taylor:

If I decide I need more time.

Judge:

Let me know. Right now we'll set it. We'll give you an hour. Ifwe need to we
can block out a little more. We could make this the last one of the day.

Greenbank:

Return to the - pursuant to the pretrial settlement agreement in this case, the State
would move to dismiss Count Two with prejudice. I'll provide an order to the
Court later.

Judge:

All right. I'm signing the order. Mr. Chisholm, we're going to give you a short
form that you need to fill out before you leave. It just has contact information.
And then there's a pre-sentence packet. You take that with you and you have to
fill that out and take it with you to the pre-sentence interview. You have to
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contact the pre-sentence investigator's office within 24 hours. What you do is just
call a Coeur d 'Alene number and they'll schedule your appointment. I believe the
actual interview will be able to take place in Sandpoint. But you need to keep
calling to get that scheduled. Sometimes you might have to leave a message or
someone might not answer. It is your responsibility to get the interview
scheduled, though. Okay?
Chisholm:

I understand.

Judge:

We'll go off the record.

(Recording ends]
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TRANSCRIPTION OF SENTENCING HEARING

Judge:
Taylor:
Bailiff:
Cook:
Greenbank:
Hobday:
LaPointe:
Sanders:
Chisholm:

Judge Barbara A. Buchanan
Daniel D. Taylor, Bonner County Public Defender
Jackie
Bailiff
Ed Cook, Witness
Shane L. Greenbank, Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
John Hobday, Witness
John LaPointe, Witness
Leonard Sanders, Witness
Michael Jesse Chisholm, Defendant

Judge:

We'll go on the record this afternoon. We're here for sentencing in State of Idaho
v. Michael Chisholm. Mr. Chisholm is present. He's represented by Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Greenbank is here for the State. Prior to coming into court, the Court has
reviewed a number of things. The pre-sentence report, gain evaluation. The presentence included a number of letters of support for Mr. Chisholm. Then there
prosecutor's off - excuse me, the public defender's office, Mr. Taylor, filed a
number of other character references. There is an addendum to the pre-sentence
report, which contained a mental health screening. And then, Mr. Taylor, are
these additional?

Taylor:

Those just came in. I made the State aware of them.

Judge:

Letters of support?

Taylor:

Yes.

Judge:

Quite a few. I'll have to go off the recqrd and take a look at them.

[Recording Ends]
[Recording Continues]

Judge:

... read all of the submissions. Does either side wish to present testimony?

Taylor:

Yes, Your Honor.

Judge:

Mr. Taylor.

Taylor:

Thank you, Your Honor. Call Ed Cook. [short pause]

Bailiff:

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give shall be the truth,
the whole trnth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Cook:

Yes I do.
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Judge:

Jackie, could you bring me a notebook please?

Bailiff:

Yes, Your Honor.

[short pause]
Judge:

Go ahead, Mr. Taylor.

Taylor:

Thank you, Your Honor. Would you please state your name and spell your last
name for the record?

Cook:

Ed Cook. The last name is C-0-0-K.

Taylor:

All right, Mr. Cook. How do you know Mr. Chisholm?

Cook:

I met him at the Elmira store 25 years ago.

Taylor:

All right. Have you had any contact with him since then?

Cook:

Yes. I've had quite a bit of contact with him.

Taylor:

Tell us a little bit about that.

Cook:

Well, my wife and I bought the Elmira store in December of 1990. And we met
Mike through the Elmira store. He used to come in and play cribbage and - with
Pinky and some of the other locals. Come in and have coffee. And that's how we
got to know him.

Taylor:

And how did you - oh, I'm sorry. Go ahead.

Cook:

About 17 years ago. We've owned Bloom Lake - it's been in their, in the family
for, since 1950. And so we went up there and it was a total mess up there. So we
took, Ed had 25 percent of it logged. And took that money and put it in the
infrastructure to put in a road, four outhouses, and remodeled the old cabin. And
about that time Mike volunteered to be a - to go up there and stay in the cabin and
sort oflook out after everything. There's things seem to disappear and things get.
Like we had a police officer up there once that - 24 trees were chopped down by
the bad guys. So he would, he's been there doing this for 17 years. And never
had any problem. And he's the President of the Friends of Bloom Lake, which
just sort of formed. There's nothing formal. About 100 people. And we had to
clean the place up because it was full of toilet paper and all the debris. So we had
about 100 people show up. Pete took 50 of 'em, Mike took the other 50 and they
split up and cleaned up the whole area.

Taylor:

Okay.

Cook:

And it has been a really nice place ever since. There's been a couple of women
that had a couple of children that'd go up there and fish with their children.
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Because they know that Mike is there. And they appreciated that kind of thing.
Because he helped the kids go fishing and do all that. And so, and that's how we
know Mike. And he's been perfect and I believe he's not a danger to civilization,
or anybody. I'm very surprised that we're here today.
Taylor:

All right. So you've known him for the last 17 years? 25?

Cook:

Yeah.

Taylor:

And he has been the caretaker at Bloom Lake for all that time?

Cook:

Yes.

Taylor:

Okay. And do you know anything about his family?

Cook:

Very little.

Taylor:

Well, do you know [inaudible] his wife and his daughter?

Cook:

I didn't know any of them.

Taylor:

All right. Nothing further, Your Honor.

Judge:

Mr. Greenbank, any questions?

Greenbank:

Yes, Judge. You stated that you're surprised we're here today. Can you explain?

Cook:

Yeah. Yes. Because he's not a violent person. And so many people like him.
He did a great job and I think he can continue to do it after this.

Greenbank:

Okay. You agree that shooting someone in the back twice requires -

Cook:

Yeah, I think that's sort of significant.

Greenbank:

Okay.

Cook:

If it's true.

Greenbank:

You don't think it's true?

Cook:

Well I wasn't there. I don't know.

Greenbank:

Okay. So you don't know anything about this event?

Cook:

No.

Greenbank:

Okay. So your knowledge of this case is based on?

Cook:

What I hear in the newspaper. And I know they're not very accurate.
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Greenbank:

Okay. And what about your discussions with Mr. Chisholm? Have you talked
with him about the case?

Cook:

Oh yeah, I talked to him afterwards. Since - afterwards.

Greenbank:

Okay. Ed, would you find him to be a truthful, credible person?

Cook:

Yes.

Greenbank:

You wrote a letter for the Court to consider, correct?

Cook:

Yes, I did. My wife and I.

Greenbank::

Okay. Was it [inaudible]?

Cook:

Yes. She's here.

Greenbank::

All right. In there you stated he was trained in the military when he was young?

Cook:

Yes. I believe he served in Vietnam.

Greenbank:

Would it surprise you to know he was never in the military?

Cook:

It would be, yes.

Greenbank::

Okay. Marked State's Exhibit 1.

[inaudible whispered discussion in background]
Greenbank:

Take a look at that document sir.

Cook:

He did mention to us that he was dead. He's been fighting that for quite a few
years.

Greenbank::

Fighting what?

Cook:

That he was dead and he couldn't get it reversed.

Greenbank:

What do you mean?

Cook:

That's all I know. He says, he has difficulty getting anything done because he's
officially dead. Somehow the records got screwed up. That's all I know.

Greenbank:

Under the five dates of birth, under those five social security numbers, known to
be used by him, under both of his names, none of the five branches have a record
of him.

Cook:

I don't know.
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Greenbank:

Okay. I'd admit State's 1.

Cook:

I don 't know his social security number other than this.

Greenbank:

Okay. Moved to admit State's 1.

Judge:

Any objection?

Taylor:

Well, it has been shown to the witness and he's recited the contents, but I don't
know that he's qualified to authenticate what it is. Again, this is a sentencing
hearing and I'll leave the rules of evidence up to the Court. But-

Judge:

I don't know that he could admit the document. I will note that I read in the presentence report that Mr. Chisholm has never served in the military.

Greenbank:

Does that surprise you?

Cook:

Yeah. If that's true, it would surprise me, yes.

Greenbank:

That he told the pre-sentence investigator that he never did?

Cook:

I don't know what he told the pre-sentencing prosecutor.

Greenbank:

That's what we're talking about. The pre-sentence investigator.

Cook:

Oh.

Greenbank:

During his interview.

Cook:

I have no knowledge of that.

Greenbank:

Do you still believe him to be truthful and honest though, huh?

Cook:

Absolutely!

Greenbank:

Okay. No further questions.

Cook:

I would trust him with Bloom Lake again.

Judge:

Thank you sir.

Taylor:

Call John Hobday, Your Honor.

[short pause]
Bailiff:

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give shall be the truth,
the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Hobday:

Yes, I do.

TRANSCRIPTION OF SENTENCING HEARING - 5

Client:4232142.1

325

Taylor:

Thank you.

Judge:

Go ahead.

Taylor:

Thank you. Please state your name and spell your last name for the record.

Hobday:

John Hobday. Excuse me. H-0-B (as in Baker)-D (as in David)-A-Y.

Taylor:

All right. And how do you know Mr. Chisholm?

Hobday:

I've lived in Elmira for 43 years and I live across the highway from where you
turn to go up to the lake. And I've fished the lake for 35, 40 years. I believe I
met Mike up at the lake and he's just been a good friend for many, many years.
He'd do anything for you.

Taylor:

And how long has he been the caretaker at Bloom Lake, do you know?

Hobday:

I think Ed said 17 years. I would say that's pretty accurate.

Taylor:

What was Bloom Lake - you said you've lived across from the entrance to -

Hobday:

Across the highway. Yes sir.

Taylor:

How you get to Bloom Lake. For how many years?

Hobday:

Forty-three.

Taylor:

Okay. Prior to Mr. Chisholm arriving at Bloom Lake, what was Bloom Lake
like?

Hobday:

It was a mess. Good fishing but a mess. And people would go up there and just
run amuck basically.

Taylor:

And what's it like now?

Hobday:

It's beautiful. It's a campground, family oriented, and safe. It's beautiful. They
spent a lot of money on the fire pits, which Mike is instrumental in building those.
They are steel. There is nice gravel pads for camping. You can either take a tent
or an RV. And it is a very family-oriented place and ve1y nice to visit. And good
fishing.

Taylor:

Have you ever been at Bloom Lake with Mr. Chisholm when other campers were
there?

Hobday:

Yes.

Taylor:

About how many times do you think?

Hobday:

Countless.
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Taylor:

Okay. And how would you say he interacts with them?

Hobday:

Very well. He's a gentleman, just a very nice man.

Taylor:

And have you, you say you've known him. Would you say you're friends with
him?

Hobday:

Absolutely.

Taylor:

Okay. This sort of behavior, what can you tell me about this?

Hobday:

What sort of behavior?

Taylor:

The sort of behavior that we're here for today.

Hobday:

It is not like him at all.

Taylor:

How so?

Hobday:

May I take a drink of water? I have asthma.

Judge:

Sure.

Hobday:

And my [inaudible]. I'm very nervous. Sorry.

Judge:

People are often nervous when they have to, you know, go up [inaudible].

Hobday:

And I've only testified once before. And I'm 68 years old. So I'm nervous.

Taylor:

So back to the question.

Hobday:

Yes sir.

Taylor:

The sort of behavior that we're here for today, what can you tell me about that? Is
that typical for Mr. Chisholm, based upon your knowledge of him?

Hobday:

No. No. The only reason I believe Mr. Chisholm would do what he is accused of
- and I wasn't there so I don't know what happened - is that he feared for his life.
That's the only reason he would do it, in my opinion.

Taylor:

Do you know anything about Mr. Chisholm's military service or?

Hobday:

No sir.

Taylor:

Or his life in California?

Hobday:

Just what I read in the paper.

Taylor:

All right. Nothing further, Your Honor.
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Judge:

Mr. Greenbank, any questions?

Greenbank::

Sir, what's your training and experience?

Hobday:

I'm a real estate broker. I own Alpine Realty. Opened it 23 years ago. Previous
to that I was with Century 21 in Sandpoint for five years.

Greenbank:

So in your opinion, you stated that you don't believe he could do this?

Hobday:

I don't hear well either. I'm sorry.

Greenbank:

You stated that in your opinion you don't believe he could do this. And that
opinion is based on your real estate experience?

Hobday:

No. It is based on my personal experience with Mr. Chisholm.

Greenbank::

Okay. But you're not an expert in psychology or?

Hobday:

No sir.

Greenbank:

[inaudible] No expert in forensics?

Hobday:

No.

Greenbank:

Never worked as a police officer?

Hobday:

No.

Greenbank:

Okay. But your opinion. And you wrote one of the letters that's attached to the
PSI?

Hobday:

Yes sir, I did.

Greenbank::

Okay. And you state in there that you believe he was acting in self-defense?

Hobday:

Yes.

Greenbank:

Okay. But the victim was shot twice in the back?

Hobday:

So they say. I wasn 't there.

Greenbank:

So you don't believe the police reports, the forensics? What?

Hobday:

I don't know. I wasn't there.

Greenbank:

Okay. So what is it you are basing your opinion on?

Hobday:

Just because I know Mike. And I don't think he's that kind of man unless his life
was in danger.
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Greenbank:

So did you know him prior to, you know, when he operated under the other
name?

Hobday:

No.

Greenbank:

Okay. But you are aware that he fled responsibilities, changed his name and
ended up here?

Hobday:

Yes sir. That's what the paper said. I don't have personal knowledge of that.

Greenbank:

Okay.

Hobday:

But, may - -one thing I'm really curious about. You mentioned at one of the
hearings that Mike had stomped a man to death and stole his motorcycle. And
that was on the front page of the paper. And I was at one of the hearings and one
of the investigators, a man named Kurt Lieman [SP?], I believe, heard a few of us
in the hall talking. And he came over there and asked me some questions. And I
asked him, I said, is it true that Mike Chisholm stomped a man to death and took
his motorcycle? And he said no, the fingerprints have come back and they're not
Mike's. It was a different alias.

Greenbank:

And your issue is?

Hobday:

Pardon me? I -

Greenbank:

What is your issue? What's your?

Hobday:

My issue is that he was convicted in the court of the Bonner County Daily Bee.
And the retraction just said Mike wasn't this guy. It didn't go on to say that this
guy was the guy that stomped a man to death and stole his motorcycle.

Greenbank:

So you have an issue - so you have an issue with the reporting of the Daily Bee?

Hobday:

Yes. But they were quoting you.

Greenbank:

Allegedly.

Hobday:

Allegedly, yeah. I'm not a lawyer. Sorry. I'm just a real estate broker.

Greenbank:

Okay. All right.

Hobday:

And a fisherman.

Greenbank:

So back on track.

Hobday:

Yes sir.

Greenbank:

You believe he acted in self-defense?
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Hobday:

Yes.

Greenbank::

If the victim was shot twice in the back. And I understand you weren't there, so and you have limited knowledge - but if he was shot twice in the back, is it
consistent with self-defense that you take your two firearms, get in a vehicle,
drive away?

Taylor:

Objection, Your Honor. We're getting into hypothe- Mr. -

Judge:

I'll sustain. Let's move on.

Taylor:

Asked in the [inaudible].

Judge:

I'll sustain the objection.

Greenbank::

Is fleeing the scene consistent with self-defense?

Taylor:

Again, objection, Your Honor. We're hammering this poor man on stuff he has
no - he's already said he has no personal knowledge of any of it. He's basing his
opinions on his personal knowledge of Mr. Chisholm. Unless he's had an
opportunity to sit down and read the police reports -

Hobday:

I have not.

Taylor:

Then all of this line of questioning is sort of irrelevant. We already know what
the State's opinion is. That's pretty well established. I think: the witness should
be allowed to step down unless the State has some specific questions about
Mr. Chisholm's character or his personal dealings with him during the time in
which he's known him.

Greenbank:

This witness's statements are part of the Court record in a PSI. That's what I'm
questioning him on. Counsel got his opinion out of him that he was acting in selfdefense. I have a right, I have a right to rebut.

Taylor:

I never -

Greenbank:

This witness.

Taylor:

I never wanted- I didn't want him to state his personal opinion about selfdefense. That was the witness blurting that out. That's not, that wasn't my reason
for putting him on the stand.

Judge:

Why don't we move on.

Greenbank:

Okay. No further questions. Thank you.

Judge:

Sir, you can step down.
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Hobday:

Thank you.

Taylor:

John LaPointe, Your Honor.

Judge:

Mr. LaPointe?

Bailiff:

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give shall be the trnth,
the whole trnth, and nothing but the trnth, so help you God?

LaPointe:

I do.

Taylor:

Please state your name and spell your last name for the record.

LaPointe:

John LaPointe. L-A-P-0-I-N-T-E.

Taylor:

All right. And how do you know Mr. Chisholm?

LaPointe:

I've known Mike for over 20 years. When I first moved out here in 1994 I met
Mike. Mike was playing in a band where I used to go to a place and listen to him
play and just really enjoyed it. And spent some time after that just sitting down
and talking to him. And then I met him at the Elmira store. I live in Elmira. I
met him at the store there and we strnck up a friendship. I'm a general contractor
so I was the one who built the house up at Bloom Lake for Mike to live in. And
he helped with that. I also plow snow in the wintertime and I do snow plowing
for his place. And Mike's always paid me. We've always had a great
relationship. So -

Taylor:

Okay. And how long have you known him?

LaPointe:

Over 20 years.

Taylor:

All right. And you've been to Bloom Lake?

LaPointe:

Oh, many times, yeah.

Taylor:

Have you ever been up to Bloom Lake prior to all this?

LaPointe:

I have, yeah. It was a real dump. Broken bottles everywhere, trash everywhere,
wild parties at night, loud music. It was really a bad place to be.

Taylor:

And what's it like now?

LaPointe:

Oh, it's almost a paradise. It's beautiful.

Taylor:

And Mr. Chisholm, as far as you know, is the caretaker up there?

LaPointe:

Oh, I attribute most of the state of Bloom Lake right now to Mike. I think he did
a wonderful job.
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Taylor:

All right.

LaPointe:

Cleaning out the riff-raff and getting rid of the undesirable characters that were
constantly there messing it up.

Taylor:

And have you ever seen him interact with anybody who is staying there or fishing
there?

LaPointe:

Oh, I have.

Taylor:

And how's that [inaudible]

LaPointe:

In a lot of ways.

Taylor:

How's that usually go?

LaPointe:

Oh, he's - Mike's always been cordial to people who follow the rules. And my
wife and I had a good friend that had a - wanted to have a wedding up there. And
Mike helped us set that whole thing up. We had a real nice wedding. Yeah, I just
found Mike to be very accommodating and very cordial and very pleasant. Just I really admire Mike.

Taylor:

Thank you. No further questions.

Judge:

Mr. Greenbank, any questions?

Greenbank:

So you like Mike?

LaPointe:

I really do. I trust Mike with my wife. I mean, he's just a great guy.

Judge:

You can step down. Thanks.

Taylor:

Leonard Sanders, Your Honor.

Bailiff:

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give shall be the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Sanders:

I do.

Taylor:

Please state your name and spell your last name for the record.

Sanders:

My name and what?

Taylor:

And spell your last name for the record.

Sanders:

Leonard Sanders. S-A-N-D-E-R-S.

Taylor:

And what's your occupation, sir?
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Sanders:

Pardon?

Taylor:

What's your occupation?

Sanders:

Retired metallurgical engineer.

Taylor:

All right. Do you have certification for that?

Sanders:

Pardon?

Taylor:

Do you have certification for that?

Sanders:

No,no.

Taylor:

Okay. And how do you know Mr. Chisholm?

Sanders:

I met Mike about 22 years ago when we, my wife and I were operating the Elmira
store. And Mike would come in. That's where we first met him. And then
actually did a little bit of music with him. He was learning to play the harmonica
and I played the flute. And we got together a couple of times with that. And then
later up at Bloom Lake.

Taylor:

All right. How well do you know Mr. Chisholm?

Sanders:

Very well. I've spent a good deal of time up at Bloom Lake with him. And I've
seen where he's helped children. He's had fishing poles for 'em to use and
sometimes he provided bait for them if they didn't have it. He's worked with the
Boy Scouts up there. A friend that I've had since kindergarten, I actually enticed
him to move up here to north Idaho. And he just fell in love with Bloom Lake
and he had cancer and he spent his last few months up at Bloom Lake. And Mike
attended to him. And he was there with Sanford, my friend, until his dying breath
along with hospice helping him. Another point that I might make is that Ed Cook
and I have known each other for about 50 years. So - we met at college studying
metallurgy. And we, my wife and I, one of the draws for us to move to north
Idaho was Bloom Lake. We thought that we might be caretakers up there. We
talked - the Cooks talked about having some kind of a youth camp or something
up there. And I'm just more than pleased that Mike took that job and did such an
excellent - has been doing such an excellent job of caretaker up there. And
helping people. He also has helped one of the people in the audience here, the
Gibbons, he's helped their child- some of their children- learn to cut meat so
they can do their own butchering and meat cutting. He's just been a real good
friend and we've just got along good.

Taylor:

You ever seen him deal with people up at the lake?

Sanders:

Yes, I have. He always goes down and greets people and makes sure that, you
know, everything is in order. And that - and just friendly with the people that are
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there. And that's why he's got, what, over 60 letters of character reference. And
so many people showed up here to support him.
Taylor:

Have you ever seen him deal with a troublesome camper up at the lake?

Sanders:

No. One time he told me about a situation that I kind of, I think, exemplifies his
attitude. He said some guy was drunk and giving him a hard time. And he told
the guy, he said, I'm just an old man but if you 're feeling froggy go ahead and
JUmp.

Taylor:

Okay. All right. Anything else you want to say, Mr. Sanders?

Sanders:

That's about it.

Taylor:

All right. Thank you. No further questions.

Judge:

Any questions, Mr. Greenbank?

Greenbank:

Yes Judge. You wrote a letter as well, correct?

Sanders:

Pardon?

Greenbank:

You wrote a letter as well, correct?

Sanders:

Yes, I did.

Greenbank:

All right. You make some statements about the victim in this case?

Sanders:

Pardon?

Greenbank:

You make some statements in that letter about the victim in this case?

Sanders:

About what?

Greenbank:

About the victim in this case?

Sanders:

Un-huh.

Greenbank:

Do you recall making those statements?

Sanders:

Pardon?

Greenbank:

Do you recall making the statements about the victim?

Sanders:

Yes, sir.

Greenbank:

Okay. How do you know the victim?

Sanders:

I don't know the victim.
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Greenbank:

Okay. So, you wrote that Mike tried to help the fugitive, convicted felon. And
the man turned on him. And he was bigger than Mike.

Sanders:

Pardon?

Judge:

Why don't you show him what he wrote?

Greenbank:

We could get the hearing in places. He heard fine -

Judge:

Sure.

Greenbank:

On direct examination for some reason.

Sanders:

Better open my hearing aids?

Judge:

Yes.

Greenbank:

Can you hear now?

Sanders:

Uh-huh.

Greenbank:

Okay. Do you remember writing, Mike tried to help the fugitive, convicted felon,
and the man turned on him and is way bigger than Mike?

Sanders:

Yes.

Greenbank:

Okay. And you don't know the victim though?

Sanders:

I'm, that's true. I don't.

Greenbank:

So where are you getting those statements from that you're making?

Sanders:

From Mike.

Greenbank:

So that's according to Mike?

Sanders:

Yeah.

Greenbank:

Okay. No further questions.

Judge:

Anything further Mr. Taylor?

Taylor:

No, Your Honor.

Judge:

Thank you sir. Mr.?

Taylor:

Nothing further. No further witnesses.

Judge:

Mr. Greenbank, do you have any witnesses?
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Greenbank:

No, Your Honor. The victim in this case was notified of the sentencing that was
occurring today. We'd operated under the assumption that he was showing up for
the hearing. So he did not complete a victim's impact statement before the
hearing. I'd confirmed, I didn't worry that he wasn't here. We made contact with
him up in Bonners Ferry. He wasn't going to come down to it. And asked that
the sentencing proceed without him. So -

Judge:

Is there a request for restitution?

Greenbank:

There is not. And the basis for that is the victim in the case has retained civil
counsel and prefers to go that route, as opposed to through the Crime Victims
avenue. So -

Judge:

So the State doesn't have any testimony or evidence that they want to present?

Greenbank:

No. Your Honor, on the issue of restitution, I'm going to ask that we leave that
open for 60 days from the perspective of the Crime Victims' compensation output
in this case. Because they maxed out at the $25,000. So I do want to talk with
civil counsel, who I haven't talked with, with regard to who is representing the
victim in the case. But I don't want to leave the State ofldaho out this $25,000 if
not necessary. But anything beyond what Crime Victims paid, we're not seeking
restitution for. So, I'll get with counsel on that aspect later.

Judge:

The Court has a question. I guess from, for both counsel. Because I don't have a
victim's impact statement. And I was concerned about talking about the victim
being a fugitive, a convicted felon. Do you have any information that would
support that?

Greenbank:

I do not.

Taylor:

Not that I'm aware of.

Judge:

Mr. Greenbank, then - well actually, Mr. Taylor, I don't think I asked you, we
had a pretty extensive pre-sentence report in this case. As we've talked about.
Many letters of support. But the pre-sentence itself, or the gain, do you want to
make any changes or corrections?

Taylor:

No, Your Honor.

Judge:

And Mr. Chisholm, you've had a chance to review the pre-sentence in that?

Chisholm:

Yes I have, Your Honor.

Judge:

Okay.

Chisholm:

Yes.
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Judge:

All right. Let's - what we generally do is begin with Mr. Greenbank's comments
and recommendations.

Greenbank:

May 1 proceed?

Judge:

You may.

Greenbank:

Thank you Judge. Your Honor, in going through the PSI I recognize there are a
lot of letters that his supporters have submitted for the Court's consideration.
Four of them testified here today. Counsel did notify me of the letters that you
considered on the Bench. Provided them to me ifl wanted to review them. I
assume they were in the same vein as the other letters. So -I had declined to
review them anyway. I think it is important to note that he certainly has a fan
club coming forth. I also find it interesting that they don't really know him. They
know what he's told them. What he's informed them of. Military services for
naught. He admits that much in his PSI. So these people don't really know who
Mr. Chisholm is. Frankly I don't know who Mr. Chisholm is. But what I do
know is that he shot a man in the back twice. And fled the scene. Wrecked the
car. Traveled on foot for two to three miles before he was apprehended. That is
not a self-defense act. That's an act of someone who was, again, trying to run
away from a problem. And that is something that demands consequences in this
case. I do find it noteworthy on page 7 at the very bottom. He indicates that
alcohol and drugs weren't a factor. That's concerning. To act in this manner, in
this way, and not be driven by booze or narcotics.
So the State's recommendation in this case is a fair recommendation. Five fixed,
five indeterminate, for a unified sentence of ten years. Now it is also noteworthy
that it is an aggravated battery case. It carries the same punishment as attempted
murder. Which in my eye it is the same thing. When you sh~ot somebody twice
and you leave them, and if you are truly in fear, acting in self-defense, you
wouldn't leave behind your girlfriend. And conduct yourself in this manner. So
those are the factors to consider for the Court and ask for [inaudible] such
sentence.

Judge:

Mr. Greenbank, I have another question. Mr. Taylor. The difficulty for the Court
is trying to sift through everything that happened in this case. The police reports,
the statements from the women that were present that evening. And reading this.
And one thing I was unclear about, Mr. Chisholm had several weapons. Was
there any weapon found that the victim had?

Greenbank:

No, Your Honor.

Taylor:

Not that I'm aware of.

Judge:

Okay. I just wanted to clarify that. Mr. Taylor, I would then hear all of your
comments and recommendations.
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Taylor:

Thank you, Your Honor. Now Your Honor, I think Mr. Cook did say one thing
on the stand that is particularly noteworthy. This case was tried in the newspaper
long before we even had a contested hearing. The odds of us picking a jury that
had no knowledge of this case was going to be slim. Now we all know how that
goes. You bring them in and they say, oh yeah, you know, it's not going to affect
my judgment, blah, blah, blah. Is that true or is it not? I don't know. But in the
papers we heard everything about Mr. Chisholm being, from being an FBI, or a,
excuse me, a Mafia hitman wanted by the FBI, being someone who steals
motorcycles and stomps peoples' brains out, up to running from the mob in
California, to living aJl over the country in different areas under different aliases.
I think the PSI is pretty clear on Mr. Chisholm's life. He married in the '70s to
someone whose father was wrapped up in the, apparently, the drug business in
California. And that went badly. He was apparently brutally murdered for
whatever reason. Nobody knows. And it doesn't have anything to do with what
we're doing here. And Mr. Chisholm ran away from that. Leaving his family
behind. Coming here to North Idaho. He did change his name. That' s never
been in dispute. But we have heard everything and anything that can possibly be
conceived as having been done wrong by somebody who has a name similar to his
as being this man . He was all these different things because of the scenario that
brings us to the Court today. And it has noth - none of those things have anything
to do with why we're here. But yet, it was all in the paper. And everybody read
about it. And everybody knew about it. So that's why I submitted all those letters
ofreference to the Court. That's why I put all four of those people on the stand.
Regardless of the charges and regardless of anything that he pled to, I think the
Court and Mr. Chisholm has the right to have it known that none of that stuff
about him was true.
So what we're dealing with is an aggravated battery. It's not an attempted
murder. He pled to aggravated battery. That is what he was charged with, that's
the plea that he entered. A significant amount of time and effort was put into this
case by my office. Between myself and the investigator and the expert that we
hired, here is what I think happened that night. I think they all were drinking.
Including my client. And I think that there was a fight going on down by the lake
that Mr. Chisholm kind of interjected himself into. And he brought those two
people up to the cabin. And Mr. Stanczak, who has never really participated in
this case, was one of the belligerents. And he is significantly younger than my
client. And he is significantly larger than my client. Mr. Stanczak is bigger than I
am. And I'm a couple of inches taller than Mr. Chisholm. You put those two
things together. Whether or not it was reasonable, or whether or not it was
something that anybody else would have done, what happened was that they got
face-to-face. They were having words. My client had a gun and it went off. And
he wasn't shot in the back twice as he was walking away. He was shot in the
torso and he was grazed in the arm. The State has tried to make it sound like
Mr. Stanczyk was running off and my client gunned him down like in a James
Bond movie or something. From everything that my ballistics expert has told me,
they were probably closer than I am to the court reporter. And most likely the
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gun was fired at a downward angle and then fired it off kind of at a 45 degree
angle that got him in the arm.
Everything that I know about this case leads me to believe that that gun wasn't
supposed to go off It just did. I think my client was afraid. It was a subjective
fear. Not an objective fear. It was a subjective fear based upon his interactions
with Mr. Stanczak. And this thing about his leaving his girlfriend behind, it is not
like they were engaged, it is not like they were living together. This is someone
that he had an informal relationship with. And yes, he did run. And he paid the
price for it that night. Unless we forget that the Sheriff's deputies put the canine
on him. And I don't want, know if the Court remembers his arm. He paid the
price for running. And he knows. He has told me over and over again. And I
have told him, if you don't run that night, this is a much different case. And he
has acknowledged that to me repeatedly.
As far as how he feels about this case, Mr. Chisholm regrets what he did. He
regrets that Mr. Stanczak was injured. And he regrets his actions that night. And
I think that's reflected in his LSI score of 16. I was really expecting to see a score
somewhere in the mid 30s. I mean, based upon everything that has gone on in
this case, everything that's been said, everything that's in the police reports. But I
think if you look at the defendant's criminal record, I think we find out a little bit
why. In the '70s there was a bunch of drug-related offenses. The last one,
Alameda County, Oakland, California, 1974. Then there's a 26 year gap, the
Bonner County failure to purchase a driver's license. Then there's a 15 year gap
and we're here. So the last time this man was charged with anything other than
not buying a driver's license, I wasn't even born yet. That was a long time ago.
I'm pushing 40 now. So I think he's earned, just based on that alone, and the fact
that there is a probation recommendation from the PSI examiner. And he does
have an LSI score of 16. I think he's earned a little bit of credibility with the
Court.
Yeah, maybe he's said some things that aren't true. And maybe he is a draft
dodger, maybe he's not. I don't know. And I don't care. That's not why I'm
here. That's not why any ofus are here. We're here to bring things back into
balance. How do we provide justice in this case? There's a significant amount of
restitution it sounds like it is going to be gone after civilly. Mr. Stanczak is going
to be trying to hold back the ocean with a rake and my client is in prison. He can
have his money or Mr. Chisholm can go to prison. He's 66 years old. $25,000,
$50,000.
Judge:

He's not 66.

Taylor:

$25,000, $50,000. That's a lot of money to pay. So what we're asking the Court
to do today is oppose local jail and give him an opportunity of probation. And
Mr. Chisholm has agreed to gladly pay the restitution. If the State offers up a
restitution amount, we will agree to whatever it is. Now, as far as whether or not
he's going to be sued civilly, that's got nothing to do with me. So what we're
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asking for is credit for time served. Which I think is about a week. I didn't do
[inaudible] to check. Oh, excuse me, 60 days.
Judge:

I do believe Mr. - I'm not - we'll have to look that. Mr. Chisholm was in for
awhile because he was doing a property bond and it took some time.

Taylor:

That's right.

Judge:

Time. So I' 11 take a look at that.

Taylor:

Getting credit for time served, local jail and probation. Thank you, Your Honor.

Judge:

Thank you. Mr. Chisholm, I want to hear from you certainly. I'm just kind of
looking back here. So Mr. Chisholm would have been arrested on June 28. The
evening this occurred.

Taylor:

Conect.

Judge:

Let me see when he bonded. Property bond. August. August 24th. So, that's
three days in county [inaudible], 58 days. Correct? Mr. Chisholm?

Chisholm:

Yes .

Judge:

This will be your opportunity to make any statement, comments you want the
Court to know. A statement on your own behalf.

Greenbank:

Your Honor, before we get to that. I do have one point I'd like to make.

Judge:

Okay. Go ahead.

Greenbank:

Okay. I heard reference to the defendant, or the victim rather, being shot in the
front of his body. Not supported by the medical documentation. I'd hand up
what's been marked as, or what hasn't been marked but was discovered to defense
as Item No. 85. Showing that the entry wound was in the back scapula.

Taylor:

And I believe that's accurate, Your Honor. I never said front.

Judge:

Okay.

Taylor:

I said torso and I said downward angle.

Judge:

We'll just note that the medical report says a gunshot wound to the chest, close
range. And it says posterior wound. And anterior wound. And it shows a wound
to the - it looks like the upper back and then grazing [inaudible].

Greenbank:

The bullet hit the scapula, traveled interior of the body and lodged in the pelvis.

Judge:

Oh, I see. I didn't see that part. Thank you.

TRANSCRIPTION OF SENTENCING HEARING - 20

Client:4232142.1

340

Greenbank:

Nothing further.

Judge:

Mr. Chisholm?

Chisholm:

Yes, Your Honor.

Judge:

This is your opportunity to make any statement that you want.

Chisholm:

Okay. I would like to address the shooting itself just briefly. There was a verbal
argument several times with Mr. Stanczak. And I declined. And, you know, I
tried to calm Mr. Stanczak down. And I got him a tent so he didn't have to drive
drunk. And he ruined that. That was fine. I offered a room in my little cabin that
he could stay in. And as he drank he got more aggressive and he started using his
finger like this. I know how to take care of old guys like you. The girls went in
to prepare the bedroom. That's when Mr. Stanczak got up and got right in my
face. I told him, get out of here. That's enough. As he exited the front door, he
turned around and pointed his finger at me like a gun again. I grabbed my gun
and I went outside to get between him and the cab of his truck. I thought he had
maybe a weapon in his truck. That's when Mr. Stanczak assaulted me. And there
was a fist fight. There was an altercation. And I knocked Mr. Stanczak down.
As I arose I'm huffing and puffing. And he came back at me and that's when I
drew my gun and fired a couple of warning shots. I had no idea that I even struck
Mr. Stanczak. And the alleged shot in the back, he was grazed once in the arm.
And as he was lunging at me, one went here, traveled down his body and lodged
in his pelvis. I did not intentionally shoot Mr. Stanczak. It was unfortunate. I did
fire the weapon. And I did not shoot him in the back. I shot him accidentally up
top and that's where the bullet traveled.
I've been a member of this community for 25 years. I haven't had any serious
charges against me except for failure to buy a driver's license or something. I've
been a member of the community. I'm a homeowner in Elmira. I would ask that
the Court consider that and I'm asking for a chance at probation so I can continue
to be a member of the community. I have my own little business that I operate in
the fall. And I work with meat processing. I worked for them for ten years
straight. And our businesses work together. I went again and worked for them
this fall. And I am sorry for what happened. I apologize to people of Bonner
County, Boundary County, the Court, all my friends here. And I'm ashamed of
my actions. But I would like a chance to prove that I can still be a protective
member of this community.

Judge:

Thank you. Mr. - you can be seated. Mr. Taylor, any legal, factual or ethical
reason not to impose a sentence?

Taylor:

No, Your Honor.

Judge:

It is a very, very unusual situation. When a judge sentences [inaudible] we look
at aggravating factors, we look at mitigating factors. We specifically can - there
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are four goals in sentencing: protecting society, to deter you and to deter other
people from committing similar crimes, rehabilitation, and then there's
retribution. There's punishment. I think it's important to try to set the record
straight in this case. First of all, the Court, the articles that came out in the
newspaper were a long time ago. And certainly this Court is not relying on
anything that would have been in the newspaper. I did not become involved in
this case until recently. The case starts off in Magistrate Court and the Magistrate
Judge has issued search warrants and did hearings and set bond and did those
things. So this Court knew actually very little about the case. And so I - and I try
to sort through what happened in this case.
And really, I don't know that the word is a Jekyll and Hyde, but it's Mr. Chisholm, in some ways you are two different people. I note that everyone
that came into this courtroom is in support of you. And you, since you've lived in
this county, you have given a lot to the community. I mean, person after person
talks about the great job you did in improving this campground. And that you are
a gracious host and you give of your time and people like you. It is concerning to
the Court that you, though, that people have to realize too, though, that your
whole life was built on a lie. You are not 66. You were born in 1952. You used
a number of different aliases. You had - it's not fair to say that you were nmning
from a drug murder. That, you know, there may have been a murder. But you
have two children. One that you abandoned as an infant and never paid, from the
Court. And the child has no relationship with you. Never supported that child.
Your son thought you were dead and just recently discovered after 30 years that
his father was actually alive. You didn't support either of your children. Three
marriages. You were declared dead by your family. So those are the kinds of
things I'm trying to balance. It is hard for the Court to understand. But you did
come here and make a better life. And start giving back to the community. It is
concerning that I've read letters about your great military service and PTSD and because none of that is true. You have to, you know, you kind of built this
fantasy life that you have. That you were a Vietnam vet and you're not a Vietnam
vet. [inaudible] I get the person is a member of the military service. I take very
seriously somebody claiming that they were when they're not. Those kinds of
things.
So then, that, the problem is you don't tell the truth. So like it is hard for me to
give much truth to what you say happened that night. And the women that were
there, this - what I can get from their police reports is from your girlfriend and the
girlfriend of Mr. - the victim, Mr. Stanczak, is that you were all there. You were
all drinking. You were - it doesn't appear that you drink very often, at least
everyone has said they don't see you drink. You admit that you had very serious
drug issues and were - as a young man. And very involved. And you have a
number of charges for drugs and alcohol when you were a young man. So
perhaps that's part of the thing, that you got highly intoxicated. The argument,
the only, the women talk about the argument might have been jealousy about the
women. In reading what they had to say. But the victim didn't have a gun. And
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you shot him twice and the shot, the wound is to the back. Let's be clear about
that. It's not to the front. And then, as Mr. Taylor said, if you are in an
altercation and are fearful and you shoot someone, you don't hop in your pickup
truck with two loaded weapons and take off. Wreck your truck. Go two miles out
in the woods, hide, and when the police were looking for you. I'm glad there was
a dog. Because from their perspective in reading the reports, you, they thought
you were in a shooting stance. You had the weapons next to you fully loaded.
There was a bullet in the firing position. And that, and you, the drug, the dog
attacked you. But I'm afraid you could have shot an officer or an officer could
have shot you. That's not what we're, what I'm judging. But that's what the
facts show the Court. So, all this is very concerning.
And that's what I'm trying to balance. In this case this Court cannot say that it is
all right to shoot a person and to flee and to be tracked by the police and that you
get probation. That doesn't deter you or anyone else from shooting a person.
That - you have to take responsibility. Mr., for all you know Mr. Stanczak was
dead. Because you shot him and ran. And luckily medical got there and he did
not die. Or you would be charged with murder. So there have to be
consequences. And that's what this Court has to balance. That's my job.
I think the State's recommending five years fixed, five years indeterminate. I
think given your age, lack of record for the, criminal record, for the last number of
years, risks to the community, that that's too harsh of a sentence. So what I'm
going to do instead is a unified ten year sentence. Two years fixed, eight years
indeterminate. A crime like this cannot, in this Court's view, I cannot impose
probation and I cannot impose [inaudible]. So that's what I'm going to do. We'll
leave the restitution issue open as Mr. Greenbank asked, for 60 days. That's what
I typically do in my judgments. But it appears that that will be, the issue will be
dealt with civilly. I'm going to impose a fine of $1,000. Court costs are $245.50
on an aggravated battery. And $500 to reimburse some of the costs to the county
for your attorney. TU give you credit for, I believe I said 58 days served. I'm
required to impose $100 for the DNA sample. It's required in every case. The
Court will prepare the judgment. It will just take a couple of moments and we' 11
be in recess.
[Recording ends]
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JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
Wes S. Larsen, ISB #9134
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
TELEPHONE: (208) 667-0683

FACSIMILE: (208) 664~ 1684

Attorneys for Joseph Stanczak
IN THE DTSTRJCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAHO,

Case No. CV 2016-0590

Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT STANCZAK'S

vs.

MOTION TO STRIKE

EDGAR WILKINS COOK~ .TR. and LAURIE

FRANCES COOK, husband and wffe; and
JOSEPH STANCZAK,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Defendant Joseph Stancz.ak, by and through his attorney ofrecord, Wes
S. Larsen. of the firm Jam.es, Vernon & Weeks, P.A., and moves this Court to strike portions of
the Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and the Declaration of

Benjamin C. Ritchie filed in support therewith, including Exhibit E of said Declaration in its
entirety, pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 408 of the Idaho
Rules of Evidence.
This Motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Defendant Stanczak, s
Motion to Strike filed concurrently herewith.
DEFENDANT STANCZAK'S MOTION TO STRTKE-1
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Oral argument is requested,

DATED this 21st day of October, 2016.

JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

Attorney for Defendant Joseph Stanczak
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345

02/10

10/21/2016

16:26

120866'\

PAGE

JVW

4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the .1.,.j_ day of October 2016, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following persons in the following manner:
James L. Martin
Tyler J. Anderson
Benjamin C. Ritchie
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & FIELDS~

CHARTERED

__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
E-mail
-- - Hand Delivery
Facsimile
__ Federal Express

-X

l 01 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
P.O. Box 829
Boise, ID 83701

Fax: (208) 385-5384
j1m@moffatt.com
tya@moffatt.com
bcr@moffatt.com
Attorneys for Plaimf{f Farm Bureau

Michael T. Howard
WINSTON & CASHATT
250 Northwest Blvd.i Ste. 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Fax: (208) 765-2121
mth@\vinstoncashatt.com
Attorney.for Defendants Cook

__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
__ E-mail
__ Hand Delivery
_2(_ Facsimile
__ Federal Express
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JAMES~ VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

__- , \, .

Wes S. Larsen, ISB #9134
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814

TELEPHONE: (208) 667-0683
FACSIMILE: (208) 664-1684

Attorneys.for .Joseph Stanczak
IN TIIB DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIIE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAHO,

Case No. CV 2016-0590

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT STANCZAK'S

vs.
EDGAR WILKINS COOK, .JR. and LAURIE
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife; and
JOSEPH STANCZAK,

MOTION TO STRIKE

Defendants.

COMES NOW Defendant Joseph Stanczak, by and through hi.s attorney of record, Wes
S. Larsen of James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A., and submits this Memorandum in Support of
Defendant Stanczak's Motion to Strike.
INTRODUCTION

On October 20; 2016, Plaintiff Fann Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho
(hereinafter '"Farm Bureau") filed a motion for summary judgment, a memorandum in support
thereof, and declarations of Barbara E. Mayne, Benjamin C. Ritchie~ and Steven Johnson in
support thereo'f. The Declaration of Benjamin C. Ritchi.e included as Exhibit Ea demand Jetter
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT' STANCZAK'S MOTTON TO ST.RJKE -1

347

04/10

10/21/2016

16:26

1208664.

JVW

A

PAGE

sent by the undersigned counsel for Defendant Stanc:r..ak to Farm Bureau on February 1, 2016,
prior to initiation of this litigation and Stanczak's underlying personal injury lawsuit. Ritchie

Deel., Ex. E. The phrase "FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES ONLY" is written in bold lettering
in the upper-half of the first page of the demand letter. Id Farm Bureau's memorandum in

support of its motion. for summary judgment makes various references to the demand letter and
statements m.ade in compromise negotiations therein in an effort to show why Stanczak's claims
are not covered under Defendants Edgar and Laurie Cook' s insurance policy v.-ith Farm Bureau.
Plaintiffs submission of Defendant Stan.czak' s demand letter as evidence in support of its

motion for summary judgment is Wln.ecessary and violates Idaho Rule of Evidence 408 and
Idaho Supreme Court case law :regarding offers to compromise, and this Court should therefore
strike and disregard such evjdence.
ARGUMENT

Plaintiff Farm Bureau has submitted Defendant Stanczak's prior demand letter as
evidence in. support of its m.otion for swnmary judgment, and discusses various "statements
made in compromise negotiations'' in an attempt to prove the invalidity of Mr. Stan.c.7.:ak's claims

unde:r: the Cooks' Fann Bureau insurance policy. This directly violates Idaho Rule of Evidence
408 and Idaho case law. As such, all evidence regarding Stanczak's demand letter must be
disregarded and omitted under IRCP 12(f).
1.

Legal Standard for Motion to Strike
Either upon the Court's own initiative, or upon the moti.on of a party, "the Court may

strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter.'' IRCP 12(f). Thus, this Court has the authority and discretion to strike matter

l'vfEMORANDUM TN SUPPOtn OF DEFENDANT STANCZAK1 S MOTTON TO STRIKE- 2
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presented in support of Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment if such evidence violates the
Idaho Rules of Evidence and Idaho court precedent.

2.

Farm Bureau.'s Violations of Evidence Rule 408 ("Compromises and Offers to
Compromise") and Idaho Supreme Court Precedent
The Court should strike all references to and inclusion of Defendant Stanczak's demand

letter from Farm Bureau's memorandum. and supporting declarati.ons because such evidence

blatantly violates Idaho Rule of Evidence 408, which states:
Evidence of (1) furnishing, offering, or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting,
offedng, or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising Ol"
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of the
claim or any other claim. Evidence of conduct or. statements made in compromise
negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of
any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course
of compromise negotiations. This rule does not require exclusion if the evidence i.s
offered for another pur.pose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness,
negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal
investigation or. prosecution. Compromise negotiations encompass medi.atioo..
Idaho R. Evi.d. 408 (l 990) (emphasis added).

The Idaho Supreme Court discussed application of ER 408 in depth in Hatfield v. Max

Rouse & Sons Nw., 100 Idaho 840, 606 P.2d 944 (1980):
The modern approach is to exclude All [sic] statements made in the course of
settlement negotiations. This is the position adopted by the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
"Rule 408 Compromise and Offers to Compromise "Evidence of (1)
furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering
or promising to accept; a valuable consideration in compromising or
attempti.ng to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity
or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim
or its amoW1t. Evi.dence of conduct or statements made in com.promise
negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the
exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is
presented in the course of corn.promise negotiations. T.hls rule also does not
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT STANCZAK'S MOTTON TO STRIKE-3
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require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as
proving a bias or prejudice of a witness. negativing a contention of undue
delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a crirninal investigation or
prosecution." Federal Rules of Evidence 408.
This position has also been widely recommended by the commentators. E. g.,
Cleary (ed.), McConnick on Evidence, s 274~ p. 664 (2d ed. 1972); McConnJ.ck,
Evidences 76 (1954); Weinstein and Berger, Weinstein1s Evidence, P 408(02), pp.
408-14 to 408-19 (1979); 2 Louisell and Mue.ller, Federal Evidence, s 170, pp. 2713 (1978); Bell~ Handbook of Evidence for the Idaho Lawyer, 78-9 (2d ed. 1972).
Because of its encouragement of settlement negotiations, the Feder.al Rule's blanket
prohibition is the best position on the question., and the one we adopt.
Hatjieldv. Max Rouse & Sons Nw . ., 100 Idaho 840,846,606 P.2d 944; 950 (1980) (overruled on

other grounds). In light of the Idaho Supreme Court's adoption of the federal standard, evidence
of statements made in compromise negotiations is not adinissible.
Yet Plaintiff attempts to use such state1nents in. support of its motion for summary
judgment. In addition to including the entire demand Jetter as an exhibit to Mr. Ritchie's
declaration, Plaintiff also refers to various statements made in the demand Jetter throughout
Plaintiffs support memorandum. Examples include:
•

"On February 1, 2016, Stanczak, through his counsel, made a demand on Farm
Bureau for damages for Stanczak under the Policy arising out of the June 28, 2015,
shooting. Ritchie Deel. ,r 7; Ex. E." Plaintiff's Memorandum, p. 10.

•

"Stanczak memorialized his claim against the Cooks and Fann Bureau in
Stanczak's counsePs demand letter of February l, 2016, which basically stated that
Chisholm shot Stanczak and fled the scene. Stanczak alleged that Chisholm was
either the Cooks' agent or employee. Based upon the information from the Cooks
and the February 1, 2016, demand letter, there is no coverage for Stanczak's claim
against the Cooks under the Policy." Plaintiff's Memorandum, p. l. 6.

• "Stanczak did not send his de:m.and letter to Farm Bureau and the Cooks W.ltiJ
February 1, 2016. By the time Stanczak sent his demand letter to Fann Bureau and
tbe Cooks, there could. be no coverage under the Policy under Exclusion Number

14, as the claim arose out of a violation of criminal law." Plaintiff's Memorandum,
p. 27.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT STANCZAK'S MOTTON TO STRIKE ·-4
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··stan.cza.k argued in his demand letter th.at the operatiou of the campground was a
business activity of the Cooks because they invited or licensed campers to come
onto the Bloom Lake Property for a voluntary donatioo.. Stanczak has also
submitted that Chisholm was the Cooks 1 employee, even though he was not paid a
wage or salary) because he was paid to do work on the Bloom Lake Property by
virtue of the fact that the Cooks allowed him to reside in the cabin on the Bloom
Lake Property without paying rent." Plaintiff's Memorandum, p. 27.

The evidence speaks for itself, and Plaintiff clearly attempts to use these various "'statements

made in compromise negotiations" in order to "prove . .. invalidity of' Mr. Stanczak's claims
asserted in his personal injury Jawsuit. Idaho R. Evid. 408. This is a clear violation of Eviden.c e

Rule 408 and the Haffield court's ruling. Id.; Hatfield, 100 Idaho at 846, 606 P .2d at 950; see

also Saim Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho 479,495,224 P.3d
1068, 1084 (2009) (..The Rule should be given a broad~ not narrow, interpretation in order to

encourage settlement negotiations.;').
Fann Bureau may try to argue that the demand letter is admissible as evidence in this
declaratory action case because it is necessary to show why Mr. Stanczak's claims are not

covered tmder the Cooks' insurance policy. However, the demand letter and all statements
therein1 which were made as part of an ER 408~protected communication ••promising to accept ..
. a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was

disputed as to either validity or amount," are not at issue in Fann Bureau's declaratory action,
and the demand letter was not included as an. exhibit to Fann, Bureau's Amended Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment (and should not have been). 'What is at issue in this declaratory action is
Mr. Stanczak's personal injury lawsuit against Mr. and Mrs. Cook, for which the Cooks have
sought indemni.fication from Fann Bureau.
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Mr. Stfil1c7.ak's lawsuit is not based on his demand letter. It is based on the claims
asserted in his First Amended Complaint for Damages~ 1 which makes no reference whatsoever to
the demand letter. The claims in Stanczak's First Amended Complaint should therefore be the
sole basis of any motion for summary judgment filed by Fann Bureau in this declaratory action
regarding insurance coverage and indemnification. It is jmproper to attempt to sway the Court
with outside evidence prohibited by the Rules of Evidence. Because Plaintiff Far.m Bureau has
attempted to do so, this Court should strike such evidence under IRCP 12(.f).
3.

Attorney Fees
In the event the Court grants Defendant Stanczak' s Motion to Strike, Defendant Stanczak

also moves for an award of attorney fees under J.C. § 12-121 and sanctions for frivolous conduct

under J.C. § 12-123.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Stanczak respectfully requests that the Court
strike the inclusion of and aU references to Defendant Stanczak's demand letter from Plaintiffs

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting declarations.

DATED this 21st day of October, 2016.

JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

Wes S. Larsen
Attorney for Defendant ,Toseph Stanczak.

1

Stancz.ak's Fii:st Amended Complaint for Damages ii:; provided as Exhibit F to Mr. Ritchie's Declaration.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1d_ day of October 2016, I caused a tn1e and correct
copy of the foregoing docwnent to be served upon the following persons in tbe following manner:
James L. Martin

Tyler J. Anderson
Benjamin C. Ritchie
MOFFATI, THOMAS, BARRETI, ROCK & FIELDS,
CHARTERED
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor

__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
__ E-mail
_ _ Hand Delivery

-X Facsimile

_

Federal Express

P.O. Box 829
Boise, ID 83 70 l
Fax: (208) 385-5384

jlrn@moffatt.com
tya@moffatt.com
bcr@moffatt.com
Attorneys.for PlaintiffFarm Bureau
Michael T. Howard

WINSTON & CASHATT
250 Northwest Blvd. 1 Ste. 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Fax: (208) 765-2121

_U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
__ E-mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
._X- Facsimile

__ Federal Express

mtb@winstoncashatt.com

Attorney.for Defendants Cook
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CLERr1 DlSTRICT COURT

JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
Wes S. Larsen, ISB #9134

~~---er~ - -

1626 Lincoln Way

Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
TELEPHONE: (208) 667-0683
FACSIMILE: (208) 664-1684

Attorneys for Joseph Stanczak
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 2016-0590

DEFENDANT STANCZAK'S
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF FARM BUREAU

vs.
EDGAR Wil,KINS COOK, JR. and LAURIE
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife; and
JOSEPH STANCZAK,
.

MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAHO'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

Defendants.
Defendant Joseph Stanczak, by and through his attorney of record, Wes S. Larsen of the
firm James, Vernon and Weeks, P.A., hereby objects to Plaintiff Fann. Bureau Mutual Insurance

Company of Idaho's Motion for Summary Judgment, and joins in and incorporates Defendants
Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook's arguments in opposition to Plaintiff Farm

Bureau's Motion.
DATED this 7th day of December, 2016.

JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS,P.A.

Wes S. Larse~ ISB No. 9134
Attorney for Defendant Joseph Stanczak.
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James L. Martin
Tyler J. Anderson

Benjamin C. Ritchie
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & FIELDS,
CHARTERED
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor

__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
__ E-mail
__ Hand Delivery
~Facsimile
__ Federal Express

P.O. Box 829

Boise, ID 83701
Fax: (208) 385-5384
jlm@lmoffatt.com
tya(@J11offatt.com
bcr@moffatt.com
Attorneys for PlaintiffFwm Bureau
Michael T. Howard
WINSTON & CASHATT
250 North.west Blvd., Ste. 206
Coeurd~Akne, Idaho 83814
Fax: (208) 765-2121
mth@winstoncashatt.com
Attorney for Defendants Cook

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
- - E-mail
- - Hand Delivery
-X Facsimile
__ Federal Express
_
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MICHAEL T. HOWARD, ISB No. 6128
WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS,
a Professional Service Corporation
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-2103
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
mth@winstoncashatt.com

6

Attorneys for Defendants Cook

2
3
4
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7

8

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

9
10

11

FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

12

Case No. CV 2016-0590

vs.
13

14

15

EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR., and LAURIE
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife, and
JOSEPH STANCZAK,

16
17
18

EDGAR AND LAURIE COOK'S
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
FARM BUREAU'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.
1.

Relief Requested.
Insured Defendants Edgar and Laurie Cook request that the court deny Farm Bureau Mutual

19
Insurance Company's (Farm Bureau's) motion for summary judgment because the claims made
20

21

against them in the underlying litigation are based on negligence and their insurance company is

22

required to defend and indemnify them for those claims. In the underlying litigation, the Stanczaks

23

sued the Cooks because Michael Chisholm, who was residing in a cabin on the Cooks' premises, shot

24

Mr. Stanczak with a gun after the Stanczaks accepted Mr. Chisholm's invitation to join him in the

25
26

EDGAR AND LAURIE COOK'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO FARM BUREAU'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT -- 1

~~1~adatt

. ---- .A..;"ROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATION
'
250 Northwm Blvd.• Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene-. ldaho83814
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1

cabin. Farm Bureau's lengthy brief relating to whether Joseph Stanczak is an "insured" under the

2

policy, or whether Mr. Chisholm acted intentionally, or criminally, is irrelevant to the Cooks' right to

3

coverage for allegations of negligent supervision and premises liability. Under these theories, it is

4

the Cooks' conduct that must be analyzed, and it is undisputed they had no intent to shoot or injure
5

6

Mr. Stanczak, and any breach of their duty to keep their premises safe or supervise Mr. Chisholm

7

arose out of "accidental" conduct constituting an occurrence which triggers coverage.

8

2.

Facts.

9

The Cooks own rural real property in Bonner County, Idaho; there is a lake on the property,

10

and a small cabin. The Cooks have allowed people to camp on the property, at no charge, since the

11

1950s. One of the campers, Mr. Chisholm, asked if he could reside in the cabin, in tum for doing

12
some chores on the property for them; they agreed. As Farm Bureau points out, the Cooks

13

14

gratuitously allowed camping on their property; they did not charge any fees, nor did they realize any

15

income from this permissive use. Similarly, no money changed hands as a result of Mr. Chisholm's

16

residence in the cabin.

17
18

19

An incident occurred on the Cooks' property when Joseph Stanczak was camping on the
property, and accepted Mr. Chisholm's invitation to join him in the Cooks' cabin. Some type of
altercation occurred, and Mr. Chisholm shot Mr. Stanczak.

20

21

22
23
24

Mr. Stanczak sued the Cooks, claiming as a First Cause of Action "Premises Liability":
3.2.2

Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook ... as owners and/or possessors of
land had a duty to their invitees, social guests, and licensees including
plaintiffs, to inspect and keep the premises reasonably safe and warn of
known dangers.

25
26

EDGAR AND LAURIE COOK' S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO FARM BUREAU'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT -- 2
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1

3.2.3

Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook ... failed to exercise ordinary and
reasonable care to keep the premises reasonably safe from and to warn
plaintiff of Defendant Chisholm's reasonably foreseeable conduct.

3.2.4

Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook ... breached this duty by failing to
warn and protect plaintiff from a firearm being discharged by
Defendant Chisholm while intoxicated on the Defendants' property.

2
3
4
5

6

(Complaint for Damages) 1
For the Second Cause of Action against the Cooks, "Negligent Supervision," the plaintiff

7

8

alleged:

9

3.2.7

[Cooks] breached a common law duty of reasonable care by failing to
properly supervise their agent/employee, Defendant Michael Jesse
Chisholm, to prevent injury to campground invitees and licensees on
their property, including the plaintiff.

3.2.8

[Cooks] breached the common law duty of reasonable care by failing to
properly supervise Defendant Chisholm to prevent him from becoming
intoxicated and discharging firearms, which could result in injury to
campground invitees and licensees, including the plaintiff.

3.2.9

[Cooks] breached the common law duty of care by failing to protect
:from or warn plaintiff of dangers posed by Defendant Chisholm
becoming intoxicated and discharging firearms.2

10
11
12
13

14
15
16
17

(Complaint for Damages) The remaining claims were solely against Mr. Chisholm.

18
19

The Cooks had purchased a liability policy from Farm Bureau to protect them in relation to
the relevant premises. The "Country Squire" policy promised in relevant part:

20
21

22

23
24

1

The plaintiffs Amended Complaint did not change this cause of action against the Cooks.
The Amended Complaint changed the allegation that Mr. Chisholm was an employee/agent to simply claiming he was
an agent.

2

25
26
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Agreement

2

1.

3

We will provide the insurance described in this policy and the declaration if
you have paid the premium ...
SECTION II LIABILITY INSURANCE

4
5

COVERAGE Fl BODILY INJURY LIABILITY ...

6

If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for damages because of
bodily injury or property damage, caused by an occurrence to which this coverage
applies, we will:

7

8

1.

Pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the insured is
legally liable ... ; and

2.

Provide a defense at our expense ...

9
10

11

(Policy, p. 22, Ex. A to Amended Complaint)

12
The relevant definitions portion of the policy provides that occurrence means "an
13

14

accident ... which results in unexpected bodily injury or property damage during the policy period."

15

(Policy, p. 3, Ex. A to Amended Complaint) "Accident" is not defined. So long as no exclusion

16

exists which limits the coverage provided, Farm Bureau is required to defend and indemnify its

17

insureds under this broad scope coverage.

18

3.

Law.

19
The Cooks are entitled to the defense and indemnification which their insured promised them.
20

21
22

They were unconnected to the shooting, and are being sued for their own allegedly negligent conduct
in allowing Mr. Chisholm to reside in the cabin, failing to supervise him, and creating Mr. Stanczak's

23

risk of harm on their premises. Irrespective of the underlying allegations regarding the shooting, it is

24

undisputed that the Cooks had insurance for claims against them of premises liability and negligence,
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1

It is under these principles that the court must analyze the policy to determine whether a duty

2

to defend and indemnify exists as a matter of law; because there exists a "potential" for the Cooks'

3

liability when the Complaint is read broadly, Farm Bureau's motion must be denied.

4

3.2
5
6

The conduct of the insureds, the Cooks, is what must be analyzed to determine
whether an "occurrence" existed, and that alleged conduct triggers coverage for
claims of premises liability and negligent supervision.

7

The Cooks do not assert that Mr. Stanczak is an insured, nor need he be so designated for

8

liability coverage under the Farm Bureau policy. The Farm Bureau policy insured the Cooks for the

9

claims made against them. As Farm Bureau notes, coverage exists if "a claim is made or a suit is

10

brought against the Insured" for bodily injury caused by "an occurrence." There is no dispute the

11

Cooks are insured and have been sued for bodily injury of Mr. Stanczak, which occurred on their

12

insured premises.
13

And contrary to Farm Bureau's argument, the Cooks' alleged conduct constitutes an

14
15

"occurrence" triggering Farm Bureau's duty to defend and indemnify. To determine an "accident" or

16

"occurrence" under an insuring agreement, when the policy does not define these terms, courts

17

analyze what is "expected" or "intended" from the viewpoint of the insured. See, North Pacific Ins.

18
19

Co. v. Mai, 130 Idaho 251, 253-54, 939 P.2d 570 (1997); City of Boise v. Planet Ins. Co., 126 Idaho
51, 57-58, 878 P.2d 750 (1994). 3 In this instance, there is no allegation that Mr. Chisholm's conduct

20
21

was expected or intended by the Cooks, when analyzed from the Cooks' standpoint. It is irrelevant

22
23
24

3

To the extent the policy does not expressly provide that an "occurrence" or "accident" must be viewed from the
insured's perspective, it merely creates an ambiguity which must be read to favor coverage. See, Brumley v. Lee, 963
P.2d 1224, 1233 (Kan. 1998).
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1

whether Mr. Chisholm intended either the act, or the injury resulting from the act, because it is clear

2

the Cooks intended neither the act or the injury.

3

While Farm Bureau focuses on the conduct of Mr. Chisholm, and the shooting, that is not the

4

"occurrence" being alleged against the Cooks.

Instead, it is the Cooks' conduct in allowing

5

6

Mr. Chisholm to reside at the cabin that underscores their alleged liability; such liability is based on

7

claims that the Cooks knew or failed to discern that an unsafe condition existed on their premises,

8

potentially by either knowing of or failing to investigate the presence of intoxicants or weapons;

9

knowing of or failing to determine Mr. Chisholm's background or condition; failed to supervise his

10
11

conduct; and without warning of or eliminating the presence of potential risk he posed. In Idaho, a
premises liability claim exists if a landowner fails to keep his premises in a reasonably safe condition,

12
or to warn of hidden or concealed dangers. Boswell v. Steele, 158 Idaho 554, 562, 348 P.3d 497
13

14

(2915) (homeowner sued for presence of a dangerous animal that attacked). Questions of fact exist

15

on issues of premises liability based on the property owner's knowledge of the dangerous propensities

16

allowed on the premises, and whether the property owner minimized such risks and/or warned of

17

them. Id. Negligent supervision of others takes various forms, but all involve a common law duty

18
19

"that one who takes charge of a third person who he knows or should know to be likely to cause
bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third

20

21

person to prevent him from doing such harm." Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 223-227, 723 P.2d

22
23
24
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1

755 (1986). Such issues generally create issues of fact, like premises liability, relating to motive,

2

knowledge, and reasonable care. Id. 4

3

Thus, both of these theories are based on allegations of negligent conduct; neither theory

4

encompasses any claim of intentional conduct by the Cooks which would preclude the existence of an
5
6

"occurrence" under the Farm Bureau policy. 5 Yet, Farm Bureau's argument for lack of its obligation

7

to defend or indemnify is that the shooting was not "unexpected" and was "intentional," and thus not

8

an "accident" constituting an "occurrence."

9

conduct, not the Cooks, or claims made against the Cooks, and the numerous cases cited by Farm

10

Bureau are primarily those analyzing the intentional assaultive behavior of the insured. Whether

11

However, Farm Bureau analyzes Mr. Chisholm's

courts refuse to impose a duty on an insured when an insured criminally assaults or shoots someone,

12

is irrelevant to determine whether the policy covers the Cooks for the conduct alleged in the
13

14

Complaint; as a result, those authorities fail to provide any guidance to the issues here.

15

Farm Bureau only briefly analyzes the actual issue in this matter - - whether the Cooks are

16

entitled to coverage based on the allegations made against them, for their conduct, separate and apart

17

from Mr. Chisholm's; it cites two Idaho cases to assert that the only behavior to be analyzed is

18
19

Mr. Chisholm's.

However, these cases do not establish as a matter of law that there can be no

coverage for the Cooks under the insuring agreement for an "occurrence" based on the broad reading

20
of all potential claims by the Stanczaks.
21
22
23
24

4

While the Stanczaks' initial complaint alleged Mr. Chisholm was an agent or employee of the Cooks, it was amended to
eliminate the "employment" context, and it is this amended complaint which governs the analysis of the issues here;
however, the general concept is the same relative to the existence of an "occurrence."
5
While Farm Bureau asserts that Mr. Stanczak may have difficulty proving these claims, it does not base its motion for
summary judgment on any claim that issues of fact do not exist on the Cooks' liability for these claims of negligence.
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1

First, in State Fann Fire & Casualty Co. v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693, 946 P.2d 1333 (1997), the

2

intentional tortfeasor was a minor resident of the home which was the insured premises, and thus an

3

"insured" himself; a minor son living in a home in which a daycare was operated sexually abused one

4

of the children and his conduct constituted intentional conduct of the insured for the purposes of an
5

6
7

"occurrence," irrelevant to the issue here.
In Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4, 843 P.2d 154 (1992), the court analyzed

8

whether the sexual assault by the ex-husband of the insured at an in-home daycare triggered

9

coverage, but did so based on "causation" of the bodily injury in Wilcox, and not whether the conduct

10

was intentional. Causation is usually a question of fact, and in this instance, when the underlying

11

action has been consolidated, a finding of no causation would be a determination of both cases. More

12
specifically, because Stanczak's claims against the Cooks include the element of causation, Stanczak

13
14

necessarily asserts that his bodily injury was caused by the Cook's conduct. Because of this, if the

15

court were to rule that the Cook's conduct didn't cause bodily injury for the purposes of constituting

16

an "occurrence," the same ruling would require the Court to dismiss Stanczak's underlying claims

17

against the Cooks for failure to prove an essential element of his claims.

18
19

Moreover, there were no claims of premises liability in the Wilcox case, which would have
differing elements of causation. These cases should be limited to their facts of the type of claims

20

21

22

made, the identity of the underlying intentional tortfeasors.
That these concepts are inapplicable here is underscored by the out-of-state cases also cited by

23

the Farm Bureau in support of its argument that the insured's conduct cannot be analyzed

24

independently of the underlying intentional act. (See, Farm Bureau Memorandum, p. 41, fn. 5) For

25
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1

example, in Allstate v. J.J.M. , 657 N.W.2d 181 (Mich. App. 2003), the court refused to find an

2

"accident" when the insured intentionally committed a crime by giving alcohol to a minor at the

3

insured's home, and the minor committed an intentional sexual assault; the insured was an active

4

participant and the insured's intentional conduct led to the intentional assault. No such active
5

6

intentional criminal conduct is alleged against the Cooks.

The remaining cases are similarly

7

inapplicable.

8

negligence in giving juvenile child gun, who then murdered neighbor; court noted no duty to defend

9

or indemnify when "acts of the insured were intentional"); Allstate v. Hill, 2005 WL 1959560 (Mich.

10

App. 2005) (no "accident" when insured was convicted of assault and battery for her role in an attack

11

See, Offhaus v. Guthrie, 746 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio App. 2000) (parents sued for

at her home).

12
13
14

Contrary to these authorities, the circumstances here are based on claims of negligent
behavior of the Cooks who did not actively participate in the intentional conduct, did not

15

intentionally create the situation, and are not being sued based on any of their intentional conduct.

16

Courts faced with such similar circumstances find that an "occurrence" has been sufficiently pled to

17

trigger a potential for coverage and corresponding duty to defend. For example, in Nationwide

18

19

Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Pipher, 140 F.3d 222 (3rd Cir. 1998), a property owner's insurer argued that
there could be no "occurrence," and thus no duty to defend or indemnify, when a painter hired by the

20
21
22
23

24

property owner murdered a tenant at the building; the pled claims against the property owner
included premises liability and negligent hiring. The Court stated:
Although [the tenant's] death was the direct result of a third party's intentional
conduct, the complaint alleges that the insured's own negligence also played a
significant part in her death ... the fact that the event causing [bodily injury or damage
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1

2
3
4

to property] may be traceable to an intentional act does not preclude the occurrence
from being an accident.
140 F.3d at 225. The court noted that from the insured's standpoint, the assault and death was
unexpected.

5

Moreover, the Pipher court noted that the insurance company could have easily drafted a

6

provision to preclude coverage for an occurrence that happens as a result of the intentional conduct of

7

"any person," or a "third person," and its failure to do so at best creates an ambiguity read against

8

the insurer. 140 F.3d at 227. See also, Westfield Ins. Co. v. Tech Dl"y. Inc., 336 F.3d 503 (6th Cir.
9
10

2003) (insured's negligent hiring and retaining of former employee who murdered customer was a

11

qualifying "occurrence" under CGL policy; court found that insured's conduct and actions must be

12

evaluated, not the perpetrator of the intentional act); Safeco Ins. Co. v. White, 913 N.E.2d 426 (Ohio

13

2009) (stabbing of a neighbor by an insured's son was an "occurrence" for purposes of negligence

14
15

claim against insureds; whether underlying act was intentional must be determined from perspective
of insureds who are sued for negligent supervision).

16
Ultimately, when properly analyzed under the rules of construction of an insurance policy
17
18
19

20
21

22

favoring coverage:
The fact that an accident is caused by or traceable to the act of a person other than the
insured does not prevent the occurrence from being an "accident." When the injury is
not a result of the misconduct or the participation of the [insured] party, it is, as to
him, accidental although intentionally inflicted by the other party.

Brumley v. Lee, 963 P.2d 1224, 1232 (Kan. 1998) [citing 10 Couch on Insurance 2d §41 :14 (1982)].

23

When viewed from the standpoint of the insured, assaults committed by third persons are

24

unexpected events constituting accidents and occurrences under insurance policies. See, COUCH
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1

ON INSURANCE, §127:21 (32rd Ed.)(" ... where the insured is not the assailant, but is instead liable

2

based on ... negligent supervision or some other negligence theory, the assault may constitute an

3

accident or occurrence, at least from the standpoint of the insured."); National Fire Ins. Co. v. Lewis,

4

898 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (D. Ariz. 2012) (medical clinic's CGL "occurrence" policy triggered for sexual
5
6

7

assault by physician); Morris v. Coker, 923 F. Supp. 2d 863 (W.D. La. 2013) (employer's insurer
obligated to cover claim by consultant punched by employee).

8

The better reason resulted in interpreting an "occurrence" in instances in which there are

9

clearly negligent claims pled against the insured to include premises liability and negligent

10

supervision is that a duty to defend and/or indemnify exists. The insurer must more clearly and

11

unambiguously define "occurrence" if it intends to exclude the intentional acts of third parties. Here,

12
the claim against the Cooks is based on negligent, i.e. accidental conduct, which Farm Bureau agreed
13

14

to insure.
3.3

15

There are also no applicable exclusions to avoid Farm Bureau's duty to defend or
indemnify.

16
Farm Bureau, in addition to asserting that there was no coverage triggered because there was
17
18

no "occurrence," also argues that there is no duty to defend or indemnify under the policy based on

19

applicable exclusions. 6 Terms in an insurance policy are given a broad meaning in cases involving

20

the extension of liability coverage, and are construed narrowly in those cases involving an exclusion

21

from coverage. Farm Bw:eau M ut. Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Schrock, 150 Idaho 817, 826, 252 P.3d 98

22
23
24

6

While Fann Bureau argues that the exclusions precluded coverage before the Stanczak complaint was filed, because
Mr. Chisholm had already pled to a criminal charge, the timing of the criminal plea and the filing is irrelevant, because
Mr. Chisholm is not the insured, and the issues will not be separately addressed herein. Similarly, because the Cooks did
not plead to any criminal conduct, the existence of Mr. Chisholm's "Alford plea" is irrelevant.
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1

(2011). Neither the intentional act nor criminal conduct exclusions, when properly construed, operate

2

to avoid Farm Bureau's duty to defend and indemnify.

3

(a)

4

The alleged conduct of the Cooks was neither criminal nor intentional and
is not excluded from coverage under the policy.

5

Farm Bureau misstates the "criminal conduct" and "intentional acts" exclusions in its policy.

6

The policy provides that there is no coverage under Section II of the policy (the bodily injury liability

7

coverage at issue):

8

14. Arising out of a violation of a criminal law .. .if committed by any insured.
9
10

Amended Complaint. Ex. A. p. 25 (Emphasis added)

11

Chisolm is not an insured, and there is no allegation that the Cooks committed a violation of criminal

12

law. Had the exclusion been intended to include third party conduct, it would have ended at the

13

"arising out of' language. The criminal conduct of Mr. Chisholm is irrelevant and the CGL coverage

14

for allegations of the negligence of the Cooks is not excluded.

15

The same is true of the "intentional acts exclusion". The policy excludes only bodily injury

16
"intentionally caused by any insured." Amended Complaint, Ex. A. p. 24. Again, Chisolm is not an
17
18

insured and there is no allegation the Cooks intentionally caused the Stanczaks bodily injury.

19

All of the cases cited by Farm Bureau to assert the exclusion applies are ones in which the

20

insured committed intentional criminal conduct, and are inapplicable to this analysis. In fact, the

21

way in which these exclusions are phrased underscores the intent of the policy to cover those events

22
23

in which intentional or criminal conduct may exist, but are not alleged to have been committed by the
insured. But in any event, the exclusions do not preclude coverage.

24
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1

(b)

2

The Cooks were also not engaged in a "business pursuit" which excludes
coverage.

Farm Bureau notes that the Stanczak complaint alleges that the Cooks operated the

3
4

campground "for profit," but in its memorandum, admits the Cooks did not charge fees for its use;

5

Farm Bureau also admits the Cooks did not financially compensate Mr. Chisholm. The policy has a

6

definition of "business":

7

Business means a full-time or part-time trade, profession, occupation, or activity,
engaged in for compensation ...

8
9

Amended Complaint, Ex. A, p. 1 (Emphasis added)

10
11

It is undisputed the Cooks did not engage in the campground "for compensation." And while

Farm Bureau ignores the existence of this definition, the only authority it cites recognizes that a

12
"business pursuit" must be "commercial in nature" and in furtherance of a business or livelihood.
13
14

(See, Farm Bureau Memorandum, p. 28) While Farm Bureau concludes that the voluntary donation

15

for upkeep converts this into a commercial enterprise, when the exclusion is narrowly construed, the

16

permissive use of property for recreational activity cannot construed as a matter of law to be a

17

"business."

18

19

4.

Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment should be denied.

20
21

DATED this 7th day of December, 2016.

22
23

a Professional Service Corporation
Attorneys for Defendants Cook
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company ofldaho ("Fann Bureau")
brought this action for declaratory relief against Edgar and Laurie Cook (the "Cooks") to ask the
Court to declare whether an intentional shooting is covered under the Cooks' in~unmce policy

with Fann Bureau (the "Policf'). On June 28, 2015, Michael Chisholm shot Joseph Stanczak.

("Stanc:.r..ak") on real property owned by the Cooks. Stanczak made a clajm for his damages
against the Cooks and Farm Bureau. In fact, Stanczak sent a demand letter directly to Farm
Bureau on February 1, 2016 (''February 1st Demand Letter). Fann Bureau responded to
Stancza.k's demand and denied coverage under the Policy for the allegations contained in the
February 1st Demand Letter. Stancz.ak later filed suit against the Cooks on May 12, 2016 and

then filed an amended complaint against the Cooks on June 7, 2016. The Cooks tendered the
defense of the lawsuit to Farm Bureau. which Farm Bureau subsequently denied finding that
there was no duty to defend that lawsuit under the tenns of the Policy.
Shortly thereafter, Farm Bureau filed this declaratory judgment action against the

Cooks. Farm Bureau also named Stanczak in this action brought under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 57(b) and Idaho Code § 10-1211 because Stanczak was a party who had claimed .a
direct interest in the Farm Bureau Policy. On October 20, 2016, Fann Bureau moved for
summary judgment in this action and included a copy of the February 1st Demand Letter as an
exhibit.
On October 21. 2016, Stanczak. moved to strike the inclusion of and all references
to the February 1st Demand Letter, arguing that the same is inadmissible under Idaho Rule of
Evidence 408, which states:
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1

Evidence of (I) fumishing, offeringt or promising to furnish, or (2)
accepting, offering, or promising to accept, a valuable
consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a
claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not
admissible lo prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of the
claim or any other claim. Evidence of conduct or statements made
in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule
does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise
discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of
compromise negotiations. This rule does not require exclusion if
the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or
prejudice of a witness, negatjving a contention of undue delay, or
proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or
prosecution. Compromise negotiations encompass mediation.
(emphasis added). Stanczak argues that Farm Bureau's submission of the February 1st Demand
Letter to the Court constitutes a violation of Idaho Rule of Evidence 408, and the letter and all
references to the content of the letter should be struck from Farm Bureau's summary judgment
filings. Stanczak also argues lhat this lawsuit is not based on the February 1st Demand Letter
and the only thing at issue in this declaratory judgment action is "Mr. Stanczak's personal injury
lawsuit against Mr. and Mrs. Cook ... '' as alleged in the underlying complaint filed by Stanczak
against the Cooks.

II.

ARGUMENT

Stanczak's motion is misplaced and Fann Bureau respectfully requests that the

Court deny Stanczak's Motion to Strike on at least the following grounds: First, Farm Bureau
did not submit the February 1st demand letter to the Court in order "to prove liability for.
invalidity of, or amount of the claim or any other claim." Rather, it submitted the demand letter
in order to analyze whether there is insurance coverage under the Policy for the allegations

Stanczak made in his demand letter. In that demand letter be asserted certain factual allegations
which he believes should invoke coverage under the Cooks' Policy. The factual allegations he
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has macle in that letter is relevant for the coverage issues that are under consideration in this
declaratory judgment action. As the February I st demand letter was not submitted for the
purposes specifically precluded by Rule 408, it can, in fact, be considered by the Court. See
Owens Corning v. American Centennial Ins. Co., 660 N.E.2d 829 (Ohio CL Common Pleas

I 997) (Evidence relating to negotiation!'. or settlement admissible when presented for a purpose
other than proving liability or the validity of a claim).
Second, courts routinely analyze the contents of demand letters when they look at

insurance coverage issues. See Shorno v. State Farm, Case No. C09-5778 RBL (W.D. Wash.
August 3, 2010) (available at 2010 WL 3119449); Opal Bank v. Liberty Underwriters Ins. , Inc.,
Case No. SACV 13--00469-CJC(JPRx) (C.D. Cal. June 26, 2013) (available at 2013 WL
11037456). It is obvioui:; that courts need to have the contents of demand letters admitted in
insurance coverage declaratory actions so that courts can analyze if claims made in demand
letters, in addition to later filed complaints against insureds, are covered. How else could a court
analyze if coverage is triggered by allegations contained in a demand letter?
Third, Stanczak. argues that the contents of the demand letter arc irrelevant

because the Cooks are not seeking coverage for the February 1st demand letter, rather, they are
seeking coverage for the allegations contained in the First Amended Complaint. It is difficult to
perceive how Stancz.ak can make this statement on behalf of the Cooks. Indeed, the Cooks have
given no notice to Farm Bureau that they arc only seeking coverage for the allegations contained
in the First Amended Complaint. The fact of the matter is the February 1st Demand Letter
contains factual allegations about Stanczak's claims against the Cooks in addition to those
factual allegations detailed in the First Amended Complaint.

PLAINTIFF FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF
IDAHO'S RESPONSE TO STANCZAK'S MOTION TO STRIKE - 4

Cllent:4277903.1

373

12/14/2016 10:59 FAX

ill 006/007

MOFFATT THOMAS

20838553?' 1

The February 1st Demand Letter was not submitted to this Court for any improper
purpose. Stanczak's attempt to assert that the submission of this relevant demand letter was
somehow frivolous and evidences bad intent on behalf of Fann Bureau is also misplaced. This is
an insurance declaratory judgment action and the sole purpose of this action is to determine if the
Cooks have insurance coverage under the Farm Bureau Policy for this shooting incident. The
action will have nothing to do with the validity or merits of Stanczak's claims against the Cooks
and Mr. Chisholm, the value of his claims against the Cooks and Mr. Chisholm, or any potential
resolution of those claims. As such, the submission of the same was not intended at all a~ an
"improper attempt to sway the Court with outside evidence."

III.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Farm Bureau respectfully requests that the Court de11y
Stanczak's Motion to Strike.

DATED this 14th day of December, 2016.
MOPFA'rr, THOMAS, BARRETI, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

es L. Martin- Of the Firm
omeys for Plaintiff Fann Bureau
utual Insurance Company of Idaho
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14th day of December, 2016, I caused a true
and correct copy of the fOTegoing PLAINTIFF FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAHO'S RESPONSE TO STANCZAK'S MOTION TO STRIKE to be
served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Michael T. Howard
WrNTON & CASHATT
250 Northwest Blvd., Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
Attorneys for Edgar and Laurie

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(x) Facsimile

Cook
Wes S. Larsen
James, Vernon & Weeks, PA
1626 LincoJn Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684
Attorneys far Joseph Stanczak

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(x) Facsimile
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In their opposition brief to Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment, the
Cooks have attempted to manufacture coverage under their Farm Bureau homeowners' insurance
policy for the claims that have been asserted against them by the man, Stanczak, who wa.5 shot

by Chisholm at the Coo.ks' cabin at BJoom Lake. The Cooks have done what other insureds have
unsuccessfuHy attempted to do in similar situations. They have argued that Farm Bureau has a
duty to defend and indemnify the Cooks for the claims asserted by Stanczak simply because
Stanc:zak has artfully pleaded claims against the Cooks for negligent supervision and premises

liability. And they assert that should be the end of the Court's inquiry.
Unfortnnately for the Cooks, this very strategy had been rejected by the Idaho
Supreme Court and the majority of other courts across the country that have looked at this
specific issue. The rationale for rejecting this strategy is simple: Where the damages that
Stanczak claims he incurred arise entirely out of an act that would not be covered under the Fann
Bureau homeowner policy, the negligence and premise liability claims asserted against the
Cooks are not claims that are covered by this Policy. That is, if the damages claimed by
Stanczak resulted entirely from an excluded cause of toss, then there is no coverage.
Under these facts, it is undisputed that Stanczak's claimed injuries and damages
result from one thing: the act of being shot in the arm and the back by Chisholm that resulted in
him being sent to the hospital-intentional and criminal acts excluded by the Farm Bureau
Policy. Neither the Cooks nor Stanczak can identify any separate damages claimed by Stanczak
that are attributable to the al]eged independent negligence acts by the Cooks or the alleged
premises liability c]aim for which coverage would be required. As such, Farm Bureau's motion
for summary judgment in this declaratory judgment action should be granted.
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The Cooks argue that they are entitled to a defense of the Amended Stanczak
Complaint because they are being sued for their own negligent conduct pursuant to the negligent
supervision and premises liability claims, and their alleged negligent conduct constitutes a
covered "occurrence" under the Policy. The following statement from the C(loks' opposition
summar:faes their argument:
While Farm Bureau focuses on the conduct of Mr. Chisholm, and
the shooting, that is not the "occurrence" being alleged against the
Cooks. Instead, it is the Cooks' conduct in allowing :Mr. Chisholm
to reside at the cabin that W1derscores their aJieged liability; such
Jiabi1ity is based on claims that the Cooks knew or failed to discern
that an unsafe condition existed on their premises, potentially by
either knowing of or failing to investigate the presence of
intoxicants or weapons; knowing of or failing to determine
Mr. Chisholm's background or condition; failed to supervise his
conduct; and without warning of or eliminating the presence of
potential risk he posed.

Edgar and Laurie Cook's Memorandum in Opposition to Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary
Judgment (''Cooks' Opposition'') at 8. The Cooks also argue that none of the cited Policy's
exclusions apply to them. Stanczak filed a one paragraphjoinder in the Cooks' Opposition and
he made no separate legal or factual arguments.
Based upon the limited arguments made in the Cooks, Opposition as adopted by
Stanczak, the defendants to this insurance declaratory judgment action have conceded at least the
following issues:
I

•

Neither Chisholm nor Stanczak is an insured under the Policy;

•

The shooting by Chisholm was not an accident and, thus, not an
"occurrence" under the Policy;
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The fact that Chisholm may have been firing warning shots at Stanczak
does not change the conclusion that the shooting was not an accident and,
thus, not an "occurrence" under the Policy;

•

Chishohn's guBty plea to the charge of Aggravated Battery results in a
conclusion that the shooting was not an accident, continns that it was
intentional and the result of a criminal act and, thus, not an "occurrence"

under the Policy;
•

Chisholm's criminal conviction is final and cannot be appealed, and as

such these issues cannot be re-litigated in this subsequent civil action
regarding insurance coverage in an attempt to avoid the intentional and
criminal act exclusions of the insurance policy;
•

There is no coverage for Stanczak' ::5 claimed medical expe11ses under the

Premises Medical Coverage provisions of the Policy (Section II F2 of the
Policy); and
•

Business activities are not covered under the Policy.

What the Cooks have argued in their opposition are strictly legal arguments that
can be resolved in this summary judgment setting. However, their arguments ignore controlling
Idaho authority and the undisputed facts. The Court should grant Fann Bureau's Motion for
Summary Judgment and fmd that there is no duty to defend or indemnify the Cooks for the
claims asserted in the Amended Stanczak Complaint and there is no coverage for Stanczak's

claimed damages.
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ARGUMENT

At the outset, the Cooks have incorrectly stated that Fann Bureau bears the
burden of proving that there is no coverage for the claims asserted in the Amended StElilczak
Complaint. When an insured claims he or she is covered under an insurance policy and the
insurer denies coverage, the burden of proof falls on the person seeking coverage. That is not
altered by the fact the insurer may become the nominal plaintiff by seeking a determination of
noncoverage. Am. Eagle Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 85 F.Jd 327,330 (8th Cir. 1996); see also 2 LAW
AND PRAC. OF!Ns. COVERAGELITIG.

§ 19:8 (2016). Here, the Cooks bear the burden of proof of

showing that coverage exists under the Policy for the allegations asserted against them in the
Amended Stanczak Complaint. Granted, Farm Bureau has the burden of proof as it relates to the
applicable exclusions, but the Cooks have not challenged in their opposition Farm Bureau's
interpretation or application of the stated exclusions, other than the business activities exclusion
which will be addressed below.
The Cooks and Stanczak have failed to carry their burden of demonstrating
coverage. First, they fail to distinguish the binding rules announced and applied by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Mutual ofEnumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4, 843 P .2d 154 ( 1992), and Slate

Farm v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693,946 P.2d 1333 (1997). Second, the claims asserted by Stanczak in
the Amended Stanczak Complaint allege causes of action against the Cooks that are foreseeable
in nature, which further confirms that there was no occurrence under the Policy. Third, the
business activities exclusion does in fact preclude coverage for the claims asserted against the

Cooks,
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The Cooks and Stanczak Have Failed to Distinguish Binding Precedent.
The issue argued by the Cooks and Stanczak in support of coverage has been

litigated extensively throughout the country: namely, whether theories of negligence against
insureds for their aI1eged negligent hiring, training or supervision of an individual who
intentionally causes injuries may be an "occurrence" under a general liability or homeowner's
policy. Idaho has followed the majority of courts that have found that insureds cannot
manufacture coverage in this situation. Despite the various causes of action that may be asserted
against an insured, whether it be negligence, negligent supervision or premises liability, there can
be no coverage under an insurance policy if the underlying claimant's injuries would not have
occurred but for the intentional or criminal acts of the third party. The focus again is on the
damages that the injured person is claiming. If the damages arise out of an act not coveTed by
the policy, then there is no duty to defend or indemnify the named insureds irrespective of the
claims asserted against them directly.

In Mutual ofEnumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 ldaho 4,843 P.2d 154 (1992), the
underlying claim invo]ved 12 victims of child abuse who had brought a lawsuit against

Mrs. Wilcox and others. As for Mrs. Wilcox, the 'Victims alleged various claims of negligence
by her in failing to protect them from and warn them about her ex-husband 1 who committed acts
of physical and sexual abuse against them. Mrs. Wilcox's insurance company, Mutual of
Enwnclaw, filed a declaratory judgment action asking the court to confirm that there was no
coverage undeT Mrs. Wilcox's homeowner's insurance policy for the claims asserted against
Mrs. Wilcox. The insurer, like Fann Bureau in this case, asserted there was no "occurrence" or

'~accident" under the terms of the policy and, moreover, the intentional act exclusion barred
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coverage because Mr. Wilcox's acts, which caused the damage to the victims, were intentional.

Wilcox, 123 ldaho at 4-5, 843 P.2d at 154-55.
When the insurer moved for summary judgment, the district court denjed its
motion, finding there was a question of whether an ••accident" or "occurrence" had occurred. In
addition, the district court attempted to distinguish between Mrs. Wilcox• s conduct and her
ex-husband's conduct and the claims asserted against Mrs. Wilcox, finding that "it is her acts or

omissions, and not those of her husband, which much be scrutinized in order to determine
whether they constitute an 'accident' within the meaning of [the Wilcox] [P]oJicy." Ultimately
the district court concluded that Mrs. Wilcox's conduct may have been an accident as there was
no evidence that she intended to harm anyone. Jd at 6-7; 843 P-2d at 156-57 (emphasis in
original). As such the district court denied the insurer's summary judgment motion.
This is the exact same argument that the Cooks have made in this case:
(1) whether or not there is coverage has to be viewed from the Cooks' position, not Chisholm's;
(2) the Court has to distinguish between the claims Stanczak asserts against the Cooks versus the
claims asserted against Chisholm for this coverage determination; and (3) that what the Cooks

are alleged to have done is certainly an "accident" from their perspective as they never
committed an intentional act nor meant to cause hann to Stanczak.
Unfortunately for the Cooks, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected Mrs. Wilcox's
claims for coverage in that case and rejected the district court's attempt to separate the claims
asserted against Mrs. Wilcox from the claims asserted against Mr. Wilcox, the tortfeasor.
Granted, the appellate court did focus on Mrs. Wilcox's conduct because she was the only one
whose acts could be covered by the policy, and it looked specifically at the claims of negligent
failure to report and warn asserted against her. Nonetheless, the Idaho Supreme Court reached
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the same conclusion that the majority of other courts have reached, and that is that the inquiry
does not end there as the Cooks have suggested in their opposition.
Rather, the Idaho Supreme Court found in the Wilcox case that despite the
separate allegations against Mrs. Wilcox and her specific conduct that was called into question,
there still wa.c; no "occurrence" under Wilcox's homeowners insurance policy "because iJ was
tiot fher/ conduct whicl, caused the inlury." Id. at 9, 843 P.2d at 159 (emphasis added). The
conduct that caused the damage to the victims in the underlying complaint was the insured's

ex-husband's abuse, not her alleged negligence for failure to supervise her ex-husband nor the
failure to report the abuse---even if her 11acts or failure to act ••• may have created or
conttibtded to tl,e environment which permitted her ex-husband's conduct." Id. (emphasis
added). The fact remains that the insured, Mrs. Wilcox, did not commit the acts complained of

by the 12 minors, nor cause their alleged damages. As a result, the appellate court reversed the
district court and held there was no "occurrence" under the policies in question and that the
insurance company owed no duty to defend its policyholder, Mrs. Wilcox, for the claims asserted
against her by the 12 victims of that abuse. The Idaho Supreme Court did not even get to the
application of the intentional act exclusion. Id.
The Wilcox case is on all fours with the facts and law presented by Fann Bureau's
motion for summary judgment. The Wilcox case rejects all the same arguments made by the
Cooks in their opposition. 1 And it confirms that Idaho is a jurisdiction that follows the majority
rule that there is no coverage for claims asserted against an insured when the plaintiff's injuries
1

The Cooks also argue Farm Bureau could have drafted the Policy language more
clearly, and defined an "occurrence" to exclude the intentional acts of third parties. The Wilcox
court has likewise already rejected this argument. Id. at 9,843 P.2d at 159. Occurrence is
defined as an accident, which the Idaho Supreme Court in Wilcox found was not ambiguous.
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in the underlying lawsuit would not have occurred but for the intentional or criminal act of a
third party, irrespective of the actual causes of action asserted against the named insureds. If the

insureds wants coverage under their policy, the burden of proof is on them to establish that the
covered set of facts (the factual basis for the negligent supervision or premises liability claims)
would have resulted in injury to the plaintiff independent of the excluded cause (the intentional
and criminal acts of Chisholm). The Cooks have not met that burden nor can they.
Likewise, a few years after the Wilcox decision, the Idaho Supreme Court

reaffirmed its holding in Wilcox in State Farm v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693, 946 P.2d 1333 (1997). 1n

Doe, the district court had applied the Court's holding in Wilcox when it granted State Farm's
motion for summary judgment in that insurance declaratory judgment action. Id. at 693, 946
P.2d at 13 3 3. Again, the question arose as to whether there was coverage under the

homeowners' insurance policies issued by State Farm for claims asserted against the parents of a
13-year old boy who committed acts of sexual abuse against children in the parent's day care.
Like Stanczak, the injured plaintiffs asserted independent negligence claims against the insureds
for negligent entrustment, negligent supervision, negligent failure to notify a business invitee,
etc., all independent claims versus what was asserted against the bad actor, the tortfeasor son. Id.

at 694, 946 P.2d at 1334.
State Farm brought an insurance declaratory judgment action, asserting that there
was no cover.tge under their policies for the negligence and other claims asserted directly against
the parents and that it had no duty to defend or inde11U1ify the parents for the claims asserted
against them for their failure to act. In Doe, the parents again asserted that the claims against

them had to be viewed from their perspective and that there should be coverage for the separate,
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independent claims asserted against them. That again is exactly what the Cooks have asserted in
the case at bar.
The fdaho Supren1e Court, however, affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment to State FamJ and again found that no "occurrence" occurred under the
homeowner8' insmance policy despite the fact that separate and independent negligence claims
were brought against the insured parents. Id. at 695-96, 946 P.2d at 1335~36. Again, the Court
focused on the aclual events that caused the damage to the injured parties, not just the claims or
causes of action that were asserted against the insureds. Because the damage to the victirns was
caused not by the negligent acts of the parents, but by the actions of the tortfeasor son, the Court
found there was no "occurrence" under the policy and it affirmed that summary judgment for the
insurer was appropriati:;. And, once again, the appellate court did not even get to the question of
the application of the other exclusions that the insurer alleged were also applicable in that case.

Id.
Idaho is not unique in its application of insurance law to thjs fact pattern or
sjtuation. Other jurisdictions have arrived at identical conclusions. 2 And what the courts

2

See cases previously cited by Fann Bureau in its opening brief. See also Miller v.
Allstate, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1137-40 (S.D. Cal. 2007); United Nat'! Ins. Co. 'V. Enhn 't Grp.,
Inc., 945 F.2d 210, 213-14 (7th Cir. 1991) (exclusion precluded coverage for negligent
supervision because focus of exclusion was on injury caused. not on acts of insured); Hermitage
Ins. Co. v. Dahms, 842 F. Supp. 319, 325-26 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (applying assault and battery
exclusion to bar coverage even though claims against insured sounded in negligence because
underlying injury was caused by assault); Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. SaJazat, 77 F.3d
1291, 1295-97 (10th Cir. 1996) (allegations of negligent supervision against the mother could
not be an "occurrence" as an ..occurrence" is the event that causes the plaintiff's injury, not the
remote cause of that injury); Erie Ins. Exch. v. Claypoole~ 673 A.2d 348 (Pa. Super. 1995)
(claimed negligence of bus company in hiring and supervising rapist would not have given rise
to injury but for tortfcasor's intentional acts); Sweet Home Cent. Sch. Dist. ofAmherst v. Aetna
Commercial Ins. Co., 263 A.D.2d 949,695 N.Y.S.2d 445 (4th Dept. 1999) (allegations that
school district was negligent in hiring teacher who sexually assaulted pupils did not allege a
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consistently focus on is the key issue of whether the damages claimed by the injured plaintiff in
the underlying case resulted from the excluded cause ofloss under the insurance policy. If that is
the situation, then the courts have no problem finding there is no coverage for the independent
causes of actions asserted against the named insureds.
The Cooks' attempt to briefly distinguish these contro1ling Idaho appellate cases
falls short. See Cooks' Opposition at 9. They first argue that none of these cases involve a claim
for premises liability. In reviewing those cases, that fact is immaterial to the analysis applied by
the Idaho Supreme Court given the whole host of various causes of action that were asserted
against the insureds in Wilcox and Doe. The Cooks also argue that:
The circumstances here are based on claims of negligent behavior
of the Cooks who did not actively participate in the intentional
conduct, did not intentionally create the situation, and are not being
sued based on any of their intentional conduct. Courts faced with
such similar circumstances find that an "occurrence" has been
sufficiently pled to trigger a potential for coverage and
corresponding duty to defend.
Cooks' Opposition at I 0. But in fact that is exactly what Mrs. Wilcox claimed in the Wilcox
case. There was no claim in that case that she actively participated in the intentional conduct of
her ex-husband, that she intentionally created the bad situation, or that she was being sued for

covered ''occurrence'' as it js "the nature of the underlying acts, not the theory ofliability, that
governs"); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 7 F.3d 86 (5th Cir. 1993) (Texas law);
Farmer:,· Union Mul. Ins. Co. v. Kienenherger, 84 7 P .2d 1360 (Mont. 1993 ); Am. Family Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Co Fat Lee, 439 F.3d 436, 439 (8th Cir. 2006) (with respect to claims in which losses
concurrently arise out of both an insured and excluded risk, the court held that allegations that
the insureds had maintained unsafe premises or negligently failed to warn their son's friends of
the risk of harmful carbon monoxide were not independent claims distinct from claims that were
barred); Hunt v. Capital lndem. Corp., 26 S.W.3d 341,345 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (bar owner's
failure to protect a patron was not independent from the excluded cause of assault and battery).
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jntentional conduct. Yet the Idaho Supreme Court still found there was no "occurrence." Same
with the parents in the Doe case.

Ignoring the controlling Idaho authority, the Cooks cite to a number of cases
outside of Idaho to support their position, including Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v.

Pipher, 140 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1998). In that case, a tenant in an apartment building was
murdered by an painter hired to paint another apartrnent. The surviving spouse brought suit
against the landlord whn hired the painter. The: court found that because the complaint against
the land]ord alleged negligence, an occurrence may have occurred and Lhe landlord's insurer was
required to defend him. The Cooks also cite to Wes{field Insurance Co. v. Tech Dry, Inc., 336
F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 2003), where the court found that an insured' s negligent hiring and retaining
of a former employee who murdered a customer was a qualifying "occurrence" under the
insured's CGL policy. The court found that the insured's conduct and actions must be evaluated,

not those of the perpetrator of the intentional act. The court in Safeco Insurance Co. v. White,
913 N.E.2d 426 (Ohio 2009), came to a similar conclusion when it held that the stabbing of a

neighbor by an insured's son was an "occurrence" for purposes of a negligence claim against
insureds.
Fann Bureau acknowledges that these cases arguably stand for the opposite
holding of the Wilcox and Doe cases from Idaho and the other cases Farnt Bureau has cited
above. However, the Cooks fail to state how the facts are different or why the Idaho court would
not come to a different conclusion than what these other jurisdictions have based upon the Idaho
court's prior reported decisions. For example, the tortfeasor son from the Safeco Insurance Co.
v. White case Cooks cited from Ohio could easily trade places with the tortfeasor son from the
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Doe case from Idaho. The fact of the matter is, Idaho has rejected the line of holdings from the
few cases cited by the Cooks.
Farm Bureau would ask that this Court follow contro11ing Idaho precedent and
find that, notwithstanding the labels put on the claims Stanczak has asserted against the Cooks in
the Stanczak Amended Complaint, there is no coverage under the Farm Bureau Policy for those
claims. The act that caused the injury and damages to Stanczak was the intentional and criminal
act of Chisholm pulling the trigger and shooting Stanczak. That shooting was not an accident
and as such there can be no covered '~occurrence11 under the Policy. The Court should apply the
holdings from the Idaho Supreme Court in Wilcox and Doe and find there is no duty to defend or
provide coverage in this instance. The rationale behind these holdings js sound.
The majority of courts that have addressed this issue are in line with Idaho law

and they look and focus on the injuries alleged and the conduct causing those injuries. Here, the
bodily injuries alleged by Stanczak resulted from gunshot wounds he suffered. The Cooks and
Stanczak have provided no evidence to contradict a conclusion that the shooting by Chisholm
was intentional. Indeed, Chisholm pled guilty to the intentional crime of Aggravated Battery.
The injuries alleged in the Stanczak Amended Complaint are those arising from an intentional
gunshot wound from Chisholm, not from any alleged negligent conduct by the Cooks.
This precise issue was addressed in Sears v. National Union, 772 N.E.2d 247
(2002). In that case, a customer of a Sears caipet cleaning contractor was raped by the carpet
cleaner. She filed suit against Sears, who made a. claim to its insurance company. The customer
alleged negligent hiring against Sears and Sears argued that their alleged negligence was an
occurrence under their policy. "The court stated: "Sears' alleged negligence in hiring an
employee with a troubled past may have helped create the conditions which made B1and's sexual
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assault possible, but this docs not change the fact that the sexual assault itself was the direct
result of a solely intentional act." Sears, 772 N.E.2d at 255. Likewise, in Smith v. Animal
Urgent Care, Inc., 542 S.E.2d 827 (W. Va. 2000), a fonner employee of a veterinarian made

claims of sexual harassment against her former employer, and couched some of her claims as
negligence by the vet clinic. The employer sought a defense of the action and coverage under its

insurance policy, arguing that because the plaintiff asserted independent negligence claims
against it, the duty to defend and indemnify was triggered. The West Virginia Supreme Court
rejected this argument, and held;
Animal Care does not dispute the accepted view that sexual
harassment does not come within the meaning of an "occurrence"
under an accident-based definition, but instead argues that
coverage is required because of the negligence-type allegations
involving Animal Care . . . . /TJ/1e inclusion of a negligenceoriented theory of recovery against Animal Care does not alter
the essence of the claim for purposes of determining the
availability of insurance coverage. Sexutd harassment, and its
inherently nonaccidental nature, remain the crux of the C(lSe
regardless of whether negligence is alleged against Animal Care.
Smith, 542 S.E.2d at 832 (emphasis added). See also Sweet Home Cent. Sch. Di.'it. ofAmhersl &

Tonqwanda, 263 A.D.2d 949 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) ("It is the nature of the underlying acts, not
the theory ofliability, that governs. Because the operative acts giving rise to any recovery are
intentional acts, i.e., assault and sexual abuse, it is of no import that the complaint in the
underlying action alleges only negligent hiring, retention and supervision on the part of Sweet
Home .... "); GATX Leasing Carp. v. Nat 'I Union Fire Ins. Co., 64 F.3d I I 12, 1118 (7th Cir.
1995) (holding that insured's negligence in failing to prevent employee's intentional act does not
constimte an "occurrence," reasoning that "'volitional act does not become an accident simply
because the insured's negligence prompted the act."').
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These same rejected arguments are what the Cooks have asked this Court to adopt
while ignoring controlling Idaho authority. However, neither the Cooks nor Stanc7.ak can avoid
the parameters of the Cooks' insurance agreement with Farm Bureau by artful pleading. In their
opposition, the Cnoks state that: "While Farm Bureau focuses on the conduct of Mr. Chisholm,
and the shooting, that is not the 'occurrence' being alleged against the Cooks." The Stanczak
Amended Complaint only alleges damages relating to the gunshot wounds he suffered at the
hands of Chisholm. It fails to allege what additional damage occurred because of the Cooks'
alleged negligent hiring/supervision and negligent maintenance of premises. Without the
intentional gwishot, what damages would there be? As the Stanczak Amended Complaint does
not contain allegations that tie any different or additional damages to the alleged negligence,
there is no occurrence, no duty to defend and no coverage. See Hunt v. Capital Indem. Corp., 26

S.W.3d 341, 345-46 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) ("Without the underlying assault and battery, there
would have been no injury and therefore no basis for plaintiffs' action ... for negligence. The
assault and battery and [the] negligence are not mutually exclusive; rather the acts are related and
interdependent. [N]egligence ... was not a separate and non-excluded cause apan from the
assaull and battery."); Preferred Nat 'l Ins. Co. v. Docusearch, Inc., 829 A.2d 1068 (N.H. 2003)
(where the damages arise entirely out of an act that would not be covered under an insurance
policy, the negligence claim is not one that would be covered under the policy). The key issue
adopted by the Idaho appellate court is whether the damages claimed by Stanczak resulted
entirely from an excluded cause of loss or whether there are separate damages attributable to the
independent acts of negligence for which coverage would be required. Here, there is no separate
damage for which coverage would be required.
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The Cooks also make much of the fa.ct that Stanczak alleges a cJaim for premises
liability and that cause of action was not addressed by either Wilcox or Doe. However, the
plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuit in Doe did assert a claim for "negligent failure to notify a
business invitee.'' This allegation did not change the court 1s analysis. Rather, the labels for the
causes of action make no difference in the court's analysis. A simple comparison between the
causes of action asserted against Mrs. Wilcox and against the parents in the Doe case make that
clear. While it is not the duty of the Court to analyze the adequacy of the allegations contained
in the Amended Stanczak Complaint, it is difficult for Fann Bureau to perceive how Chisholm

shooting Stanczak in the back is a condition on real property that would impose premises
Jiability on the part of the Cooks. Again, all this is artful pleadings. Regardless, as there is no
separate allegation of damages that Stanczak suffered from this premises liability claim. separate
and apart from being shot in the back, it does not trigger the duties of defense, indemnity or
coverage.
An allegation of premises liability was also addressed in American Family Mutual

Insurance Co. v. Co Fat Le, 439 F.Jd 436 (8th Cir. 2006). 1n that case, five teenaged boys died
when they remained overnight in a running car inside of a closed garage. The parents of four of
the deceased boys brought suit against the owners of the home (also parents of the other
deceased youth) and alleged claims for negligent operation of an automobile, premises liability
and general negligence. The homeowners submitted a claim to their homeowners' insurer,

which initiated a declaratory action to determine coverage. The homeowners' policy specifically
excluded any claim relating to the use of an automobile. With respect to the claim for premises
liability, the Eighth Circuit held:
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Appellants allege that the unsafe conditions on the premises were
an inadequately ventilated garage and a running automobile jn a
closed garage. The fonner is not an inherently dangerous
condition. It became dangerous only when the automobile was left
rWllling in the garage while the garage door was cJosed. The
condition of a running automobile in an inadequately ventilated
garage is not independent from the use of an automobile, which
falls under the policy exclusion. Further ... there would have
been no injury in the case at bar if Trai Van Le had not run the
automobile in the closed garage . . . . Appellants' premises
liability claim for running an automobile in a closed garage is
not independent from the use o(an a11tomobile1 and thus it also
falls within the policy exclusion.
Co Fat Le, 439 F.3d at 440 (emphasis added). Herc, Stanczak's premises liability claim is not

independent from the intentional tort alleged against Chisholm, which is the only thing that
caused Stanc:z.ak's claimed damages. There is no coverage for this claim.
Idaho law is settled on the argument the Cooks and Stanczak are attempting to

make to this Court. In essence, they are asking this Court to ignore controlling authority and
create new Idaho law. This Cow1 should reject that invitation and apply the law as adopted by
the Idaho Supreme Court in Wilcox and Doe and the other courts that have applied this same
sound reasoning. Farm Bureau's motior for summary ju~gment should be granted by finding
there is no occurrence and thus no covekge under the Policy.
B.

As the Negligence Claims in the Amended Stanczak Complaint Require
Foreseeability, They Are Not Occurrences Entitled to Coverage.
In its opening memorandum, Fann Bureau argued that the negligence causes of

action against the Cooks, negligent supervision and premises liability, contained in the Amended
Stanczak Complaint involve the element of foreseeability, i.e., what the negligent party knew or
should have known. Farm Bureau cited to the case of Mountain State Mutual CU$ualty Co. v.

Hau.'ier. 221 P.3d 56 (Colo. App. 2009), which held that where the allegations in the underlying
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complaint were that a restaurant knew or should have known its supervisor would assault another
employee, the alleged negligent hiring and supervision claims were not ."occurrences" under the
policy because they were foreseeable. Here, Stanczak's artful pleading attempts to assert by
virtue of his negligent supervision and premises liability claims that it was foreseeable to the
Cooks that Chisholm might shoot an invitee or licensee that came onto the Cooks' property.
Because these claims have a foreseeable element, the claimed bad act(s) by the Cooks cannot be
considered an accident and thus not an "occurrence" triggering the duty to defend or coverage
under the Policy. The Cooks have fajled to counter this argument and it should serve as
additional grounds for the granting of Farm Bureau's sununary judgment motion.

C.

The Business Activities Exclusion Applies and Precludes the Duty to Defend

and Coverage Under the Policy.
The Cooks also allege that the operation of the campground was not a business
activity, and should not apply to precJude coverage for their defense of the Amended Stanczak
Complaint. Again, the Court need only address this exclusion issue in the event it first rejects all
the above arguments that there was no ..occurrence" and thus no coverage under the Policy.
However, if the Court does get to this exclusion issue, a closer look at the plain language of the
exclusion found in the Policy requires its application to these undisputed facts.

It is important to analyze the purpose of such an exclusion. One court has noted
that ''because people characteristically separate their business activities from their personal
activities, business pursuits coverage is not essential for their homeowners coverage and is
excluded to keep premium rates at a reasonable level." Nat'/ Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co.

v. Garfinkel, 277 P.3d 905, 908 (Colo. App. 2012). One of the reasons for such an exclusion is
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that business activities present "special risks beyond the ordinary risks and hazards inherent in
maintaining a home, from personal liability coverage in homeowner policies." Id.
Here, the exclusion at issue states:
The following exclusions apply to all coverages under
Section II .... Section II does not cover bodily injury or
property damage:

1. Arising from any insured's business activities or any
professional service ....
(Emphasis in original.) The Policy contains the following definition:
Business means a full-time or part-time trade, profession,
occupation., or activity, engaged in for compensation, other than
farming or custom farming ....

(Emphasis in original.) Farm Bureau asserts that the reason Chisholm was at the campground
was pursuant to an activity in which he and the Cooks were engaged for compensation. A
common definition of compensation simply means to receive "payment for services."
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY

at 289 (1984). Pursuant to the arrangement between the

Cooks and Chisholm, it is undisputed that Chisholm was maintaining the Cooks' property,
including the Bloom Lake campground, their cabin at Bloom Lake and the property surrounding
the lake, all in exchange for living in the Cooks' cabin at the campground rent free. See
admissions in Mr. Cook's 8/5/15 recorded statement, Exhibit A to Declaration of Steve Johnson
filed 10/20/16; see also statements made by Mr. Cook at Chisholm's sentencjng hearing,
Declaration of Barbara E. Mayne. It is also undisputed that the Cooks would ask for monetary
donations in order to cover the operating expenses of the campground and, in fact, received such
donations that were collected by Chisholm. Id
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The Cooks' arrangement with Chisholm for caring for their property and the
Cooks' policy of asking for donations to help offset the upkeep of their campground, lake
property and cabin were activities. The Cooks received compensation in the form of donations
by campers and services rendered by Chisholm in keeping up and maintaining their property.

The Cooks were, in fact, engaged in an activity for which they were compensated. The language
of the business activity exclusion is broad and the operation of the campground and lake property
falls within the exclusion. The only reason Chisholm was there was because of his position as a
caretaker of the Cooks' property. But for him being allowed to stay there rent free in exchange
for maintaining the Cooks' property, Stanczak would not have been shot by Chisholm. As such,
the shooting arose out of the business activities conducted by the Cooks.
Again, there are policy reasons to consider in applying the business activities
exclusion. A business-purposes exclusion is intended "to confine the homeowner's policy
coverage to nonbusiness risks and to relegate business coverage to a commercial policy."

Erick.'iOn v. Christie, 622 N.W.2d 138, 140 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). The Cooks do not live at the
campground or in their cabin at Bloom Lake, yet they sought to insure them with a homeowners'
insurance policy. By their own admissions, they invited campers to stay at their lake and
campgrowtd and they requested monetary donations by those who used their campground and

lake property. The business risks associated with running a campground and lake property are
not the same as those associated with insuring personal property and a personal residence or even
a second home. Compound that fact with the fact the Cooks agreed to have someone live in their
personal cabin in exchange for maintaining it, the lake property and the associated campground
increases that insu.rability risk substantially. Yet, the Cooks did not pay any premiums for
commercial liability coverage. They did not pay any premiwns to have coverage for damages
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caused by their employees, agents or quasi-employees who they agreed could live in their cabin
in exchange for working for them to maintain their property.

In light of the same> Fann Bureau would request that this Court apply the business
activities exclusion to fulfil the basic purposes of the exclusion. The Cooks are attempting to get
commercial general liability coverage when they have only paid for homeowners protection for
their covered properties. That attempt should be rejected.
III.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Fann Bureau respectfully requests that the Court grant
its Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this 14th day of December, 2016.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

es L. Martin- Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14th day of December, 2016, I caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the

following:
Michael T. Howard
WINSTON

& CA SHA IT LA WYERS, PS

250 Northwest Blvd., Suite 206

Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile

Facsimile (208) 765-2121
mth@winstoncashatt.com

Attorneys for Defendants Edgar Wilkins Cook,
Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook
Wes S. Larsen
JAMES, VERNON & WF.EKS, PA

1626 Lincoln Wy.
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile

Facsimile (208) 664-1684
wes@jvwlaw.net
Attorneys for D~fendanl Joseph Stanczak
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

FARM BUREAU INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
v.

EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR. and
LAURIE FRANCES COOK, husband
and wife; and JOSEPH STANCZAK,

Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2016-0000590
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

THIS MATTER came before the Court on December 21, 2016, for a hearing on
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 20, 2016, and Defendant Stanczak's
Motion to Strike, filed October 21, 2016. Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of
Idaho ("Farm Bureau") was represented at the hearing by Benjamin C. Ritchie, of MOFFAT,
THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED. Defendants Edgar and Laurie Cook
were represented by Michael T. Howard, of WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS. Defendant
Joseph Stanczak was represented by Wes S. Larsen, of JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

I.

LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), "[t]he court must grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
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movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(a). "A party asserting that a fact
cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of
materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials .... "

I.R.C.P. 56(c)(l)(A).

"A mere

scintilla of evidence or only a slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient to withstand summary
judgment .... " Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 459, 210 P.3d 563, 567 (Ct. App. 2009),

review denied (citations omitted). "When a court considers a motion for summary judgment in a
case that would be tried to a jury, all facts are to be liberally construed, and all reasonable
inferences must be drawn in favor of the party resisting the motion." Id. at 460, 210 P.3d at 568
(citations omitted).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant Stanczak's Motion to Strike is Moot.

Defendant Joseph Stanczak moves to strike portions of the Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 20, 2016, and the supporting
Declaration of Benjamin Ritchie, filed October 20, 2016, including Exhibit E of said Declaration
in its entirety, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) and Idaho Rule of Evidence 408.
The Court finds that Defendant Stanczak' s Motion to Strike is moot because other than
the fact that Joseph Stanczak ("Stanczak") sent a demand letter to Farm Bureau on February 1,
2016, which is undisputed (as set forth below), the Court has not considered the contents of the
letter in rendering this decision on Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment.
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B. Statement of Undisputed Facts
1. Bloom Lake Campground and Michael Chisholm

Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook (the "Cooks") are the owners of real
property located in Bonner County, Idaho. The property consists of 200 acres, Bloom Lake, a
small cabin, and a campground ("Bloom Lake Property" or "Property"). The Cooks have owned
the Property for nearly 67 years. Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (filed June 3,
2016) ("Amended Complaint"), p. 3,

,r,r 10,

11; Edgar and Laurie Cook's Answer, Affirmative

Defenses, and Counterclaim (filed August 10, 2016) ("Cooks' Answer"), p. 1,

,r 1.1;

Declaration of Steven Johnson in Support of Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of
Idaho's Motion for Summary Judgment (filed October 20, 2016) ("Johnson Declaration"), pp. 23, ,r,r 7-9, and Ex. A, p. 2.
The Cooks have never charged a fee for individuals to use the campground and lake, but
they do solicit voluntary financial donations from users, which are left in two donation boxes
located at the campground, to pay the infrastructure cost. Johnson Declaration, Ex. A, pp. 2-3.
About 19 years ago, Michael Jesse Chisholm ("Chisholm") contacted the Cooks and asked if he
could stay in the cabin and maintain the Bloom Lake Property. The Cooks agreed and Chisholm
began caring for the Property. He cared for the Property year-round from then on, until his arrest
for shooting Stanczak. Id., Ex. A, pp. 2-4. His responsibilities included keeping the weeds down,
taking out the trash accumulated by campers, and maintaining the road. Id, Ex. A, p. 2. The
Cooks provided some equipment to Chisholm to maintain the Property, including a weed eater,
snowmobile, and diesel generator, and would send a truck up once a year to either place lye into
or empty out the four concrete reservoir outhouses. Id., Ex. A, p. 5. The cabin has no public
utilities. Chisholm paid for any gas, propane, or other supplies used for heating or maintenance
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of the cabin and campground areas. Id., Ex. A at pp. 3, 5. The Cooks never paid Chisholm for
his work at the Bloom Lake Property. They considered him a volunteer, and they did not control
or instruct him on maintaining the Property. Id., Ex. A, pp. 2-3, 5-6. The Cooks do not reside
near the Property and only go there once every couple of years. Id., Ex. A, pp. 1, 7.
2. The Cooks' Insurance Policy
The Cooks have a Country Squire Insurance Policy with Farm Bureau ("Policy"), which
insures, amongst other things, the Bloom Lake Property. Amended Complaint, p. 3,

~

8, and

Ex. A. The Policy has three separate coverage sections: Section I (Property), Section II
(Liability), and Section III (Automobile).

The Policy Declarations list only the individuals

"Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr." and "Laurie Frances Cook" as the "insureds." There is no business or
other entity insured by the Policy. The Policy period is 1-26-2015 to 1-26-2016. Id., Ex. A,
County Squire Policy Declarations, p. 1. The Policy Declarations for Section II Liability
Coverage include coverage for Bodily Injury Liability (Coverage Fl) and Premises Medical
(Coverage F2). The "premises" under Section II includes "Location 03," which insures one
residence and 200 acres, i.e., the Bloom Lake Property, including the cabin. 1 Id., at Ex. A,
Declarations, p. 2.
endorsements,

The Policy Declarations state that Section II coverage is subject to four

including:

Endorsement I220

(Combined

Single

Coverage

Limits),

Endorsement 1269 (Limited Employer's Liability Endorsement), Endorsement 1282 (Personal
Injury Endorsement), and Endorsement 1287 (Limited Pollution Coverage Endorsement). Id.
The Policy contains a number of relevant definitions, including the following:
Business means a full-time or part-time trade, profession, occupation, or activity,
engaged in for compensation, other than farming or custom farming ....
1

The Policy also provides coverage for the property where the Cooks have their personal residence: "Location 02"
in the Policy insures two residences and 135 acres in Sandpoint, Idaho, and "Location 04" insures one residence and
7 acres in Sandpoint, Idaho. Amended Complaint, Ex. A, Declarations, p. 2.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4

402

Farming means the production of fruit, nuts, or field crops, or the raising or
keeping of livestock, fish, or bees, or the raising of mink, fox, or similar small
mammals primarily for fur production ....
Insured means you or the entity named in the Declarations. The following are
also insureds:
1. If you are a person, insured also means, if residents of your household, your
spouse, your relatives, and minors in the care of you or your relatives ....
Insured location means:
1. A location listed in the Declarations where you maintain a farm or residence,
including private approaches; ...
Insured location does not include property where a business is conducted.
Occurrence means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the
same harmful conditions, which results in unexpected bodily injury or property
damage during the policy period. All bodily injury and property damage
resulting from a common cause will be considered the result of one occurrence.
Relative means a person related to you by blood, marriage, or adoption, who is a
resident of your household, including a ward or foster child. This definition
applies only if you are a person.
Residence employee means someone employed by you who performs duties in
connection with the maintenance or use of the residence premises. This includes
a person who performs duties for you elsewhere of a similar nature not in
connection with your business or farming.
Residence premises means, if shown in the Declaration: (a) a dwelling that is
your principal residence, including its grounds and private garages, or (b) that part
of any other building where you reside. A residence premises does not include
any part of a building used for business.

Amended Complaint, Ex. A, Policy, pp. 1-3 (emphasis in original).
Section II Liability Coverage contains two relevant coverages: Fl (Bodily Injury
Liability) and F2 (Premises Medical). Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) offers the following coverage:
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for damages because of
bodily injury or property damage, caused by an occurrence to which this
coverage applies, we will:
1. Pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the insured is legally
liable (damages includes any awarded prejudgment interest); and
2. Provide a defense at our expenses by counsel of our choice ....

Amended Complaint, Ex. A, Policy, p. 22 (emphasis in original).
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F2 (Premises Medical) offers the following coverage:
Subject to the limit of liability, we will pay reasonable and necessary medical and
funeral expenses resulting from bodily injury caused by an occurrence as
described below. This coverage does not apply to you or residents of your
household other than residence employees. This coverage applies only:
1. To a person on the insured location with the permission of any insured ....

Amended Complaint, Ex. A, Policy, p. 22 (emphasis in original).
Both of the above coverages are subject to certain exclusions, including the following:
The following exclusions apply to all coverages under Section II .... Section II
does not cover bodily injury or property damage:
1. Arising from any insured's business activities or any professional service;
3. Which is intentionally caused by any insured. This exclusion does not apply
to the use of reasonable force by an insured to protect a person or property;
14. Arising out of a violation of a criminal law ... if committed by any insured;

Amended Complaint, Ex. A, Policy, pp. 24 -25 (emphasis in original).
Two relevant Policy endorsements state the following:

1269 (0108) Limited Employers Liability Endorsement. Coverages F-1 and F2 are extended to apply to bodily injury caused by an occurrence and sustained
by a person performing labor for you in your farming operation ...
1282 (1014) Personal Injury Endorsement. Under Coverage F-1, we cover
personal injury. Personal Injury means injury other than bodily injury arising out
of one or more of the following offenses:
1. False arrest, detention or imprisonment, or malicious prosecution;
2. Libel, slander, or defamation of character; or
3. Invasion of privacy, wrongful eviction, or wrongful entry.

Amended Complaint, Ex. A, Policy, p. 42 (emphasis in original).
3. T he Shooting
On June 28, 2015, Stanczak and his girlfriend, Susan Jackson, were camping at the
Bloom Lake Property. Chisholm invited Stanczak and Susan into the cabin. A dispute arose
between Chisholm and Stanczak. Chisholm used a .45 caliber handgun to shoot Stanczak twice,
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once in the arm and once in the back, injuring him. Chisholm then left the scene, but was later
apprehended by local authorities. Amended Complaint, p. 4,

,r,r 1.1,

,r,r 18-20; Cooks' Answer, pp.

1-2,

1.5; Defendant Stanczak's Answer to Amended Complaint for Declaratory Damages

(filed August 10, 2016) ("Stanczak's Answer"), p, 4, ,r,r 18-20.
4. Chisholm's Arrest Guilty Plea, and Sentence in the Criminal Case
Chisholm was arrested on June 28, 2015, and charged with two counts: Aggravated
Battery, pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-907 (Count I); and Use of a Deadly Weapon in
Commission of a Felony (Count II), pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2520, in Bonner County Case
CR-2015-0003326, State of Idaho v. Michael Jesse Chisholm ("Chisholm Criminal Case").

Declaration of Benjamin C. Ritchie ("Ritchie Deel."), p. 2,

,r 2, and Ex. A.

Idaho Code § 18-907

provides: "(1) A person commits aggravated battery who, in committing battery: (a) Causes
great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement; or (b) Uses a deadly
weapon or instrument; ... " LC.§ 18-907. Idaho Code§ 18-903 provides:
A battery is any: (a) Willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the
person of another; or (b) Actual, intentional and unlawful touching or striking of
another person against the will of the other; or (c) Unlawfully and intentionally
causing bodily harm to an individual.
LC.§ 18-903 (emphasis supplied). Idaho Code§ 19-2520 allows for an extended sentence when
aggravated battery is committed with the use of a firearm or deadly weapon.
Chisholm entered and executed an "Acknowledgment of Alford Plea" in the Chisholm
Criminal Case on January 5, 2016, which this Court accepted, and which stated, in part:
1.
I understand that a defendant may plead guilty to a felony charge, even
though he/she claims to be innocent of the charge, or does not admit to all of the
elements of such charge. This is known as a North Carolina v. Alford guilty plea.
2.
In order for the court to accept a guilty plea, pursuant to the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), I
understand that the Court must make the following findings:
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a.
That there exists a strong factual basis to support the guilty plea;
b.
That the defendant's guilty plea is voluntarily, knowingly and
understandingly made;

3.
When the Court accepts a guilty plea, pursuant to North Carolina v.
Alford, a defendant must understand that the Court will treat the defendant
as though he/she were in fact guilty of all the elements of such felony offense.
The Court will not accept a guilty plea, pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford,
unless the court record reflects that the guilty plea was voluntary, and was also an
intelligent choice among the alternatives available to the defendant.

Ritchie Deel., p. 2,

,r 3, and Ex. B (emphasis supplied).

Chisholm also executed a Guilty Plea Advisory Form in the Chisholm Criminal Case that
informed him of his constitutional rights. Ritchie Deel., p. 2, ,r 4, and Ex. C. At the plea hearing,
Chisholm acknowledged that he understood the plea offer from the State of Idaho and that he
was giving up his right to appeal his conviction. Id., p. 2,
("Mayne Deel."), p. 2,

,r,r 4-5, and Ex. A, pp. 3-4.

,r 5; Declaration o.f Barbara E.

Mayne

A sentencing hearing was held for Chisholm

on March 8, 2016, as a result of the guilty plea. Ritchie Deel., p. 2,

,r 5; Mayne

Deel., p. 2,

,r,r

4, 6, and Ex. B. Before imposing sentence, the Court made the following comments:
And really, I don't know that the word is a Jekyll and Hyde, but it's
Mr. Chisholm, in some ways you are two different people. I note that everyone
that came into this courtroom is in support of you. And you, since you've lived in
this county, you have given a lot to the community .... It is concerning to the
Court that you, though, that people have to realize too, though, that your whole
life was built on a lie. You are not 66. You were born in 1952. You used a
number of different aliases.... But you have two children. One that you
abandoned as an infant and never paid, from the Court. And the child has no
relationship with you. Never supported that child. Your son thought you were
dead and just recently discovered after 30 years that his father was actually alive.
You didn't support either of your children. Three marriages. You were declared
dead by your family. So those are the kinds of things I'm trying to balance. It is
hard for the Court to understand. But you did come here and make a better life.
And start giving back to the community. It is concerning that I've read letters
about your great military service and PTSD and - because none of that is true.
You have to, you know, you kind of built this fantasy life that you have. That you
were a Vietnam vet and you're not a Vietnam vet. [inaudible] I get the person is a
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member of the military service. I take very seriously somebody claiming that
they were when they're not. Those kinds of things.
So then, that, the problem is you don't tell the truth. So like it is hard for me to
give much truth to what you say happened that night .... You were all
drinking.... But the victim didn't have a gun. And you shot him twice and
the shot, the wound is to the back. Let's be clear about that. It's not to the
front. And then, as Mr. Taylor said, if you are in an altercation and are fearful
and you shoot someone, you don't hop in your pickup truck with two loaded
weapons and take off. Wreck your truck. Go two miles out in the woods, hide,
and when the police were looking for you. I'm glad there was a dog. Because
from their perspective in reading the reports, you, they thought you were in a
shooting stance. You had the weapons next to you fully loaded. There was a
bullet in the firing position. And that, and you, the drug, the dog attacked you.
But I'm afraid you could have shot an officer or an officer could have shot you.
That's not what we're, what I'm judging. But that's what the facts show the
Court. So, all this is very concerning.
And that's what I'm trying to balance. In this case this Court cannot say that it
is all right to shoot a person and to flee and to be tracked by the police and that
you get probation. That doesn't deter you or anyone else from shooting a person.
That - you have to take responsibility. Mr., for all you know Mr. Stanczak was
dead. Because you shot him and ran. And luckily medical got there and he did
not die. Or you would be charged with murder. So there have to be
consequences. And that's what this Court has to balance. That's my job.
Mayne Deel., Ex. 8, pp. 22-23 (emphasis supplied).
Lastly, this Court entered a "Felony Judgment (Sentence Imposed)" on March 8, 2016, in
the Chisholm Criminal Case, convicting Chisholm of felony Aggravated Battery. Ritchie Deel.
p. 2,

,r 6,

and Ex. D. Chisholm was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two years fixed,

eight years indeterminate, for a total unified sentence of 10 years. Ritchie Deel., Ex. D, pp. 1-2.
5. Stanczak s Insurance Claim and Farm Bureau's Response
Stanczak obtained counsel to assert various claims against Chisholm, the Cooks and
Farm Bureau for his injuries and damages arising from the shooting. On February 1, 2016,
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Stanczak, through his counsel, made a demand (by letter) on Farm Bureau for damages under the
Policy arising out of the June 28, 2015, shooting. Ritchie Deel. p. 2, ,r 7, and Ex. E. 2
On March 2, 2016, Farm Bureau sent a letter to the Cooks denying coverage for the claim
made by Stanczak. Amended Complaint, p. 5, ,r 25, and Ex. B; Cooks' Answer p. 1, ,r 1.1. Farm
Bureau analyzed the potential coverage under Section II Liability Coverage, including Bodily
Injury Liability (Coverage Fl) and Premises Medical (Coverage F2) of the Policy. Farm Bureau
made the following conclusions: neither Chisholm nor Stanczak were "insureds" under the
Policy; no "occurrence" occmred under the Policy; even if Chisholm was an insured under the
Policy and an occurrence occurred, the business activities, intentional acts, and criminal acts
exceptions to coverage preclude coverage for Stanczak's injuries; and no other provision in the
Policy afforded coverage for Stanczak's injuries. Farm Bureau noted that the claim was still
under investigation; that it was reserving its rights under the Policy to deny coverage; and that it
welcomed any additional information from the Cooks about the claim. Amended Complaint,
Ex. B. No further information was provided by the Cooks. On March 22, 2016, Farm Bureau
sent another letter to the Cooks, stating that it had completed its investigation and advising the
Cooks that it was denying the claim relating to the Chisholm shooting on the grounds set forth in
its March 2, 2016, letter. Amended Complaint, p. 5, ,r 25, and Ex. C; Cooks' Answer, p. 1, ,r 1.1.
6. Stanczak's Lawsuit and Farm Bureau s Response
On May 12, 2016, Stanczak filed a Complaint for Damages against Chisholm and the
Cooks for his injuries and damages arising from the June 28, 2015, shooting ("Stanczak
Complaint" or "Stanczak Tort Action"). 3

Stanczak alleges premises liability and negligent

2

The Court has ruled Defendant Stanczyk's Motion to Strike Exhibit E, and all references to the contents thereof, to
be moot. It is an undisputed fact that a demand letter was sent on February 1, 2016; however, the Court did not
consider the contents of the demand letter in rendering a decision on Farm Bureau's summary judgment motion.
3
Bonner County Case CV-2016-0000679.
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supervision against the Cooks, 4 and strict liability, as well as negligent, reckless, and tortious
conduct against Chisholm. In the Stanczak Complaint, Stanczak alleges that Chisholm was the
employee and/or agent of the Cooks. Amended Complaint, pp. 5-6,

,r 26,

and Ex. E; Cooks '

Answer, p. 1, ,r 1.1. The Cooks tendered defense of the Stanczak Tort Action to Farm Bureau.
On June 2, 2016, Farm Bureau sent additional correspondence to the Cooks, addressing
whether there might be coverage for the allegations contained in the Stanczak Complaint.

Amended Complaint, p. 5,

,r 25,

and Ex. D; Cooks' Answer, p. 1,

,r 1.1.

Once again, Farm

Bureau found no coverage for the allegations contained in the Stanczak Complaint, citing the
same grounds outlined in its prior denials of coverage. Amended Complaint, Ex. D
On June 7, 2016, Stanczak filed a First Amended Complaint for Damages against
Chisholm and the Cooks 5 ("Amended Stanczak Complaint") in the Stanczak Tort Action.

Ritchie Deel. , p . 3,

,r 8, and Ex. F.

The Amended Stanczak Complaint deletes references to the

Bloom Lake Property as a "for-profit" enterprise.

The Amended Stanczak Complaint also

modifies its references to Chisholm to an "agent" of the Cooks and not an "agent and/or
employee." Ritchie Deel., Ex. F. On August 22, 2016, Farm Bureau sent a letter to the Cooks'
counsel denying coverage for the allegations contained in the Amended Stanczak Complaint.

Ritchie Deel., p. 3,

,r 9,

and Ex. G. Farm Bureau stated that the modified allegations failed to

alter the coverage opinion previously given to the Cooks by Farm Bureau. Ritchie Deel., Ex. G.

7. Farm Blll'eau

Action for Declaratory Judgment

Farm Bureau originally filed its Complaint for Declaratory Judgment on May 2, 2016,
but upon receipt of the Stanczak Complaint, Farm Bureau filed an Amended Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment on June 3, 2016, requesting a declaration that: (1) there is no coverage

4

5

Cooks are named individually, as husband and wife, and d/b/a Bloom Lake Campground.
Cooks are named individually, as husband and wife, and d/b/a Bloom Lake Campground.
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under the Policy for Stanczak' s claimed injuries or damages sustained from the June 28, 2015,
shooting, as outlined in the Stanczak Tort Action; and (2) Farm Bureau has no duty to defend the
Cooks against the claims made in the Stanczak Tort Action. Amended Complaint, p . 7, ,i,i 33-34.
The Cooks filed an "Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim" on August 10,
2016. The Cooks have asserted Breach of Contract and Declaration of Coverage counterclaims,
alleging that Farm Bureau breached the Policy by failing to provide coverage for the claims
asserted in the Stanczak Tort Action, and seeking a declaration of coverage for the defense or
indemnity of the claims made therein. Stanczak filed his Answer on August 10, 2016.
C. Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and the Cooks'
counterclaims are dismissed.

In Andrae v. Idaho Counties Risk Management Program Underwriters, 145 Idaho 33,
175 P.3d 195 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
Insurance policies are contracts, and "the parties' rights and remedies are
primarily established within the four comers of the policy." Featherston By and
Through Featherston v. Allstate Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 840, 843 , 875 P.2d 937, 940
(1994). Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law upon which this
Court exercises free review. Martinez v. Idaho Counties Reciprocal Mgmt.
Program, 134 Idaho 247, 250, 999 P.2d 902, 905 (2000). Like other contracts,
insurance policies "are to be construed as a whole and the courts will look to the
plain meaning and ordinary sense in which words are used in a policy." Miller v.
Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 108 Idaho 896, 899, 702 P.2d 1356, 1359 (1985).
Finally, where the "policy language is clear and unambiguous, coverage must
be determined in accordance with the plain meaning of the words used." Mut.
of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 128 Idaho 232, 235, 912 P.2d 119, 122 (1996).
Id. at 36, 175 P.3d at 198 (emphasis supplied). Additionally,

[N]ot every word and phrase in an insurance contract needs to be defined in the
contract. Rather, insurance policies may contain words and phrases that
simply have settled legal meanings or interpretations, and, thus, would not be
ambiguous merely because the policy does not provide a definition.
Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4, 8,843 P.2d 154, 158 (1992) (emphasis supplied).
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The Cooks made an insurance claim to Farm Bureau for policy coverage and defense of
the allegations made against them by Stanczak (in the Stanczak Tort Action) for the injuries and
damages he suffered as a result of being shot by Chisholm. Stanczak alleges that Chisholm was
the Cooks' agent. In determining whether there is a "genuine dispute as to any material fact,"
I.R.C.P. 56(a), the Court shall apply the rules of contract interpretation to the Policy, and shall
liberally construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party resisting the
motion, the Cooks. Applying this standard, the Court finds that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact regarding whether Stanczak's claims against the Cooks are covered under the
Policy: Stanczak's claims against the Cooks are not covered, for the following reasons:
1. There is no coverage under Section II Liability Coverage - Fl (Bodily Injury Liability)

for Stanczak's claims against tJ1e Cooks.
Coverage Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) under the Policy provides coverage to an insured
"[i]f a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for damages because of bodily
injury or property damage, caused by an occurrence." Amended Complaint, Ex. A, Policy, p. 22.
Coverage Fl only applies to a claim brought against an insured under the Policy. Under the
Policy, an "insured" is a person named in the Policy Declarations or "residents of your [the
insured's] household, your spouse, your relatives, and minors in the care of you or your
relatives .... Amended Complaint, Ex. A, Policy, p. 2. The Policy Declarations list only Edgar and
Laurie Cook as insureds. Amended Complaint, Ex. A, Declarations, p. 1. Chisholm is not a
relative of the Cooks who might be considered an additional insured under the Policy, and there
is no definition or other provision in the Policy that would include Chisholm as an insured.
Lastly, to the extent Stanczak has alleged that the Cooks have a "business" related to the Bloom
Lake Property, no such business is insured under the Policy and no employees of such business
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are insured by the Policy.
Furthermore, Fl coverage only applies to "bodily injury or property damage, caused by
an occurrence." Amended Complaint, Ex. A, Policy, p. 22. "Occurrence" is defined in the Policy
as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the same harmful conditions,
which results in unexpected bodily injury or property damage during the policy period. All
bodily injury and property damage resulting from a common cause will be considered the result
of one occurrence." Amended Complaint, Ex. A, Policy, p. 3 (emphasis suuplied). The term
"accident" is not defined in the Policy, but the Idaho Supreme Court has applied the following
definitions to the term "accident":
Accident.
Insurance contract. An accident within accident insurance policies is an event
happening without any human agency, or, if happening through such agency,
an event which, under circumstances, is unusual and not expected by the
person to whom it happens. A more comprehensive term than "negligence,"
and in its common signification the word means an unexpected happening
without intention or design.
Black's Law Dictionary 14 (5th ed. 1979).
ac • ci • dent (ak' si dent), n. l. an undesirable or unfortunate happening,
unintentionally caused and usually resulting in harm, injury, damage, or loss;
casualty; mishap: automobile accidents. 2. any event that happens
unexpectedly, without a deliberate plan or cause ....
Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary 9 (1989).
Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4, 8-9, 843 P.2d 154, 158-159 (1992) (emphasis
supplied).
The Supreme Court in Wilcox, having held "that the word "accident," as used in an
insurance policy such as the two policies in this case, and not otherwise defined in the policy, has
a settled legal meaning or interpretation," id. at 9, 843 P.2d at 159, this Court finds that the
shooting of Stanczak by Chisholm was not an accident because it was not "an unexpected

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 14

412

happening without intention or design." Id. Chisholm has already been found guilty in the
Chisholm Criminal Case of committing battery against Stanczak, meaning "[u]nlawfully and
intentionally causing bodily harm" to Stanczak. I.C. § 18-903(c).
"[W]here the policy language is clear and unambiguous, coverage must be determined in
accordance with the plain meaning of the words used." Andrae v. Idaho Counties Risk

Management Program Underwriters, 145 Idaho 33, 36,175 P.3d 195,198 (2007) (internal
quotations omitted). As a preliminary matter, the Court finds the policy language outlined above
to be clear and unambiguous, and shall thus apply the plain meaning of the words used to
determine coverage. So doing, and liberally construing all facts and drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the Cooks, the Court finds that there is no genuine dispute left for trial that
Chisholm is not an insured under the Policy, and because he is not an insured, he is not entitled
to F 1 coverage under the Policy; and that, even if Chisholm was found to be an insured under the
Policy, there would be no coverage for Stanczak's claims against the Cooks since Chisholm's
commission of an intentional act precludes F 1 coverage because no "occurrence" occurred. 6
2. Idaho case law precludes coverage of tanczak s claims against the Cooks.
The Cooks argue that they are entitled to a defense of the Amended Stanczak Complaint
because they are being sued for their own negligent conduct pursuant to Stanczak's negligent
supervision and premises liability claims, and their alleged negligent conduct constitutes a
covered "occurrence" under the Policy. Specifically, the Cooks' contend that:
While Farm Bureau focuses on the conduct of Mr. Chisholm, and the
shooting, that is not the "occurrence" being alleged against the Cooks. Instead, it
is the Cooks' conduct in allowing Mr. Chisholm to reside at the cabin that
underscores their alleged liability; such liability is based on claims that the Cooks
knew or failed to discern that an unsafe condition existed on their premises,
6

Based upon the lack of any argument on the issue, the Cooks appear to concede that there is no coverage for
Stanczak's claims against the Cooks under Section II Liability Coverage - F2 (Premises Medical) of the Policy.
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potentially by either knowing of or failing to investigate the presence of
intoxicants or weapons; knowing of or failing to determine Mr. Chisholm's
background or condition; failed to supervise his conduct; and without warning of
or eliminating the presence of potential risk he posed ....

Edgar and Laurie Cook 's Memorandum in Opposition to Farm Bureau 's Motion for Summary
Judgment (filed December 9, 2016), at p. 7.
The Cooks also argue that none of the cited Policy's exclusions apply to them. Stanczak filed a
brief joinder in the Cooks' Opposition and he made no separate legal or factual arguments. 7
There are two Idaho Supreme Court cases directly relevant to the coverage determination
in the case at bar. The first is Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4, 843 P .2d 154 (1992),
the facts of which are as follows:
A. The Underlying Action.
On August 18, 1989, twelve anonymous plaintiffs filed suit against Shirley
Mae Wilcox ("Wilcox"), her ex-husband, the state of Idaho, and ten unnamed
employees of the state of Idaho. In the complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the
Wilcoxes were employed by the state of Idaho at the Child Development Center
and provided respite or foster care through the state of Idaho. In addition,
plaintiffs alleged that "the minor Plaintiffs suffered incidences of repeated sexual
exploitation, sexual molestation, and sexual abuse between May, 1980, and May,
1987, at the said Child Development Center and at the home of Defendants Jay
Wilcox and Shirley Wilcox .... " Further, plaintiffs alleged that "the adult Plaintiffs
were never informed by representatives of the Defendant, State of Idaho, nor by
its Department of Health & Welfare, nor by any of its employees at its Child
Development Center, of the sexual exploitation, sexual molestation, and sexual
abuse of the minor Plaintiffs."
As to Wilcox, plaintiffs alleged that she "was negligent in one or more of the
following:"
a. In failing to report to the law enforcement authorities, the sexual abuse,
exploitation and molestation which occurred at her home by Defendant, Jay
Wilcox, which duty to report is set out in Idaho Code§ 16-1619, Idaho Code;
b. In failing to report to her husband's employer the tendencies and sexual
molestation of other children by her husband, Defendant Jay Wilcox.
c. In failing to warn or provide adequate safety for the minor Plaintiffs herein,
who were brought to her home by her husband, Defendant Jay Wilcox,
knowing the sexual propensities of her husband, Defendant Jay Wilcox.
7

See Defendant Stanczak 's Response in Opposition to Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho's
Motion for Summa,y Judgment (filed December 7, 2016).
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Plaintiffs prayed for their economic and non-economic losses against Wilcox,
reasonable attorney fees, and costs and disbursements.
B. The Declaratory Action.
On June 25, 1990, Enumclaw filed a complaint for declaratory judgment.
In the complaint, Enumclaw alleged that it was not liable under the policy of
insurance issued to Wilcox with respect to the claims made against her by the
twelve anonymous plaintiffs. Specifically, Enumclaw stated that it denied
liability because "it appears that the basis of the claims against Shirley
Wilcox, are not an accident or 'occurrence' as set out in the terms of the
insurance policy.... " Enumclaw attached an insurance policy to its complaint,
which it alleged was "in effect during all times relevant to the matters contained
in this complaint."
On July 9, 1990, Enumclaw filed an amended complaint for declaratory
judgment. In the amended complaint, Enumclaw added that the insurance
policy did not provide coverage pursuant to an exclusion relating to
intentional conduct, because Wilcox's ex-husband's acts were intentional and
Wilcox's failure to report was also intentional.
On March 6, 1991, Enumclaw filed a motion for summary judgment. ...
Argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment was heard on May 8,
1991. The district court issued its memorandum decision on June 5, 1991, its
order denying Enumclaw's motion and granting the Wilcox/intervenor motion for
summary judgment on June 9, 1991, and summary judgment dated June 10, 1991.
The district court first addressed Enumclaw's motion for summary judgment.
As to the contention that Wilcox's conduct did not constitute an "occurrence,"
which the Wilcox Policy defines as "an accident ... ," the court noted that the
Wilcox Policy did not define the term "accident," and, thus, the term is "unclear,
and therefore ambiguous from the language of the policy itself.. .. " Since an
ambiguity in an insurance contract must be resolved in favor of the insured, the
district court reasoned, the court adopted the broad definition of "accident" given
in Penley v. Gulf Ins. Co., 414 P.2d 305, 308 (Okla.1966), which the district court
stated as: "an injury is the result of an 'accident' if it is not caused by intentional
conduct."
The second question was whether Wilcox's "alleged misconduct in the
underlying case was intentional. If it was, then [the Wilcox] [P]olicy provides no
liability coverage. On the other hand, if it was not, then coverage exists." In this
regard, the district court specifically distinguished between Wilcox's conduct
and her ex-husband's conduct-"it is her acts or omissions, and not those of
her husband, which must be scrutinized in order to determine whether they
constitute an 'accident' within the meaning of [the Wilcox] [P]olicy."
(Emphasis added.) The court stated that "[w]hile it may be that [Wilcox]
intentionally decided not to report or warn of her husband's misconduct, that
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decision constituted nothing more than a mistake or an error in judgment. There is
no evidence whatsoever to suggest that she intentionally harmed anyone." Thus,
the district court found that Wilcox's conduct constituted an "occurrence" within
the meaning of the Wilcox Policy.
The district court then addressed the policy exclusions relating to the wilful
violation of a law or ordinance by the insured and expected or intended injury. As
to the wilful violation of a law exclusion, the court found that since this exclusion
was not in the Wilcox Policy, but only in the Enumclaw Policy, it would not be
considered. As to the expected or intended injury exclusion, the court found that
there was no evidence that Wilcox expected or intended to injure anyone. In
addition, the court stated that "[w]hile it may be argued that [Wilcox's] failure to
report or warn of her husband's sexual misconduct could foreseeably result in
injury to the minor plaintiffs in the underlying action, in this court's view
foreseeability does not amount to an expectation of or an intent to cause injury,"
citing Farmers Ins. Group v. Sessions. 100 Idaho 914,607 P.2d 422 (1980).
The court then reviewed the business pursuits exclusion of the Wilcox Policy.
In this regard, the court followed the rationale of Farmers Ins. Exchange v.
Sipple, 255 N.W.2d 373 (Minn.1977), and found that "the acts of molesting the
children were not acts that contributed, or furthered the interest of, the Wilcox
business." Thus, the court ruled that the business pursuits exclusion does not bar
coverage for Wilcox as to those children who may have been molested at the
Child Development Center by her ex-husband since Wilcox was not engaged in
any business pursuit.
As to the children who may have been molested at the Wilcox home while
Wilcox and her ex-husband were providing respite or foster care for them, the
district court turned to the definition of "business pursuits" given in Black v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 449, 767 P.2d 824 (Ct.App.1989). With this
definition in mind, the court concluded that Wilcox's "activities in providing
respite or foster care did not constitute a business." Particularly, the court found
that Wilcox and her ex-husband "provided respite and foster care primarily for
humanitarian reasons, and not for commercialism or profit," that the activities
were "performed intermittently and not on a regular basis," and that "any
compensation received for such care was equalled or exceeded by the expenses
involved."
Initially, the district court concluded that the provision of the Wilcox Policy
regarding the scope of coverage (the "occurrence" and "accident" provision) was
"substantially the same" as the provision in the Enumclaw Policy. The court then
found that the exclusion regarding a wilful violation of the law did not apply to
Wilcox's conduct because only her ex-husband violated the law and because
Enumclaw had not alleged that her ex-husband's conduct is imputed to Wilcox.
Finally, the district court found that the business pursuits exclusion of the Wilcox
Policy was substantially the same as that in the Enumclaw Policy, and, thus,
inapplicable. The court granted the Wilcox/intervenor motion for summary
judgment.
Enumclaw filed a notice of appeal on June 26, 1991 ....
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123 Idaho at 4-7, 843 P.2d at 154-157 (emphasis m bold supplied) (emphasis m italics m
original).
The district court's analysis in Wilcox is identical to the arguments made by the Cooks in
this case, to-wit: (1) whether or not there is coverage has to be viewed from the Cooks' position,
not Chisholm's; (2) the Court has to distinguish between the claims Stanczak asserts against the
Cooks versus the claims asserted against Chisholm for this coverage determination; and (3) that
what the Cooks are alleged to have done is an "accident" from their perspective as they never
committed an intentional act nor meant to cause harm to Stanczak. Unfortunately for the Cooks,
the Idaho Supreme Court rejected Mrs. Wilcox's claims for coverage in that case and rejected the
district court's attempt to separate the claims asserted against Mrs. Wilcox from the claims
asserted against Mr. Wilcox, the tortfeasor.

Rather, the Idaho Supreme Court found in the

Wilcox case that despite the separate allegations against Mrs. Wilcox and her specific conduct,

there still was no "occurrence" under Mrs. Wilcox's homeowners' insurance policy because it
was not her conduct which caused the injury, but rather, the conduct of her ex-husband. As a
result, the Supreme Court reversed the district court and held there was no "occurrence" under
the policies in question and that the insurance company owed no duty to defend its policyholder,
Mrs. Wilcox, for the claims asserted against her by the 12 abuse victims; and so ruling, the
Supreme Court did not even reach the application of the intentional act exclusion.
The Supreme Court's in Wilcox set forth the following analysis:
The Enumclaw Policy defines "occurrence" as "an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially similar conditions." The Wilcox
Policy defines "occurrence" as "an accident, including injurious exposure to
conditions, which results, during the policy term, in bodily injury or property
damage." The district court found the term ''accident" to be ambiguous, and
resolved the ambiguity by adopting a definition of "accident" found in an
Oklahoma case, Penley v. Gulf Ins. Co., 414 P.2d 305 (Okla.1966). The district
court stated the definition given in Penley as: "an injury is the result of an
'accident' if it is not caused by intentional conduct." It adopted this definition of
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"accident" from Penley because it reasoned that rules of construction required it
to give the word a broad definition since the policies left it undefined. We
disagree with the reasoning of the district court as well as its adopted definition of
"accident."
In Stein-McMurray Ins. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 818, 820, 520 P.2d
865, 867 (1974), this Court stated:
[W]here a word or phrase used in an insurance contract has a settled legal
meaning or interpretation, that meaning or interpretation must be given even
though other interpretations are possible.
In other words, not every word and phrase in an insurance contract needs to be
defined in the contract. Rather, insurance policies may contain words and phrases
that simply have settled legal meanings or interpretations, and, thus, would not be
ambiguous merely because the policy does not provide a definition.
In this case, both parties have cited a number of definitions for the word
"accident," including Couch on Insurance, Webster's New World Dictionary,
Black's Law Dictionary, and cases from other jurisdictions. All of these
definitions, with the exception of the Penley definition, are not mutually
exclusive. In fact, the definitions cited by the parties say essentially the same
thing.
Accident.

Insurance contract. An accident within accident insurance policies is an event
happening without any human agency, or, if happening through such agency,
an event which, under circumstances, is unusual and not expected by the
person to whom it happens. A more comprehensive term than "negligence,"
and in its common signification the word means an unexpected happening
without intention or design.
Black's Law Dictionary 14 (5th ed. 1979).
ac • ci • dent (ak' si dent), n. 1. an undesirable or unfortunate happening,
unintentionally caused and usually resulting in harm, injury, damage, or loss;
casualty; mishap: automobile accidents. 2. any event that happens
unexpectedly, without a deliberate plan or cause ....
Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary 9 (1989).
We hold that the word "accident," as used in an insurance policy such as the
two policies in this case, and not otherwise defined in the policy, has a settled
legal meaning or interpretation.
With this definition in mind, we tum to the alleged acts of Wilcox. It is her
conduct that we must look to, and not to her ex-husband's conduct, because she is
the only one whose acts could be covered by the policy in question. The twelve
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anonymous plaintiffs in the underlying action have alleged that Wilcox was
negligent in failing to report or warn the proper authorities of the child
molestation perpetrated upon minors by her ex-husband. Her alleged
conduct is the failing to report or warn, while her ex-husband's conduct is
the child molestation, which is intentional conduct and, thus, clearly not an
"occurrence."
Looking to Wilcox's alleged conduct, we find that it is not an
"occurrence" under the policies because it was not the conduct which caused
injury. The injury suffered by the minors is child molestation. While the acts
or failure to act by Wilcox may have created or contributed to the
environment which permitted her ex-husband's conduct, Wilcox did not
commit the acts complained of by the twelve anonymous plaintiffs.
Therefore, the Enumclaw Policy and the Wilcox Policy do not provide
coverage for Wilcox.
Because we hold that the policy in question does not afford coverage for
Wilcox, it is unnecessary to consider the policy exclusions, the issue relating to
whether the intervenors were parties entitled to attorney fees pursuant to LC. §
41-183 9, and whether the district court could proceed on the Wilcox/intervenor
motion for summary judgment if it found no "substantial and material difference"
between the insurance policies. Further, the district court's award of attorney fees
is vacated.
The decision of the district court is reversed.

Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 8-9, 843 P.2d 158-159 (emphasis in bold supplied)
(emphasis in italics in original).
Later, the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed its Wilcox holding in State Farm Fire and

Cas. Co. v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693, 946 P.2d 1333 (1997), the facts of which are as follows :
John and Jane Doe operated a day care business in their residence in Boise
from 1973 through August 1991. The facility operated under both city and state
licenses authorizing care for up to twelve (12) children per day. The three yearold daughter of Jane and John Roe attended the day care from March 1988 to July
1991. She was never at the residence other than as a client of the day care.
The Does' thirteen year-old son helped out at the day care. He acknowledged
that sexual conduct with the Roes' daughter occurred in the downstairs bathroom
of the facility between late 1990 and July 1991. The Does' son told the Roes'
daughter that a "green monster" would get her if she told anyone. In July 1991 she
told her mother what had happened to her at the day care. State Farm Fire and
Casualty Company (State Farm) insured the Does under succeeding homeowners
and umbrella insurance policies ....
The Roes brought suit against the Does alleging the legal theories of
assault, breach of contract, negligent entrustment, negligent supervision,
negligent misrepresentation, negligent failure to notify a business invitee of a
dangerous condition, failure to report child abuse under section 16-1619 of
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the Idaho Code and civil claims for commission of a criminal act of lewd
conduct, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, or injury to a child (I.C. Section 61701 ). State Farm provided a defense for this action under a reservation of
rights. The Roes' action was grounded on the sexual abuse of their daughter
and the alleged accompanying failure of John and Jane Doe to identify and to
prevent their son's conduct.
State Farm brought this declaratory judgment action seeking a
determination that the sexual abuse is outside its policy coverage, asserting
that the policies do not obligate it to defend or indemnify the Does against the
allegations and claims in the Roes' action. The Roes petitioned to intervene in
the action, alleging that the Does did not have sufficient assets to cover the cost of
defense or pay any judgment.
The district court granted summary judgment for State Farm, relying on
Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4,843 P.2d 154 (1992). The district
court held that the sexual abuse was not an "accident" or "occurrence"
under the policy. The court cited Wilcox for the legal definition of "accident"
as it is used in insurance policies:
An accident within accident insurance policies is an event happening without
any human agency, or if happening through such an agency, an event which,
under the circumstances, is unusual and not expected by the person to whom it
happens. A more comprehensive term than "negligence", and in its common
signification the word means an unexpected happening without intention or
design.
n. I. an undesirable or unfortunate happening, unintentionally caused and
usually resulting in harm, injury, damage, or loss; casualty; mishap;
automobile accidents. 2. An event that happens unexpectedly, without a
deliberate plan or cause ...
Memorandum and Order Granting Amended Motion for Summary Judgment
(citing Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159 (1992) (citations omitted)). The
district court referred to the conduct as "intentional acts of sexual abuse" and
analogous to the conduct of Mr. Wilcox in Wilcox.
The district court also held, on alternative grounds, that the defense and
indemnification of the Does were excluded under the Business Pursuits Exclusion
of the homeowners policies, the Business Operations Exclusion of the umbrella
policy and the Child Care Services Exclusion applicable to all the policies.
130 Idaho at 693-694, 946 P.2d at 1333-1334 (emphasis supplied).
Like Stanczak, the injured plaintiffs in Doe asserted independent negligence claims
against the insured parents, John and Jane Doe, for negligent entrustment, negligent supervision,
negligent failure to notify a business invitee of a dangerous condition, etc. despite the fact that
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the actual criminal conduct was committed by their son.

The Idaho Supreme Court in Doe

affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to State Farm, finding that no
"occurrence" occurred under the Does' homeowners' insurance policy despite the fact that
separate and independent negligence claims were brought against the insured parents. The
Supreme Court focused on the actual events that caused the damage to the Roes, not just the
causes of action asserted against the insureds. Because the damage to the Roes was caused not
by the negligent acts of the parents, but by the actions of their son, the Supreme Court found
there was no "occurrence" under the policy, and once again, did not even reach the question of
the applicability of other policy exclusions. The Supreme Court's analysis in Doe is as follows:
Under the coverage provision of the State Farm homeowner policy there
is liability coverage for an insured when a claim is made or suit is brought
against an insured based on an "occurrence." The policy defines an
"occurrence" as an accident, including exposure to conditions, which result in
bodily injury or property damage. Under the umbrella liability policy, coverage is
provided if the insured is legally obligated to pay damages for a "loss." The
policy defines "loss" as an accident that results in personal injury or property
damage. Each policy limits liability coverage to "accidents;" however, the
policies do not set forth definitions for "accident."
Whether an insured acted wilfully, intentionally or maliciously, relieving
the insurer of liability under the policy, is a factual determination. Farmers
Ins. Group v. Sessions, 100 Idaho 914,607 P.2d 422 (1980). The absence of such
a determination precludes summary judgment for the insurer. Id. In this case
the district court found that the conduct in issue constituted "intentional acts
of sexual abuse" and was not an "accident" or "occurrence" under the
applicable policies.
This Court defined "accident" in Wilcox, noting that, "[w]here a word or
phrase used in an insurance contract has a settled legal meaning or interpretation,
that meaning or interpretation must be given even though other interpretations are
possible." 123 Idaho at 8, 843 P.2d at 158 (1992) (quoting Stein-McMurray Ins.
Inc. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 818, 820, 520 P.2d 865, 867 (1974)); see also
City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 201, 899 P.2d 411, 414
(1995). Insurance policies may contain words that have settled legal meanings or
interpretations and are not ambiguous merely because the policy does not contain
a definition. Id. at 8, 843 P.2d at 158.
The Wilcox Court referred to the following two definitions of "accident" as the
"settled legal meaning or interpretation:"
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Accident.
Insurance contract. An accident within accident insurance policies is an event
happening without any human agency, or, if happening through such agency,
an event which, under circumstances, is unusual and not expected by the
person to whom it happens. A more comprehensive term than "negligence,"
and in its common signification the word means an unexpected happening
without intention or design.
... 1. an undesirable or unfortunate happening, unintentionally caused and
usually resulting in harm, injury, damage, or loss; casualty; mishap:
automobile accidents. 2. any event that happens unexpectedly, without a
deliberate plan or cause ....
123 Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159 (citations omitted). Ms. Wilcox's failure to
report or warn the proper authorities of the child molestation perpetrated
upon minors by her ex-husband was "not an 'occurrence' under the policies
because it was not the conduct which caused injury." Id.
The facts in this case clearly show that the abuser understood the sexual
nature of his conduct as well as its wrongfulness. He threatened the child by
telling her that a "green monster" would get her if she told anyone of his behavior.
The conduct occurred in the downstairs bathroom of the residence in a location
where his conduct would not easily be detected. The Does' son's conduct was
not "without intention or design." Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159. An
accident is an unexpected event which is the result of unintentional conduct or an
intentional act which results in unexpected consequences. The district court
found the facts established "intentional acts of sexual abuse." There is no
other reasonable interpretation of the facts. This intentional conduct, with
consequences that could be expected, cannot be characterized as an accident.
Therefore, there was no "occurrence" within the meaning of the policy.
The policies in question do not afford coverage because there was no
"occurrence." It is unnecessary to consider the Business Pursuits Exclusion of
the homeowners policies, the Business Operations Exclusion of the umbrella
policy and the Child Care Services Exclusion applicable to all of the policies.
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Doe 130 Idaho 695-696, 946 P.2d 1335-1336 (footnotes
omitted) (emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, this Court is compelled to follow the controlling Idaho precedent of

Wilcox and Doe, supra, and in so doing, finds that notwithstanding the types of claims Stanczak
has asserted against the Cooks in the Stanczak Amended Complaint, there is no coverage under
the Policy for those claims, because the conduct that caused Stanczak's injuries was being shot
by Chisholm. Stanczak's injuries were not caused by any alleged failure of the Cooks either "to
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inspect and keep the premises reasonably safe and warn of known dangers" or "to properly
supervise ... Chisholm .... " Ritchie Deel., Ex. F., pp. 4-5, at ,r,r 3.2.2, 3.2.7.
As the Supreme Court makes abundantly clear in Wilcox:
Looking to Wilcox's alleged conduct, we find that it is not an "occurrence"
under the policies because it was not the conduct which caused injury. The injury
suffered by the minors is child molestation. While the acts or failure to act by
Wilcox may have created or contributed to the environment which permitted
her ex-husband's conduct, Wilcox did not commit the acts complained of by
the twelve anonymous plaintiffs. Therefore, the Enumclaw Policy and the
Wilcox Policy do not provide coverage for Wilcox.
Mutual o.f Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159 (emphasis in bold supplied).
So, too, in this case, while the Cooks' acts or failure to act as alleged in the Stanczak Amended
Complaint may have created or contributed to the environment which permitted Chisholm's
conduct, the Cooks did not shoot Stanczak. The shooting of Stanczak by Chisholm was not an
accident. As such, there can be no covered "occurrence" under the Policy, and having found
there was no "occurrence," the Court need not even reach the applicability of other policy
exclusions. Therefore, in light of the clear holdings in Wilcox and Doe, and liberally construing
all facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Cooks, the Court finds that there is
no genuine dispute that Farm Bureau has no duty to defend or provide coverage to the Cooks or
Chisholm for the claims made against them in the Stanczak Amended Complaint.

*****
For all the above reasons, the Court finds that Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted. Accordingly, the Court declares there is no coverage under the Policy for
Stanczak' s claimed injuries or damages sustained from the June 28, 2015, shooting, as outlined
in the Stanczak Tort Action; and Farm Bureau has no duty to defend the Cooks or Chisholm
against the claims made in the Stanczak Tort Action.
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Lastly, with regard to the Cooks' two counterclaims against Farm Bureau for Breach of
Contract and for Declaration of Coverage-without coverage there can be no breach of the
Policy. See Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 180, 45 P.3d 829, 836
(2002) ("Implicit in this instruction is that there must be coverage under the policy for Robinson
to recover on the breach of contract claim, a proposition that cannot be disputed.") Therefore,
the Breach of Contract counterclaim is dismissed; and having declared there is no coverage, the
counterclaim for Declaration of Coverage is also dismissed.
D. Farm Bureau is the prevailing party and is entitled to costs.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(B) provides:
Prevailing Party. In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party
and entitled to costs, the trial court must, in its sound discretion, consider the
final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the
respective parties. The trial court may determine that a party to an action
prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and on so finding may apportion the
costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after
considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action and the resulting
judgment or judgments obtained.
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) (emphasis supplied).
Summary judgment having been granted to Farm Bureau on its declaratory judgment
action, and the Cooks' counterclaims having been dismissed, the Court, in the exercise of its
discretion, finds that Farm Bureau is the prevailing party in this matter.
As the prevailing party, Farm Bureau is entitled to costs as a matter of right under Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(A), (C). Fann Bureau is also entitled under Rule 54(d)(l)(D)
to such discretionary costs that "were necessary and exceptional costs, reasonably incurred, and
should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D).
Costs are awarded against Edgar and Laurie Cook who were claiming coverage under the Policy.
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E. Farm Bureau is not entitled to attorney's fees.

Farm Bureau has requested attorney's fees under Idaho Code §§ 10-1210, 12-121, 12123, and 41-1839 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 57. Amended Complaint, p. 8, ,r 3.
Idaho code§ 41-1839, which governs the allowance of attorney's fees in suits against or
in arbitration with insurers, provides in part:
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of statute to the contrary, this section
and section 12-123, Idaho Code, shall provide the exclusive remedy for the
award of statutory attorney's fees in all actions or arbitrations between
insureds and insurers involving disputes arising under policies of insurance.
Provided, attorney's fees may be awarded by the court when it finds, from
the facts presented to it that a case was brought, pursued or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Section 12-120, Idaho Code,
shall not apply to any actions or arbitrations between insureds and insurers
involving disputes arising under any policy of insurance.
LC. § 41-1839 (emphasis supplied).
The Court finds that Farm Bureau is not eligible for an award of attorney's fees under
Idaho Code§ 41-1839(1). The Court also finds, from the facts presented, that this case was not
brought, pursued or defended by the Cooks frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation
under Idaho Code § 12-123. Having so found, and § 41-1839 and § 12-123 providing the
exclusive remedy for the award of statutory attorney's fees, and Farm Bureau proving no
contractual basis for such an award, the Court finds that Farm Bureau is not entitled to fees.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendant Stanczak's Motion to Strike is MOOT.

2. Plaintiff Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
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3. Judgment is granted in favor of Farm Bureau and against the defendants on Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief. The Cooks' counterclaims for Breach of
Contract and Declaration of Coverage are dismissed.
4. The Court declares there is no coverage under the Cooks' Farm Bureau Insurance Policy
for any and all claims asserted against the Cooks and Chisholm by Stanczak in Bonner
County Case CV-2016-0679; and Farm Bureau has no duty to defend the Cooks or
Chisholm against the claims made against them in Bonner County Case CV-2016-0679.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Farm Bureau shall submit within fourteen (14) days
of the date of this Order, a Memorandum of Costs, itemizing its: (i) costs as a matter of right; and
(ii) discretionary costs, if any, with the showing required by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). The
defendants may object in the time and manner provided in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54.
The Court shall enter a Judgment in accordance with this decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this£!_ day of January, 2017.

~~~~~

Barbara Buchanan
District Judge
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comHY OF BONNER
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2011 JAN 20 PM 2: 56
CLERK DISTRICT COURT

OFPUTY
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

FARM BUREAU INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
v.

EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR. and
LAURIE FRANCES COOK, husband
and wife; and JOSEPH STANCZAK,

Defendants.

)
) Case No. CV 2016-0000590
)
) JUDGMENT
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of
Idaho ("Farm Bureau"), and against Defendants Edgar Cook and Laurie Cook and Joseph
Stanczak, on Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief.
2. Defendants Edgar and Laurie Cook's counterclaims are dismissed.
3. The Court hereby declares that:
a. There is no coverage under Edgar and Laurie Cook's Farm Bureau Insurance
Policy for any and all claims asserted by Joseph Stanczak, in Bonner County Case
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CV-2016-0679, against Edgar and Laurie Cook, individually, as husband and
wife, and d/b/a Bloom Lake Campground, and Michael Chisholm; and
b. Farm Bureau has no duty to defend Edgar and Laurie Cook or Michael Chisholm
against any of the claims made in Bonner County Case CV-2016-0679.
4. Costs are awarded in favor of Farm Bureau, and against Edgar Cook and Laurie Cook,
jointly and severally, in an amount to be determined.

DATED this

Ji)iayofJ,

uary 2017.

Q~

lb u~
h- J~1

,____

Barbara Buchanan
District Judge
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Michael T. Howard
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Wes S. Larsen
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
FARM BUREAU INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAHO,

)

)

Case No. CV 2016-0000590

)

) ORDER SETTLING AMOUNT
)
OF COSTS

Plaintiff,
v.

EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR. and
LAURIE FRANCES COOK, husband
and wife; and JOSEPH STANCZAK,

Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I. INTRODUCTION
On January 20, 2017, this Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order Granting
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, together with a final Judgment, which granted
judgment in favor of Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho ("Farm
Bureau"), and against Defendants Edgar and Laurie Cook ("Cooks") and Joseph Stanczak, in the
above-entitled matter. In the Memorandum Decision and Order, the Court found that:
As the prevailing party, Farm Bureau is entitled to costs as a matter of
right under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(A), (C). Farm Bureau is also
entitled under Rule 54(d)(l)(D) to such discretionary costs that "were necessary
and exceptional costs, reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be
assessed against the adverse party." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). Costs are awarded
against Edgar and Laurie Cook who were claiming coverage under the Policy.

Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, at p. 26.
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On February 2, 2017, Farm Bureau filed its Verified Memorandum of Costs.

On

February 9, 2017, the Cook's Opposition to Farm Bureau's Memorandum of Costs was filed. No
hearing has been requested. WHEREFORE, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(6),
the Court enters this Order settling the dollar amount of costs to be awarded to Farm Bureau.

II. DISCUSSION
Farm Bureau is awarded the filing fee of $221.00 as a cost as a matter of right. However,
the Court finds that it is not reasonable for Farm Bureau to assess against the Cooks the $150 fee
for service of the Amended Complaint and Summons upon the co-defendant, Joseph Stanczak.
Further, Farm Bureau is not entitled to any of its claimed discretionary costs of $1,507.44, for
photocopying/imaging, transcripts, mileage/travel reimbursement, and Westlaw research,
because it failed to show how any of these costs "were necessary and exceptional costs,
reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party."
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). Therefore, Farm Bureau is entitled to costs in the total amount of $221.00

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT costs
are awarded in favor of Farm Bureau, and against Defendants Edgar and Laurie Cook, jointly
and severally, in the amount of $221.00.
The Court shall enter an Amended Judgment in accordance with this decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this

J;j_ d-ay-of__,rs=·=br_u_ry_,2,-· - - - - - - Barbara Buchanan
District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

FARM BUREAU INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAHO,

)

) Case No. CV 2016-0000590
)

) AMENDED JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
v.

EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR. and
LAURIE FRANCES COOK, husband
and wife; and JOSEPH STANCZAK,

Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of

Idaho ("Farm Bureau"), and against Defendants Edgar Cook and Laurie Cook and Joseph
Stanczak, on Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief.
2. Defendants Edgar and Laurie Cook's counterclaims are dismissed.
3. The Court hereby declares that:
a. There is no coverage under Edgar and Laurie Cook's Farm Bureau Insurance
Policy for any and all claims asserted by Joseph Stanczak, in Bonner County Case
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CV-2016-0679, against Edgar and Laurie Cook, individually, as husband and
wife, and d/b/a Bloom Lake Campground, and Michael Chisholm; and
b. Farm Bureau has no duty to defend Edgar and Laurie Cook or Michael Chisholm
against any of the claims made in Bonner County Case CV-2016-0679.
4. Costs are awarded in favor of Farm Bureau, and against Edgar Cook and Laurie Cook,
jointly and severally, in the amount of $221.00.
DATED this ~

day of February\ 20 l

7)?G .

6tQ,~ J'b

Barbara Buchanan
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

(

~Cl,~ Q
""J~.q,ereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed,..p t:if¥ J:lreprHd
this J2f....:::/_ day of January, 2017, to:
James L. Martin
Benjamin C. Ritchie
MOFFA TT, THOMAS, BARRETT,
ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
P.O. Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Michael T. Howard
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, PS
250 Northwest Blvd., Ste. 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Wes S. Larsen
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, PA
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

cil!/Mtc~
eputy Clerk

~
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1

5

MICHAEL T. HOWARD, ISB No. 6128
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, a
Professional Service Corporation
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-2103
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
mth@winstoncashatt.com

6

Attorneys for Defendant Cooks

2
3

4

,. A /, . .
lY

r-_-_

7

8
9

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

10

11

FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMP ANY OF IDAHO,
Case No. CV 2016-0590

12
Plaintiffs/Respondent,

13

NOTICE OF APPEAL
vs.

14

15
16

EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR., and LAURIE
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife; and
JOSEPH STANCZAK,

17
18
19
20

21

22
23
24

25
26

Defendants/ A
TO:

ellants,

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAHO, AND ITS ATTORNEY, JAMES L MARTIN; AND THE CLERK OF
THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Appellants, Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook,

husband and wife and the marital community thereof, appeal against the above named Respondent to the
Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment entered January 20, 2017; and the Memorandum Decision and
Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment entered January 20, 2017, Honorable Barbara
Buchanan presiding.
2.

That Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment and

NOTICE OF APPEAL - PAGE 1

l/t1i~A ri~d41t
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A "'RO=ESSlONAL se::wrcE COR?ORATlON
250 Nortr11eSI Blvd., &.its 206
Co9ur d' Alen,;t ld;;iho 83814
Ph .... ~ · i?I\A; M7_•.nfYl

1

2
3

Order described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable Orders under and pursuant to Appellate Rule 11.
3.

Appellants appeal from the District Court's Order granting Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment on the following basis:

4

a.

5
6
7

8

constitute an "occurrence" under the policy.
4.

No Order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the transcript in

electronic and hard copy:

9

10
11

a.

6.

13

The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in

a.

Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, dated 6/3/2016.

b.

Edgar and Laurie Cook's Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim, dated

14

8/10/16.

15

C.

16

20

Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment, dated 1/20/17.

17

19

No transcript has been requested.

addition to those automatically included under Rule 28 LA.R.:

12

18

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the claims against Cooks did not

d.

Judgment dated, 1/20/17.

7.

The appellant request NO exhibits.

8.

I certify:
(a)

21

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:

22
Kathy Plizga, Court Reporter
Bonner County Courthouse
215 S. 1st Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83 864

23
24

25
26

(b)

That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the Reporter's transcript.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - PAGE 2
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A "'RO~ESSiONAL SE"IV!CE COR;>QRATiQr,.
250 NorttlWeet Blvd. &.rte 206
Cosur d'Alene.

,daha B3814

1

(c)

2
3
4

paid.
(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to

5

6

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record has been

Idaho Appellate Rule 20.
DATED this

Z-K:' day of

7

,-4'£:::) , 2017.

8

MIC
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, a Professional
Service Corporation
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

9

10
11

12
13

14

15

16
17
18
19

20

21

22
23
24

25

26
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A "'RO;:ESSlONAl SE~\/lCE CORPORATrn,

250 Northwest Blvd. SJite 206
Coeur d'Alene. Idaho 83814
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1
2
3

4

5
6
7

I hereby certify that I caused a true and
complete copy of the foregoing to be D mailed,
postage prepaid; D hand <letim ~ sent
via facsimile on the £a.ay o
,·v ~ 2017, to:
James L. Martin
Moffatt Thomas
P.O. Box 829
Boise, ID 83701-0829
Fax: 208/385-5384

8
9

10
11

12
13

14

Wes S. Larsen
James Vernon & Weeks, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Fax: 208/664/1684
Kathy Plizga
Court Reporter
Bonner County Courthouse
215 S. First Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83 864

5-<A-+
i).5.

l/ .- ~

r-1~,.,J

15
16
17

MI~

T. HOWARD

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
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A ;,ROFESSiONAL SERVICE CORPORATION
2--50 Norcw1sz1 Blvd" Suite 200
Coeur d'Alene. k!aho 83814
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STATE OF IDAMO
CDU~.JT~( OF BJJHNER
FfRST JUOiC!;\L D!STRlCT

2011 JMl 20 PM 2: 56

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

FARM BUREAU INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAH07

Plaintiff,
v.
EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR. and
LAURIE FRANCES COOK, husband
and wife; and JOSEPH STANCZAK,

Defendants.

)
) Case No. CV 2016-0000590
)
) JUDGMENT
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
I. Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of

Idaho (""Farm Bureau"). and against Defendants Edgar Cook and Laurie Cook and Joseph
Stanczak, on Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief.
2. Defendants Edgar and Laurie Cook's counterclaims are dismissed.
3. The Court hereby declares that:
a. There is no coverage under Edgar and Laurie Cook's Fann Bureau Insurance
Policy for any and all claims asserted by Joseph Stanczak, in Bonner County Case

JUDGMENT-I

439

CV-2016-0679, against Edgar and Laurie Coo~ individually, as husband and
wife, and d/b/a Bloom Lake Campground, and Michael Chisholm; and
b. Fann Bureau has no duty to defend Edgar and Laurie Cook or Michael Chisholm
against any of the claims made in Bonner County Case CV-2016-0679.
4. Costs are awarded in favor of Farm Bureau, and against Edgar Cook and Laurie Cook,
jointly and severally, in an amount to be determined.
DATED iliis

20ayof

t":C l~- Barbara Buchanan
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

this

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid,
day of January, 2017, to:

-:2_8

James L. Martin
Benjamin C. Ritchie
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT,
ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
P.O. Box 829
Boise, ID 83701
Michael T. Howard
WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS, PS
250 Northwest Blvd., Ste. 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Wes S. Larsen
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, PA
J626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
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James L. Martin. ISB No. 4226
Tyler J. Anderson. ISB No. 6632
Benjamin C. Ritchie. ISB No. 7210
MOFFA IT, THOMAS, BARRETI, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
jlm@moffatt.com
tya@moffatt.com
bcr@moffatt.com
13900.0252
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Company of Idaho

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 1HE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAHO,
PlaintlfflRespondent,
vs.

EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR. and LAURIE
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife, and
JOSEPH STANCZAK.,

Case No. CV-2016-0590
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT'S FARM
BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAHO'S REQUEST
FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS IN
THE CLERK'S RECORD AND
REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT

Defendants/Appellants.

PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT'S FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
OF IDAHO'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS IN THE CLERK'S

RECORD AND REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT- 1

ciient:4373110.1
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COMES NOW, the plaintiff-respondent, Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Company of Idaho, by and through undersigned counsel of record, pursuant to Idaho Appellate
Rule 28(c) and hereby requests that the following additional documents be included in the
appellate record:
•

10/20/2016-Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutua1 Insurance Company ofldaho's
Motion for Summary Judgment;

•

10/20/2016-Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Fann Bureau Mutual
Insurance Company of Idaho's Motion for Summary Judgment;

•

10/20/2016-Declaration of Steven Johnson in Support of Plaintiff Fann
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company ofldaho's Motion for Summary
Judgment with exhibits;

•

10/20/2016 Declaration of Benjamin C. Ritchie In Support of Plaintiff
Fann Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho's Motion for Summary
Judgment with exhibits;

•

10/20/2016-Declaration of Barbara E. Mayne in Support of Plaintiff Fann
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company ofldaho~s Motion for Sununary
Judgment with exhibits;

•

12/07/2016-Defendant Stanczak's Response in Opposition to Plaintiff
Fann Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho's Motion for Summary
Judgment;

•

12/09/2016·Edgar and Laurie Cook's Memorandum in Opposition to Fann
Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment; and

•

12/14/2016-Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho's
Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

•

Pursuant to this Motion, Farm Bureau is likewise seeking to order the transcript
from the hearing on Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment, which occurred on
December 21, 2016 at the Bonner County Courthouse before the Honorable Barbara A.

PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT'S FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
OF IDAHO'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS IN THE CLERK'S
RECORD AND REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT· 2
cnent:431ano.1
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;j

Buchanan at 1:30 p.m. and would request that transcript also be a part of this record on appeal.
A copy of this request is being provided to the Court Reporter as well.

DATED this 8th day of March, 2017.
MOFFATT, TuOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

es L. Martin-Of the Firm
ttom.eys for Plaintiff/Respondent Farm Bureau
utual Insurance Company of Idaho

PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT'S FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
OF IDAHO'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS IN THE CLERK'S

RECORD AND REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT-3

c1ien1:4373110.1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of March, 2017, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT'S FARM BUREAU MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS
IN THE CLERK'S RECORD AND REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT to be served by the
method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Michael T. Howard
WINTON & CASHATT
250 Northwest Blvd., Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121
Attorneys for Edgar and Laurie
Cook

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile

Wes S. Larsen
James, Vernon& Weeks, PA
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684
Attorneysfor Joseph Stanczak

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile

Kathy Plizga
Court Reporter
Bonner County Courthouse
215 S. 1st Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83 864
Facsimile: (208) 263-0896

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile

.

PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT'S FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
OF IDAHO'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS IN THE CLERK'S
c11enu31:mo.1
RECORD AND REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT- 4
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MAILING ADDRESS:

POBox829
Boise ID 83701-0829

MOFFATT
THOMAS

208.34 5.2000
208.385.5384
(208) 3 85-53 27

FAX

Attorney.~ at Law

FACSIMILE
From:
Re:

Pamela E. Buckley
Legal Administrative Assistant to James L. Martin
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho v.
Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr., et al.

Date:

March 8, 2017

File No.:

13900.0252

Number of pages being transmitted including the cover page: 5
Please call fax operator at 208.345.2000 if all pages are not received.

Name

Organization

Fax No.

Voice No.

To:

Bonner County Clerk

First Judicial District

208-263-0896

(208) 265-1432

cc:

Michael T. Howard

Winston & Cashatt
Lawyers, PS

(208) 765-2121

(208) 667-2103

cc:

Wes Larsen

James Vernon & Weeks,

(208) 664-1684

(208) 667-0683

cc:

Kathy Plizga

PA
Bonner County
Courthouse

208-263-0896

Message:

Attached is Plaintiff Respondent's Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho's Request
for Additional Documents in the Clerk's Record and Request for Transcript for filing with the
Court.
Thank you.
PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

The following message constitutes confidential attorney-client information, or other confidential communication.
If you have received this communication in error, do not read it. It is not intended for transmission to, or receipt by,
any unauthorized persons. Please destroy it without copying it, and notify the sender by calling 208 345-2000, so
that our address record can be corrected. Thank you.

Client:4375909.1

BOISE • POCATELLO • IDAHO FALLS
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201 1APR 20 AH II: t..O
CL.El~!-\ DIST RI Cl COURT

FARM BUREAU INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAHO
Plaintiff - Respondent

vs.

EDGAR WILKINS COOK JR. and
LAURIE FRANCES COOK,
Husband and wife
Defendants - Appellants

and
JOSEPH STANCZAK
Defendant

) SUPREME COURT NO. 44897
) BONNER COUNTY NO. CV2016-0590
)
)
) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
) OF EXHIBITS
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I, Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, do hereby certify that the following is offered as the Clerk's
Exhibit on Appeal:
NO EXHIBITS
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court this
.:?.o+l day of 0..,~
J
,2017.

2011 APR 20 AM II: t.O

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF11TA"H1 _P U ~ FARM BUREAU INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAHO
Plaintiff - Respondent

) SUPREME COURT NO. 44897
) BONNER COUNTY NO. CV2016-0590

)
)

) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

vs.

EDGAR WILKINS COOK JR. and
LAURIE FRANCES COOK,
Husband and wife
Defendants - Appellants
and

JOSEPH STANCZAK
Defendant

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I, Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County ofBoMer do certify that the foregoing Record in this cause was
compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete Record of the pleadings
and documents requested by Appellant Rule 28.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court this
dayof ~ /
,2017.

,-QC)it-

Michael W. Rosedale,
Clerk of the District Court

Clerk's Certificate

.. , -,i C Ot iDAHO

::~c,t;:.:T y o:=- BONHER
FIF;'.~ '." .JU'.JlGl/\L O!STRJCT

2011 APR 20 AM II: 40
CLEFd·\ Di STR!GT COURT
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE 6Fil>1\: ~ TY

FARM BUREAU INSURANCE
COMPANY OF IDAHO
Plaintiff - Respondent
vs.

EDGAR WILKINS COOK JR. and
LAURIE FRANCES COOK,
Husband and wife
Defendants - Appellants
and

JOSEPH STANCZAK
Defendant

) SUPREME COURT NO. 44897
) BONNER COUNTY NO. CV2016-0590
)
)
) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
)OF SERVICE
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I, Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, do hereby certify that I have personally served or mailed, by
United Postal Service, one copy of the CLERK'S RECORD to each of the Attorneys of Record in
this cause as follows:
James L. Martin
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields
PO Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
ATTORNEY FOR FARM BUREAU
Michael T. Howard
Winston & Cashatt
250 Northwest Blvd., Suite 206
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 814
ATTORNEY FOR EDGAR AND LAURIE COOK

Wes. S. Larsen
James, Vernon & Weeks
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
ATTORNEY FOR JOSEPH STANCZAK
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court this
/::)dk day of
, 2017.

Q~ /

Certificate of Service

